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
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METHODIST

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

1854.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXVI.—1854.

JANUARY NUMBER.

ARTICLE PAGE

I. STEPHEN OLIN 9

By the Editor.

1. The Life and Letters of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.
2. The Works of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.
3. Travels in Egypt, Arabia Petræa, and the Holy Land. By the Rev. Stephen Olin, D. D.

II. COLERIDGE 34

By the Rev. Dr. Curry, Hartford, Conn.

The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, with an Introductory Essay upon his Philosophical and Theological Opinions. Edited by Professor Shedd.

III. THE SPIRIT AND MISSION OF METHODISM 57

By W. T. Willey, Morgantown, Va.

IV. STROUD'S HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS 77

A New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, comprising a Synopsis and a Diatessaron, together with an Introductory Treatise, and numerous Tables, Indexes, and Diagrams, supplying the necessary proofs and explanations. By William Stroud, M. D.

V. MEMOIRS OF MRS. SETON 83

By A. D.

Life of Mrs. Eliza A. Seton, Foundress and First Superior of the Sisters or Daughters of Charity, in the United States of America; with Copious Extracts from her Writings, and an Historical Sketch of the Sisterhood, from its Foundation to the Present Time. By Rev. Charles I. White, D. D.

VI. NEW THEORY OF PHYSICS 102

By the Rev. R. S. Rust, Lawrence, Mass.

Outlines of a System of Mechanical Philosophy: being a Research into the Laws of Force. By Samuel Elliott Coues.

VII. LAYARD'S SECOND EXPLORATION 113

By the Rev. Dr. Collins, President of Dickinson College.

Discoveries among the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan, and the Desert; being the Result of a Second Expedition, undertaken for the Trustees of the British Museum. By Austen H. Layard, M. P.

ARTICLE PAGE

VIII. HORACE BINNEY WALLACE 132

By the Editor.

Obituary. Horace Binney Wallace.

IX. MISCELLANIES 143

Narrative of a Journey round the Dead Sea and in the Bible Lands, in 1850 and 1851. By F. DE SAULCY, Member of the French Institute. Edited, with Notes, by the Count Edward de Warren.

X. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS 148

1. Sir William Hamilton's Discussions and Philosophy by Wight, p. 148.—2. Grayson's True Theory of Christianity, p. 149.—3. Beecher's Conflict of Ages, p. 150.—4. Bledsoe's Theodicy, p. 150.—5. Homes of the New World, p. 150.—6. The Book of Nature, p. 151.—7. Scotia's Bards, p. 151.—8. Abbeokuta, p. 151.—9. Kirwan's Men and Things in Europe, p. 152.—10. Insurrection in China, p. 152.—11. Hughes's Outlines of Scripture Geography, p. 152.—12. Christian Father's Present, p. 152.—13. Hawks's Peruvian Antiquities, p. 152.—14. Salad for the Solitary, p. 153.—15. Life of Louis XVII., p. 153.—16. Silliman's Visit to Europe, p. 153.—17. Poole's Index, p. 154.—18. De Vere's Outlines of Comparative Philology, p. 154.—19. Spicer on Christian Baptism, p. 154.—20. Jaqueline Pascal, p. 155.—21. Hook's Church Dictionary, p. 155.—22. Addison's Works, p. 155.—23. Life of Dr. Judson, p. 155.—24. Memoir of S. B. Bangs, p. 156.—25. Mr. Rutherford's Children, p. 156.—26. Infant Church Membership, p. 157.—27. Anecdotes of Painters, p. 157.—28. Barnes on Daniel, p. 157.—29. Field's City Architecture, p. 158.—30. Asbury and his Coadjutors, p. 158.—31. West's Analysis of the Bible, p. 158.—32. Rhetoric of Conversation, p. 158.—33. Turner on Romans, p. 159.—34. Hunters of the World, p. 159.—35. Missionary of Kilmany, p. 159.—36. Jimeson on the Articles, p. 160.—37. Malcom's Bible Dictionary, p. 160.—38. Brewer's Guide to Composition, p. 160.—39. Banvard's American Statesman, p. 160.—40. Simms's Egeria, p. 160.—41. The Czar and the Sultan, p. 160.—42. Sketches of Eminent Methodist Ministers, p. 160.

XI. RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE 161

THEOLOGICAL.—European 161

American 166

CLASSICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS.—European 167

APRIL NUMBER.

I. THE CONFLICT OF AGES 169

The Conflict of Ages; or, the Great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Man. By EDWARD BEECHER, D. D.

II. REVIVAL OF THE BLACK ARTS 191

1. The Mountain Cove Journal and Spiritual Harbinger.

2. Rochester Weekly American, Thursday, April 14th, 1853. A Discourse upon the Ancient and Modern Arts of Divination. Delivered in the First Presbyterian Church of Rochester, New-York, Sabbath evening, March 20, 1853, by the Pastor.

3. A Review of the Spiritual Manifestations. By CHARLES BEECHER, Pastor of the First Congregational Church, Newark, New-Jersey.

III. SCIENCE AND REVELATION 213

By the Rev. H. Bannister, D. D., Cazenovia, N. Y.

ARTICLE PAGE

IV. THE POINT OF POWER 228
By the Rev. C. Adams, Lima, N. Y.

V. THE PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW. 244
By the Rev. W. C. Hosmer, Auburn, N. Y.

VI. A THEODICY 263
By the Rev. D. Curry, D. D., Hartford, Conn.

A Theodicy; or, Vindication of the Divine Glory, as manifested in the Constitution and Government of the Moral World. By Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Professor, &c., in the University of Mississippi.

VII. THE GROUND AND METHOD OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE . 287

Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique Philosophique. Par A. A. Cournot, Inspecteur Général de l'Instruction Publique.

VIII. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS 314

1. The Grinnell Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin, p. 314.—2. The Old Brewery, p. 315.—3. The Lost Prince, by J. H. Hanson, p. 315.—4. The Life and Experience of a Converted Infidel, by John Scarlett, p. 315.—5. Hamilton's Memoir of Richard Williams, p. 317.—6. Leu's Warnung von den Neuerungen und Uebertreibungen in der Kathol. Kirche Deutschlands; Grone's Tetzel und Luther; Kleudgen's Die Theologie der Vorzeit vertheidigt, p. 317.—7. Clemens's Die Speculative Theologie A. Günthers und die Kath. Kirchenlehre; Balzer's Neue Theologische Briefe an Dr. A. Günther Ein Gericht für seine Ankläger; Clemens's Die Abweichung der Güntherschen Speculation von der Kathol. Kirchenlehre; Knoodt's Günther und Clemens, p. 319.—8. Mrs. Hale's Liberia, p. 320.—9. Berridge's Christian World Unmasked, p. 320.—10. Maurice's Religions of the World, and their Relations to Christianity, p. 321.—11. Cobb's Philosophy of Faith, p. 321.—12. Elliott's Lectures to Young Men, p. 321.—13. God with Men, by Osgood, p. 321.—14. Maurice's Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament, p. 322.—15. Vinet's Homiletics, p. 322.

IX. RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE. 322

Classical and Miscellaneous.—European 322
Theological.—European 326

JULY NUMBER.

I. THE POSITIVE RELIGION: OR, RELIGION OF HUMANITY 329

1. République Occidentale. Ordre et Progrès. Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme, ou Exposition sommaire de la doctrine philosophique et sociale propre à la grande République Occidentale, composée des cinq populations avancées Française, Italienne, Germanique, Britannique, et Espagnole, toujours solidaires depuis Charlemagne. Par Auguste Comte, Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive.

2. République Occidentale. Ordre et Progrès. Vivre pour autrui. Catéchisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion Universelle, en onze entretiens systématiques entre une Femme et un Prêtre de l'Humanité. Par Auguste Comte, &c.

L'Amour pour principe, L'Ordre pour base, Et le Progrès pour but.

3. Système de Politique Positive, ou Traité de Sociologie, Instituant la Religion de l'Humanité. Par Auguste Comte, &c.

ARTICLE PAGE

II. OUR RELATION TO PUBLIC OPINION 360
By the Rev. E. O. Wines.

III. ENGLISH GRAMMAR 368
By James Strong, Esq., Flushing, L. I.

1. The Grammar of English Grammars, with an Introduction Historical and Critical; the whole methodically arranged and amply illustrated; with Forms of Correcting and of Parsing, Improprieties for Correction, Examples for Parsing, Questions for Examination, Exercises for Writing, Observations for the Advanced Students, Decisions and Proofs for the Settlement of Disputed Points, Occasional Strictures and Defences, an Exhibition of the several Methods of Analysis, and a Key to the Oral Exercises: to which are added Four Appendixes, pertaining separately to the Four Parts of Grammar. By GOULD BROWN, formerly Principal, &c., Author, &c.

2. The English Language. By ROBERT GORDON LATHAM, M. D., F. R. S., &c.

IV. JACQUELINE PASCAL. 393
By L. A. H., New-York.

Jacqueline Pascal: or, a Glimpse of Convent Life at Port-Royal. From the French of M. VICTOR COUSIN, M. PROSPER FAUGERE, M. VINET, and other sources. Translated by H. N. With an Introduction by W. R. WILLIAMS, D. D.

V. BISHOP ASBURY 407
By the Rev. S. W. Coggeshall, Mystic Bridge, Conn.

Journals of the Rev. Francis Asbury, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

VI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION 431
By the Rev. Dr. True, Middletown, Conn.

VII. MISCELLANIES 443

1. Address of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church to the British Conference 443
Reply of the British Conference, 1858 445
2. Horace Binney Wallace 447

VIII. LETTERS ON RECENT FRENCH LITERATURE 454

IX. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS 463

1. Ives's Trials of a Mind, &c., p. 463.—2. Binney's Make the Best of both Worlds, p. 463.—3. Brown's Discourses of Christ, p. 464.—4. Smith's History of Greece, p. 464.—5. Parish Side, p. 464.—6. Summers on Baptism, p. 464.—7. Dixon's Howard, p. 465.—8. Carter's Fireside Series, p. 466.—9. Successful Men, p. 466.—10. Bonar's Eternal Day, p. 466.—11. Lardner's Hand-books, p. 466.—12. Weiss's History of the French Protestant Refugees, p. 466.—13. Remarkable Examples, p. 467.—14. Grayson's Church and Ministry, p. 467.—15. Constitutional Text-Book, p. 467.—16. Dr. Grant and the Mountain Nestorians, p. 468.—17. Vinet's Pastoral Theology, p. 468.—18. The Words of Jesus, p. 468.—19. Jay's Female Characters, p. 468.—20. Vara, p. 468.—21. Guizot's Cromwell, p. 468.—22. Purple Tints of Paris, p. 469.—23. Life of Augustine, p. 469.—24. Miller's Two Records, p. 469.—25. Gurowski's Russia, p. 469.—26. Hill's Infant Baptism, p. 470.—27. Quarles's Emblems,

ARTICLE PAGE

p. 470.—28. Bohn's Libraries, p. 470.—29. Coleman's Historical Text-Book, p. 471.—30. Withered Leaf, p. 471.—31. Mabel Grant, p. 471.—32. The Ballad of Babe Christabel, with other Poems, by Gerald Massey, p. 472.—33. Child's History of England, p. 475.—34. Dietetics of the Soul, p. 475.—35. Orr's Circle of the Sciences, p. 475.—36. Henkle's Life of Bascom, p. 475.—37. Charles Roussel, p. 476.—38. Advanced Latin Exercises, p. 476.—39. Kossuth's Select Speeches, p. 476.—40. Mattison's Checks to Arianism, p. 476.—41. Ryle's Home Truths, p. 477.—42. Talfourd's Miscellanies, p. 477.—43. Hildreth's Despotism in America, p. 477.—44. Schaff's History of the Apostolic Church, p. 477.—45. Sunday-School Books, p. 478.—46. The Neighbour's Children, p. 479.—47. M'Lean's Sketch of Philip Gatch, p. 479.—48. Olmstead's Noah and his Times, p. 479.—49. Family Prayers, p. 479.—50. Tuckerman's Month in England, p. 479.—51. Bohn's Classical Library, p. 480.—52. Harry's Ladder to Learning, p. 480.—53. Chalmers's Correspondence, p. 480.—54. Valentine's New-York, p. 480.—55. Tweedie's Glad Tidings, p. 480.—56. Sir Hudson Lowe's Journal, p. 481.—57. Life of Pierre Toussaint, p. 481.—58. Life of Abernethy, p. 481.—59. Clinton, p. 481.—60. Smith's First Book in Geography, p. 482.—61. Life of Dr. Croswell, p. 482.—62. Davidson's Connexion, p. 482.—63. Osgood's Hearth-Stone, p. 482.—64. Cheever's Bible in Common Schools, p. 482.—65. The Law and the Testimony, p. 482.

X. RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE 483

THEOLOGICAL 483

CLASSICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS 486

OCTOBER NUMBER.

I. THE SIBYLLINE ORACLES 489

1. Die Sibyllinischen Weissagungen, vollständig gesammelt, nach neuer Handschriften-Vergleichung, mit kritischem Commentare und metrischer Deutscher Uebersetzung: herausgegeben von DR. J. H. FRIEDLIEB, Professor an der Universität zu Breslau.

2. De Oraculis Sibyllinis Dissertatio. Supplementum editionis a Friedliebio exhibitæ. Scripsit RICARDUS VOLKMANN, Phil. Dr. Sem. Phil. Reg. Hal. Sod.

3. Oracula Sibyllina. Textu ad Codices Manuscriptos recognito; Maianis supplementis aucto; cum Castalionis versione metrica, innumeris pene locis emendata, et, ubi opus fuit, suppleta; commentario perpetuo, excursibus et indicibus. Curante C. ALEXANDRE. Volumen Prius.

II. PUBLIC PRAYER 526

III. THE CLAIMS OF ROMANISM 533

By the Rev. T. M. Eddy, Indiana.

Delineation of Roman Catholicism, drawn from authentic and acknowledged Standards of the Church of Rome; namely, her Creeds, Catechisms, Decisions of Councils, Papal Bulls, Roman Catholic Writers, the Records of History, etc., etc.; in which the peculiar Doctrines, Morals, Government, and Usages of the Church of Rome are stated, treated at large, and confuted. By REV. CHARLES ELLIOTT, D. D.

ARTICLE PAGE

IV. THE GENUINENESS OF DANIEL 553

By the Rev. H. M. Harman, Baltimore.

1. Dissertations on the Genuineness of Daniel. By Dr. E. W. Hengstenberg, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin.

2. Neue kritische Untersuchungen über das Buch Daniel. Von Heinrich Havernick, der Theologie Doctor, u. s. w.

3. A Commentary and Defence of Daniel.[4] By Moses Stuart.

4. Das Buch Daniel verdeutscht und ausgelegt. Von C. Von Lengerke.

5. A Critical and Historical Introduction to the Canon of the Old Testament. By Wm. M. L. De Wette.

V. BRODHEAD'S HISTORY OF NEW-YORK 578

By the Rev. D. Curry, D. D., New-York.

History of the State of New-York. By John Romeyn Brodhead. First Period, 1609–1664.

VI. FABER ON BAPTISMAL REGENERATION 599

By the Rev. Z. Paddock, D. D., Binghampton, N. Y.

Sermons on the doctrine of Regeneration, according to Scripture and the Church of England. By George Stanley Faber, B. D.

VII. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS 616

1. Knout and the Russians, p. 616.—2. Thomas's Farm Implements, p. 616.—3. Tweedie's Lamp to the Path, p. 617.—4. History of the Protestant Church in Hungary, p. 617.—5. Richard's Life in Judea, p. 617.—6. Gold and the Gospel, p. 617.—7. Plurality of Worlds, p. 617.—8. Daniel a Model for Young Men, p. 618.—9. Recreations of Christopher North, p. 618.—10. Howe's Oriental and Sacred Scenes, p. 618.—11. Utah and the Mormons, p. 618.—12. Memorials of Baptist Martyrs, p. 619.—13. The Master's House, p. 619.—14. The Closet Companion, p. 621.—15. Orator's Touchstone, p. 621.—16. Thoughts and Things at Home and Abroad, p. 621.—17. Popular Account of the Ancient Egyptians, p. 621.—18. Twenty Years in the Philippines, p. 622.—19. Great Truths for Thoughtful Hours, p. 622.—20. The Pastor's Family, p. 623.—21. Tholuck's Guido and Julius, p. 623.—22. Miss Leslie's New Receipts for Cooking, p. 624.—23. Finley's Sketches of Western Methodism, p. 624.—24. Leila Ada, p. 624.—25. Boyhood of Great Men, p. 625.—26. Seven Lamps of Architecture, p. 625.—27. Strong's Greek Harmony of the Gospels, p. 625.—28. Palmoni, p. 626.—29. Mrs. Stowe's Sunny Memories of Foreign Lands, p. 627.—30. Harpers' publications, p. 627.—31. Florence Egerton, p. 628.—32. Bohn's publications, p. 628.—33. Carlton & Phillips's books for juvenile readers, p. 629.—34. Munroe and Company's publications, p. 629.—35. Fruits and Farinacea the proper Food of Man, p. 630.—36. My Schools and Schoolmasters, p. 630.—37. Uncle Sam's Farm Fence, p. 630.—38. Kitto's Daily Bible Illustrations, p. 631.—39. Burgess & Company's School-books, p. 631.—40. Jay's Morning and Evening Exercises, p. 631.—41. Christ and Christianity, p. 631.—42. Lives of the Queens of Scotland and English Princesses, p. 631.—43. Wilson's Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life, p. 632.—44. Standard Methodist Hymn-Book, p. 632.—45. Carlton & Phillips's publications, p. 632.—46. Pamphlets, etc., p. 634.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1854.

ART. I.—STEPHEN OLIN.

1. *The Life and Letters of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. Two vols., 12mo.
2. *The Works of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. Two vols., 12mo.
3. *Travels in Egypt, Arabia Petræa, and the Holy Land.* By the Rev. STEPHEN OLIN, D. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers. Two vols., 8vo.

No biographies are more instructive than those of men of intellect and culture, when made up from their letters, diaries, or private memoranda. The absence of mere incident is no drawback upon the value of such lives. What we want in such a case is the history, not so much of what the man did or suffered, as of what he thought and felt, and how he came so to think and feel. This inner history of a man of genius is not often to be gathered from his published works. These generally exhibit conclusions, not processes; the fruits of the mind, not its growth. The true stamp of a man's moral and intellectual nature is impressed far more strongly upon his free conversations, and upon his open and frank letters to his friends, than upon writings painfully elaborated for the public eye, and guarded upon the right hand and the left against misconception and perversion. In his books the man of genius withholds far more of himself than he reveals.

Such a biography is that whose title heads this article. We are told in the preface that Dr. Olin once expressed his wonder that any one could make arrangements for the preparation of his own memoirs; but in his own long series of letters to friends he was unconsciously writing an autobiography. The book contains nearly two hundred letters, extending over a period of thirty years, and illustrating the development of his moral and intellectual being in a wonderful degree. "They are," to quote words which he himself once used of another, "leaves from his own book—first impressions of his

feelings, and certainly true to the life—a true report from his mind and heart." Besides this wealth of correspondence, the biography is rich in another class of contributions to a knowledge of its subject, namely, sketches of different periods of his life and different phases of his character, from personal observers who had every opportunity of knowing him well, and every capacity to tell what they knew. The value of these contributions is the greater in this case, as Dr. Olin was a man of manifold relations to society and to the world—in the apt language of his biographer, "a man who touched society at many points." In this respect his life differs from most of those in which the annals of Methodism are so rich. They are generally biographies of men and women whose career was limited to a narrow circle, and whose doings and writings are of interest rather to Methodists than to mankind. Not so with Dr. Olin, who was, in the best sense of the phrase, a man of the world, thrown by circumstances into personal relations with men and women of almost every class, and sect, and character, in almost every civilized country. It is a great advantage, and one that contributes greatly to the completeness of the picture of Dr. Olin, afforded in these volumes, that men in different spheres of life and action, to whom he must of necessity have shown himself in varied lights, bring their several impressions together to show us the man as he was—*teres atque rotundus.* The editor of the biography shows admirable taste and skill in the arrangement and combination of these abundant materials into a record giving us a history, not merely of Dr. Olin's outward life, activities, and sufferings, but of the progress of his mind from youth to age.

It is not our purpose in this article to give a full sketch of Dr. Olin's life, but only to touch upon the prominent points of his character as brought out in the biography. The chief facts of his history have before been given in this journal, and for the rest we refer our readers to the "Life" itself, which they will find to be one of the most interesting as well as instructive biographies produced since Stanley's Life of Arnold.

Dr. Olin sprang of an excellent stock. For generations back the men of that name have been noted in New-England for sense, judgment, and integrity, His father, a man of vigorous understanding and abundant humour—the oracle of his neighbourhood—filled, in turn, nearly every office of trust the people could bestow upon him, from justice of peace to member of Congress and Lieutenant Governor. His mother was a woman of masculine mind and great piety, but so strong a Puritan and Baptist that she abstained from cultivating religious habits in her children. She was so fearful of

formal religion that she never taught them even the Lord's prayer, lest they should "draw near unto God with their lips, while their hearts were far from him." This good mother's ultra-Calvinistic theory condemned her son to a prayerless youth, and to years of distance from Christ. Nevertheless she was herself a woman of prayer, and of mighty faith; and the influence of her Christian example was not lost upon her children, every one of whom became a disciple of Christ: not, however, in virtue of her theory of religion, but in spite of it. It was probably a deep conviction of the wrong principle on which he was trained in childhood that made Dr. Olin, in after years, so thorough an advocate of the religious nurture of children, which no writer has better treated. In this matter he was in the habit of saying that the "Baptists are principled to do wrong." The Puritanical element, however, was never thoroughly eradicated from his habits of life and his modes of thinking.

The "child is father of the man." Though the promise of childhood is not always fulfilled, there is never a strong intellect that does not somehow show its presence early, unless, indeed, in a diseased physical organization. In the corner of Judge Olin's sitting-room you might always have found the boy Stephen, when his out-door work was done, absorbed in reading, from which it was almost impossible to divert him. In that Puritanical household there were no fairy tales to beguile the lad from his work: it was strong reading—Bigland's View, and a History of the World, "a huge book of a thousand pages"—over which he pored and pondered. The father was a wise man, and made a companion of his son. "As he grew older, the alternations of diligent study with the hardy labours of the farm, which gave him muscular vigour—and the ever-varying aspects of nature throughout the rolling year—all formed part of his education as much as the humble teachings of the district school whither he went to recite his daily task." Constant employment for every one was the rule of the house. At eight years old the boy was man enough to be sent, alone, on horseback to Pawlett, forty miles off, to "attend to some business for his father." This was the training to make a man. At seventeen he taught a village school, and soon after was placed in the office of the Hon. Horatio Seymour, at Middlebury, to study law. He soon found his lack of learning; and quietly packing up his books went home and told his father "he had made up his mind not to be half a lawyer, and without a liberal education he never could expect to be a whole one." His father sent him to an academy, and he was fitted for college in half the usual time.

In the spring of 1816 the students of Middlebury College were one day in chapel, when a country lad entered, upon

whom all eyes were turned; for his great head, ample chest, and massive frame towered above the rest like the oak above the lesser trees. They soon discovered that his intellectual proportions, like his physical, were colossal. Not one in any of the classes, according to the ample testimony both of professors and students, could compare with him; and when he came to seek his diploma, one of his instructors pronounced him "the ripest scholar who had ever come before him to be examined for a degree." His industry at college was equal to his ability: indeed, his rapid success was dearly purchased by excessive application, which no doubt prepared the way for subsequent suffering. "He used to apply himself, day after day, sixteen hours, leaning over a table, or sitting in the window-sill, his limbs bent up, where he read till the twilight was gone, and then fell asleep, exposed to the evening air and dew." At the same time he almost entirely neglected vigorous exercise, thus disregarding the very first laws of physical health. These imprudences of his youth were fearfully expiated afterward by years of enforced idleness and pain, in what should have been the maturity of his bodily and mental vigour. The laws of God *will* have obedience or penalty. Too late Dr. Olin became sensible of his mistake, acknowledging that "under the influence of a strange infatuation he had continued to act and feel as if his iron constitution furnished an exception to all general rules." His after life, for thirty years, was one long struggle with disease. It is proof of the amazing force of his will, that with his disabled organization he succeeded in accomplishing so much.

Olin's ruling motive at this time seems to have been ambition. "He that aspireth," says Lord Bacon, "that he may have a vantage-ground to do good, is an honest man;" but we can hardly class the impulses of our youthful student so high. The Chief-Justiceship of the United States was an express object of his desire and hope. The thought of being a minister of the gospel at this time would have been abhorrent to his feelings. Dr. Bates (President of Middlebury College) tells us that no student in the institution prepared his recitations more thoroughly than Olin; but thinks it probable that his "promptings to ardent and untiring study took their rise from some of those personal considerations which leave out of view the great end for which men should live." A fellow-student remarks that "his aspiring soul could not brook a subordinate position; and that his ambition was intense and soul-absorbing." But the vice, if vice it was, was that of a noble nature. There was nothing dishonourable or grovelling about it. Had he continued in the course of life he first marked for himself, and gained its highest posts,

he would have filled them well, and so have justified his aspirations. But the sun of honour that now filled and dazzled his eye was soon to pale before the brighter fires of the Sun of Righteousness.

There are few minds of large compass that do not, at some period or other—generally, however, in youth—pass through doubts and scepticisms with regard to Christianity. The human mind is even prouder than the human heart. In its first flush of joy at finding its pinions strong enough to bear it aloft, it essays to fly far and alone, and thinks it can sustain itself with unresting and unsupported wing in the pure azure it discerns above, and which it believes to be the atmosphere of truth. But when the height is reached, the azure is there no longer; but only an atmosphere in which respiration is stifled. And the mind of large compass never remains sceptical, except as a penalty for persevering pride of thought, or immorality of life. It says to itself, "I will renounce all things foreign to my own thought, that I may seek the truth and know it." Then it is sceptical. By-and-by it finds its speculations to end—not in certainty and truth, but in irresolution and despair. It finds that it can know nothing of itself. But unless the voice of conscience be dead, it is still impelled to act; and it cannot act without either knowledge or belief. And another voice comes, responsive to the voice within, saying, "This is the way, walk ye in it;" and the true mind hears, and is delivered from all doubt, and irresolution, and darkness, by the light and life of faith. So it was with Olin. During his life in college he neglected the duties of piety,—indeed, he had never been trained to exercise them; the world and its prizes filled up his whole field of vision; he was, as he himself says, "not exactly an infidel; he had not learned to think like a fool, and to say there was no God;" but he deliberately made up his mind that he would not trouble himself about religion. The present life was real; in that he was to act; of all else he was both indifferent and doubtful. Yet no one could quote from him an infidel opinion; but his "keen relish of witticisms and sarcasms at the expense of Christians, and even of Christianity itself, together with his course of life," made the impression on his fellows that he was secretly an unbeliever. For all practical purposes he was. A long and severe illness, just after his college course ended, had no other effect than to make him determine that he "would not show the world a sneaking way of dying," or be "coward enough to shrink from an inevitable destiny."

In this state of mind he went to South Carolina, in 1821, to take charge of a seminary in Abbeville District. His proud spirit, instead of being humbled or sobered by the sickness through which he had

just passed, was only chafed and roused. For several months his indifference—even his contempt—for religion, were greater than ever.

He had been for some time engaged in teaching before he found out that it was expected of him to pray daily in the school. On learning this, he retired to a neighbouring grove, and there "composed and rehearsed the prayer with which he intended to open the school the next day; and day after day did he, in the presence of his pupils, offer prayers which did not even come from the surface of his careless, indifferent heart." The rest must be told in his own language:—

"The mockery of attempting to pray in my school seemed to increase my hardness of heart every day, till at length I came to disregard experimental religion altogether; and, as my judgment assented to the veracity of the Scriptures and the truth of revelation, I thought myself as good a Christian as anybody. It was some time in July that I began to feel a sense of horror and wretchedness stealing upon me, which, though I was ignorant of the cause, destroyed my peace, and daily gathered strength. The information which I often received of the revivals in Vermont smote upon my heart like peals of thunder, and reproached me with many misspent opportunities which had borne the record of my guilt before me to judgment. I spent all my leisure hours in reading the Bible and other religious books. These tended to deepen my convictions and to augment my sorrows. My nights were many of them spent in prayers and tears. A cloud of darkness was gathering over my mind. Doubts and fears tortured my soul, and temptations, in a thousand forms, assailed me on every side. For about six weeks I continued in a state of wretchedness not easily to be described. It was on the 20th of September that, as I trust, the Sun of Righteousness rose upon my soul, and healed my wounded spirit. I was alone in the woods. I had just risen from my knees, with a heart pressed down with insupportable agony. I was overwhelmed, and melted with a sense of guilt and unworthiness, when, 'in the twinkling of an eye,' I was filled with joy unspeakable. Blessed be God! I was then made happy in his redeeming love, and am happy still. I am afraid I expose myself to the imputation of enthusiasm. I never gave much credit to sudden operations and ecstasies in religious things. It is the comfortable evidence I still enjoy of my acceptance with God that gives me hope and happiness."—Life, vol. i, pp. 66, 67.

This conversion was complete and thorough: it was the crisis in his history which gave a new bent to his life. The world, duty, honour, time, eternity—all these words had a new meaning for him. The old self-reliance was gone; but he had a stronger stay: the SPIRIT was in him, and he walked after it. The old ambition was at once extinguished: new and nobler aspirations took its place, and he began immediately to work for the advancement of Christ's kingdom. His letters to young friends, which before had abounded in sportive badinage, and in details of worldly plans and ambitious dreams, were now made vehicles of religious instruction and exhortation. "Do you," he writes to one of them, "read my Methodistical

letters with pleasure, seriousness, pity, or contempt? If I write, I shall continue to persuade you to turn to Christ. My conscience, my duty, my love to you will forbid my doing otherwise." His religious confidence kept pace with his religious zeal, then, and ever after. We hear of no continued clouds or darkness, of no hesitation or faltering, of no parleying with the world, of no distrust in Christianity at any subsequent period of his life. He knew in whom he had believed: founded on that Rock he was strong; his principles were inexpugnable; his practice was uniform; his profession calm and modest, yet ever clear and unmistakable. No man could be freer from cant than Olin; but the long talks in which he delighted in the inner circle of his friends almost always ended (at least we found it so in our intercourse with him) in questions pertaining to his and their *personal* relations to God and the world. Thitherward the tendencies of his mind always led them. We remember being struck, at an early period of our acquaintance, with the vast and solemn views he used to take of life; that every human life has its influence, in its degree, upon the destinies of the race, and that it is, moreover, to "leave behind it in the spiritual world an imperishable and eternal result,"—this was his profound conviction, and all his modes of thought and action were inspired by it. His *impulse* was "the love of Christ constraining him," which he himself called the "comprehensive motive," far above all subordinate and partial aims. Instead of measuring everything by "safety, or duty, or fears, or feelings," and thus "finding himself, unawares, on purely selfish grounds," he adopted and lived by the larger principle, and found that it not only afforded him a universal and safe rule, but that, to use his own language, it "lifted him above difficulties and doubts, and having no dependence upon frames or particular states of mind, beautifully simplified the whole business of religion."* In this simple way of Christian faith his steps were firm and assured. Resting in Christ, his mind was clear and his heart was calm. Perplexed and distressed he often was, but not with regard to his relations to his Maker: *that* care he rested upon Christ, and found his staff strong. In all his conversations upon the subject, he spoke of his sense of acceptance in the strong language of assured Christian faith. He had, to use his own words,† "a sure trust in God and his promises, which are an inexhaustible fountain, not of encouragement only, but of courage. His hands never grew weak in their proper work. He was ever calm, and cheerful, and wholehearted; assured of ultimate triumph over all obstacles and all foes." He seemed to *see* Christ as few Christians do: not as the

* Works, vol. i, p. 357. † Sermons, vol. i, p. 65.

Redeemer of men centuries ago, but as a present and sympathizing friend. And he spoke of Christ with an intimate personal affection, such as John's the beloved apostle.

Indeed, on the side of his affections, he was altogether John-like. His glowing love for the friends of his heart did not prevent him from the widest sympathy with the race; nay, was perhaps its necessary condition and concomitant. The heart which is not ardent in its love for a few, can nourish no expansive benevolence for the many; one disciple was received with peculiar fondness to that divine bosom on which all mankind were to find rest. And so while Olin lavished upon his family and his friends a wealth of love which few men can afford, his heart was pierced through by the woes of humanity at large, and sympathized with all men, everywhere, as born with immortal destinies, and as equally capable with himself of being made the trophies of Christ's grace and heirs of heaven. In this sense he was truly Lord Bacon's "citizen of the world—his heart no island cut off from other lands, but a continent that joins to them." The great commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," was written upon his heart, and he always felt the force of its demands. He not only preached of the missionary spirit as a vital element in Christian character, but illustrated it in ceaseless strivings of soul, and labours of love. "True to the unerring instincts of a fervent piety, he sympathized deeply with the longings of the crucified Saviour for the conversion of immortal souls." The apathy and indifference of the Church with regard to the work of missions pierced him through with many sorrows; and he was restless, even to impatience, under a penetrating sense of the complicated evils that oppress the human race, and of the feebleness of the Church's efforts to alleviate them. Under these feelings, he was always ready to put forth his highest activities in order to stimulate the missionary spirit of that branch of the Church to which he belonged. He was oppressed for years with the conviction that the Methodist Episcopal Church was fearfully delinquent with regard to the work of foreign missions; and in his speeches and sermons he poured forth, with a vehemence of Christian indignation, fearless reproaches and stirring exhortations, which contributed in no small degree to generate the present improved state of feeling in the Church on that subject.

His Christian life was tried and purified by many years of affliction. Before he was twenty-five his constitution was irrecoverably broken down. His plans of usefulness as a minister were all hindered, and for years frustrated by disease. He could rarely preach more than a few sermons successively before he was pros-

trate; and to public labours, even at his best periods, he could hardly ever bring more than half his power. In twenty years together he was rarely able to attend upon the preaching of the gospel, or other means of grace, social or public. At some periods, even when he could "perform long journeys, take long walks, and read or write for several hours in the day," a single half-hour in a place of public-worship would produce sleepless nights and days of disorder and anguish. Long and weary journeys he took, in his own and other lands, in search of health; but even from Rome he writes—"Silent, earnest prayer, if continued so long as two or three minutes, quite upsets me;" and we believe he was *never* able to give himself hours of importunate prayer. Yet none of these things moved him, or shook his trust in God. It was not an easy thing for this man of mighty powers—inevitably conscious of great intellectual and moral energies, endowed with the largest capabilities of public usefulness, and full of religious zeal—it was not easy for such a man to bow submissively, and "be content to be obscure." Yet this victory was granted to him. When he passed from the pulpit to a sick bed, he found *that* a holier place; when he drank the bitterest cup of domestic grief in a land of strangers, he found that "Christ made it the means of imparting grace such as he had never known before."

"In all this God is teaching me an important lesson. I have thought myself willing, even desirous, to *do* my Master's will. I am now called to suffer it—a far more difficult task. To the former a man is encouraged not only by piety, but he may likewise feel the influence of ambition, of applause, and of many other motives, sinful or right. But to pine away in obscurity and in anguish; to see years waste away without improvement or usefulness; to contemplate the wants of the Church and the perdition of the wicked, without being able to raise a helping hand or a warning voice, are afflictions addressed both to nature and grace. Yet in this furnace do I trust I am learning my weakness and my dependence, and from it, if God shall lead me out, do I hope to come forth, possibly to the work of the ministry, more probably to the grave, with profit and rejoicing. The hand of the Lord supports me. In him I find an unfailing source of consolation."—Life, vol. i, p. 121.

On the subject of Christian perfection Dr. Olin was, for some time after his conversion, at least sceptical: indeed, he was admitted on trial as a preacher with an understood reservation of this point, openly stating his objections before the whole Conference. But with the ever-deepening experience of years and sorrows his theoretical difficulties gradually passed away. "It pleased God," he says, "to lead me into the truth. My health failed; my official employments had to be abandoned; I lost my children, my wife died; and I was wandering over the world alone, with scarcely anything remaining but God. My affections centered in Him; my will became absorbed

in His. I *sank*, as it were, into the blessing of His perfect love, and found in my own consciousness the reality of the doctrine which I had theoretically doubted."* It was while praying alone, upon the banks of the ancient river of Egypt, that he first "*felt* that perfect love casteth out fear." The calm repose, the solid peace, the steadfast confidence which this perfect love begets, remained his blessed portion ever after during his earthly pilgrimage.

Thus far we have contemplated Dr. Olin as a Christian, rather than as a Methodist. As we have before intimated, his mind was too wide, and his sympathies too broad, for mere sectarianism. But though there was no bigotry in his nature, he was yet a thorough Methodist, both in theory and practice. Born and nurtured—so far as the system under which he was trained can be called nurture—in Calvinism, he yet attended the Methodist circuit-preaching in his father's neighbourhood while yet a boy. But even after his conversion, in 1821, and the decision that followed it that he would become a minister of the gospel, he had no decided Church affinities. It was his purpose early in 1822 to go northward, and enter upon theological studies; but whether in New-England, at Princeton, or at some Episcopal Seminary, he had not made up his mind. He had, indeed, soon after his conversion, joined the Methodist Church, because he believed "their doctrines to be those of the Bible, and their practice truly Christian;" but yet he was strongly prejudiced against some of the peculiarities of Methodism, and meant, as soon as his position and circumstances would allow, to become a member of the Episcopal Church, as, upon the whole, more congenial with his feelings and opinions. A few months' enjoyment of Methodist prayer-meetings and class-meetings served to dissipate all this mist, and to show him his true place. "I must inform you," he writes in September, 1822, "that I have become a Methodist in good earnest, and shall never quit them for the Episcopalians." His conviction that he had chosen wisely strengthened with his years; and, next to his zeal for the progress of Christianity, and, indeed, coincident with it, was his ardent desire for the improvement and spread of Methodism. A mind so free and a heart so vast as his—tinged, too, with Puritanism —would have been strangely out of place in the Episcopal Church. So late as 1846 he expresses himself as "more and more impressed with the general inefficacy of the Church service. . . . At the end of three months, in which I have attended the Episcopal Church more than during my whole life before, my opinion of the service is less favourable than ever."†

Dr. Olin's moral qualities were naturally lofty and attractive:

* Life, vol. i, p. 208. † Life, vol. ii, p. 307.

and religion exalted and purified them. His powers were all on so large a scale, the motive forces in him, so to speak, were so strong and so rapid, that, without religion, he might have been overbearing or domineering. But nothing of this leaven remained in him after his conversion; he was ever kind, gentle, and, even to a great extent, yielding. From early life he was noted for frankness and cordiality; and among his college friends, as in after life, he was deemed the soul of honour. The same elements of character which, under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, made him so active and zealous for the welfare of mankind at large, were also fruitful of kindness and blessing to those immediately around him. His domestic relations were of the happiest kind, and he was most happy in enjoying them. His grief for the loss of his first wife was that penetrating and yet long-enduring sorrow of which none but fine natures are capable; and yet it was never weak or morbid in its manifestations. He thus describes her in a beautiful paragraph in the Preface to his Travels:—

"I remained more than a year in Paris, deriving no benefit from the best medical advice which that capital afforded, and hovering continually upon the borders of the grave. I was accompanied, however, by a beloved and honoured wife, herself in the vigour and bloom of health, and every way fitted to be the minister of the richest earthly blessings which it has pleased God to confer upon me. Rarely endowed with the talent of doing good and communicating happiness, and a bright example of the conjugal virtues—patient, indefatigable, and inventive; full of cheerfulness, and hope, and courage, and faith, she was the angel of my sick-room, who watched by my restless pillow day and night during these dreary months, anticipating and satisfying the wants of my situation with a skill and untiring assiduity which strong affection alone can inspire and sustain. It is not surprising, perhaps, that, under the divine blessing upon auspices so benign, I passed successfully through this trying crisis."—Life, vol. i, pp. 217, 218.

One of his letters soon after reveals tenderly the character of his grief, and at the same time exhibits the depth and tenderness of his own nature, telling his friends at home that his absence in Europe would now be prolonged, and that he should "wander a little longer among strangers," because he could not bear the condolence of friends.

A man of such qualities could not but be an admirable social companion. Dr. Olin's generous affections were a magnet of such powerful attraction that none came within the sphere of its influence without obeying the charm. Men and women of all classes, and of all degrees of culture, old and young, alike yielded to the fascinations of his manner and to the tenderness of his heart. Like Dr. Johnson, he aimed to keep his friendships ever in repair by forming new associates, wherever he could find suitable ones, especially among

the young. "Young men," he said, "are less worldly, more frank and fearless, and, as a class, they are more intelligent and of larger views. To keep up communication with the warmest hearts postpones the coming of the chills of selfishness, caution, and superannuation." Among his friends he was unreserved and even playful; yet never at the sacrifice, even in the slightest degree, of the commanding dignity which was natural to him. He was not a man of wit, in the full sense of the word; but with humour, springing from a warm and sympathizing heart, and, in its genial manifestations, seizing upon the feelings of others with a kind attraction, he was largely endowed. We should be glad to cite some of the abundant illustrations of this quality which the volumes before us afford; but our limits forbid.

The *intellect* of Dr. Olin was of the highest class. His printed works, though they are full of original thinking, and display to very great advantage the *massive* qualities of his mind, are yet an inadequate exhibition of his powers. Like Coleridge, he could only be judged of by those who knew him personally. He never had health enough to do full justice to his powers in writing on any subject; for many years he was almost a stranger to books; and even continuous thinking was interdicted. To minute scholarship, therefore, he could lay no claim; but a broad and deep foundation had been laid in the severe studies of his youth and earlier manhood; and, when in college, as we have seen, he was head and shoulders above his fellows. Dr. Bates remarks that even at that early age "his perceptive faculties were ready, acute, and far-seeing; his reflective powers strong, sound, and severe. His powers of discrimination and analysis were wonderful. . . . Indeed, the several faculties of his giant mind seemed to be developed together, and cultivated with great equality, so as to exhibit a beautiful symmetry of intellectual character." In spite of physical weakness, his mental forces were always robust; indeed vigour, rather than elegance, was the characteristic quality of his mind. When he was able to read, he gave himself to the study mainly of the English writers marked by strong common-sense: with books of poetry and fancy he meddled very little. Butler's Analogy was always one of his hand-books. In late years he greatly affected John Foster, in whose rugged strength and force he found qualities eminently congenial to his own; so, too, he sympathized thoroughly with Thomas Arnold, with whom he had many points in common. It is quite characteristic of him, moreover, that he could not tolerate Thomas Carlyle—except for his Cromwell; the attraction there, by the law of affinities, being the stern, rough honesty of the Puritan soldier. But through-

out his life he was a thinker, rather than a student of books; and there were few subjects of theology, education, or social science, on which he had not thought profoundly, and come to fixed conclusions from which he could not be shaken. Though he never pursued extensively what is commonly called speculative philosophy, he had yet thoroughly mastered the fundamental laws of human thought, which underlie all true philosophy; and in these grooves, so to speak, his mind worked, in the examination of the problems of life as they came up. On most of the profound topics of society, in regard to which the generality of men—even cultivated men—never get beyond the sphere of mere *opinion*, and so are never strongly fixed in any view, he dwelt in the sphere of *thought*, and his convictions had thus steadfast foundations whereon to rest. His writings of all classes—sermons, lectures, travels—abound in philosophical insight, as well as in practical wisdom. Had he chosen to devote himself to philosophical studies, strictly so called, he would doubtless have illuminated the history of the human mind. Eminently healthy in its action, his intellect was yet eminently acute and penetrating; he had a wonderful sort of intuition, if such it may be called, into all forms of human thought and knowledge. His judgment, always acting according to settled laws, was so habitually profound, that on subjects of an ethical, political, or religious character, his *a priori* views were of more value than most other men's judgments upon the largest collection of facts would be.

With such qualities of mind and heart, it is not wonderful that Dr. Olin was preëminent as a preacher. Within the year of his conversion he began to preach; and his very first essays were triumphs. "Never," says Dr. Wightman, "had so powerful a preacher burst with so sudden a splendour and so tremendous an effect upon the Church." Nor was this a temporary brilliancy. Olin was no meteor, but a light shining brighter and brighter to the end. The biography contains testimonies from all sorts of people—clergymen, lawyers, students—and from all parts of the country, North, South, and Middle,—and all the witnesses unite, in substance, in the declaration that he was the "greatest preacher they had ever heard." Repeated accounts are given of his preaching for two hours or more, and keeping his hearers, the while, not merely unconscious of the flight of time, but all tremulous with excitement and bathed in tears. Nay, far greater effects are recorded of his preaching than these:—the overthrow of bitter and long-cherished prejudices; the clearing up of sceptical doubts and difficulties from honest minds, and the sudden flashing of conviction into dishonest ones; the humbling of proud, ambitious, and worldly-minded men

at the foot of the cross; and the awakening of whole neighbourhoods and populations to a new sense of duty to God and man. Under one sermon, preached at the home of his boyhood, "thirteen persons found peace in believing;" under another, in one of the interior towns of Georgia, "scores literally *rushed* to the altar when he finished his discourse; the powers of the world to come had won the field—perhaps to the last man." Such accounts of the effects of his preaching abound not merely in the biography before us, but in the newspapers of the land, and in the mouths of men.

What was the secret of this power? It did not lie in excellence of manner; for his gesticulation was singular and awkward, his voice had naturally no peculiar charm, and was not well managed —in a word, his elocution, as such, was very defective. It is not to be found in any remarkable graces of style: both in speaking and writing, though always clear, correct, and strong, he was apt to be diffuse, and sometimes even heavy. His sentences are always solid, but often cumbrous. Nor can we account for the effects of his preaching by any use on his part of the arts of the rhetorician, legitimate or illegitimate; of what value soever these may be to others, they were no aids to him. You never heard from his lips, nor will you find in his writings, passages gorgeous with images and pictures like Jeremy Taylor's; he had little or none of the poetic element; an ornate and glittering style was even his abhorrence. Whether Olin were or were not an orator, was a question his hearers never asked themselves; but that he *was* an orator, and of the very highest class, is very certain. Wherein, then, did his power consist?

It lay chiefly, we think, in his *earnestness*. Life, in his view, was nothing, and worse than nothing, without Christianity. This conviction was incorporated with every fibre of his intellectual and moral nature. Religion was with him not merely a sentiment, or a prevailing belief, or an expedient, or a refuge, but a reality, a living presence,—the essence, in short, of his life. His conversion to God was a surrender without reserve or stipulation; and from the hour of that change to the hour of his death, the one object of his pursuit was the glory of God. Such convictions are essential to the true Christian orator. It is the intensity of his own feelings that draws the feelings of others, and so fascinates their minds. The heart of the great Christian orator is penetrated by an intense desire for his own sanctification and for the sanctification of others; his eloquence has its roots in his own moral condition and moral sympathies. "His distinctive agency consists in giving a powerful impulse and direction to the minds of others; and he is not equal to this, unless the goal

to which he would direct them is plainly in his eye, and unless he earnestly desires to reach it himself."* It was the remark of Rufus Choate, that "Dr. Olin's preaching was characterized by the same rare combination of forcible thought and deep feeling that gave the preaching of Chalmers its great power." He was so absorbed in his subject as to lose sight of himself and of all earthly considertions in the greatness of his theme. Whatever would subserve the grand purpose of interesting his hearers in this theme—whether argument, illustration, description, or exhortation—he would introduce: for all beyond he had no solicitude, never admitting a thought however striking, or an image however graceful and pleasing, if irrelevant to his main purpose. You felt, in hearing him, from the very opening of his exordium, that a great and earnest mind was dealing with you on topics of the profoundest interest both to him and to yourself; and whether you would or no, his mighty thoughts penetrated your intellect, and his overwhelming tide of feeling carried away your heart.

"You would as soon have looked to see the waters of Niagara pause to dally with the wild flowers on the margin, as entertained the remotest suspicion that Dr. Olin was paying the least attention to the rhetorical fringes of his sentences, or putting himself or the elaborate composition of the sermon forward as an object of admiration. Indeed, you had time for nothing but to tremble while he unlocked the mysterious chambers of your heart, and let in daylight upon your dim moral perceptions; or to lay hold upon Christ as he made the way of justification by faith plain, and led you on to Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling in a path all luminous with "the light of life;" or to exult with a believer's bounding joy while he pointed out the massy structure of your Christianity, its base durable as eternity, its capital high as heaven, and lost in the splendours of God's throne."—Life, vol. i, p. 99.

It may be said that many other preachers are quite as earnest as Olin was, but yet produce little or no effect. We do not believe it. Such earnestness is one of the rarest and richest of human gifts; and when it appears, its power is irresistible: it affects all hearers with an inevitable contagion. Few men—even comparatively few pious and faithful ministers—ever bring up before their minds *distinctly* the great realities of time and eternity, which form the substantial themes of religion: fewer still habitually contemplate them with emotions proportioned to their tremendous importance. Now it was precisely in such conceptions and emotions that Olin was preëminent. But when this precious earnestness is combined, as it was in his case, with an intellect of imperial rank, with a comprehension of the grandest sweep, with an analytical faculty that pierced and penetrated every mystery of human passion—in short, with

* Theremin, *Eloquence a Virtue*, p. 71.

physical, mental, and moral powers in every aspect colossal—there is no need to wonder that he swayed the minds and hearts of men at his will. In the intimate blending of logical argument with fiery feeling, he was more like what we know Demosthenes to have been than any speaker we have ever listened to; and his power (as was the case with the great Athenian orator) did not consist in any single quality—in force of reasoning, or fire of imagination, or heat of declamation—but in all combined. His course of argument was always clear and strong, yet interfused throughout with a fervid and glowing passion—the two inseparably united in a torrent that overwhelmed all who listened to him. His was, indeed, the

> "Seraphic intellect and force
> To seize and throw the doubts of man;
> Impassion'd logic, which outran
> The hearer in its fiery course."

In the best sense of the word Theology—the knowledge of God—Dr. Olin was a profound theologian. The religion of the heart is as essential to theological insight as to Christian faith: *pectus est, quod theologum facit.* "The theologian," said Neander, "must study the Scriptures with his heart as well as with his head, unless he wishes his theology to be robbed of its salt." But in the mere literature of Christianity—in the science of Biblical criticism, and of so-called Biblical interpretation—Olin had very little skill or mastery. As we have seen, he had intended, at an early period of his life, to spend some years at a theological seminary; but his plans were frustrated, and in after-life his feeble health would never allow of devotion to these studies. In the knowledge and skill, however, which is most essential to the Christian preacher—a knowledge, namely, of the spirit and contents of Holy Scripture, and skill in their application—he was, again, preëminent. This latter capacity is rare, even among educated theologians—the common system of theological education does not tend to produce or develop it. A man's mind may be overlaid with philology and criticism, and yet be powerless in practical interpretation and application of the Scriptures. For this latter purpose a man "requires," says Dr. Arnold, "first, the general cultivation of his mind, by reading the works of the greatest writers, philosophers, orators, and poets; and, next, an understanding of the actual state of society, and of our own and general history, as affecting and explaining the existing differences among us, both social and religious." It is for this reason that so few eminent critics are eminent preachers: criticism, to *be* eminent, requires a man to be exclusive and jealous in his devotion to it, and he cannot

find time for wide and general reading. But miscellaneous knowledge is precisely what the preacher needs, not to criticise the sacred word, but to apply it to the circumstances of his age, and to the hearts and habits of the living men and women in the congregation before him. The preacher, as such, can commit no more fatal mistake than to confine himself exclusively, or chiefly, to the reading of books of divinity. Such exclusive reading will inevitably narrow his mind, and give it a sort of professional one-sidedness, that will show itself not merely in his mode of thinking, but in his style of writing and speaking. Here, then, was one element of Dr. Olin's great power as a preacher: he was a student of man and of society; he watched the movements of his age, the progress of nations, of sciences, of arts; he was interested in the politics of his country and of the world; he read widely and variously in all classes of literature; and so cultivated his large mind on many sides. And we are therefore not surprised to hear that his preaching was "singularly free from all merely scholastic expressions and cant phrases. Perhaps it was this that gave an air of good sense and liberality, a sort of non-professional character, both to his preaching and his conversation on religious topics. The odour of the schools—a sort of bookishness—hangs about most clergymen, that serves to repel men of taste and liberal views; just as we naturally shrink from a physician who always talks in the phrases of Hippocrates, or a lawyer forever quoting Blackstone and Kent. Yet the effect was not the less salutary. Nay, it was more effective, from the unstudied simplicity and naturalness of his manner, both in the pulpit and out of it."

The last source of Olin's power as a preacher to which we shall allude was his care in preparing for the pulpit. In his early days he never wrote his sermons, but thought them out, elaborately, from the beginning to the end. After the publication of his "Travels in the East" he became accustomed to "think with the pen in his hand," so that he now wrote his discourses out at length. Nearly all his printed sermons were written during the last nine years of his life. It was not his custom, however, to take his manuscript to the pulpit, not even the briefest skeleton. Nor did he commit his sermons to memory; indeed, we are told in his biography, that it was quite impracticable for him to do this, as he seemed to have some inaptitude at remembering words. But the topics and their arrangement, the course of his argument and the illustrations by which it was to be made plain, were all settled beforehand carefully and thoroughly: the mere dress came of itself. The printed sermons are vigorous, massive, and powerful, to a degree unsurpassed in modern literature, unless, perhaps, by Chalmers and Robert

Hall; but they are yet a very inadequate representation of the living preacher.

"Every extemporaneous speaker will realize in a moment the vast difference between the preparations of the study and the freedom and force of the pulpit. In the volume before us we have the germs; in his uttered sermons we have the full flower in all its fragrance. This is the blossom; that was the golden fruitage. We must expect a difference. Nevertheless, to adopt one of his own illustrations, the printed sermon is to the spoken what the solid mountains, stripped of foliage and flower by winter's blasts, are to the mountains covered with verdure and beauty, and bathed in summer sunshine. The strong, distinguishing features of the original mind, the massive foundations of thought, the methodical progression of ideas grasping the whole field of the subject, and developing the succession of relations it embraces, are there. The vividness and luxuriance of imagination, the dew-drop and the perfume of the flower are gone; but the sweeping outline, the spread of vision, the urgency of argument remain. There they are in these volumes, a precious legacy to the rising race of Methodist preachers, who cannot find a more masterly guide for thought, a more exquisite model for style—majestic the one, simple and severe the other."—Life, vol. ii, p. 188.

So large a portion of Dr. Olin's life and labours was devoted to Christian Education, that any notice of him that should not contemplate this aspect of his activities, would be very incomplete. A short period of pastoral work showed that his physical strength was inadequate to the duties of an itinerant Methodist minister; and his whole public life thereafter may be said to have been given to education. His attachment to the pastoral office, however, was now stronger than when he left it; and he hoped to return to it again before long. Hopes and wishes of this sort he cherished to the last. "O," he would often say, "how gladly would I take the poorest circuit in the Conference, if I had only health!" Again, in 1840,—"A circuit fills my idea of a happy and useful future; in 1842,—"I want to preach above all things, but probably shall never be able. . . . I would sooner preach Christ to men than enjoy any or all other things. I would gladly suffer any degree of pain for it;" and, in 1843,—"In nothing do I so exult as in this work of the ministry—this holding up of Christ as the one object of faith, and love, and admiration. I have often thought that I would willingly spend six days of every week in a cell, or on a sick bed, if on the seventh I might be allowed to preach Christ crucified." It is therefore highly probable that if his health had not failed, he would never have taken a professor's chair; a consideration which may serve to reconcile us, in some degree, to the dispensation of sickness that was allotted to him. We agree with Dr. Wightman that, "with the preëminent qualifications he possessed for influencing young men, for wielding aright the potent instrumentalities belonging to the professor's chair, aided by the power which gave his sermons a baptism of fire, when occasionally he was

able to preach, Dr. Olin did more for the Church than if he had even worn the mitre." We cannot but believe that it was the mission of his life to *lead* the Church in the great work of Christian Education. Nor did he ever think himself out of place, so far as duty (not inclination) was concerned, within the walls of a college, believing that the work was "an eminently Christian work," and quite befitting the minister of Christ. "Some fear," said he, "encumbering the Church with too much work. There may be danger, but not if it be the right sort of work. I think the work of education peculiarly appropriate to her sphere. We should attempt nothing that is foreign from the great end of saving souls and honouring Christ. But our colleges and schools should live in the heart of the Church —be part and parcel of it—be imbued with its spirit—embosomed in its holy atmosphere. So impressed am I with this truth, that I would resign my office to-day should the Church disjoin my work from its operations, and supervision, and patronage. This is my cherished sentiment. I am Christ's minister; I must do his work. If this be not his—the work of his Church—then I would know my error. I may not do a strange work."

Of Dr. Olin's services as President at Randolph Macon College, and at the Wesleyan University, full and admirable statements, prepared by Professor Garland and Dr. Holdich, are given in the volumes before us; and to their discriminating and lucid pages we must refer our readers who wish to study the career of a preëminent teacher and governor of youth. His "Inaugural Addresses,"* with the "Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Scholastic Life,"† set forth amply the great principles on which his own success was built. He considered education to be a science, whose fundamental principles were well established; and the root of all its principles he placed in the position, that its aim is not so much acquisition as discipline. He held that every teacher, who does not do his work in the presence of a guiding philosophy, degrades what should be a liberal intellectual function into an irksome and useless drudgery. He had no sympathy with new-fangled systems of education, believing that the ordinary course pursued in the best American colleges, which recognises the study of Latin, Greek, and the Mathematics as the chief *means* (not *end*) of culture, is grounded in the truest philosophy.

"The great prominence given to linguistic and scientific studies is a well-merited concession, approved by all experience, to their preëminent adapta-

* Works, vol. ii, pp. 240, 254. See also the admirable "Address at the Opening of the Genesee Wesleyan Seminary," Works, vol. ii, p. 299.

† Works, vol. ii, pp. 23–94.

tion to the ends of development and training. They occupy an early as well as a considerable part of the course, because they best furnish the indispensable experience and habitudes which the mind wants in order to secure the best fruits of the discursive and speculative studies that are to employ its subsequent labours. This course of study is the result of a comprehensive, protracted experiment in education. It may be regarded as the accumulated testimony of the teachers and scholars of many enlightened nations and centuries. We do well to observe that the malcontents under this system do not usually deny to it the highest merit to which it lays claim—the merit of being incomparably the best system which human genius and experience have ever devised for the development and discipline of the mental faculties. This, I repeat again and again, is the true philosophical idea of liberal education. Between those who embrace this theory of education and those who so clamorously demand of our colleges, not intellectual culture, but only so many of the crude elements of knowledge as are immediately applicable to the art or craft to which they hasten, there is really no just ground for controversy. Their ideas of education are, indeed, very diverse; but not more so than their objects, which are unlike, by the entire difference that exists between a scholar and an artisan—between a philosopher and a superintendent of farm or factory operations."—Works, vol. ii, pp. 62, 63.

As a teacher, he aimed chiefly to train his pupils to habits of attention, accuracy, and independent thought. He required the most perfect preparation of the lessons from the text-book, but would not allow them to be recited *memoriter:* nor would he aid the student by questions, but threw him on his own powers of analysis and statement. His discipline was kind and gentle, but strict to an unusual degree. He had a happy way, however, of preventing things from getting to the last extremity; and his quick inventive faculty averted many a catastrophe. He understood when to praise, when to blame, when to be keen-sighted, and when even to shut his eyes to what was passing before him. His own lofty and generous nature was one of the best qualifications for a teacher and guide of youth: the eyes of the young are as quick to discern a mean or ignoble trait as they are to penetrate intellectual incapacity. His frankness made hypocrisy in dealing with him doubly difficult. "Students, when called before him, were usually compelled, by his manifested confidence in them, never to dissemble. Few could go before him, and meet the gaze of that eye which seemed to read the very soul, and do aught but confess the truth." But, after all, it was more by the high moral principles to which he appealed, and by the moral atmosphere of his own grand presence, that Dr. Olin secured and preserved so great an influence over the minds of the students. He taught the young to seek after the true, rather than the expedient; to search out the true theory of life, and go by it; or, to use his own favourite phrase, to find out "first principles," and act upon them. The motives to which he appealed were of the highest class—those which are at once pure, elevating, and permanent.

In him they saw a visible embodiment of his own pure teachings; his very "presence in the building had a perceptible moral influence over the little community. His tread within the walls was one of moral majesty. His presence at the chapel service, and the daily prayers he offered, when able to be present, had a hallowing power." To the same effect is the following beautiful tribute from one of his students:—*

"It is a rare blessing to be near and feel about and within you the breath of a mind so kingly, of a heart so rich and deep. Ill health prevented Dr. Olin from labouring in the recitation-room, but his *presence* was a conscious culture, and the few things which he was permitted to say to us will make him eternally influential in many souls. But he is asleep in the cemetery of the University over which he presided. And now these words I cast as a wreath upon his grave: God stamped manhood on him from his birth, and religion put upon his greatness so much of beauty as shall make him memorable for generations."—Life, vol. ii, pp. 466.

We have before remarked that Dr. Olin gave much of his attention to public affairs, both in Church and State; indeed, that he was impatient of all forms of evil, and took public troubles to heart as his own. The division of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1844 saddened and darkened his remaining years. During the unfortunate session of the General Conference at which the separation was effected, he was "worn down with agony of mind, with efforts and tears." His own position was, as he expressed it, inexpressibly painful and delicate. His earliest and, perhaps, his dearest friends were on the Southern side of the question: it was, moreover, a question about slavery, and so it was liable, almost of necessity, to set reason and right at defiance. He knew the "great and appalling evils of slavery," for he had himself been a slaveholder—nay, if we are correctly informed, had himself sold slaves. On this point he expressed himself openly in the General Conference: he had seen, he said, the Christian graces and virtues developed in their fulness among slaveholders. He did not dream that he had been unfit, in the sight of God, to preach the gospel when a slaveholder:—

"And if the state of my health had not driven me away from that region, I should probably have been a slaveholder to this day. In this day of reform and manifold suggestions, I go further, and say that if by a vote of this General Conference you might call in question the right of our Southern brethren to the ministry, and make their claim to the sacred office dependent on their giving immediate freedom to their slaves, I do not think that that would be a blessing to the slaves or the Church. I do not believe the slave fares worse for having a Christian master, and I think the preachers may have more of public confidence on our present plan. I know these opinions may by some be regarded as unsound; and I make them not because they have any special value or novelty, but because I profess to speak my sentiments freely."—Life, vol. ii, pp. 168, 169,

* Mr. N. J. Burton.

He voted, according to his convictions, with the majority, and thereby alienated, for a time, the affections of many of his Southern friends; but it was only for a time, as the warm and overflowing testimonies of regard and reverence from the best men of the South, contained in the biography, will attest. At the same time, it is not to be concealed that if his *vote* lost him friends in the South, his *speeches* cost him much popularity in the North; and he has been, and is still, in some quarters, we think, regarded as—to use the mildest phrase—a strict Conservative.

There is a sense in which Conservatism is a very bad thing—nay the worst of all things in a public man. That Conservatism, namely, which, as Dr. Arnold expresses it, "always looks backward and never forward," which resists all change merely because it is change, and therefore "destroys what it loves because it will not mend it," is indeed the worst enemy of human progress in all countries, under all governments, in all ages. It is just as bad in the Church as it is in the State. Putting on a semblance of virtue, professing reverence for law, and order, and established institutions, and arraying itself in the costume of *respectability*, it is at once a wrong and a sham, and is, as such, a bitterer foe to humanity than flagrant vice, or open anarchy. But it is a common mistake of modern reformers—especially of uncultivated or half-educated men who set up as reformers—to stigmatize every man as a Conservative (using the term, of course, in its bad sense) who does not happen to consider *their* special reform as the most important of human interests, or who, while approving their object, may differ with them as to the means of accomplishing it. Many such men begin, like Robespierre, with just views and sincere convictions, concentrated, however, on a single point: like him they make every other interest give way to the one which absorbs their own thoughts and feelings; and, like him, they become, at last, a fear and terror to the race. Whoever stands in their way *must* be sacrificed.

Now Dr. Olin, by constitution, by reflection, and by habit, was far removed from Conservatism. He valued the institutions of the republic and of the Church too much to regard the evils or defects of either with indifference. His zeal for the improvement of Methodism was a passion. He spoke with great freedom of such parts of her economy as he thought obsolete or pernicious. He thought that theological schools were not only desirable in the Church, but indispensable; and he uttered this conviction at a time when such opinions were far more unpopular than they are now. In 1835 he wrote:—"I am full to overflowing and to agony upon this subject. . . . I dare not be prudent, as I am to stand before my

Judge. . . . Do not fear that I am about to grow mad because I abjure prudence. I only mean not to be covert, cunning, or cowardly. I will say or write what I think I ought, though I will neither speak nor write without thinking." These are not words, by any means, that could come out of a Conservative mouth.

But, on the other hand, he was far removed from ultraism. We are told by President Bates that, even when in college, Olin's "powers were so united and balanced in his mind as to secure him from all extravagance in theory and ultraism of opinion." His mind was too broad, both from nature and culture, ever to be so absorbed by one idea as to lose sight of its relations. His reverence for *law* was as strong as Cicero's; he might have taken for his motto the orator's maxim,—"Indignum est in ea civitate, quæ legibus tenetur, discedi a legibus; hoc enim vinculum est ejus dignitatis, qua fruimur in republica; hoc fundamentum libertatis; hic fons æquitatis."

On the question of slavery his position may be justly stated, we think, as follows. He held it to be an evil, "great and appalling," which we are bound to extirpate, when and how God permits. He held that the laws which sanction slavery are inconsistent with Christianity; and that, on the part of the state, slavery is a moral evil of the most flagrant kind. But he believed, at the same time, that every slaveholder is not, *ipso facto*, a sinner; nay, he knew that the very highest style of Christianity has been exhibited among slaveholders. He did not believe that the slave fared worse for having a Christian master. He thought that slavery would be abolished in "God's time," but he did not believe that time to be immediately at hand. These opinions he had imbibed when he dwelt in the South, and was himself a slaveholder; but he did not change them when he came Northward. He never could be made to believe, or hope, that good could come of the so-called abolition movement. He "loved many Abolitionists;" but he thought "he understood the question as well as they,"—and that "they had done much evil." He was jealous of all engagements that do not come fairly within the embrace of the gospel; and the anti-slavery movement he did not think to be such a one.

The fundamental error in all this, was the notion that the time for an effectual movement against American slavery must yet be far remote. Our own conviction has been, and continues to be, that the present state of the American Church, and the American nation, affords precisely the juncture when all possible *prudent* efforts should be made to weaken the influence of the slave power, (so called,) and to prepare the way for the entire overthrow of the system.

In this country the people make the laws; and the Church is made up of the people. In such a country, and in such a Church, it is neither right, nor possible, that a system which makes oppression inevitable; which rests upon a code of laws that are utterly at war with the first principles of political (not to say of Christian) ethics; which considers and treats one man as the property of another; which denies marriage, and legal protection,* and mental culture† to millions of human beings,—it is neither right, we say, nor possible, that such a system should escape discussion. One of the strongest Southern apologists for slavery admits that the most important view of the subject is the religious one; and that "if slavery be condemned by the revealed will of God, then in Christendom it cannot continue to exist. It is the duty of every man, making the laws of God the rule of his conduct, to use all practicable efforts to abolish whatever violates them;"‡ but, at the same time, it cannot be denied that most of the leaders of the anti-slavery crusade, in America, have departed far from the example of Christ and his apostles, in their *mode* of discussing the subject, and that their course has been precisely such as to disgust and disaffect the most thoughtful minds of both North and South. Albert Barnes has produced one of the most forcible and judicious books in opposition to slavery that has yet appeared in this country; and his language with regard to the ultra-abolitionists is nearly akin to Olin's, as follows: "It would seem that if Satan had resolved to employ his highest ability in forming a scheme by which the fetters of the slave should be riveted forever on the unhappy children of Africa in this land, he could not have devised a more effectual way than by producing just the mode of treating it which prevails at the South and the North. Never, it seems to me, has a good cause been more wretchedly managed, in the main, than the cause of anti-slavery in the United States."§ Dr. Channing testifies to the same effect, as follows: "The Abolitionists have done wrong, I believe: nor is their wrong to be winked at because done fanatically, or with good intentions; for how much mischief may be wrought with good designs! One great principle which we should lay down as immovably true is, that if a good work cannot be carried on by the calm, self-controlled, benevolent spirit of Christianity, then the time for doing it has not come. God asks not the aid of our vices; he can overrule them for good, but they are not the chosen instruments of human happiness."

* Legal protection is practically denied by the refusal to admit "coloured testimony" in courts of justice.

† The laws of many of the states make it a crime to teach slaves to read.

‡ Southern Quarterly, October, 1845. § Barnes on Slavery, p. 267.

It may be said in reply to all this—and with truth—that if such men as Barnes and Channing had taken up the anti-slavery cause at an early period, it would have escaped the "bad hands" that have so wretchedly managed it. We may say also, in addition, that we should be glad, were it possible, to enrol Olin's name upon the noble list of those who, within the last twenty years, have spoken out clearly and manfully against the giant evil of our country and of the age. It is very certain that his reticence was not caused by lack of courage or of virtue, but by lack of conviction. He did not see his duty in *that* course, and so he did not pursue it. But his connexion with slavery teaches us one lesson of Christian charity and prudence, which we should all do well to heed. The wildest scepticism, to use Gibbon's phrase, never insinuated that Cæsar might possibly be a coward; so the extremest ultraism would not venture to deny the piety of Olin. He exemplified in his life, character, thoughts, and feelings, the very highest virtues of our holy religion; and this too, according to all testimonies, *while he was a slaveholder*. Even those "reformers" who are so extravagant in un-reason as to desire the exclusion of all slaveholders from the Church, will not deny that Stephen Olin was a true follower of Jesus of Nazareth: and if he, then many more could be at once slaveholders and Christians. One such case, it might be thought, would be enough to arrest the spirit of hasty and passionate impatience, which seems to blind the perceptions of those enthusiastic men who, unable to solve the greatest social problem of the Church and of the times, offer no method of untying the knot, but are anxious at once to cut it. That Stephen Olin did wrong in his connexion with slavery, we firmly believe; that he *intended* no wrong, we believe just as firmly. Such is the true state of the case, in our judgment, even with those Christian slaveholders of the South who justify the system. Their position has the eminent unhappiness of almost necessitating a feeble or corrupt moral sense on this subject: they are carried along by a great movement that absorbs their individuality, so to speak; the personal conscience is lost in the general sense of the community. The great work to be done is to purify that general sense; not to curse and malign individual slaveholders, but to break up the false public morality in which the system finds its main support.

We had intended to enter into a brief examination of Dr. Olin's writings; but our utmost limits are reached. Enough, however, has been said in this paper to show our general estimate of their great value.

ART. II.—COLERIDGE.

The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, with an Introductory Essay upon his Philosophical and Theological Opinions. Edited by PROFESSOR SHEDD. In Seven Volumes. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1853.

AN American edition of Coleridge's complete works is at this time a significant and interesting fact. To print and publish a volume, or a work of several volumes, is no very great matter—less than the construction of a railroad, or the building of a steamship, or even the erection of a dwelling; but the doing it often has a significance of much greater interest than any of these. Very few books would be written but for the expectation that they will be read, and yet fewer would be printed but for the assurance that they will be bought. The issuing of this work, therefore, indicates the prevalence of the conviction that the public demand for the writings of Coleridge is sufficient to justify, commercially, the outlay. We have great confidence in the judgment of the more intelligent members of "the trade" in such matters, and are, therefore, prepared to hail this event as an indication of a healthy condition of the public mind in matters of literature; and we receive it as a hearty practical endorsement of the good taste and common sense of our reading public, since only through these qualities, exercised by them, can the enterprise be adequately rewarded.

Few names have figured more largely in current English literature, during the last half-century, than that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge; and as to scarcely any other has there prevailed so wide a diversity of opinions. The causes of this diversity are obvious. In the case of a living, or recently deceased writer, the man and the author are often so much at variance, that the life of the former is constantly marring the precepts of the latter. Men naturally look to the every-day life of a didactic writer for an exemplification of his own precepts; nor are they ready to believe that he can be wise as an author who wants the practical wisdom requisite to guide his affairs with discretion, and to keep himself from vices and follies; and where they behold the common frailties and infirmities in the man, they are slow to believe that his writings can contain anything greatly elevated above the common range of thought. This, however, is only a temporary embarrassment. The author whose works survive their own novelty, comes at length to be known only by his works: the man is forgotten, and only the author remains. This

apotheosis Coleridge is now undergoing, though the process is yet incomplete. It is, however, so far effected that even now he may be contemplated as he is seen in his writings, rather than as he was known in his lifetime.

As a writer, Coleridge was very unequal in the various departments of literature to which he devoted his pen. Beginning as a mediocre English poet, above which rank he never rose in the service of the Muses, he afterward became a critic and essayist, still evincing the same characteristics that appear in his poetry, varied with occasional indications of greater force of thought, and a more profound philosophy; but Coleridge the poet and critic will be little talked of by the next generation. Already his reputation is becoming that of a philosophical and theological writer, to the exclusion of all else; and this publication of a standard edition of his works, in which the appropriate prominence is given to those subjects, will increase that tendency.

But even as a philosopher and theologian he is very differently estimated by different persons; and by those, too, whose opinions are entitled to much credit. Not a few respectable critics have considered him as a second-rate retailer of German transcendentalism, —a writer of incoherent fragments of thoughts, adumbrating commonplace notions, which, clothed in a party-coloured jargon, made up of Latin, Greek, and German, strangely commingled with his own barbarous English, though only the chimeras of a disordered fancy—disordered, too, by well-ascertained physical causes—have been mistaken for profound philosophical speculations; and though such censures are, to some extent, unjust, they are not altogether groundless. His devotion to German literature and philosophy so far transposed his mental stand-point, that he wrote and philosophized as a German rather than as an Englishman; and since, on account of the dissimilarity of the English and the German mind, the same thought as set forth by one would scarcely be recognised as identical with itself as embodied by the other, Coleridge sometimes seems to be profound when he is commonplace, and at other times his real excellences escape the observation of his readers. This difficulty, however, is rapidly giving way, as English scholars (under which designation we include all who use the English language, without any reference to their political nationalities) are becoming more familiar with the modes of thought and forms of expression employed by their Teutonic contemporaries. If, however, it shall be asserted, on the one hand, that Coleridge has taken ideas familiar to the English mind, and, after decking them in a foreign costume, pro-

duced them as novelties, and also brought with them a variety of German conceits, which he has passed off as profound truths,—it may be answered on the other, that, while we cannot wholly deny the charge, it is equally true that he has not only corrected the aberrations of our philosophy from the observations of those strangers, but also suggested much valuable matter from his own original reflections.

His modes of thinking, and especially of expressing his thoughts, are not altogether felicitous. Though he is unquestionably profound, yet for want of clearness his apparent depth is ever liable to be charged to his obscurity. His thoughts are brilliant rather than transparent, and as in an atmosphere surcharged with foreign particles, the same causes that illuminate also obscure his meditations. His thoughts are fragmentary in their form and character; his themes are seldom or never discussed in all their relations, and their characters are commonly only partially developed. These things of course add to the unsatisfactoriness of his discussions; since isolated truths, like the fragments of an arch, are not commonly self-sustaining, as are symmetrical systems.

But to a certain and very large class of minds, the chief objections to Coleridge, as a philosophical writer, are not against the accidents, but rather the whole character of his works,—not so much, indeed, as to the matter set forth, as to the manner in which it is presented. Coleridge provides *aids to reflection;* but *aids* always imply that efforts are to be made by those who receive them, and these such persons have no wish to make. Most readers would have all their thinking done for them; they delight to be carried along on a smooth train of thought, which passes over the subject without requiring any labour, and which makes its impressions on the memory as the carriage-wheel marks its track, instead of entering into the mind and assimilating itself with the internal elements of thought. Because he is a suggestive and not a dogmatical writer—supplying elements and methods of thought, but leaving the reader to use them, if he would be profited by them—Coleridge is not a favourite with the indolent and the imbecile. Even among learned men there are very few original thinkers, while to the multitude—not only the imbruted and ignorant, but even the generally intelligent—"reflection" is a word that has no definite signification. In proportion as a writer transcends the beaten track of disquisition, he diminishes the number of his readers; and there is but little doubt that the fact that Coleridge has struck out new methods of thinking, and elucidated truth by original processes, is among the causes that have prejudiced his acceptance with the public. But truth is

essentially vital; it may be obscured or perverted, but it cannot be destroyed. It is also life-giving; and when it has been once uttered it will find a response somewhere, and at some time,—though its voice may seem to be stifled in the noise of the multitude, or overborne by the trumpet tones of authority. Whether he scattered the vital seeds of thought, or only chaff and cockle, must be determined by the harvest that shall follow, and which is already beginning to mature.

In the field of metaphysical disquisition Coleridge appeared as an unheralded and unaccredited observer. Having entered by another way than the one prescribed by authority, he pursued such paths as seemed good to himself, and explored the scene upon which he had entered in whatever method promised the best results. That his thoughts are really new—that he was the first that ever entertained them—is not supposed; nor is it certain that they were entirely original with himself, since similar reflections are found scattered over the whole field of literature, both domestic and foreign, as well as constantly occurring in the ordinary remarks and conversations of mankind. It were scarcely to be presumed that an earnest and gifted mind, after casting off the shackles of authority, would confine itself to the beaten track of thought, or fail either to detect latent truths, or to present old ones in new and startling aspects.

The system of mental philosophy that at that time pervaded and reigned over the English mind was unsatisfactory, because it was defective. As a scientific generalization it fails legitimately to answer the necessities of its subject, since a large class of the phenomena to which it applies cannot be brought without violence into its classification. Its tendency to materialism has often been felt, and only resisted by a conviction of the absurdity to which its acknowledged premises were leading. In the highest department of human psychology,—the illustration of spiritual phenomena, as contradistinguished from the *quasi*-mechanical—that system is especially defective and perniciously misleading; and as this had been carried into theology, which is itself inseparable from the highest forms of the philosophy of mind, the result had been, on the one hand, the adoption of a kind of mechanical fatalism, and, on the other, the abnegation of all metaphysical inquiry upon a subject at once purely metaphysical and essentially transcendental. These were the themes upon which Coleridge loved to reflect, and as to which he has bequeathed, to all who will use them, his "Aids to Reflection." But these are really what their title imports, and the same character, to a great extent, prevails in all his metaphysical writings: they help to think, rather than supply perfected thinking to the reader.

Our present purpose will confine our remarks to a discussion of Coleridge's writings as they apply to questions of a theological character and bearing. In them philosophy is considered in its relations to theology, and theology is viewed from a philosophical stand-point. We can, in this article, consider only the former portion of this general subject; the latter we reserve for another opportunity. We are aware that there is a strong and wide-spread prejudice against the use of philosophical modes in theological discussions,—a prejudice with which we in some measure sympathize, unless philosophy shall be emancipated from the clogs and fetters of materialism. Yet it will be granted by every rational mind that the necessity for such a divorce is an evil to be deprecated, and, were it possible, avoided. But since it has been found impossible to reconcile the deductions of the prevailing mechanico-mental philosophy to many spiritual phenomena in their theological relations, it has seemed necessary to exclude philosophy from their discussion. The result of this separation has been a state of hostility between the partisans of the two dissevered systems. The theologian feels compelled to decry a system which, while it pretends to embrace his themes, fails entirely to elucidate them; and the philosopher looks with disfavour upon a science which engrosses the best part of his domains, and sets his laws at defiance. If by any means the necessity for this separation may be obviated, and theology and philosophy made to harmonize, certainly a most desirable end would be effected.

It is very evident that there can be no real discrepancy between these two sciences; for truth cannot be inconsistent with itself. It is equally certain that if there is radical error in either system, it must be in the latter; for the elements of theological truth are too obvious and immutable to be widely misconstrued. Notwithstanding all that has been said against rationalism in theology, no one but a stark enthusiast will confess that his religious opinions are irrational. The proper use of reason in matters of religious belief is a subject of great practical importance; and its difficulty has, no doubt, been not a little enhanced by the unfortunate position of the prevailing system of mental philosophy. Every intelligent thinker must be ready to confess that, since reason and revelation are concurrent streams from the same great fountain—the truth—there must be a substantial agreement between them. Each has indeed its own channel, and each is designed to beautify and fertilize its own banks; but while distinct, they are parallel or convergent, and in their confluence the highest excellence of each is demonstrated. A system of theology should embrace all the doctrinal truths of revelation, and

embody them in a harmonious whole; while it is the province of philosophy to recognise and appropriate all the facts and phenomena of man's mental constitution, and to deduce from these the laws of his being, and his modes of action. The two are counterparts of each other, therefore there can be no real disagreement between them.

In all his inquiries Coleridge seems to have not only confessed these obvious truths, but, which is much more, to have practically recognised them. The truth is the same everywhere, and as the basis of both these sciences is the same, their details cannot be discordant; and therefore either theology must be adjusted to the requirements of philosophy, or else philosophy enlarged to meet the demands of theology. With a mind certainly not unduly prepossessed in favour of theological orthodoxy—with a boldness in speculation that bordered on temerity, united to a candour that does credit to the heart, and a power of deliberation that bespeaks the force of his intellect—he commenced the survey of the whole region covered by these two apparently discordant systems. And if but little is gained for the credibility of Christian orthodoxy by the confirmation, in the conviction of its truth, of the wavering and semi-infidel speculatist, that fact is certainly honourable to his mental acumen and ingenuousness. But in proportion as his convictions in favour of the truths of theology increased, was his confidence in the philosophy of the age diminished, and a thorough reëxamination of its basis and superstructure seemed to be required.

The system of philosophy that had governed the minds of the learned since the time of Bacon, with a tyranny scarcely less absolute than that of Aristotle among the schoolmen, was then in the fulness of its undisputed power. Its superiority over that which it had supplanted is unquestionable; and because it rested upon indisputable phenomena, it seemed immovable. Here all was clear, and obvious, and *tangible*. True, the system, as such, was not altogether new; it had been proposed and maintained by the Epicureans two thousand years before; but they employed it chiefly in the highest forms of philosophical investigation, and pushed its conclusions where they were most certain to appear objectionable. The modern sensuous philosophy, which is known by the name of Locke, differs in many important particulars from the system of the Epicureans; but only in *particulars*—the bases are the same. Nor is it to be lightly accounted of for that reason. Of its truthfulness within its appropriate sphere, no man possessed of five senses, and accustomed to examine and analyze his own mental processes, can be long in doubt. Our objections are not against the system itself, but the

abuse of it; not that it is an incorrect philosophy, but that while it is but the half of a system, it is set up as the whole,—and that its processes, carried into a region that belongs not to it, produce confusion and propagate error.

This state of the case was early seen and felt by Coleridge, who detected the fault long before he was able to construct a better theory. He was, in fact, of all men the least fitted for theorizing. His thoughts were eminently fragmentary. His perceptions were acute rather than clear; and so intensely did he fix his mind upon the definite point of his observations, that he considered the things which he contemplated in their individuality rather than in their relations. This habit of concentration, fearlessly exercised in the highest metaphysical inquiries, led to a clear and steady view of facts and principles of which the sensuous philosophy of Locke afforded no satisfactory solution, and of course suggested the thought that that system is fundamentally defective. Out of this suggestion arose at length, by the accretion of evidences derived from continued observations and reflections, the theory of the distinction of the understanding and the reason.

Here we must request the reader to observe, that these terms (reason and understanding) are used by this writer with a definiteness of meaning that excludes from each much that in common usage is applied indiscriminately to either, and so renders them no longer in any degree synonymous, but clearly and pointedly distinct. Such a discrimination would be unreal in the sensuous system of Bacon and Locke, where both terms are applied to a common faculty; but here they are employed to indicate things, not only not identical, but clearly contradistinguished, the one from the other. Nor is this a merely curious discrimination, fitted only to exercise the intellect; it is real in its character, and fruitful of consequences.

It is freely granted by those who complain of the old system of philosophy as defective, that we receive a large share of our original ideas by means of the senses. There must be, therefore, in the constitution of the mind an adaptation, first to the senses and the external world, and secondly, but eminently, to the use of the original ideas thus received. To this general faculty—this intellectual adaptation to converse with the external world, and with the ideas received by such conversation—Coleridge gives the name of the *understanding;* which, adopting the definition of Kant, he denominates "the faculty judging according to sense," and elsewhere he styles it the *discursive* faculty. The nature of this faculty, as described by him, is not essentially nor widely different from that which bears the same name in the systems of Locke and the Scotch

metaphysicians; but while they use the term as comprehending the whole of man's intellectual faculties in the aggregate, he confines it to only a part. What though it is granted that all the earliest ideas we receive are of external causation; and though it were further conceded that without the quickening influences of sensation the soul could never arouse itself from its oblivious unconsciousness, still it must be evident to him who thinks independently, that there are mental states and processes which cannot be referred either immediately or mediately to external causes. This supersensuous perception, or rather the faculty of the mind by which it is made, he denominates *reason*, "the power of universal and necessary conviction, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves." The definite appropriation of these terms severally to their particular faculties is not altogether arbitrary. Human language, which is but the outward dress of human thought, has ever recognised a difference of meaning between the reason and the understanding; a difference that constantly impresses the intelligent mind, even when the distinction is not clearly perceived. But the use of terms is less important than are the things implied in their use. If the distinction thus indicated is a real one, then each faculty requires its own proper designation; and till a better nomenclature is proposed we may continue to use this.

Nor is this discrimination merely a barren act of definition and classification. The elucidation of any great principle in philosophy usually casts its light upon the relations and consequences of the truths thus brought into view. An important use of this distinction is the determination of an infallible test of rationality; for no enlargement of the understanding can amount to reason, and no degree of reason can subsist without rationality. The human understanding is almost, if not altogether inductive; and therefore it appears in all proportions of development and increase, according to its amount of intelligent experience. But that which men attain to only by experience may be, and no doubt often is, congenital with other beings; and yet, as in its processes with them no less than with him, it is "the faculty judging according to sense," it is understanding and not reason. In this faculty it is indeed often found that in some particulars many of the inferior animals greatly excel men; but no one can suppose that any degree of improvement in the intelligence of irrational animals would render them rational. This sufficiently demonstrates the difference in kind of the two faculties, and also recognises the reason as that property (found only in man, among the denizens of the earth) by which a rational being is distinguished.

In its operations the reason takes cognizance of a class of truths, and originates a set of ideas, that have no proper causal relations to the senses, and therefore lie beyond the field of the understanding. Occupied exclusively in supersensuous matters, things that have their evidence in themselves, reason appeals only to itself as the basis—the substratum of the truths it affirms. While the understanding, because it operates through organs, and deduces its determinations from multiform sources of conviction, is at once discursive in its actions, and uncertain as to its decisions; the reason, which acts directly upon its objects by immediate contemplation, is fixed in its position, and (as to its own assurance) absolutely certain in its determinations. The themes that belong exclusively to the reason—things above or beyond the range of the senses, and the operations of sensation—are those which are generally recognised as distinctive of the human character, as compared with that of brutes, —the æsthetical and moral. The emotions of beauty, of sublimity, or of admiration, though occasioned by sensations, and finding their exciting causes in the objects of the senses, are manifestly neither sensations nor the objects of sensuous observations. They are also fixed and determinate as to the truths they affirm. No one ever asks whether the landscape he is contemplating is or is not beautiful, or whether there is sublimity in the tempest-driven ocean upon which he is gazing, or moral grandeur in the heroic virtue that he is considering. Here every one appeals to himself, and determines conclusively, according to the dictates of "the power of universal and necessary convictions" in his own mind. From this has arisen the common, but strictly philosophical maxim, that "*there can be no disputing about tastes;*" for when the reason of the individual has decided the case, there can be no appeal. For him the thing is beautiful, sublime, or noble, though no other can find it so. The same rule holds good as to moral qualities, and the distinctions of right and wrong. Here, indeed, there is an entire independence of the senses, not only in the exercise of the faculty, but also as to the occasioning excitement. Here, too, is the same fixedness of views and self-consciousness of truth that distinguish the reason from the understanding. True the decisions of reason may be conditional, and so far uncertain as the conditions on which its decisions depend are not fixed; but this uncertainty always arises from causes extraneous to the reason. Let its conditions be assumed as fixed, and its determinations will be absolute and invariable, contemplated in its relation to abstract truth,—because when its conditions are fixed its determinations are absolute; but, in its relation to facts, cognizable by the understanding, which are always variable, its

decisions are also conditional, though absolute as far as the conditions are determined. The uncertainty in all such cases is not as to things perceived by the reason, but as to matters beyond its range, whose relations to these may modify its determinations.

Since the faculty of reason perceives purely spiritual objects by its direct action, as the eye detects colours and the ear sounds, it bears a near analogy to the senses, and has been denominated the interior and the moral sense. And as the convictions produced by sensations are direct and necessary, so those produced by the operations of the reason are complete and indubitable. By virtue of this faculty the rational being has a conscience and taste—which, indeed, are only the reason brought to operate upon two distinct classes of objects—and experiences through the one a sense of self-approval or remorse, and through the other mental gratification or disgust. And as it is by this faculty that men are chiefly distinguished from irrational animals, so in proportion as it is cultivated will the spiritual in man be elevated above the sensual,—the man above the brute,—and the human character made to approximate the nature of superior beings. Here, too, is found in man something which transcends mere nature, and lives and acts without immediate dependence on the material world; and is therefore immortal, and capable of performing its functions without the coöperation, or even the presence of the material organism.

The recognition of the essential diversity of the two faculties denominated the understanding and the reason, which is the characteristic of Coleridge's philosophy, suggests the inference that the personal being, the *ego ipse*, lies back of both of them, and is only indirectly known. As perceptive faculties they differ in that the understanding operates only by the aid of the senses, while the reason acts directly and without intermediate helps. Both are alike attributes of the same personality—*ὑπόστασις*—and both are essential to man's intrinsic being. The understanding, employing its apparatus of material organs, and elaborating the intellectual pabulum obtained by sensation, exhibits its possessor as "nature's noblest animal," yet only a natural being; reason, on the other hand, by direct intuitions performing like functions as to things purely spiritual, equally clearly demonstrates the claims of its subject to the character of a spiritual being. Behind both of these lies the originating cause of their activities,—the rational soul, "having life in itself;" and by its own inherent energy, giving impulse and direction to its faculties. To the soul thus revealed by its own exercises, in the dialect of philosophy, is given the name of the will.

In discussing the nature of the human will—the volitionary power of the soul—it is necessary to distinguish it from mere external purposes,—*the surface will:* this is common to men and brutes, that pertains only to rational beings. The appetites which originate in the animal system, and the passions and desires that are possessed in common by men and inferior animals, all tend strongly to determine the purposes of their subjects. In the case of irrational beings, these influences are as direct and their results as certain as the mechanical laws, because there is no power in their subjects above them to hold them in check; but in rational beings the reason rises above the passions, and acts by its own energy, and independently of all beyond itself:—this is original volition. To both the mechanical determinations of irrational impulses, and the self-conscious exercise of the rational soul, the term *will* is applied in popular discourse; and in a sense in each case suited to the nature of each, both are said to be free. The force of gravitation certainly acts freely,—that is, the body acted upon by it offers no opposing force. So the impulse that acts upon irrational creatures acts freely, because there is no higher principle in them to resist it. Endow the magnetic needle with consciousness, and it will find itself strongly desiring to balance itself agreeably to the laws of its polarity; and in like manner the undivided purpose of the merely sensuous mind agrees with the tendency of the extraneous impulse, and acts freely, though necessarily. In the absence of the rational principle—the supersensuous reason—there can be only a mechanical freedom—a freedom that is irresistibly necessitated—and therefore properly no freedom at all.

But the freedom of the rational will is of a higher and more absolute character. It is the high prerogative of the will to originate its volitions independently of everything beyond its own essential being. The inclinations that govern all besides originate beyond their being, but the rational will is a law to itself. The proofs of these positions are precisely those that any original investigation must produce. All that can be said as to them is, Such are the facts, as found upon actual examination. We do not prove the existence of matter, nor, otherwise than by examination, the laws of matter; neither do we prove that man is more than a creature of sense, that he is capable of acting from the inherent energy of his own nature; because these things, if believed at all, must be believed because they are found to be true by the individual. If, with the same objects presented to the mind's contemplation, in two or more persons, different convictions are produced, this diversity can be referred only to a constitutional diversity of the perceptive faculties,

and all dispute about it must cease. But there is no such diversity in the mental constitutions of men; there, more than anywhere else, do we find a wonderful harmony, an absolute uniformity in the moral sense.

The corollaries deducible from this sublime truth of the freedom of the rational will are of the utmost practical importance, and require a passing notice. The first of these, as elaborated by our author, relates to the nature and application of moral responsibility. We intuitively associate responsibility with freedom, or the power of self-determination; and if by a false philosophy the mind becomes so far sophisticated as to believe that its purposes are not determined by its own independent action, the sense of responsibility at once becomes unsettled, or it wholly disappears. When by the exercise of the reason men perceive what is right, they at once, and by the necessary action of the internal sense, feel their obligation to do it, because they know that they are free so to do; and if, through the perversity of the will, duty is neglected, the sense of guilt that ensues constantly assumes the existence of this freedom as its necessary and vital condition. The notion that a sense of duty can be derived from the power of the sovereign, or the rights of proprietorship, is simply an absurdity, against which every rational mind bears a steady and indignant protest. We ascribe moral responsibility among earthly beings only to man, because he alone is a rational being; he only is possessed of reason, and a *will*—the highest form of reason. Let him be deprived of this power, and you acquit him of guilt for anything he may have done or neglected to do, and forever remove from him all moral obligations and responsibilities.

These things appear exceedingly plain and evident when considered in the light of Coleridge's philosophy of the mind. (We call it Coleridge's, without presuming that he either invented it, or that he was the first to promulgate it; but because it is the philosophy that pervades his works, and which he has, more fully and satisfactorily than any other, developed and illustrated.) They are also too evident to be practically denied, even where a false or defective philosophy gives its suffrages in opposition to them. And yet it would be exceedingly difficult, on the basis of the sensuous philosophy—which either entirely ignores the reason, or makes it a modification of the understanding—to prove the reality of such a freedom, or to believe its existence possible. If the premises laid down by that system of philosophy are adopted, we see not how to avoid the application of the law of mechanical dynamics to the impulses and purposes of the will. If the will be no more than the resultant of the various

forces that operate upon the mind, (forces that originate beyond itself,) then by the utmost certainty are its directions and final actions necessary. Hence the sublimated doctrine of philosophical necessity, so elaborately defended by the elder Edwards, is the only just conclusion that can be drawn from that system: The human mind is then a piece of machinery, most subtile and intricate indeed; but yet only a machine, to be impelled and directed by influences arising from its circumstances, over which it has no control, and against which it can offer no form or degree of existence.

It is true that most writers, whether philosophical or theological, who have set out with these premises, have sought to avoid their conclusions; and, for that purpose, all forms of sophistry have been used with the usual success: those who have used them have neither satisfied themselves nor convinced their readers. It has been said that the freedom of the will is a matter of consciousness; but do those who thus answer distinguish between mechanical and spiritual freedom?—the apparent only, and the real? Would not the animated and self-conscious magnetic-needle have a consciousness of its own freedom, when agreeable to its natural appetences it balances itself upon the magnetic meridian? Self-consciousness cannot go back of the soul's own exercises, and therefore can never affirmatively assert the absence of a constraining power lying back of these. Coleridge's philosophy avoids this difficulty by bringing into view the self-active spirit in man—the originating will, which being itself causative is recognised as the sufficient and primary source of all volitions. But the most effective objections have been drawn from the consideration of the consequences of granting the conclusions to which that system leads. It is undeniable that this philosophical necessity removes responsibility from the agent, and refers it back to the originating cause,—that is, to God himself,—and so obliterates all moral distinctions and responsibilities; in which, however, it contradicts the universal sentiment of mankind, and therefore cannot be true. This argument, the *reductio ad absurdum* of the geometricians, to be of any value, must assume as a postulate that which only the pure reason can satisfactorily ascertain,—to wit, the reality of right and wrong. If that point be assumed as fixed, then, as in a geometrical proposition, this result being false, the premises from which it is deduced must also be false; and the philosophical system, of which it is an integral part, must be either positively false or radically defective. The establishment, upon a clearly ascertained basis, of the doctrine of the absolute freedom of the rational will, is among the earliest results of the spiritual philosophy that justly bears the name of Coleridge among English readers, in opposition to

the sensuous system of Locke; and this philosophy, carried into theological discussions, must forever silence the long-continued Calvinistic controversy,—a controversy in which one party held to their philosophy at the expense of truth, and the other to the truth at the expense of philosophy.

In asserting the absolute freedom of the will, it should be remembered that the original constitution of the mind is considered, without taking into the account its accidents and history. Though this freedom is essential, and therefore, as to external causes, imperdible, the will is, nevertheless, subject to a variety of influences, which originate in itself, tending to affect its volitions, and to modify the perceptive powers of the reason, and even in certain cases to bring the will itself into a kind of captivity. This doctrine of the depravation of the will is among the points most fully elaborated in Coleridge's Works, and one of so much practical importance that we shall presently refer to it again.

The nature of sin is most clearly and satisfactorily illustrated by this philosophy; and, we think we may safely add, by no other. Omitting all merely theological definitions of the subject, and passing by any historical account of the introduction of sin into the world, we would endeavour simply to ascertain in what sin consists. That it is always intimately related to the will may be assumed without argument, since that will not be called in question. Here, however, the distinction just noticed between the surface-will—the making of choices, and purposing specific ends in detail—and the volitionary power of the whole soul, which in its determinations carries with it the *me-ipsum*, the entire self, demands our attention. Particular acts may be determined by particular volitions, and these may themselves be determined by circumstances—things exterior to the will—which operate upon the determining power within, through the understanding,—the sensuous soul. Now such acts may be styled sinful; not however as to their own nature, but on account of the sinful purpose of the will that suggests or permits them. Since only the reason recognises moral properties, and the interior-will is alone capable of acting in view of moral obligations, sin can be predicated of only the reason, in its volitionary action—that is, of the *will*. The reason, acting as a moral sense, becomes the conscience, which is also a law to the will, obliging its volitions, but not compelling them. The final determination is with the sovereign self; and sin results when its determinations are contrary to the truth, and in violation of the obligations which the conscience discloses and enjoins. But though the final determination of every purpose is with the will,

yet its determinations are seldom, perhaps never, strictly arbitrary. The will is indeed capable of rising above all extraneous motives, and is required to do so at the suggestions of the conscience; yet it is plain that external motives do often decide its determinations, which indeed they always should do when no higher considerations forbid it. This subjection of the will to the understanding constitutes *prudence*,—a property which may be a virtue or a vice, according as it is or is not agreeable to the conscience. But the will has also a moral character of its own, which is the law of its being and of its actions. To this inherent moral aptitude, or tendency of the will, its volitionary powers are subject, and by it are its volitions determined. If, through the power of its own depravity, the will is steadily and effectually self-determined to a course at variance with right and duty, such a determination is not the less sin because of the enslavement of the will; it is still a transgression of the law,—the arraying of the will in its determinations against the light of reason and the dictates of conscience. And should both the perceptive and the impulsive powers of reason be overborne and suspended, the volitions that are thus made in the darkness of depravity are still essentially sinful. Sin, therefore, in its active form, is any exercise of the will in opposition to the right,—which right is indeed an object of the intuitive perception of the reason, but it also has a substantial being; so that if for any cause the reason fails to find it, its observance is nevertheless matter of duty, and its neglect or violation is sin.

This, however, is only sin in action. The question here very naturally arises, whether it has not also a substantial being—an ontological character? Is not that which prompts the soul to evil deeds, and effectually determines the will in a direction the reverse of that dictated by the uncorrupted reason, itself the very essence that imparts its colouring to the perverse volitions of the will? Though a sinful self-determination may have led the soul into its weakness and depravity, is not that which reveals itself in the fatal proclivity of the soul to unrighteousness, and the effectual alienation of the will from the direction of the perceptive and impulsive reason, the substantive being which in such combinations becomes only an attribute? "All unrighteousness is sin;" and the spirit of mind that produces every form of practical iniquity in the exercise of the active powers, is most assuredly the very essence of unrighteousness.

From this view of the nature of sin we may readily apprehend what that is which we denominate *original sin*. We employ the epithet *original* in its philosophical, rather than in its historical or

theological sense—to indicate that a certain congenital proclivity of the human will, to a course of action in opposition to the right and good, is found inhering in every human soul *ab origine*. If, therefore, sin be considered in its ontological character as existing in man's character at his birth, so that it grows up with his growth, and is developed with the development of the original elements of his character, it is evidently *original sin*. Nor does this statement differ in its substance from that which we find in the formularies of the faith of the Church. There we are taught that "Original sin is the corruption of the nature [will] of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is of his own nature [will] inclined to evil, and that continually." The fact here assumed is not merely a theological dogma,—one of the distinctive doctrines of Christianity. Whether the truth of revealed religion is believed or denied, the native depravity of the human character is a terrible self-demonstrating fact. The Scriptures do indeed describe it with a clearness and force nowhere else to be met with; but its existence is recognised in every form of religion that recognises the distinctions of right and wrong; and its practical effects are seen by all whose attention is at all directed to the characteristics of the rational soul. Original sin, then, is a depravation of the *will*,—a corruption inherent in itself, effectually inclining its determinations in opposition to the essential good, and to the dictates of right reason. Out of this, as from an impure fountain, flows whatever of actual wrong-doing is found in men's conduct; and though we judge them by their overt actions, yet we do this, always understanding that such actions are the index to their character. To adopt Coleridge's own words: "We call an individual a bad man, not because an *action* of his is contrary to the law, but because it has led us to conclude from it some *principle* opposed to the law,—some private maxim or by-law of his *will*, contrary to the universal law of right reason in the conscience, as the ground of the action." Men are good or bad according as their individual wills are or are not conformed to the law of right reason, which is the expression of the divine will in them; and their actions are morally good or bad according to the character of the volitionary agent from which they proceed. "A good man, out of the good treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man, out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is evil: *for of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh*;" or, in the language of our philosophy, the outward actions express the character of the will, whence they proceed. The whole matter as to the character of original sin is very happily given by our author in a few concise sentences:

"A moral evil is an evil that has its origin in the will. An evil common to all must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral evil, we are bound in conscience (the reason exercised upon matters of right and wrong) to admit; and that there is an evil common to all is a fact,—and this evil must therefore have a common ground. Now this evil ground cannot originate in the divine will; it must therefore be referred to the will of man (man in the aggregate.) And this evil ground we call *original sin.*"

We have already noticed the influence of original sin in effectually anticipating the volitionary action of the will. As a philosophical possibility this appears to be open to no valid objection. Freedom of action in the will depends not only upon its nature as a volitionary agent, but upon this power of volition being unencumbered by any constitutional tendency of the volitionary self to some particular course of willing. If any such constitutional proclivity exists in the will, the volitions will of course be affected by them; and the will, though absolutely free as to all influences beyond its own essential nature, will still be effectually determined by its own nature in one direction, to the exclusion of the opposite. In its condition of original rectitude, (we employ this expression only philosophically, discarding for the present the aid of historical facts,) like the well-balanced compass-needle, it moved freely, according to the direction of the great magnetic centre—the True and Good—and by its own impulses, the dictates of the conscience. But it has now become subjected to a disturbing force, which has not only caused a temporary variation in its direction, but has permanently induced a new polarity. The will is still self-moved, as it ever must be; but its own self-originated impulses have become evil in their tendency. This is the result of that fatal depravation of the human will, which in both philosophical and theological language is called original sin. Whether in fact this depravation is total, or whether there still remains in the will the power of self-recovery, is a question of facts. We see, however, no philosophical objection against concluding that it is complete; and unhappily the facts gathered from human history would favour the same conclusion. Nor is the fact that the fallen will has been reinstated, in numerous individual cases, an argument against this position, since the interference of a redemptive agency, *ab extra*, is no less a philosophical possibility than it is a fundamental theological truth.

We are thus brought, without going out of our way, to the consideration of the conversion and regeneration of the will,—its emancipation from the thraldom of original sin, by the destruction

or removal of that principle or power from the soul. If indeed the depravation of the will is complete, such a restoration can be effected only by a power from beyond its own being. This, in theological language, would be a redemption by grace. Whether there is such a redemption provided beyond himself for man, is primarily a question lying outside of the range of philosophy. That it is a possibility, though it is not susceptible of proof, *a priori*, no one can deny. To assume that the Almighty, the creating and sustaining Spirit, may not so communicate his renovating power to the fallen and disordered soul as to repair its ruin and restore its integrity, is to assert a high improbability, without any evidence whatever. Though we are at no time conscious of the action of such a renovating power upon our spiritual being, that cannot be adduced as an argument against it, since the point of his access is beyond the range of self-consciousness;* and it would be presumptuous in us to attempt to decide what may not be in such a case. It is plain, therefore, that while the efficient cause of the conversion of the soul —or, to speak philosophically, the rectification of the will—is beyond the range of philosophical inquiry, there is nothing in the supposition of a divine agency in that work to conflict with the light of reason; and if other evidence seems to make that supposition probable, reason has nothing to oppose against it. But though the Divine Spirit operates in secret, the effects are manifest—first to the interior sense, and then by their outward manifestations to the discursive faculty. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: *so is* [it with] *every one that is born of the Spirit.*" These inward manifestations of the work of the regenerating Spirit constitute the phenomena of religious experience; and to the properly-instructed mind they are the necessary and indubitable evidences of their own reality. By the light of his own reason a man perceives the processes of his internal being; and though he may be unable to trace them to their sources, or to explain their relations, yet as facts he cannot disbelieve them. He may fail to assign the things which he sees, and feels, and cannot doubt, to their proper places, and to deduce from them their legitimate inferences; but he knows beyond a peradventure that certain changes have taken place

* If any reflecting mind be surprised that the aids of the Divine Spirit should be deeper than our consciousness can reach, it must arise from the not having attended sufficiently to the nature and necessary limits of human consciousness. For the same impossibility exists as to the first acts and movements of our own will,—the furthest distance our recollection can follow back the traces never leads us to the first foot-marks.—*Coleridge.*

within him. Like him who was miraculously restored to sight, he may permit others to call in question all points respecting the matter that do not come within his own self-consciousness; as to these things, however, he will say, "One thing *I do know.*" Nor are we to view the object of this divine process—the soul graciously emancipated from its own corruptions—as the merely passive though intelligent beholder and recipient of the work of the Spirit. It was not merely by using a metonymy that the apostle, as the prophet had before done, exhorted the people to repent and *convert themselves;* for the aids of divine grace go no further than to enable the soul, by its own uncompelled action, to refuse the evil and choose the good. When the soul, thus enabled, makes that better choice, the work of conversion is effected—the soul is regenerated; and by continuing to hold the volitions in the line of the right, the soul becomes conformed by its own exercises (maintained indeed by gracious aids) to habits of righteousness.

Following this train of speculation a little further, we may obtain some valuable suggestions respecting the difficult question of the sudden and thorough conversion of the soul, which some maintain as a fact, and others doubt as unphilosophical. With the facts in the case we have now nothing to do; we only inquire whether such a thorough regeneration of the moral nature is agreeable to the requirements of our philosophy. If the depravity of the soul is so complete that it is free in its own nature to will only evil, its power at any time to choose what is good must result from extraneous causes. The existence and perpetual operation of such a counteracting cause is one of the essential conditions of personal responsibility, which must therefore be sufficient to overcome the power of inbred sin, but not of such force as to compel the volitions. In such a case, the volitionary power of the soul always effectually determines the decision for good or evil. Now, if the extraneous influences in favour of the right are of such a force as to require a perpetual volitionary action against them to maintain the soul in its evil choice, the yielding to these influences necessarily determines the choice agreeably to their tendency. But in proportion to the volitionary energy, the resistance may be great, and the accumulation of external motives powerful; and when, after such a stubborn resistance, the will at length yields, and casts its power on the same side, the effects upon the whole moral character must be at once and thoroughly transforming. Whatever therefore may be the facts in the case, there is nothing unphilosophical in the notion that a great sinner may be suddenly and thoroughly converted.

Pursuing our line of remark one stage further, we will next con-

sider the nature of Christian faith, in the light of Coleridge's philosophy, though not altogether as he has presented it; for on this point he seems not to have thought himself through his subject. Faith, evidently, has much in its nature that quite transcends reason, but we hold that it is in nothing contrary to reason; and, therefore, just as far as faith comes within the sphere of reason, it may be subjected to a philosophical analysis. Reason demonstrates man's proper spiritual character, and his power of supersensuous perception; but the range of its observations is confined to the world within: all its operations are subjective. Faith, on the contrary, is wholly objective in its operations; it looks constantly abroad, and contemplates things extraneous to its own subject. The teachings of natural theology, and the historical evidences of Christianity, have only a secondary relation to faith,—they reveal nothing to the interior soul. The forces of evidence as to moral subjects are not realized to the mind by their own natural and necessary power, in such a manner as to occasion conviction; otherwise all who are exposed to the same external evidences would believe precisely alike. The state of the heart and the exercises of the will have much to do in determining the strength or weakness of conviction; so that men are held responsible for what they believe or disbelieve, as well as for what they do or leave undone. A susceptible heart, an attentive spirit, and an obedient will, are all indispensable requisites for the attainment and exercise of faith; and whatever unbelief exists in the face of revealed truth, exists through this perversity of spirit, and it is therefore at once sinful and the mother of all sins. The external evidences of revealed religion are the foundation of its temple of faith; the spiritual soul, with its intuitions and its pure reason, is the sacred shrine where it dwells, and whence it looks outward and upward to contemplate its objects,—

> "The things unknown to feeble sense,
> Unseen by reason's glimmering rays."

To the human soul, in the perfection of its powers and susceptibilities, faith were as steady a property as either sense or reason; but to human nature as it is, it must be a supernatural gift. It is not the less rational in its character, however, because of its supernatural origin. The restored life of one miraculously raised from the dead is only natural life, though supernaturally bestowed; and the reinstated reason of the maniac of Gadara was in no wise another thing from the same faculty enjoyed by him before his madness had overtaken him, though now he had received it by a miraculous interposition. So the power of faith, restored by the

agency of the Divine Spirit, though above reason as to its objects, is nevertheless strictly agreeable to reason as a reality, and in its modes of operation. The relations of faith to its appropriate objects are highly analogous to those of sense, as applied to material things, and of reason, to the internal states and to spiritual essences. Like theirs, its perceptions are direct and immediate; and in its decisions it appeals for support only to its own perceptions, and it remains fixed in their certainty. It sees the truth of which the Scriptures bear their record, and appropriates the provisions and promises of the gospel, while the theologian is discussing their character and adaptation, and the Christian apologist is vindicating their title to credibility. Faith supplies its own evidences, and therefore it is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." By it man becomes cognizant of spiritual things, and through its guidance he is led into all truth pertaining to his spiritual affairs.

We have thus laid before the reader the distinctive features of the philosophical system to which Coleridge devoted all his power of thought and illustration, and which pervades all his works. To the mere philosopher, the single question of interest respecting it relates to its truth; as to which our author appeals to the facts of mental action as they are found in all rational minds, and to each one's personal self-consciousness, with the fullest confidence that these will sustain his positions. But the Christian has a still higher interest in the question thus propounded to him. Holding his philosophy subordinate to his faith, he is nevertheless solicitous that this should be fortified by that, and confesses the embarrassment that he feels when they seem to disagree. Too long has the popular philosophy maintained an unfriendly relation to revealed religion; and the mysteries of the Christian faith have been embraced, when indeed they have not been rejected, in defiance of the lessons of the schools. Man wants a philosophy that recognises his spiritual as well as his sensuous nature, and a theology which, so far as it comes within the sphere of philosophy, is agreeable to its requirements. This, it has been our purpose to show, is effected by the system of spiritual philosophy set forth by our author, which at once answers to the facts of man's character, and illustrates the theology of the Scriptures. The most implicit believer of revelation cannot wholly divest himself of the influence of his reason over his faith; he believes there is a substantial harmony between them, though he may fail to find it; and though he defers his philosophy for the sake of his faith, yet he confidently expects a period in his mental history when the present apparent disagreement shall be harmonized. But so long

as they are at variance, they necessarily act as opposing forces, and the power of faith is diminished by whatever is attained by philosophy. How often and how sadly this has been experienced by many an intelligent and ingenuous spirit, who desired a faith for the soul's comfort, but could not, even for such a boon, divest itself of its rationality, the confessions of many an inquiring spirit but too plainly demonstrate. How greatly would the faith of men be increased and rendered permanent, could all the influences of philosophy be added to its own inherent power,—an assistance to which the soul is entitled, and of which there is a very great necessity. The contest between the faith of the Church and the philosophy of the schools, since the days of Bacon, and especially since the inauguration of Locke's semi-materialism, has been a fearful one; and the ascendency of the faith over its antagonist is proof of its indestructibleness, and of the feeble hold that the latter has had upon the convictions of those who have adopted it for want of a better system. By the inauguration of a more rational and spiritual system, and one that answers to the real conditions of man's character, philosophy itself will be greatly strengthened, and all its increased powers made available in behalf of revealed truth.

Such being our settled convictions as to the practical nature of the subject under consideration, we cannot but congratulate the Christian public, and the advocates of sound philosophy, on the issue in this country of a standard edition of Coleridge's Works, trusting that their general diffusion will go far toward effecting that harmony, just noticed, as so highly desirable. Nor can we forbear to avail ourselves of the present occasion to urge upon all who possess at once the ingenuity and the ingenuousness to use them agreeably to their design and tendency, to "read, learn, and thoroughly digest" what is thus offered them. Here, especially, may that class of minds who are alike dissatisfied with a soulless, materialistic scepticism on the one hand, and a blindfolded faith or a congeries of transcendental vagaries—miscalled spiritual philosophy, but really a gilded atheism—on the other; here may such minds find a sure and safe middle-ground, where faith shall offer no violence to reason, and where reason shall contribute its undivided suffrages to faith. The times imperatively demand such a system of philosophy. The days of arbitrary authority are numbered; and even in matters of religion men will think and decide as free and rational beings. The dogmas of the theological teachers and the determinations of ecclesiastical councils can no longer compel the assent of minds that both can and will think rationally and independently. With that interest which one feels for such manly

independence, we would not only applaud the bravery by which such have broken the leading-strings of authority, but would gladly afford them any aid in our power in this perilous enterprise. He that disdains to have others think for him must learn, what very few have learned, to think for himself; and in this arduous work the prudent man will seek to avail himself of all possible assistance. To all such, therefore, we commend Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection," fully believing that they will prove to be what they profess to be,—that without the dogmatic air of the instructor, they are full of instruction,—and while compelling to reflection they greatly facilitate the performance of the work they impose. He who reads Coleridge has the key of knowledge in his own hand, by which he may open the portals of knowledge for himself, and learn not only what to believe, but the grounds of his convictions. He may indeed find cause to differ from his mentor—doubtless he will often do so, especially because the teacher had many errors to unlearn, and a mind slow to be convinced of cherished prejudices—but his own teachings will most surely direct others in so doing. Above all, the man who pursues this method with himself, will never be ashamed of his own cherished opinions, because he will know the foundation upon which they are built, and, by whomsoever they may be challenged, he will be able to render a reason for the hope that is in him.

We have confined our notices almost exclusively to the "Aids to Reflection," because they most fully and satisfactorily embody and illustrate the author's philosophico-theological speculations. Other portions of his works, however, are valuable helps in the same studies, since they afford many illustrations and elucidations of the principles here laid down in a more abstract form. "The Friend," the "Biographia Literaria," the "Literary Remains," and even the "Table Talk," abound in valuable reflections and illustrations, and afford not a few pregnant suggestions adapted equally to provoke that most unwelcome and infrequent exercise of the human mind—thinking—and to direct it upon a profitable track.

Before dismissing these volumes, even temporarily, we must importune the learned editor, and the publishers, to immediately set about remedying a defect that greatly mars the worth of these invaluable volumes; and to let all future editions—of which we trust there will be, not a few—be free from it. We refer to the want of a comprehensive index to the subjects. If, as has been said, every book that is worthy to be read is worthy of an index, Coleridge's Works are surely not unworthy of such an apparatus; and of all writers he has the most need of it, since the fragmentary and unsystematic form of his works makes some means of collecting the

scattered parts almost essential to a proper understanding of the whole. An index could readily be affixed to each volume—or, what would be better, a general index to the whole could be appended to the seventh—without sensibly increasing either its bulk or its cost; and we claim in behalf of the reading public, and especially in the name of the admirers of Coleridge, that Professor Shedd shall immediately render this further service to these works, with which his name is now so honourably associated.

Art. III.—THE SPIRIT AND MISSION OF METHODISM.

Some peculiar characteristic distinguishes every nation, and every period of its history. The last half-century has exhibited throughout Protestant Christendom a remarkable activity in all departments of society: more especially has this been so in the United States. "Progress" is inscribed on every banner. In the sciences and the arts, in morals and metaphysics, in civil and ecclesiastical polity, there is a general commotion—a restless, feverish effort to accomplish something new and extraordinary—it is hoped something better than the past.

It would be unwise to suppress these activities, either in the moral or the physical world. Men are fallible and finite, and therefore all their systems and organizations are subject to error and imperfection. Every honest effort to eschew error and vindicate the truth is commendable. The mighty improvements of recent date are worthy of the gratulations of every patriot and every Christian. The present universal eagerness for still further advancement inspires still higher hopes in the bosom of the philanthropist; but the frailties which have caused men to err heretofore should admonish them to take heed, lest in their attempts to eradicate existing evils in our civil, social, and religious systems, they do not fall into others equally pernicious.

In physical science, and the mechanic arts, the widest scope may be allowed to the genius and skill of men; for mistakes in these soon correct themselves by a practical demonstration of their fallacy. But in morals, in metaphysics, in religion, it is not always so easy to discover the relation between cause and effect, and to determine the errors of a doctrine or creed by an application of its principles to the conduct of life. And misconception here is the more to be dreaded, as the interests involved are so much the higher.

Among the organizations which have participated, more or less, in the progressive spirit of the times, is the Methodist Episcopal Church. We are happy to know, however, that this spirit of change has not impeached the cardinal doctrines of the Church, nor has it assailed to any great extent her existing usages, but is rather cumulative in its character, seeking to make additions to her administrative and disciplinary economy.

It is not the design of this article to discuss the propriety of any changes already made, or of those proposed to be made. All mere prudential rules may require modification and amendment, to meet the ever-varying condition and circumstances of the organization which they were ordained to regulate. And, doubtless, there may be exigencies now existing, demanding an enlargement and alteration of the original secular ordinances of the Church; but it is our design to fortify certain principles and regulations of Methodism against all encroachment, from all quarters. While it is granted that some parts of her economy may be modified, or dispensed with altogether, it is the design of this article to show that there are at least two things essential to the success of the Church, which must be allowed to remain as they are and have been.

We may, perhaps, be allowed to say, without vain-glory or bigotry, that, during the last century, no ecclesiastical organization has achieved more distinguished success than the Methodist Episcopal Church. To what has this been attributable? In the fundamental articles of her creed she is identical with all other orthodox denominations. It will not suffice, therefore, to assign her success to her doctrines alone. Nor will a reference to her schools, and general educational economy, or the learning of her ministry, or the amount and mode of application of her pecuniary resources solve the problem. In all these respects she has been equalled, and in some of them surpassed, by other sects. She has enjoyed no patronage from the state. No Mohammed has unsheathed the sword to propagate her dogmas, or to conquer proselytes. She has not pandered to the corrupt passions and propensions of human nature; for her peculiar tenet is Christian perfection, and her avowed mission is "to spread Scriptural holiness over these lands." She has never been the special favourite of the great. She commenced her career amid the gibes, and sneers, and persecutions of ungodly men; and, even at this day, she is sometimes the object of contumely and derision, not only from the infidel and the scorner, but also from the self-righteous and Pharisaic. Nevertheless, she has come up out of the wilderness, and stands forth "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners."

To what shall we ascribe her astonishing progress and power? Apart from the grace of God nothing good can be done. To God be all the glory. But what special principle or usage of Methodism, blessed by the grace of God, has been specially instrumental in the accomplishment of such vast and glorious results? Among the causes most prominent are: first, her earnestness—what Carlyle would call her "Heart-earnestness;" and, secondly, her system of Itinerancy. To a brief consideration of these, the reader's attention is respectfully solicited.

The rapid diffusion of Methodism attracted the attention of the philosophic mind of the great Chalmers. And when he, as the result of his investigation, declared that Methodism was "Christianity in earnest," he meant no idle compliment. To suppose so, would do injustice to the grave character of his mind and heart. He intended to announce an important principle. He meant to be understood, that abstract theology, and metaphysical dogmas, and mere creeds and catechisms, and decrees of ecclesiastical councils, would never convert the world. He intended that it should be implied that speculative and formal Christianity would never accomplish the object designed by the promulgation of the gospel. He wished to be understood that the mere moralist might preach virtue, and doctors of divinity expound the doctrines of the Bible, with all the precision of faultless logic, and every sanction of orthodoxy, and the people would still remain like the clay-image of Prometheus —cold, unmoved, and spiritually dead—till touched by the fire which the earnest heart brings down from Heaven.

All observation of man's moral constitution evinces the mighty influence of earnestness of heart and character, as an element of moral power, in the accomplishment of anything dependent upon the voluntary power and coöperation of mankind. The will, in matters of moral reformation, seldom yields to the mere convictions of the understanding.

> "Video meliora, proboque,
> Deteriora sequor."

The heart is the great motive power of human action. "That faith," says Hannah More, "which is purely a conviction of the understanding, seldom stirs beyond the point at which it first sits down." The intellectual faculties never achieve much, apart from the concurring and impelling influence of the affections. But the affections are depraved and averse to virtue. They, too, need something to arouse them to action. How can this be done? How can they be enlisted and excited to moral and religious effort?

Dr. Chalmers had been taught by his own early ministerial experience that the brightest mind may pour its radiance upon the people, while they shall remain, like the northern ice-field, mirroring the coruscations of the Borealis above it, cold and impassive; but his later experience had also taught him, that the same intellectual light, bathed and warmed in the energies and ardour of *an earnest heart*, and falling upon the very same people, could and would inspire them with a vigorous and virtuous activity. There is a contagious confidence in the earnest heart—a kind of moral magnetism—which attracts the will, and secures the faith and coöperation of men. Like the vernal sun, whose genial rays dissolve the icy fetters that bind the earth, and warm into life, and power, and beauty, animate and inanimate creation, so the fervour of the earnest Christian soul sheds its quickening lustre over the moral wastes of society, eliciting the sympathies, exciting the affections, and impelling the minds of men to the achievement of good deeds. "The passions," says Mr. Fletcher, "are the springs by which we are usually actuated. Reason alone is too weak to put us in motion as often as duty requires; but when love, that sacred passion of the faithful, comes to its assistance, we are then sweetly constrained to act in conformity to the various relations we sustain in civil and religious life."

It has been said that "history is philosophy teaching by example." What are the lessons that history—profane as well as sacred—has taught us on this subject? Her annals have not recorded an instance of a man or a people, that ever rose to enduring eminence and glory, who were not distinguished by earnestness of heart and energy of purpose. If we look into the quiet chamber of the student who has excelled in learning, we shall find him an earnest man—a man of faith. If we investigate the life of the man remarkable for his holiness of life, we shall hear him constantly exclaiming, in the language of the Psalmist,—"My *heart* is fixed, O God! my heart is fixed." If we desire to analyze the orator's power over his auditory, it will be found deep in his own earnest heart. "True eloquence," said Milton, "I find to be none but serious and hearty love of the truth" * * * * "whose mind is fully possessed with a fervent desire to know good things, and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others. When such a man would speak, his words, like so many airy servitors, trip about him at command, and in well-ordered files, as he would wish, fall aptly into their places." Referring to this sentiment of the great poet, so quaintly and yet so forcibly expressed, Mr. Legare, who was, perhaps, the most accomplished scholar that this country has

ever produced, declared that it comprehended "the great cardinal principles of all sound rhetoric, and was worth more than all Quintilian's twelve books put together." * * * * "It is given to no man, be his genius or accomplishments what they may, to sway with a real empire great masses, with any other voice than that of faith animated by hope; but, above all, inflamed with zeal, and with 'dearest charity,' to impress his convictions on others."

What is the reason that Clay had more influence over the masses, and even over the senate, than Webster? His logical powers were no better; his language was no better; his mental capacity was not superior: for in these respects Webster had no superior, if he had an equal. But Mr. Clay always threw his great heart into his cause; he was always in earnest. The people *felt* that he was in earnest; the senate *felt* that he was in earnest: and people and senate, like the willow in the blast, bowed to the power of his burning eloquence and fervid spirit.

Peter the Hermit affords a striking example. Impartial history assigns to him no great amount of talent, and very meagre literary accomplishments. He had not the learning of the scholar, nor the graces of the orator; yet he set Europe on fire, and at his bidding hundreds of thousands rushed to enrol themselves in the ranks of the Crusaders. It must be admitted that the hermit was a fanatic; but what is fanaticism but true zeal run mad? And the maxim that no heresiarch was ever dangerous whose temperament was not vehement, is an argument in favour of legitimate zeal and earnestness. The fact that fire, when it escapes from its proper limits, is a dangerous and destructive element, is no reason why there should be no fire at all. Nay, it is no reason why there should not be a great deal of fire, where a great deal of heat is necessary.

Take a more deserving example. The African Bishop Augustine was, it is true, a man of great intellectual capacity; but it was his heart that incited his mind to action. When the elegant historian, Mr. Bancroft, full of admiration, describes this celebrated ecclesiastic,—"when not a province, nor city, nor village, nor family was safe; confident that though Rome tottered, the hope of man would endure; rescuing from the wreck of the old world the truths that would renew humanity, and sheltering them in a cloister,"—he represents him as being animated by a "burning heart."

So, when the same historian writes of Luther,—"at whose bidding truth leaped from the cloister-walls, and challenged man to make her his guest, aroused every intelligence to acts of private judgment, and changed a dependent, recipient people into a reflecting, inquiring people,"—he describes him as accomplishing the mighty

work with a "heart of flame." Perhaps, indeed, few parts of history afford a more striking confirmation of the appeal we are making to her records than the Reformation. There was Erasmus, whose learning confounded cardinals and casuists; whose wit exasperated a corrupt hierarchy to desperation; whose raillery made folly laugh at itself; whose ridicule caused vice to blush at her own turpitude. There was Melancthon, the philosopher and the theologian, whose doctrinal theses and polemical writings were unsurpassed then, and perhaps are so still. But Rome baffled all these intellectual and literary agencies and influences. Luther entered the lists. He came with no supereminent mental endowments, no extraordinary stores of learning; but he came with a heart full of faith and the Holy Ghost. He came in earnest; and his earnestness, like electricity, smote the hearts of the people, and quickened them into life and activity. "The strongholds, and imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God," were "cast down" by it. Devils and diets fled before the vehement energies of the intrepid reformer; and the very Vatican trembled at the bare mention of his name.

Signal exemplifications of the same principle are displayed in our own national history. The admirers of the "Pilgrim Fathers" ascribe the present advanced and happy moral and political condition of our federal Union to the principles and virtues of these worthies. But who were the adventurers who first stood on "Old Plymouth Rock," having abandoned the homes of their childhood and the land of their fathers, for conscience' sake? Were they the kings and conquerors of the old world coming to found an empire in the new? Were they a colony of learned theologians, —the doctors of Oxford and Geneva? Were they the literati of Europe? Not so. No stars and garters, no glittering coronets, no mitred hierarchy, no emblems of royal power, no display of military authority, were seen on the decks of the "Mayflower." They were a little crew of European peasantry. Nevertheless, these plain, unsophisticated men kindled a flame amid the snows of our northern shores, whose light has, ever since, been a beacon to guide the oppressed of every clime and kindred to civil and religious freedom. What was the principle of this power and influence? It was earnestness of heart and purpose; it was heroic, fervent faith.

Let us pass to another quarter of our country, and another period of its history. The writer of this article recently stood on the very spot where the first effective impulse was given to the ball of the American Revolution; and as we thought of the past and contemplated the present, we felt like exclaiming, in the language of

the younger Adams,—"How sublime the transition from gloom to glory!" But when and how did this glorious transition commence? Let us look into the House of Burgesses of Virginia. There sits the high-born Robinson in the chair; there are the fiery spirits of the Randolphs; there is the classic Lee; there is the pure and spotless Wythe. But they are chilled and powerless in the dark shadow of the British throne,—spellbound by hereditary reverence for royal prerogative and prescriptive authority. It was reserved for the obscure son of a Hanover-county farmer—the unlettered, untitled Henry—to dissolve the charm of the tyrant. And when we see him rising in his place, and, in the midst of cries of treason from every part of the hall, denouncing his country's oppressor; and when afterward, responsive to his voice, the echo comes back from every mountain and every shore, from Massachusetts Bay to Savannah, "Give me liberty, or give me death,"—tell us what was the secret of his power? Was it the excellence of his rhetoric?—was it the force of his logic?—was it his intellectual supremacy? Nay! Divest the character of Mr. Henry of the veneration in which tradition has embalmed it, and strip it of the flowers with which the rhapsodies of Mr. Wirt have adorned it, and sober criticism will not award to him the highest degree of excellence in any of these respects. His heart—his bold, earnest heart of flame—was the source of his power over his countrymen.

How was the secession of the Free Church of Scotland in 1843 accomplished? Who was the master-spirit of that event, scarcely second in sublimity and importance to the Reformation itself? For a century or more the evangelical party had been exclaiming, in some form or other, against the assumptions of the civil authority, to coerce the reception and induction of the nominees of wicked and ungodly patrons. The most gifted intellects of this most intellectual nation had exhausted every source of argument in resisting governmental dictation in matters of spiritual concernment. The pulpit had not been silent in its remonstrances for a hundred years. The press groaned daily beneath the burden of the controversy. The weight of talent was in favour of the spiritual independence of the Church. Learning, religion, and the Bible espoused the same side of the question. The government party could hold out no longer. It was silenced; and, virtually acknowledging itself vanquished in the argument, it fell back upon the decree of the Court of Sessions, and upon the covetousness and selfishness of human nature, complacently reposing upon the conviction that the evangelical ministers would never renounce their livings merely to vindicate an abstract principle.

Thus the public understanding was enlightened. The argument was complete. The conviction of the national mind was thorough and universal. And yet the day of freedom lingered. What was wanting to consummate the designs of Heaven, and emancipate the conscience of Scotland from the corrupting thraldom of the civil power? It was an earnest man—a man with a soul of fire, and a heart of flame. God sent the man! Ever since the General Assembly of 1816, Chalmers had been infusing his own earnest faith and spirit into the Church. His words, like the arrow of the ancient archer, caught fire as they flew; and, like the steel upon the flint, his arguments struck fire from the Scotch heart. The spirituality of the Church increased daily. She became more and more earnest. God was preparing her for the 18th of May, 1843. That day arrived to chronicle an event of moral grandeur such as the world has seldom witnessed.

The limits of this article will not allow a particular reference to the events of that remarkable occasion. Nor is such a reference necessary now, while the heart is still throbbing with emotions produced by descriptions of the scene so recently passed away. Nevertheless, we may pause a moment to look upon those vast multitudes that are pouring along the streets of Edinburgh toward St. Andrews, till the precincts of that sanctuary present a wide sea of eager faces. The noble and ignoble are there, regardless of the distinction. Youth and hoary age mingle together, unmindful of the difference. The *élite* of Scotland's proudest cities are jostled by the Highland peasant, who has come down from his mountain-home, whither his fathers fled from the persecutions of Rome. Every other consideration is absorbed in one common solicitude. But through all the mighty throng the long-smothered fire of Knox and Henderson is rekindling in the hearts of the children of the covenant. Whence all this extraordinary excitement? How is it that the masses, until recently so indifferent, so callous to the concerns of the Church, so lukewarm, so unspiritual, are now even clamouring at the delay of their champions and leaders? What has produced this popular, nay, this Christian fervour, in the usually cold, circumspect, not to say phlegmatic heart of the Scotch nation? Who has thus stirred the deep elements of the Scotch mind to this unwonted degree of activity and enthusaism? Wait a moment. The people shall answer for themselves. The doors of St. Andrews will open presently. Meantime, what has hushed the eager multitudes into absolute silence? This is, indeed, "breathless expectation." You are startled by the exclamation—"They are coming!" and all is again silent. But who are coming? More

than four hundred of Scotland's best clergy are falling into the ranks of that procession—turning their backs not only upon the royal commissioner, but also upon the temples where they and their fathers have preached Christ for ages past; upon the dear manses, consecrated by the pious tears and prayers of centuries; upon comfort and competency, to cast themselves, and their wives, and their children upon God and the Church. They come; but still the vast multitude are hushed like the deep calm sea before the storm. A murmur is heard along the shore, ever and anon. So of this multitude. As their eyes survey the ranks of the seceding divines, they are unconsciously murmuring their names: "There is Dunlap—there is Welsh—here comes Cunningham—yonder is M'Candlish." Yes! Scotland's best talents—Scotland's greatest learning—men of whom the world might boast, are there. But still the masses are not satisfied. There is one name they have not yet pronounced. A tall, manly form, with concentrated brow and heaving heart, steps forward to the van of the procession; and forthwith the cry runs through the multitude—"There comes old Chalmers!" It is caught up and repeated from one to another, till every tongue has swelled the acclamation. And every beating heart and every gushing eye of that vast multitude affords another attestation of the moral power of an earnest heart and fervent zeal. It was so then. It is so still. It always will be so. Chalmers was a man of extensive erudition; but in this he did by no means surpass many of his contemporaries. He was a man of great intellectual capacity, but not greater than some of his coadjutors. He was eloquent; but even in this respect he had his peers. But in earnestness and zeal he stood alone; and these were the mainsprings of that great national movement which resulted in the establishment of the Free Church of Scotland.

But the history of the primitive Church affords, perhaps, the most conclusive demonstration of the principle we are discussing. Christianity was not propagated by kings, or councils, or conquerors. Its Divine Author went not for his apostles to the princes of Judea, or the rabbins of the Sanhedrim. His prescience saw that the Temple and the palace would not furnish the men to endure the persecutions which awaited his disciples. The earnest heart of martyrdom did not "dwell in king's houses." He sought for it elsewhere, and found it among the fishermen and tax-gatherers of Galilee. It was to them he confided the incipient work of the world's evangelization; to them he said, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Go into the midst of perils and prisons. Go, without scrip, or purse, or sword, and

encounter the treachery of the Jew, the cross of the Roman, and the wild beasts of the Gentile. And they went, poor in the world's esteem, but rich in faith. And thus chosen and commissioned, these obscure followers of the "despised Nazarene" lifted up the standard of their Master on the walls of Jerusalem, in sight of his crucifiers. They planted it on Mars Hill, in the midst of the myriad gods of Athens, and of their haughty worshippers. They preached Jesus in the palace of the Cæsars, while the streets of Rome were flowing with Christian blood. And wheresoever they went superstition and idolatry began to disappear. Classic shrines, hoary with age, were deserted. The metaphysics of Aristotle, the morals of Seneca, the sublime speculations of Plato, and the almost divine teachings of Socrates, yielded to the purer doctrines and better hopes of the gospel, as written by Matthew the publican, and preached by Peter the fisherman. Thus, and by such men, was that gospel promulgated, and its doctrines established, which bring "life and immortality to light;" which kindles hopes in the bosom of humanity that death cannot extinguish; which cheers earth's weariest pilgrim through all his toils and trials; robs death of its sting, and the grave of its victory; and points the dying saint to a crown of unfading glory.

And thus the extraordinary diffusion of Christianity, under the preaching of the primitive apostles, and all through the first three centuries of the Christian era, is a most irrefutable demonstration of the potency of an earnest faith. The annals of Methodism afford manifold signal and glorious illustrations of this principle. The incessant labours, the bitter denunciations, the vile calumnies, the furious mobs, the perils by sea and the perils by land, the perpetual persecutions through which Mr. Wesley passed, hardly less, if less at all, than those encountered by Luther and his contemporary reformers, leave no doubt of the earnestness and zeal of the founder of Methodism. The labours of Bishop Asbury, his journeys through the wilderness, his encounters with the savages, rivalling in perils and thrilling incidents the Anabasis of Xenophon; the privations and sufferings, the conquests and triumphs, the trials and achievements of the solitary "circuit-rider," pursuing the wanderers from the fold of his Master along our frontier settlements,—these things, and a thousand others connected with the history of the Church, supply ample materials for cogent and conclusive attestation of the almost omnipotent power of earnestness and zeal. The rapid spread and progress of Methodism can only be accounted for by referring them to these instrumentalities.

Now there is danger of forgetting this principle. Success and

power are of corrupting tendency. They have ruined multitudes of individuals. They have destroyed nations. They are the prolific source of that "ease in Zion" which is so disastrous to vital piety. And now that the Methodist Episcopal Church has assumed a position where she can no longer be despised; now that she has become powerful and respectable, even in the estimation of the world; now that it is no longer considered disreputable to be connected with her, and men begin to perceive that they may derive honour, or profit, or both, by being found within her pale; and now, when she no longer feels the purifying influence of persecution, there is danger of formal professions and a mammon-spirited membership. There is danger of pride and vainglory. There is danger of trusting in her own strength, and forgetting her dependence upon the grace of God. And thus surrounded by all these perils, there is danger of losing her pristine simplicity, zeal, and earnest faith. O let her invoke the spirit of our fathers, and, through all time to come, remain "a peculiar people, zealous of good works!"

It was a wise remark of Phocion, that "no state ever ceased to be prosperous while she adhered to those principles and institutions to which she owed her prosperity." This maxim is equally true when applied to the Church. Let the Methodist Episcopal Church, therefore, beware, lest her future disasters shall be reproved by the superior wisdom of the Athenian statesman.

II. *The Itinerancy* of the Methodist Episcopal Church is an important secondary agency in promoting her progress and success.

It is not our purpose to discuss the apostolic origin and authority of this feature of her economy. We are willing to take it as we find it, convinced that whether it be according to primitive usage or not, it is an admirable and efficient instrumentality. It appears to us, moreover, to be almost a necessary result of that faith which works by love. An earnest Christianity must be aggressive—must be missionary. It cannot remain stationary, or be kept in seclusion. It will not be satisfied with a parish less than the world; for it has a message of mercy to "every creature."

But, apart from these general considerations, what response shall be made to the allegations of some, who declare that the itinerancy has accomplished its mission, and ought to be discontinued? There is one fact, particularly, which may be referred to as a replication to this fancy of our reformers. If, heretofore, wide extent of territory and sparseness of population, where a local, settled ministry cannot be supported, have demanded a travelling ministry, do not the same difficulties still demand the same regulations to meet them?

Far from admitting the inutility of an itinerating ministry, even in the most densely populated districts, including our largest cities, where, it may be asked, is there a rural population of any considerable extent, that could be regularly supplied by a local clergy? In 1850 the average number of inhabitants in the United States to each square mile—excluding Texas, California, and the territories—was not quite eighteen; including these, about ten. Nor can the states be so classified as to connect any considerable extent of country, so fully inhabited, as to obviate the necessity of a travelling ministry. Take the six New-England States, for instance. Their average population to the square mile, including cities and towns, is only forty-three inhabitants. So of the Middle States, including Delaware, Maryland, and Ohio: they contain an average to the square mile of only fifty-seven inhabitants. The average of the six cotton-planting states is only twelve; of the central slave states, —namely, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas,—seventeen; and of the five northwestern states,—Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa,—eleven. These facts need no explication; they speak for themselves. If there were no part of the population supplied by other denominations, and every man, woman, and child belonged to the Methodist Episcopal Church, there are many large sections of the country where a settled ministry could not be maintained. Indeed, notwithstanding the efforts of all the Churches combined, there are portions of the older states where even the Methodist itinerant has never been heard.

But look at Texas, containing some 237,321 square miles, and less than one inhabitant for each. California, containing 188,982 square miles, has little more than one inhabitant for each square mile. Survey our immense primeval territories:—

	Sq. miles.
Oregon—including Washington	341,463
Minnesota	83,000
Utah	187,923
Nebraska	136,700
Indian	187,171
Northwest	587,564
New-Mexico	219,774
Making a grand total of	1,743,595

All this territory is soon to be filled with human beings. The pioneer has already pitched his tent there in many a rich valley. The smoke from his cabin is curling above the trees along a hundred rivers, to guide the footsteps of God's messengers to his humble

home. Thousands are on the way thither. Immigrants from all quarters of the babbling earth are settling along the rich savannas. Ere long a considerable population will be scattered all through this immense domain. Who shall preach the gospel to these people, if it be not the Methodist itinerant? Moreover, if Methodists earnestly love their doctrines and economy, does not duty demand of them that they shall, by their mode of preaching, so admirably adapted to do it, preöccupy this great field of evangelical enterprise, and incorporate their faith and usages in the very framework of society, and thus let them "grow with the growth, and strengthen with the strength" of the people? But above all, a sense of Christian obligation, aside from all considerations of mere denominational advantage, calls upon the Methodist Episcopal Church, with a voice divinely imperative, to preach the gospel to the families who will soon be dispersed throughout these territories, since she must do it, if it be done at all, and since she can only do it by means of her itinerancy.

It would seem that the hand of Divine Providence is palpably manifest in the present organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, directly involving her existing and prospective relations to this great work. By her peculiar economy she can and does send her ministry on the front wave of the tide of population, as it swells up our rivers and flows out into the wilderness. The immigrant—whether from old England or New-England, New-York or Norway, Pennsylvania or Prussia, Iowa or Ireland, China or California—no matter whence he comes, has hardly erected his cottage in the wilderness, when the itinerant knocks at his door to "reprove him of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment;" and under his faithful ministry, long before a house has been erected, or a public altar consecrated to the worship of the Most High, the praises of redeeming grace are ascending from a thousand groves and a thousand firesides. Such is the happy adaptation of the itinerancy to the exigencies of this great work; and yet there are those who wish to abolish it!

It were by no means uncharitable to aver that no man, with true Christian philanthropy in his heart, can contemplate the future destinies of these vast territories without the deepest solicitude. Let us pause a moment to realize, if we can, the grandeur of the prospect, and to hearken to the voice which God is uttering to his Church in all of her branches.

Mr. Kennedy, the late superintendent of the census, reports that the decennial increase of population in the United States has averaged three and a half *per centum*. The same rate of increase

for eighty years to come would make our population, at the end of that period, amount to upward of two hundred and twenty-five millions. Now, it is probable that seventy-five or a hundred millions of this increase of people will inhabit this new domain. No argumentation can make a stronger appeal for Christian effort than the simple announcement of this fact. He is unworthy of the name of Methodist who does not feel an increased sense of responsibility and obligation resting upon him in view of it. Other branches of the Church are beginning to manifest a most lively and commendable appreciation of the emergency, and are buckling on their armour for rich and glorious conquests on this new and boundless field of Christian warfare. The true friend of Christ cannot restrain emotions of a kind of divine chivalry as he sees the various divisions of His followers rallying around his standard. It is worth the while to pass them in review.

Yonder floats the Presbyterian banner, over an aggregate array of some four hundred thousand soldiers of the cross, good and true. Here the Baptist legions spread along the plains, more than eight hundred thousand strong, full of zeal, and eager for the onset. The Episcopalian cohort, though not so numerous, is animated by the memory of its ancient renown. There, too, is the Lutheran brigade, full of the energy of the great reformer whose name they honour. The smaller tribes are gathering from mountain and valley, like the roar of many waters. What of our own Methodist cavalry, containing in its three grand divisions upward of one million three hundred thousand souls? Already there are more than six thousand itinerants in the saddle—captains of the host—booted and spurred, with sword unsheathed—the "sword of the Spirit." They remind one of Mr. Good's elegant translation of Job's description of the horse:—

> "He exclaimeth among the trumpets, aha!
> And scenteth the battle afar off,
> The thunder of the chieftains, and the shouting."

Shall the Methodist Church—thus equipped, disciplined, and ready for the work, now when the finest field for her peculiar operations that ever she occupied is opening around her—be recreant to her trust? Surely now is not the time to speculate about the utility of her system of itinerancy, or to favour measures which may cripple and destroy its energy and efficiency, or to be bickering about unessential disciplinary ordinances, when millions of souls—famishing in the wilderness of Oregon, Utah, Nebraska, and our other territories—will ere long be crying aloud for the word of life. It would be far more consistent with the spirit and obligations of true Christian

charity to labour to accelerate the day (a day which some now living may yet see, if the Church be faithful to her duty) when these vast territories, having become the seat of civilization and refinement, adorned by a hundred cities, and enlivened by ten thousand villages, and inhabited by eighty, or one hundred, or one hundred and fifty millions of people, shall be divided into thirty, or forty, or fifty conferences, representing the interests of three, or five, or ten millions of pious members of the Methodist Church. It were far better to cherish the hope, and labour to see it fulfilled, that ere the present century has expired, men shall read the proceedings of a Santa Fe Conference, a Salt Lake Conference, a Puget's Sound Conference, a Kansas River Conference, a Rocky Mountain Conference, a Bear River Conference. What say some of our young men just entering the ministry to a pleasant excursion by railroad to a General Conference in the Willamette Valley, before they finally shall retire from their Christian warfare? Is such a proposition too extravagant to be entertained? Who, at least, shall say that, three-quarters of a century hence, delegates from Cape Cod on the Atlantic, shall not meet delegates from Cape Oxford on the Pacific, in General Conference at St. Louis, or some yet unnamed city still further toward the Rocky Mountains, as the most central point of our wide-spread itinerancy? The simple thought of this, sustained as it is by the highest degree of probability, is thrilling; but the mind, expanded by the grandeur of the prospect, becomes inspired by the contemplation with other thoughts still more thrilling and exalting—burning thoughts—enough to set the Christian's soul on fire. If the Church, in all her various branches, is true to her trust, the time is just at hand when this wide continent shall be Christianized all over—Protestantized, if Protestants shall be faithful to themselves and to God. A few relics of the heathen may still remain to remind our children of the superiority of the Christian's faith; but, in a sense properly considered general, the name of Messiah shall be sung in every valley and every plain, on every mountain and every river from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico.

"From each craggy mountain
The sacred shout shall fly;
And shady vale and fountain
Shall echo the reply.
High tower and lowly dwelling
Shall send the chorus round."

Thus will this great "Western world" become the head-quarters of Protestant Christendom. It is now the "land of the free and

the home of the brave;" but it will then be the first Christian power on the earth. Think of a nation containing a Protestant Christian population of two hundred millions! The missionary efforts of the various denominations are now accomplishing much; but what can be done when these efforts are sustained by two hundred millions of Christian population, and by an actual Church-membership exceeding the entire number of inhabitants now in the United States? Now the Churches send out a few hundred missionaries; but then they will be able to supply a thousand foreign fields with evangelical labourers. The word of God, already printed in almost all the dialects of babbling man, shall indeed "take the wings of the morning and fly to the uttermost parts of the earth." And will there not then be an almost literal fulfilment of the vision of the apostle, when he saw "the angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth, and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people?" From all along our two ocean shores, from the Atlantic side and the Pacific side, from the centre and the circumference of this vast continent, streams of light, and knowledge, and religion, with their inseparable blessings of civil liberty, shall be poured back upon the pagan millions of the Eastern Hemisphere, till "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." O! it were a holy ambition among the various divisions of Christ's Church to "strive for the mastery" in advancing and accelerating these glorious results; and, therefore, we here record our appeal to the Methodist itinerancy to aspire to lead the van of the sacramental host.

Motives, too, for prompt and vigorous effort to secure a speedy and permanent ascendency of Christian influence in these territories are multiplied, and their obligation augmented, by the fact, that infidelity, in her most hideous and disgusting forms, has fastened her lustful eye upon some of the fairest portions of them, and is, even now, intrenching herself in possession of them, where, like Circe, she sits decoying by her blandishments the simple and unwary into her embraces, transforming them into brutes.

And this necessity assumes increased interest when contemplated in the light of an intelligent patriotism. Religion is the great conservative element of democratic institutions. The laws of the land are the only legitimate sovereign of a free people; but in a republic the laws are no less the creature than the masters of the people. They are the result of public opinion. It is a matter of the highest importance, therefore, that there should always be a pure and wholesome public sentiment; but to secure this there must always be a

pure and wholesome religious influence operating upon the public sentiment.

Looking to the national defences, in view of our recent acquisitions of territory, and, more especially, with reference to English and French colonization in Central America, Lieutenant Maury recently suggested: "Build that railroad to the Pacific—strengthen the naval arm—fortify Key West and the Tortugas—go to casting new and improved heavy ordnance for both navy and army—and make Pensacola what she ought to be."

This may all be very well. These suggestions may be the dictates of a wise and patriotic forecast. But while our statesmen are thus providing the necessary physical means of strengthening and consolidating the national powers and security, let the Christian remember, that "Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it;" that morality and religion are the only sure basis of popular government. "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity," said President Washington in his farewell address, "religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great pillars of human happiness,—these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and cherish them."

It is not, therefore, as Christians only, but as patriots also, that the various Churches should exert themselves to meet the early settlers in our territories with the Bible, and indoctrinate the public mind there, from the very beginning, with the principles of our holy Christianity. It may be well to "make Pensacola what she ought to be," and to bestow due regard upon all the national defences; but if the people are made what they ought to be, then the hearts of the citizens will constitute a security more reliable than "Key West," and stronger than the "naval arm" can be made.

It was well remarked by Mr. Everett, in his recent address before the Colonization Society: "It is not political nor military power, but moral sentiment, principally under the guidance and influence of religious zeal, that has, in all ages, civilized the world." And may it not be said that it will require the same salutary influence to perpetuate the civilization of the world?

And now, with such a work to do, and such events impending, what time is there—what room is there—to quarrel about minor points? to be angry, because our own individual schemes of disciplinary economy are not allowed to prevail? to be prescribing new tests and new dogmas, which neither Christ nor his apostles ever prescribed? to be threatening schism and secession, when God,

in his providence, is calling upon every true-hearted Methodist to extend the victories of the cross in the salvation of souls? Especially, it is no time to talk of abandoning the itinerancy, or to endanger it by questionable measures of reform. Nay, let no rude or sacrilegious hand touch it! *Procul! procul! este profani!* When the itinerancy falls, Methodism falls with it. But it will not fall. It must not fall! It is the child of God. It has been nurtured by his hand, and honoured by his special grace. It is just getting out of its pupilage, and assuming a mature and manly vigour. Its past achievements are but the earnest of its future triumphs. Commencing in Europe, little more than a century ago, it is destined to extend to the ends of the earth. It now covers North America. The time is not far distant when it shall traverse the entire Western Hemisphere. It is following the British arms into Asia; and one of our own bishops has just planted it on the western shores of Africa. Where shall it stop? When shall it be abandoned? Not until the faithful itinerant has driven the last savage from his cannibal feast; not until he shall have snatched every Hindoo widow from the funeral pile of her husband, and celebrated her espousal to Christ; not until he shall have arrested the last wretched mother who would devote her offspring to the god of the Ganges, and persuade her to consecrate it in baptism to the God of the universe; not until, as he "travels his circuit" over the mountains of Persia, he shall have extinguished all the fires of the Magi, and pointed every worshipper of the sun to Him who made it; not until "the heathen shall be given to Christ for his inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession." Let it always be considered as a "fixed fact," that the Methodist itinerancy will have fulfilled its mission only when the world shall have been evangelized. And if imagination were allowed to prescribe the concluding act in the grand drama of its existence, it should be as follows:—

Some faithful itinerant is despatched in pursuit of the last wanderer from the "fold of God." This wanderer is arrested, skulking in the "furthest verge of the green earth." He is a Jew. He is brought by the man of God to the cross of Jesus of Nazareth. The obdurate son of an outcast nation looks upon it with all the obstinacy of his race; but the story of the Saviour's love and mercy is falling sweetly upon his ear. The Holy Spirit seals the truth. The child of them who cried, "His blood be on us, and on our children," begins to relent. He is penitent. His heart melts within him. He bows; for "every knee shall bow." He looks up with an eye of faith to the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world." He

believes. He cries out—"Abba! Father—my Lord and my God." *Then* may the curtain fall upon the last scene of the itinerancy—but not till then.

Nevertheless, let it not be understood, from anything suggested in this article, that the writer is utterly hostile to all reform or modification of the rules and usages of the Methodist Episcopal Church. By no means. But there are some things which do not need reform—which cannot be reformed—indispensable elements of her power and usefulness, for which there is no substitute. Her primitive earnestness and zeal—an energetic and untrammelled itinerancy, are two of these things. The first, indeed, is a vital principle of Christianity, under any form of it. The second, if not divinely instituted, has been divinely favoured, and is, for the Methodist Church at least, the best means for giving expression and effect to her earnestness and zeal.

Nor must it be supposed that we have any wish to depreciate the importance of a well-educated ministry, or even a well-educated laity. God forbid! Knowledge is the basis and best safeguard of true Christian faith and conduct. Zeal without knowledge is many times worse than indifference. The multiplication of schools and colleges by the Church, the enlargement of the Book Concern, and the increase of its depositories, and all efforts to amplify and strengthen our means of diffusing knowledge, are worthy of the highest commendation. These are, indeed, but the necessary and legitimate fruits of the earnestness and zeal commended. The patriotism no less than the piety of any sectary should be suspected, who teaches that "ignorance is the mother of devotion." What is meant, therefore, is, that all the Church does for the advancement of science, or the arts, or literature, or whatsoever else it may be, should be baptized with an earnest religious zeal and faith.

While our ministers shall commend themselves to men and to God by the highest degree of scholarship attainable, let them, nevertheless, keep an eye on the example of the "chiefest" of the apostles. St. Paul was a learned man in his day. He had sat at the feet of Gamaliel. He had confounded the subtlety of Greek and Jew by his logic. He had made governors tremble by his eloquence. He had extorted the admiration of kings by his wisdom. But these were the weapons of his warfare, not the source of his strength. Mark how he comes to his brethren at Corinth; not with mere "excellency of speech," but "determined to know nothing save Jesus Christ, and him crucified." This was the language of an earnest heart. Consider the results. Wheresoever the apostle went—in Greece, or Rome, or Asia Minor—polytheism and superstition fled

before the ardour of his zeal and the power of his faith. The ancient schools of heathen philosophy were deserted. The Academy of Plato and the Porch of Zeno no longer distracted the sects by their rivalry. Cynics and Sophists, Sceptics and Peripatetics, Pythagoreans and Megarians, bowed together before the altar of "The Unknown God," and were baptized in the faith of Jesus.

And while the great apostle was thus exemplifying in his life and labours the character of the Christian minister, he also no less faithfully delineated the portrait of the Church at large,—"Be fervent in spirit, serving the Lord;" which Dr. Clarke thus paraphrases: "Be *always* in *earnest*, and let your *heart* ever accompany your hand."

With such a ministry and such a membership, what might not the Methodist Church accomplish? Some attention to ecclesiastical history has confirmed the convictions produced by personal observation of the character and tendencies of the human heart, that there is great danger always to be apprehended of transferring reliance and faith from the cardinal and essential principles of religion itself, to those external secular appliances which have been deemed necessary to regulate the administrative economy of the Church. Substantive doctrines and pure spirituality are apt to be supplanted by shadows and emblems. The vitality of true devotion is liable to be lost in an undue regard for rites and ceremonies, and mere prudential contrivances. Have we not a signal illustration of this tendency in the history of the Roman Church, where the simplicity and spirituality of the apostolic doctrines and usages have been utterly lost sight of in the multiplication of sacraments and ceremonies, in external pomp and childish pageantry, and the endless complex amplification of ecclesiastical machinery,—all adjusted to please the eye and captivate the imagination, without addressing the heart or enlightening the understanding?

It would be well for the Church at all times, and especially at the present time, to take heed, lest, in the language of a late writer, "mechanical philosophies supplant faith." With all his infidel proclivities of heart, and obliquities of style, Carlyle sometimes utters truths which Christians may profit by. One of these may be found in his essay on the Signs of the Times. "Our true deity"—he writes of England—"Our true deity is mechanism. It has subdued external nature for us, and we think it will do all other things. We see giants in physical power; in a deeper than physical sense we are Titans, that strive, by heaping mountains on mountains, to conquer heaven also." Let the moral of the fable to

which the writer alludes admonish the Church, that a discomfiture more fatal than that which befel the sons of Cœlus and Terra awaits her, if she be guilty of the like temerity and presumption.

When Demosthenes was asked what was the first, the second, and the third quality of eloquence, he is commonly represented as answering,—"Action—action—action!" But the German critics, who in such matters are the best critics, say that he has been misconstrued. They render his reply,—"Earnestness—earnestness—earnestness. *Ut res ex animo agi videatur.*" The true idea of Methodism embraces both constructions of the great orator's desideratum—earnestness *and* action—an earnest faith and an energetic itinerancy.

Art. IV.—STROUD'S HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS.

A New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, comprising a Synopsis and a Diatessaron, together with an Introductory Treatise, and numerous Tables, Indexes, and Diagrams, supplying the necessary proofs and explanations. By William Stroud, M. D. London: Bagsters. 1853. 4to., pp. 602.

It ought to be a matter of joy to all right-minded theologians, to observe the increasing attention and labour bestowed of late by their brethren among the laity upon the Bible, with a view to its critical elucidation and vindication. In no way can this be done more effectually than by improving and perfecting the harmony of the Gospels. The day is rapidly approaching when the evangelical narratives will be *studied* in this form alone,—a form, indeed, so admirably adapted to the just apprehension of the entire Bible history, that we wonder it has not been more exclusively adopted heretofore. The work named at the head of this article, from its marked originality of execution and eminent adaptation to the wants of the times, is entitled to more than a passing notice in our pages. The space, however, to which we find it necessary to confine this article, will not allow us the full discussion which the subject, as well as the book, deserves; and we can merely attempt a general description of the plan and merits of the work. The author was some time since introduced to our readers in an article on the immediate cause of the death of Christ, a subject which his medical knowledge enabled him to discuss with peculiar ability. The judgment and acumen displayed in that

treatise have been fully sustained by the present volume, for which the public have been for some time prepared, by a specimen published in Kitto's Journal, harmonizing the accounts of Christ's resurrection.

The chief desideratum in a Harmony of the Gospels, is to exhibit, on the same page, both the language of the several Gospels respecting each event, and a connected and continuous history compiled from them all. Harmonists have hitherto contented themselves with either presenting the Gospels in the former or in the latter form, instead of giving both. It is needless to state that either of these plans alone must be very inadequate and unsatisfactory: they must be combined in order to exhibit the just and full result. A mere compilation of the gospel history, although in the very words of the evangelists, does not come up to the idea of a harmony. We want to see the statements of the inspired penmen side by side, each in its proper connexion, or we cannot judge of the correctness of the arrangement. On the other hand, a mere parallel arrangement of the texts of the Gospels, however minutely carried out, does not show the mode in which the accounts supplement each other. In either case the work is but half done, and the reader must do the remainder himself. The work before us accomplishes this combination by giving, in addition to the four columns (or less, as the case may be) containing the evangelical texts, two other columns,—the first containing a "consolidation of the evangelical narrative," made up of fragments from each Gospel; and the second indicating the several chapters and verses from which these fragments are derived. In the following columns, containing the "collation of the Gospels," the first and last words only are given of those clauses which have been transferred to the "consolidation" column, the intermediate words being supplied by dots or points. The first two columns constitute what is styled in the title-page the "Synopsis," and the rest the "Diatessaron." When only one evangelist contains an account of any event, there is, of course, but one column at that place, and the Synopsis and Diatessaron become the same. The text given in the several columns is in the original Greek, which has been amended according to the critical authorities, as cited in the foot-notes. The collated texts are arranged in the order in which the author believes the several Gospels to have been written, namely, Luke, Matthew, Mark, John. The whole history is divided, on a logical rather than circumstantial basis, into parts, sections, and paragraphs, with appropriate titles to each. Prefixed to the volume is an extended introduction, which treats of the materials, principles, and plan of the work, including

a historical account of the Gospels, and a running statement of the reasons for the author's arrangement of events. Appended are various tables, exhibiting the points of agreement, &c., between the Gospels. Such is an outline of the plan and contents of the work, on the merits of which we proceed briefly to remark.

In criticising any Harmony, the most fundamental point is the historical order of the events. In this respect Dr. Stroud's will be found to approach more nearly to the arrangements of Greswell and Tischendorf, than to any other. His elementary chronological data are taken mainly from the published dissertations of the former; and the period assigned by him to the Saviour's ministry is that of most harmonists—about four years. But it is evident that the author has borrowed no man's arrangement; he has pursued an independent course. The rules on this point, which he has laid down for his guidance in the Introduction, are sound and unobjectionable; and he seems to have pretty faithfully adhered to them. But in a subject of so much intricacy and detail, it is difficult to proceed upon strict rules of any minute character; and although most harmonists would probably admit the general correctness of such canons, they have nevertheless differed widely in their application. General rules only are available, and these are simply those of common-sense. We should ourselves dissent from the author as to the location of many subordinate passages and events, and had we room, we could give our reasons for a different position; but as the general outline of the history is correctly traced, our readers would probably feel but little interest in the discussion of minor points. The only point of which we feel tenacious, is in the collation of isolated passages and apothegms occurring in different connexions in the several Gospels, but all containing the same sentiment, and often the same words. These we think should be brought together, when there is no note of time, or other special indication to the contrary. The same rule should apply to *passages* as to *events*. The presumption is, that they occurred only once in the history, and convenience requires their collocation. For instance, the Lord's prayer, although occurring in the midst of the Sermon on the Mount, in Matthew, and not particularly inapposite to that connexion, should be transferred to a subsequent period, in accordance with Luke, who gives the occasion which led to its utterance, with such attendant circumstances as render it very unlikely that it had been presented before. In repeating it, therefore, *totidem verbis*, harmonists, we think, have violated the very rules which they all acknowledge with regard to other passages containing proper *events*. We cannot see why the prayer should be repeated, any more than the sermon itself. If pas-

sages are to be repeated whenever they occur in different connexions, then truly the task of harmonising becomes an easy one. We have only to string the Gospels together, after the fashion of Macknight, and the thing is done in a trice. We say, therefore, that in neglecting or refusing to parallelize passages of every kind in the several Gospels, harmonists have but half-performed the work appropriate to their department. We are aware that many readers may demur from this principle; but we are willing to abide by it, and we have no doubt it will yet prevail. Wherever there are positive indications of such a repetition in the narrative itself, then, of course, the passage must be repeated, whether it contain a doctrine or an event; otherwise their sameness argues their identity, or at least requires their juxtaposition, in order to carry out the purposes of a harmony.

With regard to the author's view as to the date of the several Gospels, we should have but little to say, but that it is so prominent on the face of the whole work, running through the entire argument in the Introduction, and forming the basis of the order of the text columns. This question, we think, must ever be a doubtful one. The historical data are too few, and the internal evidences too slight, to enable us to arrive at certainty respecting it. The author has shown much research and ingenuity in working these up, but they have failed to produce conviction on our mind: they are too subjective and indefinite to be reliable. Still the discussion is an interesting and valuable one, and in the course of it the author develops many original and striking illustrations and applications of Scripture. Occasionally these run into eccentricity, especially in the version of passages. These faults, however, do not materially detract from the merit of the Introduction, on which, as upon the whole work, great pains have evidently been bestowed. The author has matured and digested his views, and for this he deserves the thanks of his readers.

The concluding part of the Introduction—concerning which we may as well say in this place all we have to say—is occupied with an explanation of the history as arranged by the author, in the course of which his reasons for that arrangement become apparent. This is, of itself, quite a readable syllabus of the evangelical accounts. Many incidental points are ably illustrated, and the meaning of the narratives of the evangelists acutely explained. A special regard is maintained to the moral purpose of our Saviour's career, and every incident is interpreted with reference to it. This is a peculiar feature of great importance, and shows that the author has penetrated the spirit of the Gospels while engaged upon their outward form. We especially admire the liberal and comprehensive view

taken throughout the work, as to the character and composition of the evangelical records: no feeble, timid system of empiricism confines the author's opinions or elucidations. In some instances, perhaps, this is carried to excess in the explanation of the peculiar coincidences or variations observable in the different Gospels; and we are by no means prepared to admit the author's solution, that the successive evangelists copied, compiled, and emended the narratives of their predecessors. Still we love to see a writer, in discussing these points, fairly meet the question, and not take refuge in the doctrine of inspiration, as sufficient to account for every anomaly.

The Introduction, as a whole, is highly pertinent and instructive. Its usefulness is somewhat impaired by its prolixity, and still more by a degree of inattention to keeping each topic distinct, in consequence of which there is much repetition. We especially regret the absence of a more minute and prominent set of sub-titles, or a particular index, by which the remarks upon each section of the Harmony might be more readily found in its order. The convenience of readers, in this respect, is too apt to be neglected by authors.

The second great consideration in a work like the present, is its adaptedness to convey a clear and connected view of the contents of the four Gospels; in other words, its convenience as a collation of the sacred texts. In characterizing the Harmony itself, therefore, we will first speak of the Synopsis, or continued text, as contained in the first column. This delicate task is performed with much care and ingenuity. The several clauses are so well dovetailed together that the whole reads smoothly and appropriately, and this in the language of the parallel texts, very few words being modified, omitted, or added for this purpose. This part is printed in larger type than the parallel columns, and is altogether an admirable digest of the gospel history. There is but one drawback: the paragraphs, with their respective titles, are so minute and special, that the whole is broken up into fragments too minute to be favourable for connected apprehension. This, however, was unavoidable under the plan pursued, and is in some measure compensated by the distinctness with which each item is represented to the eye. The second column, containing references to the passages thus combined, has several typographical peculiarities, all calculated, if duly kept in mind, to render it a more complete index in this respect. This column might have been wholly dispensed with by inserting the references in immediate connexion with the clauses themselves, and the inconvenience of carrying the eye from one to the other might

thus have been avoided; but that would have unduly crowded the first column, and also interfered in some degree with another object, presently to be noted, namely, that of bringing out the peculiarities of each Gospel in relief.

In the remaining columns, (when more than one evangelist relates substantially the same event,) the parallel clauses, by being kept as nearly as possible on a line with those in the combined text, exhibit, at one view, the agreement or variation among the different Gospels on each point. The eye is further assisted for this purpose by the omissions supplied by points, which indicate an identity of expression, and obviate a repetition of the same words on the same page. This plan has been carried out through the whole volume with an accuracy and thoroughness which command admiration. The other typographical peculiarities, such as broken lines, special punctuation, &c., all contribute to the author's general object.

In examining the harmony thus constituted, the first thing that would probably occur to most readers, after noting the above advantages, is a certain awkwardness in the book *for ordinary use*, arising not only from its bulk and form, but also from the scattered and intricate arrangement of the matter on the page. The necessity of providing for six columns, of itself threw the page at once into a quarto form; and the frequent blanks, and detached parts of lines, still further swelled the size of the volume. The reader, therefore, would naturally conclude that the work was not intended as a *Manual* for simple perusal, but rather as a reference-book or standard for the library. He will at once conclude that it was constructed for the *student*, principally, and is calculated for recondite ends. But it must be remembered that the English are not so parsimonious of space, nor so intent upon compendious abbreviation in books as ourselves; and hence the portliness of the volume is not likely to prejudice it seriously in the London market. But a closer inspection will reveal a different design in the work from that of a simple chronological arrangement of the Gospels. Its main object is to exhibit the *coincidences and peculiarities* of the different Gospels, as compared with each other: a full and carefully drawn table of these is given at the close of the volume, among other valuable supplementary matters. It is with a view to this grand design that the whole book is evidently constructed, and in this light it accordingly ought to be judged. The object is a noble one; and we do not hesitate to say that it has been steadily kept in view, and successfully wrought out. In point of mere convenience, as a harmony, in the ordinary sense, we know of other works that will probably surpass it; but for the purpose above named it is a great advance upon all

that have preceded it. We could name many works more or less kindred with it in both respects, but a comparison of this kind would be invidious. Each has its excellences for the uses intended; and it is enough to say that those of the volume before us are neither few nor small. That it can accomplish all purposes, or that it is even perfect for any, is more than can be claimed for a mortal production: that it is an improvement upon previous attempts in the same line, even though it may still leave room for succeeding labourers, is all that the public have a right to expect or demand As such we cheerfully welcome it to a place in the literary world, and cordially recommend it to all who would attain a more thorough knowledge of the subject it is designed to elucidate.

We cannot dismiss the volume without complimenting the publishers upon the elegant style in which it is issued. The type, printing, and paper, are all that could be desired. We have, however, observed numerous errors in the accentuation of the Greek texts, for which we presume the author is not responsible.

Art. V.—MEMOIRS OF MRS. SETON.

Life of Mrs. Eliza A. Seton, Foundress and First Superior of the Sisters or Daughters of Charity, in the United States of America; with Copious Extracts from her Writings, and an Historical Sketch of the Sisterhood, from its Foundation to the Present Time. By Rev. Charles I. White, D. D. New-York: Edward Dunigan & Brother. 1853.

"How shall man be just with God?" is the problem of a ruined world. When the soul is oppressed with the consciousness of divine anger—and sees that in this question is involved the weal or woe which, for it, will brighten or shadow the eternal ages—then all other questions fade into nothing, and this alone fills the universe. The yearning after perfection, the clinging belief in a latent power of self-rectification, in fallen man, would seem to be a fragment of the glittering crown that once sparkled on his brow: not indeed as once in favoured Eden, reflecting back in its purity celestial light, but even though bruised, and tarnished, and trampled in the dust, still betraying its celestial origin. All is not extinct of the divine spark which once breathed eternity into that moulded form of clay,—

"Even in its ashes live its wonted fires."

In whatever form it develops itself, the principle is the same; and in all, save those sunk in the lowest depths of barbarism, it is universally diffused. The costly offering, the bloody sacrifice, the cruel rite, the weary pilgrimage, the self-inflicted penance, as well as the effort by supererogatory merit to purchase expiation for past delinquency—all tell the same sad tale—a consciousness of sin, and an intense desire to avert its dreaded consequences.

Who that has ever contemplated calmly that tremendous Future, and felt, as all must feel, his unpreparedness to meet it, but has again and again made the attempt, with all the earnestness of his immortal nature, only to fall back upon himself, sick at heart, in the bitter consciousness that, like the giant shorn of his locks, his strength has departed from him?

> "Like the chain'd eagle in his fetter'd might,
> Straining upon the heavens his wishful sight,
> Who toward the upward glory fondly springs,
> With all the vain strength of his shivering wings,
> So chain'd to earth and baffled ——"

That heathen nations "feeling after God, if haply they might find him," should err so widely of the true mark, is a matter of grief, not surprise; but that those upon whom the light of revelation has beamed should yet turn aside from its heavenly ray, and "choose rather to walk in the light of the *sparks* which they have kindled," would seem to be an infatuation bordering on madness. We have lost heaven. Vainly shall we attempt to scale its crystal battlements in our unaided strength, even though every muscle break in agonizing effort, and the last drop of our blood be poured out, a costly yet free oblation, before its walls. God be thanked that we have heard a voice of unearthly music ever saying, "I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved." "Come unto *me*, all ye that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest."

In nothing has the Evil One more shown his consummate cunning, than in the various devices with which he has led men astray, while cheating them with the belief that they were in the path of truth and safety. No matter by what subtlety he may divert his deluded victims from the primal duty of worshipping the one God in spirit and in truth—whether he endeavour to deprive the Son of God of half his glory, by degrading him to a mere man; or whether it be by bestowing divine adoration upon her, a mere woman, yet who, by proximity to Godhead, seems to be radiant with its reflected glories; or by directing devotion to one or all the saints in the calendar, or to the highest archangel who blazes before the

throne—his end is gained: they do *not* worship the Lord their God. Of all these delusions none is more captivating and mischievous than Mariolatry. By seeming to address all that is gentle and tender in fallen human nature, it hides the real enormity of the sin. The ineffable honour bestowed upon Mary in her first maternity; her relation to Him, our incarnate Hope; the sympathy which in all her domestic relations is felt toward her by one half of her race—one of themselves, yet so infinitely honoured; her weak and feminine nature appealing to all that is chivalrous in manly devotion in the other—the misguided devotee willingly delegates to her the power to bless, while he escapes from the oppressive sense of the presence of an infinitely holy God. "Confess now," said a Catholic bishop in the West, to a Protestant lady who had accidentally been driven into a discussion of this subject,—"confess now, that, to your woman's heart, it were a pleasing idea to address your petition to one who was once a woman like yourself?" "Yes," was the reply, "I do acknowledge that to my carnal heart it *is* pleasant to approach any being who does not make me feel my own sinfulness, like the infinitely pure Jehovah."

While at every salient point the Bible-taught scholar must clearly see the utter antagonism of Popery to the Scriptural plan of worship and salvation, yet we are sometimes lost in astonishment at the wonderful ingenuity of that masterpiece of Satan. To see how near her path seems to border upon Canaan, while leading her votaries away from its peaceful realms,—to see how she will array her most damning doctrine in the guise of truth, till it almost needs Ithuriel's spear to detect the counterfeit,—to hear her reiterate in tones of authority, *Peace, peace,* while the cloud of avenging justice is gathering in blackness above, makes us feel how difficult the task to disenchant the siren, and gain a willing ear to the audience of *only* truth. With a deep insight into human nature, and a marvellous adaptation to all its varied phases of character, she has a resource in every case, a lure for every one willing to be misled. For the lover of the fine arts, she decorates her churches with paintings and statuary, and all the charm of gorgeous and attractive architecture; while music lends her aid to captivate the senses, and persuades the rapt listener that his soul is attuned to heavenly harmony. To the imaginative, she recounts wondrous tales of celestial visions and of angelic forms appearing again in communion with men. The superstitious she takes by the hand, and leads far away from worldly haunts and secular pursuits to the lonely cell, or cave, or desert mountain, and enjoins ceaseless prayer and nightly vigils; while to the disappointed she paints in glowing terms the calm retreat of the convent or the

monastery as the certain abode of peace. To the self-righteous she announces the only doctrine pride will receive—that their own good works can merit heaven. And to those, alas! to whom religion in any form is a bitter pill, only to be swallowed in the article of death, in the last extremity, as a desperate hope to avoid eternal fires, she preaches a purgatory, where, by suffering, sin may be expiated, and the purified spirit at last escape to the regions of the blessed. This creed is not the less deceptive, that while she acknowledges the true God, she offers only strange fire upon his altar,—while she rears a temple ostensibly to his glory, her richest and costliest offerings are laid upon other shrines. She has borrowed the nomenclature of heaven to teach the doctrines of the pit. She prates of charity to the suffering body, while she piles the fagots for an *auto da fé* to burn the misguided soul. She virtually makes of none effect the commandment of God by her traditions, yet stuns the ear with "The Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord are we!"

While the doctrines of this religion sit lightly upon the careless spirit, and a few muttered *aves*, or *pater-nosters*, or nominal fasts, suffice to drown the voice of conscience,—to the earnest soul, that feels the weight of sin, and longs intensely for pardon and peace, and the favour of an offended God, and will not be satisfied with anything short of its soul-felt reality, dark, dreary, and desolate are the teachings of this creed. Wearying and ever-recurring penances; mortifications of the extremest kind; appeals from saint to angel, and thence to the Virgin—in all these means, and many more such, the sinful soul is taught to seek its remedies; for hope which never comes; and after a life spent in a round of unmeaning ritualisms and monotonous observances, "wearied in the greatness of their way," even death itself brings no relief, but the gloomy perspective of purgatory unfolds its mysterious horrors. Not thus reasoned St. Paul, when he exclaimed, "For me to live is Christ;" not thus the triumphant song rose exultingly to his lips, in view even of a martyr's death: "Thanks be unto God, which giveth us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord." Does this sound like the fearful looking for of "purgatorial fires?"

These thoughts have been suggested by the life of Mrs. Eliza Ann Seton, the Foundress and First Superior of the Sisters of Charity in the United States of America—a sad history of a gentle nature, broken down by misfortune, and, in its weakness, falling an easy prey to the seductive agencies so often employed with success of late years, by that apostate Church which usurps the name of Catholic.

Elisa Ann Bayley was born in the city of New-York, August 28th, 1774. She was the daughter of Dr. Richard Bayley, a physician distinguished alike for ability and benevolence. The following incident is illustrative of his character: "A physician of Staten Island, having a case which required a difficult operation, requested Dr. Bayley to perform it; but he declined on account of the distance, and the large practice which demanded his attention. The applicant, in pressing his request, at length observed to him, 'It is true, doctor, they are not able to pay you much, for they are poor.' 'Poor, are they?' said Dr. Bayley. 'Come, I will go with you;' and, true to his word, he went, and performed the operation with the utmost ease and success." It was plainly shown in after years that the daughter inherited the generous and philanthropic disposition of the father.

Miss Bayley was brought up in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and was early "admitted," as the writer of these memoirs rather sneeringly observes, "to what the members of that denomination term the ordinance of confirmation." None who read her memoirs can doubt that she became truly pious while in that Protestant Church; yet her imagination far outran her judgment, and she was evidently, when quite young, strongly tinctured with superstition. For example: "She wore on her person a small crucifix, expressed her early admiration for the conventual life," and "such was the profound awe awakened in her by the communion, that, in receiving it, her teeth clattered against the cup which contained the elements. Such was her fervour in complying with this rite, that after the service she would obtain from the sexton a further portion of the elements, and even go from one church to another in order to repeat this religious act." She often regretted that there were no "convents" among Protestants. These pregnant hints seem not obscurely to intimate the kind of doctrine which she must have listened to, and which prepared her mind for that perversion to another faith. If further proof of its tendencies were needed, the annals of that Church have, alas! since furnished but too many illustrations. The teachings of a Hobart, logically followed out, have led more than one deluded victim to Rome.

At the age of nineteen Miss Bayley was united in marriage to Mr. Seton, a merchant of New-York city, a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and a man of very high character. For some years her outward life was full of happiness and beauty: with a noble husband, with ample wealth, and with all the enjoyments of refined and cultivated taste, she was happy, even during the years of pestilence that ravaged New-York toward the close of the last

century. She kept up the forms of religious life, and at times was full of devotional sentiment; though in 1799 she became enamoured of Rousseau, and, as she afterward confessed, made his writings her "Sunday devotions" for a time. But the day of prosperity was soon followed by darker skies. Early in 1801 her husband's business became embarrassed; and in August of the same year, her father, in the discharge of his duties as health physician at the port of New-York, took the ship fever from a crew of Irish emigrants who had suffered severely from that scourge. During his illness, which resulted fatally, his daughter, knowing his principles to be conformable to the then prevalent infidel philosophy, feared that, notwithstanding his great moral virtues, his soul might be in danger. In the ardour of her love, and with full confidence in the infinite goodness of God, she endeavoured to think of some sacrifice which could be offered to the Almighty as a pledge for the eternal happiness of her father's soul. Leaving her dying parent for a few moments, she went to the cradle where her infant child was sleeping, clasped it in her arms, and, going out on the piazza of the building, she there raised the little innocent babe toward heaven, and appealed to the divine compassion, saying, "O Jesus, my merciful Father and God, take this little innocent offering! I give it to thee with all my heart. Take it, my Lord; but save my father's soul." It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the lamentable deficiency in the very first principles of Christian doctrine, indicated by such an incident.

Early in the spring of 1803, Mr. Seton's health, which had before been extremely delicate, seemed to be rapidly declining, and a sea-voyage to Leghorn was determined on, in hopes of a restoration. He had long had a commercial connexion with the Messrs. Filicchi of that city, whose influence in afterward proselyting his wife was very important. Her oldest daughter, Anna, eight years old, accompanied them. After a voyage of seven weeks—tedious it must have been to a suffering invalid—they arrived at Leghorn. Here, in consequence of the yellow fever having been in New-York when they left, they were detained in quarantine for four weary weeks longer. These desolate weeks were passed alone in the lazaretto, some miles from the town, in one corner of an immense prison, in a room with a single window double-grated with iron; the wind almost putting out the light, blowing over the sick husband at every crevice, and roaring over the chimney like loud thunder; the only view the open sea, through the bars, and the beatings of the waves against the high rocks at the entrance of the prison, which threw them violently back, and raised the white foam as high as the walls. The record

of affliction given in Mrs. Seton's diary for this period is very touching.

In this sad condition she found comfort to her soul "in prayer to her Almighty Father, accepted through her adored Redeemer, and enlightened by the blessed Spirit." Here, as might have been expected, Mr. Seton was seized with severe ague and fever. The captain of the place said to them one day, seeing him in high fever: "In this room what sufferings have I seen! Here lay an American, begging a knife to end the struggle of death; and there, where the signora's bed is, in the frenzy of fever, a Frenchman insisted on shooting himself, and died in agonies." In solitude and suffering the teachings of the Bible seemed to be blessed to the invalid's soul; and, though he lived but a week after they were released, his end apparently had hope. Immediately after his death, the Filicchis, who were zealous Catholics, took the widow home, and showed her every kindness and attention. Their object, openly avowed, was to convert her to Romanism, and no stone was left unturned to accomplish it. They took her to the opera; but she "could not find the least gratification in the quavers of the singers, and felt that those who could find pleasure in such a scene must be unacquainted with real pleasure." Their unremitting kindness touched her sensitive and grateful heart; and when they went with her on Sundays, full of sentiment and devotion, to the gorgeous chapels of Florence, she was open to any impression. "I went," says she, "with Mrs. Filicchi, to the chapel La Santissima Annunziata. Passing through a curtain, my eye was struck with hundreds of persons kneeling; but the gloom of the chapel made every object at first appear very indistinct, while that kind of soft and distant music which lifts the mind to a foretaste of heavenly pleasures, called up in an instant every dear and tender idea of my soul, and I sank on my knees in the first place I found vacant, and shed a torrent of tears at the recollection of how long I had been a stranger in the house of my God." The Filicchis took every care to minister to this feeling, and, at the same time, practised every art of Christian kindness upon the bereaved stranger thus thrown upon their hospitality.

One can almost imagine that after seven weeks on ship-board, and a still drearier imprisonment in a loathsome lazaretto, kind Mohammedans and a delicious climate would have made her somewhat lenient even to the claims of the false prophet himself. It is not much to be wondered at, therefore, that her comparatively feeble intellect should yield to so many appliances, calculated to impress a tender and susceptible nature. "They placed in her hands

suitable books of instruction, and made her acquainted with a learned Jesuit of Leghorn, who took a lively interest in her welfare." Detained many weeks longer than she anticipated, by the sickness, first of her daughter and then of herself, it is easy to trace the effect of these influences upon her now enfeebled and always imaginative temperament. Thus she writes to a friend: "How happy would we be, if we believed all that these dear souls believe,—that they possess God in the sacrament, that he remains in their churches, and is carried to them when they are sick." On another occasion: "This evening, standing by the window, the moon shining full in Filicchi's countenance, he raised his eyes to heaven, and showed me how to make the sign of the cross. I was cold with the awful impression my first making it gave me." And further: "Why, Rebecca, they believe that all we do and suffer, if we offer it for our sins, serves to expiate them. If *I* don't believe it, it shall not be for want of praying!" The first effort of Mr. Filicchi was to impress upon her mind the common Romanist sophism that, as even Protestants admit the possibility of a Romanist being safe, while the Romanist will *not* admit it of the Protestant, it is better and safer to side with Rome. And before Mrs. Seton left Italy, this poison had done its work.

To take charge of Mrs. Seton, and to insure her entire conversion to Romanism, Mr. Antonio Filicchi accompanied her to America. He furnished her with a manuscript from his own pen, containing a summary and defence of the Roman Catholic faith. During the voyage, which occupied fifty-six days, "he frequently conversed with her on the superiority of Catholicity over Protestantism; and a portion of her time was daily allotted to reading the Lives of the Saints." Had she as frequently resorted to her Bible, she might have escaped the deep-laid snare; but, as Mr. Filicchi truly observes, "If one point were well understood, the discussion of all the others would be unnecessary. I mean the authority of the Church to interpret the sense of the Scriptures." True: only induce a person to give up the study of the Bible, and the mind is open to receive any error. For ourselves, we never see the image of St. Peter so conspicuous in their churches, with the *keys* fastened to his girdle, or in his hand, but we are forcibly reminded of the denunciation of our Saviour: "Woe unto you! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye enter not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered."

One of Mrs. Seton's first steps, after her arrival at New-York, was to acquaint her pastor and friend, the Rev. John Henry Hobart, (subsequently widely known as a High-Church Protestant Episcopal

bishop,) with her purpose to abandon the Church of her fathers. It was a sad thing for the misguided woman to fall into such hands at this time. That the clearest reasoning, and most convincing evidence of the truth, spirituality, and Scriptural authority of the Protestant Church would have been lost upon her, in her then state of mind, may be clearly seen from the following extract: "I instruct my children in the Catholic religion, without taking any decided step; my heart is in that faith, and it is my greatest comfort to station myself in imagination in a Catholic Church." "All I can do,"—she thus expresses herself, in answer to the exhortations of her Catholic friend, Filicchi,—"all I can do is, to renew my promise that I will pray incessantly, and strive to wash out, with tears and penance, the sins which I fear oppose my way to God." In this state, with her mind filled with the vivid recollections of the magnificent churches and cathedrals in Italy, it is not surprising that she speaks of our (Protestant) churches, as having nothing but "bare walls," and of our "altars as unadorned."* She alludes to the "empty churches" and "unmeaning sacraments." Empty churches! To the Christian heart the Deity himself is there; and unless his blessed Spirit gives efficacy to the ordinances, vainly do statues, or paintings, or costly altars, or blazing candles, or even the sacramental elements themselves, attempt to supply his place. Unmeaning sacraments! We would appeal to myriads of Protestant Christians throughout our land, whether they have not found their faith invigorated, their love enkindled, their hope brightened, in the reception of the holy communion, until their hearts have burned within them, and they have said, "Surely, this is none other than the *house of God;* this is the gate of heaven."

But if Mrs. Seton had fallen in with a simple-hearted Christian pastor, full of love and faith, who, instead of arguing with her, had pointed her at once to Christ the Redeemer, and led her to his cross as the only refuge for a soul burdened and oppressed like hers, the result might have been different. Unfortunately Mr. Hobart had nothing better to offer her than arguments to prove that the Protestant Episcopal Church has the *doctrines* of Christ, because "it admits the Apostles' Creed, and the Nicene Creed;" that it has the *priesthood* instituted by Christ, because "it has the Apostolical Succession:" with other points equally external in their character. The "Apostolical Succession" seemed, for a while, likely to keep her in the Protestant Church; but *that* ground was soon taken from under her feet by the superior claims of Rome in that respect. This was the

* The statue of St. Peter at Rome is the ancient Jupiter Tonans, with a new head. Is not this baptized Paganism?

rock upon which she split, as far indeed as her secession was the result of religious opinion, and not of excited and superstitious feeling.

"Her final resolution on this important question, and the grounds on which it rested, are thus beautifully (!) expressed in her own words: 'Now they tell me, Take care! I am a mother, and my children I must answer for in judgment, whatever faith I lead them to. That being so, and I so unconscious, (for I little thought, till told by Mr. Hobart, that their faith could be so full of consequence to them or me,) I will go peaceably and firmly to the Catholic Church; for if faith is so important to our salvation, I will seek it where true faith first began, —seek it among those who received it from God himself. The controversies on it I am quite incapable of deciding; and as the strictest Protestant allows salvation to a good Catholic, to the Catholics I will go, and try to be a good one. May God accept my intention, and pity me. As to supposing the word of our Lord has failed, and that he suffered his first foundation to be built on antichrist, I cannot stop on that, without stopping on every other word of our Lord, and being tempted to be no Christian at all; for if the first Church became antichrist, and the second holds her right from it, then I should be afraid both might be antichrist, and I make my way to the bottomless pit by following either. Come, then, my little ones, we will go to judgment together, and present our Lord his own words; and if he says, "You fools, I did not mean that;" we will say, "Since you said you would be *always*, even to the end of ages, with this Church you built with your blood, if you ever left it, it is your word which misled us; therefore please pardon your poor fools, for your own word's sake."'"

Already in heart a Papist, and not endowed with a clear logical mind, she was easily led by Mr. Hobart's own premises, to take the decisive step; and, renouncing the light and liberty of the Church of her fathers, she was re-baptized in St. Peter's, March 14th, 1805, thus uniting herself to a people who, as the writer of the biography acknowledges, were said to be a "public nuisance." After her perversion, as might be expected, some of her former friends became estranged from her, and her pecuniary circumstances very much reduced. It is even asserted that "had she remained a Protestant she would have inherited a large fortune, instead of being obliged to depend upon her own exertions for subsistence." That a legacy—which would have been left her, to assist her young family, had she remained in the Protestant connexion—was withheld, after her founding a Romish institution, because in that case her children would derive no benefit from it, we can readily believe; but that she was deprived of any property to which she was rightfully entitled, in consequence of the change in religion, we cannot but discredit; for none who read the biography can suppose that such an occurrence would have been passed by with so slight an allusion, where there would have been so good and just an opportunity to inveigh against the intolerance of Protestants.

To account for the fact to which the author here refers, that the spirit of hostility to the Romish Church was more deeply rooted in

the public mind then than at the present day, it is only necessary to recall the circumstances under which many of the early colonists first settled this country. Refugees from that very Church which taught that heretics may be silenced or exterminated by the dungeon, the sword, or the more terrific fagot, they had not yet survived the traditions of Smithfield, the bloody horrors of St. Bartholomew's Day, and the Sicilian Vespers. They had not, as have their favoured descendants, so long enjoyed the clear atmosphere of religious freedom, that the memory of papal intolerance and inquisitorial cruelty had ceased to be numbered with the dim and shadowy recollections of history.

That her former friends were not without reason in withdrawing from her society, may be inferred from the fact, that shortly after her own apostasy, she succeeded in inducing her young sister-in-law, Miss Cecilia Seton, at the age of fourteen, to join her. For two years Mrs. Seton supported herself by keeping boarders for an academy of boys; but this resource partially failing, she removed to Baltimore, and applied herself to teaching a school of her own sex, with the hope that, in process of time, it would grow into "a society whose members would be specially consecrated to the service of God,"—that is, into a convent. Shortly after she was joined by Miss Cecilia O'Conway, of Philadelphia, who had intended to cross the Atlantic for the purpose of "seeking a refuge from the distractions of the world," but who, on learning Mrs. Seton's plans, determined to go to her at Baltimore. At this juncture, the gift of eight thousand dollars from Mr. Cooper, of Baltimore, determined the priests of that city that Mrs. Seton should commence a "religious" establishment; and Emmetsburgh, Maryland, was chosen as the location.

"The vicinity of Emmetsburgh having been selected for the location of the sisterhood projected by Mrs. Seton, Mr. Dubourg turned his attention to the purchase of an eligible site; and, on a visit to that part of the country shortly after, he bought the piece of land now held by the Sisters of Charity, about half a mile south of the village. At that time the only tenement on the farm was a very small stone building, forming about one-half of what is now used as the wash-house of the institution. The property was settled in the joint tenantship of the Rev. William V. Dubourg, Rev. John Dubois, and Samuel Cooper. The Rev. Mr. Dubois was at that time located near Emmetsburgh, being pastor of several congregations in Frederick County, and principal of a school which he had recently established."—P. 247.

Such was the origin of the celebrated society of the "Sisters of Charity" in America. Mrs. Seton was everywhere hailed throughout the Roman Catholic Church as the founder of a new and holy order.

The second addition to the sisterhood was Miss Murphy, of Philadelphia, "who left the house of her mother without her consent, in obedience to what she deemed the will of God." Mrs. Seton soon had four candidates in her house, and it was deemed advisable for them to assume the title of "Sisters of St. Joseph;" considering it "the dictate of piety thus to place themselves under the protecting care of St. Joseph, the faithful guardian of the Son of God upon earth." We, alas! in our simple notion of Bible faith, would prefer to place ourselves under the care of the Son of God himself, as certain of his omnipresence, and not doubting his ability to fulfil his promise, "Lo, *I* am with you always, even to the end of the world." The minutiæ of the dress assumed by the sisterhood is gravely detailed by the reverend author:—

"She proposed to the sisters to appear in a habit like that which she wore herself, and which consisted of a black dress with a short cape, similar to a costume that she had observed among the religious of Italy. Her head-dress was a neat white muslin cap, with a crimped border, and a black crape band around the head, fastened under the chin."—P. 253.

The "Institute" thus founded, with a Mother Superior at its head, with name, rules, and costume established, might be considered fairly set at work, though as yet not fully constituted according to monastic laws. The work before us gives the history of its progress clearly, and we think honestly. It is a record of self-inflicted miseries, intense devotion, blind obedience, ghastly suffering, disease and death. All the laws of the human constitution were violated by these feeble women, in obedience to what they thought the voice of God; and the fearful penalty had to be paid.

In their new residence—a small tenement containing only one story and an attic, only two rooms on each floor—sixteen persons were crowded together, often reduced to the poorest fare,—"carrot coffee, salt-pork, and buttermilk." Thus they "laboured at the work of their sanctification." These were their "paths of penance," by which they aimed to merit heaven. "Consequent upon this style of living, to persons mostly reared in luxury, the sisterhood was for several months an infirmary." Miss Harriet Seton, who, on a visit to them at Emmetsburgh, was induced to join them, and break a previous matrimonial engagement she had formed, was the first victim. "To the last," we are told, "she manifested great confidence in the intercession of Mary." She was shortly followed by her sister Cecilia, of whom we have spoken, and who had taken up her abode with them. Mrs. Seton's eldest daughter, Anna, soon after sickened and died of consumption; probably induced by acts of violent mortification, which our author characterizes as "heroic."

"I half reproached her," said her mother, "for her little care of her health: rising at the first bell, ever being on the watch to ring it the moment the clock struck, washing at the pump in the severest weather, often eating in the refectory what sickened her stomach." The next victim to this unnatural sort of life was Miss Murphy. "On one occasion she was directed to put her feet in warm water, which the sister infirmarian having brought, she put her feet into it, and immediately withdrew them, observing that the water was too hot; but her attendant insisting that it was not too warm, she returned her feet into the vessel, and kept them there as long as she was required, although it caused her intense pain, and produced an inflammation from which she suffered for a long time after." After giving this account our author tells us that by such "assiduous practice of the virtues of her state, she soon became ripe for heaven!"

In July, 1813, the society was regularly instituted by eighteen taking upon themselves the vows of "poverty, chastity, and obedience." Meantime large additions were made, and continued to be made, to the buildings and conveniences of the establishment.

That seclusion from the world did not operate like a talismanic spell to make the inmates of the convent holy, we may infer from the following extract from an address of Mrs. Seton (now called Mother Superior) to her sisters in profession:—

"How is it that many of us keep the rule, as to the letter of it, and also look pious enough? There is no want of good will, nor idleness indulged; and in a house where it would seem so easy to become saints, you would say, What is the matter? why are we not saints? Why is there so little progress in perfection? or rather, why are so many tepid, heavy, discouraged, and going along more like slaves in a workhouse than children in their own homes, and the house of their Father?"

One morning, meeting a young sister after mass, who had been absent, Mother Seton looked her steadfastly in the face, and asked, "Why did you not come to our Lord for a recompense this morning?" "Mother," replied the sister, "I felt a little weak, and took a cup of coffee before mass." "Ah, my dear child!" said Mother Seton, "how could you sell your God for a miserable cup of coffee?" Nothing weakens the moral sense more than hair-breadth distinctions and minute observances; yet Mrs. Seton's life, for a series of years, was full of them. She rivalled the Hindoos in self-mortification, and carried on her theory so far as to make her asceticism even ridiculous. She denied herself fine writing-paper, and, for pens, used the stumps abandoned by her pupils.

The year following, three more of the sisters died,—one at the early age of seventeen, who, having remarkably beautiful hands, stained them with walnut juice, to give them an unsightly appearance

The Mother Superior was next severely tried in the loss of her second daughter, a lovely girl, only in her fourteenth year. Her last moments testify to the shrinking horror with which the departing soul must regard the doctrine of purgatory. "Father," she cried to the priest, "is there any harm to hope that I shall go to heaven as soon as I am dead?" He replied, "Not if that hope was not grounded on her own merits." "What merits can such a child as I have?" (Truly our own good works seem little comforting in the dying hour!) She cried again: "I hope that my sufferings will be accepted as my penance, without going to purgatory. O, how I would like to go to heaven!" "Heaven," says the same writer we have before quoted, "is the place of reward. We can enter it only by the merits of Christ, and prepare for it only by the grace of Christ; yet not the least provision of mercy is, that God will then pay with wages for every service rendered to him by Christians on earth."

In 1816 two more of the sisters died,—one only twenty-one years of age, brought up in luxury in the West Indies, whose delicate hands often bled from exposure during the winter in performing the rough work in which she was employed. The following year witnessed the death of four more of the sisters; and, still further, the very next year, three more. How the austerities which accelerated the death of so many young persons agreed with the Mother Superior herself, may be inferred from the following confession, in a letter of hers to the Rev. Mr. Bruté: "Rules, prudence, subjection, opinions, &c., are dreadful walls to a burning soul, wild as mine. For me, I am like a fiery horse I had when a girl, whom they tried to break by making him drag a heavy cart; and the poor beast was so humbled that he could never more be inspired by whips or caresses, and wasted to a skeleton till he died." One of the victims was Madame Guérin, who, during a voyage from Martinique to the United States, made a vow to wear a brown dress for three months, in honour of the Virgin Mary, if she reached her destination in safety; whereupon the author pertinently remarks: "The blessed Virgin is honoured by any act of Christian virtue. Brown being a penitential colour, and unusual among ladies of the world, it was an act of humility and self-denial in Madame Guérin to wear it for three months." What low, grovelling ideas of virtue must they profess, who make it consist in the colour, or, as elsewhere in this volume, in the texture of a dress!

Year after year did Mrs. Seton continue her life of painful self-denial—toiling, suffering, weeping—to secure for herself an eternal reward by "following the commandments of men," which she mis-

took for those of Christ. The whole history is one of the saddest we have ever read. Her name was widely reverenced; her sisterhood grew in numbers in spite of the fatal system which decimated it so often; her schools were full of pupils; and her *protégés* were scattered abroad to form new schools, and to discharge offices of charity. All her children had followed her into the Church of Rome; the desires of her heart had been fulfilled; and the time came for her to die.

She had never entirely recovered from an attack of illness she had suffered in 1818; and in 1820 she contracted a pulmonary disease which could not be eradicated.

"As she approached the term of her earthly career, no change was visible in her dispositions, except that she became more united to God, and more disengaged from all created things. Though her sufferings were very great at times, no complaint ever escaped her lips; and it was chiefly her moaning during sleep that indicated the severity of her pains. Such was her attention to improve every opportunity of merit, that she felt distressed at the efforts which the affection of her spiritual daughters suggested for her relief, and submitted to them only by the advice of her director. . . . Peace, love, confidence, joy—such were the sentiments that supported her in her last trial, and by which she administered comfort to those around her. When she perceived the anxiety of her sisters in regard to her situation, she would try to calm their apprehensions by saying, 'His will be done!' The peaceful quiet which she enjoyed was not the result of a presumptuous reliance upon her own merits: for she had a lively fear of the divine judgments. But her soul was tranquillized by that filial confidence which is inspired by the love of God, and the consideration of his infinite mercy. One of the sisters having expressed the wish that God would grant her the opportunity of entirely expiating her faults during life, that at the moment of death she might fly to the embraces of her heavenly Spouse, Mother Seton raised her eyes and said, 'My blessed God! how far from that thought am I, of going straight to heaven! such a miserable creature as I am!'"—Pp. 437, 438.

In spite of all her errors of theory, it is plain that she held fast the cross of Christ in her dying hour, and that her end was peace. None who read her biography can doubt that she was truly a Christian. Much of the warmth of her piety and earnestness of her devotion we attribute to her Protestant education, and her familiarity with the Bible in early life. The true foundation was there; and the "wood, hay, and stubble" afterward superadded, though it might obscure the lustre of her example, could not affect her final blessedness.

The Society founded by Mrs. Seton continued to flourish after her death, and has since been diffused over nearly all the earth. Her successor in the office of superior was sister Rose White, of Philadelphia, under whose care the society grew in numbers and in superstition. Mrs. Seton made no pretension to miracle-working

powers, nor were any "wonders" wrought at Emmetsburgh during her life; but things soon after changed:—

"On the 10th of June, one of the sisters, who had been reduced by an accumulation of disease to the very verge of the grave, was suddenly restored to health, immediately after receiving the holy communion. For thirty-six days she had not been able to retain the least particle of food on her stomach; and whenever she attempted to take any nourishment, it was ejected with such violent sufferings as to create the apprehension of immediate death. The physicians, having exhausted all the resources of their art, and the case having been pronounced desperate, she was advised by Mr. Dubois to make a novena, or nine days' devotion, in honour of the holy name of Jesus, in union with Prince Hohenlohe, who on a previous occasion had announced that on the tenth of each month he would pray for the intentions of those living out of Europe. On the last day of the novena she received the blessed sacrament at the hands of the reverend Superior, and all her morbid symptoms *instantly disappeared*. On the 10th of August, another case of disease, but of a much more aggravated character, was also suddenly cured by performing a similar novena in union with Prince Hohenlohe."—P. 444.

This society—the Sisters of Charity of St. Joseph—now embraces, throughout the world, five hundred and fifty-three establishments; of which five hundred and seven are in Europe, five in Africa, one in Asia, and forty in America. The number of sisters in these different houses is nearly nine thousand. Of the institutions in Europe, three hundred and seventy-two are in France—forty in Paris alone. Of those in America, two are in Mexico, and thirty-eight in the United States. The number of sisters in the United States is four hundred and twenty, of whom one hundred and twenty-three are at Emmetsburgh, and the rest are distributed throughout the country. Their reputation for acts of self-denial and self-sacrifice is world-wide; and it is the common boast of Papists that no such organizations for systematic charity can or do exist among Protestants. A few remarks upon this topic will close this paper.

The whole monastic system, the growth of ages of domestic oppression, popular ignorance, and misrule, is alike unnecessary and uncongenial to the spirit of our free institutions. We never emerge from the oppressive and stifling air of a nunnery, (and we have visited many,) or rise from the perusal of the life of one of its inmates, without a deeper and more abiding conviction that the practice of conventual seclusion is a libel upon our Maker, and an outrage upon all the dearest and purest sensibilities of our nature.*

* A correspondent of the London *Christian Times* says: "Mr. Seymour has stated, on the authority of an official visitor of the Roman convents, that one half of the nuns die raving mad before they reach the age of twenty-five. No wonder that *secrecy* is a part of the whole policy of the Romish Church. But the people are beginning to open their eyes, and to demand a supervision of this great interest. Nature cannot be forced out of its course in the delicate female

Woman has a nobler mission. In the honoured station of wife, it is her blessed privilege to cheer, to comfort, to support those who must do battle with the sterner realities of life; and ever, like the Æolian harp, to transmute all external sounds into the music of her own harmonious nature. Or if hers be the holier privileges of a *mother*—how high her responsibility to train up heirs for heaven! "Take this child and nurse it for me." How fraught with unspeakable blessings are the "wages." They may not be reckoned *here*—they shall be paid in heaven. In that awful day, how will she, who must approach the Judge and say, "Lord, here is thy talent, which I have kept laid up in a napkin," compare with her who shall be able to exclaim with joy, "Behold, I and the children which God hath given me?"

As to Papal charities, a little consideration will greatly modify the extravagant praise frequently awarded to them, and tend to place ourselves, as Protestants, in our true position. While we freely award all the credit that may be justly due, wherever extensive charities are founded or sustained, yet it is but just sometimes to call attention to those circumstances which have favoured their growth out of our connexion, and also, by exonerating ourselves from the charge of neglect, not suffer a slander to be fastened upon us which we are far from deserving.

And first, we would observe that the necessities of Roman Catholic countries are much greater than ours, and demand imperiously a larger amount of eleemosynary aid, and other charitable assistance. In any land, where the immense proportion of the population is already reduced to all but nominal slavery, and dependent for daily supplies upon their daily earnings, and those the minimum of bare existence, it is easy to see that a religion which practically nullifies a part of the divine decalogue, which says, "Six days shalt thou labour," by compelling to idleness and worse on so many saints' days and holidays, must constantly throw great numbers of this class into the yet lower condition of beggary and absolute want. This compulsory inactivity tends still further to unthrift, improvidence, poverty, vice; and, consequently, to destitution and suffering. This is so evidently the result, that it is the universal testimony of travellers, that in passing through Switzerland they can tell whether

frame without complaining. The free air and social relations suited to educate, and develop, and strengthen the physical economy, are essential to a sound mind in a sound body. The people of this country are beginning to take notice of these things, and it is not strange that they should be jealous of every attempt to allure young females to *take the veil*, or to wear it after they *alter their minds*."

they are in a Protestant or Catholic canton, by the appearance of the country, as well as of the people. In the Papal countries in Europe, beggars are so numerous as to form a large class by themselves. Want, of the extremest kind, disease, and suffering, are so evident everywhere, that the first impulse of a pious or benevolent heart is to minister to physical need.

Again: The *meritorious nature* of *good works* is so prominently taught in the Romish Church, and seems so comparatively easy a way to win heaven, that the owners of great wealth gladly compromise by bestowing of their abundance rather than abandon dear and cherished sins. The concurrent experience of all ages proves that men will submit to any privation—impart freely of their wealth, undergo any physical torture, and even give their bodies to be burned if taught to believe that by such means they will merit heaven—rather than give up their sins, and live an humble, holy life of faith in a crucified Saviour.

The necessity of *extreme unction* also, to a dying Catholic, insures, if possible, the presence of a priest in the last hour; and innumerable are the instances of large sums left to religious and charitable houses, by persons whose lives were spent in anything but acts of charity. This is often indeed done to the great wrong of surviving families; and thus, instead of securing to themselves a blessing, they receive the denunciation of our Saviour against those who say, "It is Corban, that is to say, a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me." Many of the most extensive Catholic institutions in Europe have been founded and enriched by legacies from the dying. The *doctrine of purgatory*, too, in teaching that money paid for masses may shorten the period and mitigate the extent of their suffering, has further still greatly tended to the accumulation of large amounts for kindred purposes, from the hands of those whose grasp was relaxed by death, and who thus vainly strove to lay up treasure, not in heaven, but in a place of torment. We need not do more than allude to the world-wide difference between the selfish, *slavish* exertion that works for a stipulated reward, and the spontaneous outgushing in return for love, itself the glad service of uncalculating affection.

There is another thought worthy of being taken into the account, as far as females devote themselves to a life of external charities. When so great a number of the other sex become celibates, (as all the priests must,) the necessity is forced upon many of them to remain unmarried also; and, deprived of their legitimate sphere of duties, they naturally seek other methods of gratifying the benevolence of their nature. Thus we have seen that the tendency of the

Catholic ritual is to *create* poverty, and have glanced at the nature of the influences which induce works of charity.

As Protestants, we acknowledge the justice of no charge which will lay to our account any comparative deficiency in this matter. The unprejudiced observation of a lifetime has convinced us, that the same principle which has prompted labours of love in the members of our communion, has made them careless of sounding their own deeds abroad. Their efforts, unlike those made in the Romish Church, have been less concentrated, and therefore less obvious. The one might be compared to a fountain, to which the thirsty must come to drink; the other, to a thousand smaller streams scattered throughout our land,—less noisy and noticeable indeed in themselves, but diffusing more widely and efficiently nourishment, verdure, and beauty. The duties of charity, in its restricted sense, have not been neglected, but higher claims have also been admitted. There is kindness to be done to many who need not pecuniary aid. The wounded spirit is to be soothed, as well as the feverish body to be tended. We are not only to dispense medicines, but to give kind and loving words. We are not only to pray ourselves, but to teach others the spirit of devotion which gushes forth in "Our Father." We are not, as monks and nuns, to "go out of the world," but to strive to make that world beautiful with the light of a pure and holy example. Many a fair being have we seen, clothed in no Pharisaic garb of a "professed" religionist, yet whose garments seemed to have caught the refulgence of the Mount. No claim for merit was preferred; even her gentle footfall might not be noticed—yet the path was greener for her passing step. No trumpet sounded before her deeds of charity—yet all the echoes she awoke were musical. No saintly honours canonize her on earth—but her "record is on high." "When the ear heard her, then it blessed her; and when the eye saw her, it gave witness to her." Not wiser than her Maker, she calmly put the chalice he had prepared to her lips, while love, and submission, and holy trust, turned all its bitterest drops to sweetness. Such a *true* daughter of Charity does not, like a coward, flee to a cloister from all the ills of life, but lightens the sad burden of humanity by sharing it.

It is well to care for orphans, even though it be within the dismal walls of a convent, where none can know the deep sympathies which warm a mother's heart; it is better, as do Protestants, to gather them together into an asylum, where one who has felt the mother's instinct will love and tend them; but best of all, the true refuge for the motherless is the fireside of the bereaved parent, who, mourning the dead, may transfer to the living the care,

and affection, and tenderness, which helpless infancy so much needs. These we believe to be the *true* orphan asylums, intended by the God of providence, of which he will testify his approval by the commendation, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto me."

We frankly acknowledge, that in the duties of charity we incline more to caring for the soul than the body. Do what we may, the casket will crumble into dust; we rather aim to polish and beautify the gem within, that it may be fitted to adorn His heavenly crown. We may not have tried so assiduously to filter the turbid streams of human life; but have sought, as the surest course, to purify the *fountain*. We are endeavouring to disseminate throughout the world the gospel of Christ, well assured that all temporal blessings will follow in its train. We make no profession of having done all our duty; nay, after our best efforts, we own that we are but "unprofitable servants;" and we pray for a more abundant gift of that wisdom which is "full of mercy and good fruits." We are not of the number of those who fear the final success of Popery, because we confidently believe the word God has spoken, that "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea;" but when we see the man of sin strengthening himself for one last desperate struggle—albeit his death struggle—we fear that some we love may fall in the terrible contest. We would forearm them to meet every emergency. We would so prepare the combatants, that when the battle must come, the victory shall be ours. Then let them rear their costly structures, and build, as for ages, in massive piles of sculptured stone,—those walls shall yet be vocal with praise to the *one* Mediator, and the "incense of a true oblation" shall yet be offered on the very altars which are now profaned with the mockery of daily mass.

Art. VI.—NEW THEORY OF PHYSICS.

Outlines of a System of Mechanical Philosophy: being a Research into the Laws of Force. By Samuel Elliott Coues. Boston: Little & Brown. 1851.

This bold treatise aims at nothing less than the overthrow of the established doctrines of physics. They all rest on the Newtonian law of gravitation, which our author affirms to be no law at all. He presents his novel views with great confidence, believing it possible to reach a clearer view of nature, and a higher and more

spiritual philosophy than has yet been attained. He thinks that philosophy treats too exclusively of second causes; and that to refer all the phenomena of nature to the action of matter upon matter, is to keep completely out of sight the great First Cause, and, to the extent of our ability, to exclude God from the superintendence of the universe.

There is a strong conservatism in science, and there is but little prospect that the theory of Mr. Coues, whether right or wrong, will soon be adopted. New ideas slowly win their way, especially when in direct opposition to commonly received opinions. This dislike of innovation is well for the true interests of science; it is the safeguard of her choicest treasures. Truth, though at first rejected, is welcomed at length with gratitude. She may be compelled to stand for a long time, waiting in the distance, while she is curiously scanned and watched, lest she may be some base impostor arrayed in lovely garb; but the moment her celestial features are distinctly recognised, she is received with joy. An illustration of this tendency of the mind may be found in the bitter hostility manifested toward the Copernican system of astronomy. It had been taught and believed that the sun revolved around the earth; and it was extremely difficult to relinquish the long-cherished theory, and admit that this beautiful world was not the motionless centre of the universe. The literature and religion of the age were so completely interwoven with this error, and the rapidity of the sun in the heavens was so often recognised in illustrating science and theology, that it was deemed downright heresy and impiety to assert that the sun stood still. We quote the following specimen from a "Body of Divinity," published by a contemporary of the great astronomer Copernicus: "The celerity of the motion of the sun is incredible: it goes beyond the thought of man to conceive distinctly of the passage through every place. If a man should divide the circumference of the circle of the sun into certain parts, he could not so soon have thought of them as the sun runs through them. God doth this great work. It is thought to be caused by the turning round of the highest sphere of the firmament, which, pulling along with itself the inferior orbs, makes them to move according to its course. But who can give a reason why that sphere itself should move so swiftly—even much more swiftly than the sun, because it is far higher than the sun, as much as that is higher than the earth—but the immediate power of God, who doth all in moving this one? But that God should make the sun fulfil such a daily race to make day and night, it highly commends the work."

We have an amusing instance in the great astronomical discoverer,

Galileo himself, of the extreme reluctance even of great men to embrace new ideas. He was a firm believer in the Ptolemaic system; and when a disciple of Copernicus gave a course of lectures on this new theory in the city of his residence, Galileo, regarding the novel ideas as unworthy of his attention, refused to give the lecturer a candid hearing. But at a subsequent period, when he had embraced these beautiful truths, and after he had made many brilliant discoveries with his improved telescope, we find him quite indignant at others for merely following his own timid example. In a letter to his friend Kepler, he says: "O, my dear Kepler, how I wish that we could have one hearty laugh together. Here at Padua is the principal professor of philosophy, whom I have repeatedly and urgently requested to look at the moon and the planets through my glass, which he pertinaciously refuses to do." And again he amuses himself with the profound folly of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who, he says, asked his telescope of him, and "intends to lay it up in his museum, among his most rare and precious curiosities, in eternal remembrance of the invention."

There is, however, at the present time, a greater willingness than formerly to examine, if not to embrace, new ideas. There is a growing belief that a more elevated system of philosophy than the present materialism is demanded, and that it will, at no distant day, dawn upon the world. The twilight of the morning has already come, as the harbinger of noonday effulgence. During the last century, men of science have been most busily and usefully employed in collecting facts, inquiring into details, and in recording minute observations. Nature has been parcelled out in little plats, each of which has been most diligently cultivated; and now some master mind is needed to combine these elements, and unite them in one harmonious system. Similar sentiments were expressed in a very able article in the July number of this Review, for 1852: "The numerous efforts which have been made in recent years to review, criticise, coördinate, and reclassify the sciences, for the purpose of facilitating their symmetrical adunation and prospective amplification, furnish indubitable evidence of a latent and instructive sentiment that, notwithstanding our noisy boasts about the age of intellect, some new principles, or some revision of old ones, are essentially required for the accurate determination of the truth and validity of our scientific conclusions."

The volume before us professes to be only a preliminary one, to be followed by more elaborate investigations—a mere outline, in the author's view. Whether the theory of Mr. Coues, when it shall be more fully developed and illustrated, is destined to occupy a con-

spicuous rank in revolutionizing our old systems of philosophy, or to be embraced as a higher, we will not undertake to decide. At any rate, the principles which he has developed are certainly worthy of careful examination. They have already attracted considerable attention and commendation, both in this country and in England. The author appears to have arrived at his principles by a bold effort of reasoning; and then he attempts to corroborate them by an appeal to nature. It is a significant circumstance, that shortly after the publication of this work, another on the "Mechanics of Nature," elaborately prepared, evidently the result of long and protracted investigation, was published in Providence, which, by a careful examination of facts, arrives at the same conclusion with regard to the inherent powers of matter which, by bold synthesis, Mr. Coues had previously reached. Both deny the existence of any essential properties in matter which enable it to give motion to itself, or to other particles of matter; both refer to the existence of a force essentially spiritual, existing independently of, and apart from matter.

Mr. Coues's style is characterized by perspicuity, beauty, and strength. It becomes at times impassioned and poetical. There is no unnecessary display of learning; yet there are manifestations of profound study and deep thought. The author has avoided all needless technicalities, and presented his views in a manner perfectly intelligible to the common reader of ordinary culture. Its defects, as far as style is concerned, are a want of skill in arrangement; and, occasionally, a hasty and impatient glancing at important points, which require more minute detail and extended research for their complete elucidation. This is no more than must always be expected in the exploration of unknown fields of science, however profound may be the author's abilities. It is a matter of astonishment to us that the author has succeeded in presenting so large a mass of interesting facts, and from these has deduced so complete a system, which he sustains by a process of reasoning alike ingenious and logical.

Before we proceed to a particular analysis of Mr. Coues's theories, we wish to notice an objection which meets us at the very threshold. It is asked how it can be possible, that a system of philosophy matured by the greatest mathematician that ever lived, and supported by the most eminent mathematicians since the days of Newton, can ever be overthrown? Figures cannot deceive us, and it is absurd to controvert them. The folly of the attempt seems to be sufficient to brand the investigation as worthless; but, if we rightly apprehend our author's views, these objections are not applicable to

his theory. He wages the battle against the physical system based upon the Newtonian mathematics—not against the impregnable foundation itself. A superstructure erected upon a rock, may by well-directed missiles be shattered down, and the rock remain firm as the foundation of other and perhaps nobler edifices. It is the superstructure of materialism, founded upon the rock of mathematics, against which Mr. Coues has directed his heaviest enginery; though there are several passages which lead us to believe that he is not a very firm believer in the infallibility of the calculus, when applied to physical researches. And it must be admitted that these doubts are not entirely unreasonable, when we remember how often mathematical reasoning is urged to support fundamentally differing hypotheses. There are two distinct and entirely opposite theories of electricity, each of which claims to be rigidly and exactly proved by recondite calculations. Newton clearly recognised the difference between a mathematical system and the philosophy which he built upon it, when he says, in a concluding paragraph of the Principia: "I have laid down principles—mathematical, not philosophical; such, to wit, as we may build our reasoning upon in philosophical matters."

On this subject our author remarks:—

"With a full admission of the accuracy of the results of mathematical reasoning as applied to astronomy, it does not follow that the spheres attract each other. An aberration or perturbation of the earth, calculated from the increased nearness of the sun, may be correctly calculated, and yet the aberration may not be occasioned by any attractive power in the sun. The motion of the earth may be changed, because of the greater force of motion relatively to the diameter of her orbit. The navigator finds the position of his ship by the aid of the imaginary lines of latitude and longitude intersecting each other; but it is not these lines which give position to the ship. Thus may the astronomer find the place and determine the motion of a planet by imaginary forces,—the one acting inward, the other outward; but these forces do not give position to the star. His calculation might be more difficult, yet no less certain, if in the place of two conflicting forces he used as the basis of his reasoning but one force giving directly the form of the orbit."—P. 287.

This quotation introduces us to a cardinal doctrine of the new theory, namely, the unity of force. Our author considers force as a power entirely distinct from, and independent of the matter which it moves. He also teaches that this force is essentially one and the same in all its diversified operations. This force, distinct and separate from matter, is cause; motion is only effect. He does not believe in any "inherent forces" in matter, or in any physical cause of motion residing as an essential property in matter:—

"Our first attempt is to illustrate the idea of the identity of force,—to prove that the motive power of nature is one acting under uniform laws; that force,

whether it form the dew-drop or marshal the 'hosts of heaven,' whether it manifest itself in the flow of the tides or of the purple stream of life, whether in the flash of lightning or in the sweep of the bird with motionless wing, is ever the same principle; that its divisions and subdivisions, its ever-varying names in science have obscured the law of its action, and thrown a mist over philosophy."—Pp. 17, 18.

"Matter influences the motion of other matter only by an interchange of force,—by the transmission of motive energy from one body to another. It is force which

> 'Sweeps through the dull, dense world, compelling there
> All new successions to the forms they wear.'

"Thus is the place and position of all things determined,—not by the 'appetite of matter' for matter,—not by the desire of one fragment of the world for the presence of another fragment,—not by mutual attraction,—not by a blind instinct of consolidation, kept at times in abeyance by an equally blind instinct of repulsion. It is by the diffusion of force, giving the position of every atom, that the order of the universe is maintained. Change is as normal as permanence,—fluctuation as much a phase of perfection as stability itself. A solitary rain-drop gives us a glimpse of the law which in its action clothes the earth with verdure; the sudden shooting of a minute crystal into perfect symmetry discloses the power which gives form and cohesion to the world.

"This view carries us again to the thought which we have before attempted to elucidate,—to our idea of the unity of force,—to the oneness of that energy, which under many manifestations constitutes the "Life of the Universe." We hear it in the rustling of the forest leaves, in the roar of the ocean, in the thunder of the storm; we see it in the aurora's arch, in the volcano's blaze, in the lightning's flash; we trace it by the oscillations of the barometer, by the tremblings of the magnetic needle, by the action of the voltaic pile; we witness the full majesty of its action in the motions of the spheres.

"This thought, which resolves the powers which move all things above and around us into one and the same force—ever circulating, ever inducing perfection, never subsiding into rest—is not a mere poetical idea, a dream of the imagination. The fact of the unity of force—the identity of its nature under whatever form it may present itself—is proved by the most accurate experiments, by the severest tests of philosophy. Fill a metallic plate with a crystallizing solution, place a horse-shoe magnet under it, crystallization ensues immediately, and the line of crystals formed writes down the direction of the current of magnetic force. Cohesion, then, is but one phase of force,—symmetry of form one of the results of its action. A rain-drop falls before us. We know, from the experiments of Farraday, the exact amount of force which formed it from its constituent gases, and by the abstraction of which it will be again resolved into its elements. Further, we trace in its fall the operation of the same force which gives its rotative and revolving motion to the world."—Pp. 175–177.

Mr. Coues does not content himself with discarding the ideas of the multitude of forces, which the present philosophy teaches us preserve order here upon the earth by their never-ending conflicts. Not satisfied with assigning all the incessant changes and motions of things about us to the one ever-present and controlling force, he carries the same idea to the examination of the motions of the heavenly bodies. He does not believe in any "attractive power" in the sun, which controls the motion of the earth, and changes it from the

direction given it in the beginning, by the "projectile force;" nor does he believe that there is a power vested in the earth to retain the moon in her orbit. He declares that only one force is needed to govern the motion of the heavenly bodies; that the same Almighty Power which first launched them into existence, on that primal morn when the stars first sang together, has strength to sustain and direct in its appointed course every brilliant orb, without any aid or interference from them,—without any controlling influence of one upon the other. He does not believe that God needs to provide any counteracting forces to prevent some of his planets from rushing outward, and others from being drawn inward, and all from starting off in a straight line to chaos; but that whatever God doeth, he doeth directly, at once, and forever. It is the recognition of the immediate presence of the Creator with the works of his hands, so earnestly and eloquently presented, which constitutes a chief excellence of this work.

Another cardinal feature in Mr. Coues's theory, and one in which he differs most widely from the present received philosophy, is his denial of the first of the three great laws of motion: "That any body in motion would continue in a state of uniform motion, *in a straight line*, forever, unless disturbed or drawn out of this straight line by the action of some opposing force." The idea that all motion is naturally rectilinear, is the foundation thought of the Newtonian system. According to Dr. Whewell, this idea was the generative principle, without which it would have been impossible to frame the theory of gravitation. Mr. Coues speaks of this primal law, as it is usually considered, as a mere fiction, only necessary for the support of a false hypothesis:—

"Matter occupies but one place in space at the same time, and consequently no atom can have motion but in one line of direction at the same time. Hence it follows that all motion is orbital, rotary, curvilinear; for, all atoms being in curvilinear motion, no addition of rectilinear motion can change the curve into the straight line,—there will ever remain the element of the curve.

"Rectilinear motion, or motion in a straight line, cannot be affirmed of any atom belonging to or in harmony with the solar system, or with the system of worlds. The horizontal line on the surface of the globe is curvilinear. So from any one point to another, in, on, and about the earth, the moving body takes the curved line.

"The supposed perpendicular descent of a falling body is a curvilinear motion. This is not practically admitted, but mathematically deduced; the fall is termed a 'cubical parabola.' The supposed attraction of the earth does not draw in straight lines, falling bodies preserving ever their rotary motion." —Pp. 8–10.

Again:—

"Equally surprising is it that any one can look upward to the revolving spheres, in number exceeding the sands of the sea-shore, all, every one, mov-

ing in curves; or look downward, seeing there no straight lines of motion—the smallest level of the earth to the eye of philosophy being a curve—knowing that the straight line, wherever drawn, would be a line of collision and impingement—and yet affirm, that not one sphere for one moment could be held to the curve without the conflicting force of gravitation to overcome the natural rectilinear law of motion."—Pp. 322, 323.

But it will be impatiently asked, What does Mr. Coues offer in exchange for the theory which has received the sanction of the greatest minds for nearly two centuries? It is comparatively easy to demolish; any Vandal may do that. What does he give us instead of the doctrine of gravitation? of which he says himself:—

"This theory has been a settled doctrine of philosophy for nearly two centuries; and generally, if not universally, it is deemed an established truth. It seems to have passed away from examination, to be laid aside as that which need never again be the subject of thought. It is spoken of as ascertained; and its discovery and extended application are considered as among the most glorious achievements of the human intellect.

"Thus it will be almost impossible, even if the theory be not founded in truth, to bring the minds of men to its reëxamination. It has become associated with the universe, from its most enlarged to its most attenuated parts. The attempt to substitute other theories, to assign other laws of force, may be deemed the wandering of an erratic mind, or the presumption of an ignorant man."—P. 80.

To this objection he replies:—

"The law of gravitation is not needed for the motion of the heavenly bodies. There is more truth to nature, there is more simplicity and beauty in the idea that the force of the revolving body is within itself; that its curvilinear motion is its natural motion; that it goes round in its orbit without needing the guidance and direction of central and tangential forces; that it can be trusted to the unerring energy imparted to it from the beginning. It needs no great presumption thus to affirm; for by ancient philosophers, and in more recent times by Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, it was believed that circular motion was the natural motion."—Pp. 81, 82.

But bodies on the earth do, when free to move, continually tend toward the centre. There is a centripetal force; no fact is more evident to our senses than this. We cannot throw a stone into the air without being convinced of it. If Mr. Coues denies the principle of attraction, what does he offer in its stead as the consolidating power? To this we reply,—and it is truly a serious objection to his theory,—our author has no single word to take the place of the potent syllables "gravitation." We know that there is much in having a good name. If a physician is summoned to a sick bed, he is fortunate if he be able to assign a distinct name to the disease under which the patient is suffering: no matter how unmeaning, or how unintelligible the word may be, the patient is satisfied the doctor knows all about it, and his fears are allayed. Unluckily our author

has introduced no single word as the invariable exponent of his principles. We will endeavour, however, to present his ideas as clearly as they can be gathered from his work. He asserts that one error of the philosophy of the times is its "keeping out of sight the intense motion of every atom, in its rotation and revolution *with the earth*, which, from its greater comparative velocity, supplies the governing or controlling motion,—and by reference to which alone, incidental, retarded, or accelerated motion is to be understood or explained." A stone apparently quiescent on the surface of the earth actually moves through space, at the rate of many thousand feet in a second. When it is thrown up from the earth, its fall in the first second is only sixteen feet, which is but an almost inappreciably slight difference from its proper planetary motion as an integral part of the earth. A stone in falling from a height does not commence motion, for it already had an intense planetary motion. There is only a slight difference in the direction of its motion. As motion is the result of force, so the degree of motion produced in any body is the exact measure of the amount of force employed; the quantity of force requisite to move a particle of matter one foot in a second is less than that needed to move it sixteen feet in the same time. All the matter which composes the earth completes its rotary circuit in the same period of time. Of course the matter of the outer parts of the earth, as they describe in rotation a circle of eight thousand miles in diameter, require a much larger amount of rotary force than those particles near the centre, which describe only a small circle. To make this idea more distinct, imagine the whole substance of the earth to be divided into concentric rings, one within another, each one foot in thickness. As the orbit traversed by each of those rings in its rotation is completed in the same time, it is evident that a larger amount of force is needed to move the outer ring, with a circumference of twenty-five thousand miles, than the one next to it,—and this than the one next, and so on; the force required to move each next interior ring constantly diminishing according to the square of the distance.

A stone lying on the summit of a mountain describes every twenty-four hours a certain extent of rotary orbit. Another stone at the base of a mountain describes in the same time a smaller extent of rotary orbit. In the fall of a stone from the summit to the base there is a reduction of the amount of force acquired to effect a daily rotation; but the force of the higher level is not annihilated: it is the force of the fall, and it can be communicated to an arresting body. The difference of force at different altitudes, Mr. Coues terms the "spare force of rotation;" an expression which is

rather an awkward substitute for the word gravitation. As this is deemed by the author an important part of the work, and lest we have not succeeded in representing his ideas, we quote his own language:—

"The force obtained by the change of the level of the falling mass—of water for instance—cannot come from the attracting earth; for the attractive force is force to draw the mass toward her centre, and having acted according to this, the essential principle of attraction, it would cease to act, or merely hold the water at its new level. But the force of the fall of bodies remains; it is a living principle. It was in them at their higher level, their acting in rotation. If water falls, it transfers this force to other bodies, inducing motion in them. If not imparted, it is sufficient in intensity to raise the water again to its former level. It is not a mere gravitating, or downward force, but force giving motion irrespective of direction.

"Thus, the fall of water over an artificial dam is not from the downward attraction of the earth. That force can only exert its essential property of bringing the particles of matter nearer to each other. In doing this, it has discharged its only conceivable function. But the particles of water, by the act of descent, impart the spare force of their lower level of rotation; and this force, diverted from the majestic stream of rotative power, can have given to it by mechanical appliances the line of direction which crushes the grain, or on the revolving spindle twirls the fibre of cotton,—the mechanic using the force of nature for the comforts and luxuries of life."—Pp. 111, 112.

We have endeavoured to present an impartial view of this new theory. Our space does not permit us to follow the author further in his illustrations and reasonings, many of which are interesting and instructive, while others seem to fail in explaining phenomena according to his new theory. The author attempts to apply these principles not only to planetary motion, but to the explanation of all the "mechanical powers,"—to the oscillations of the pendulum, to the motions of fluids, to the tides, to atmospheric pressure, to meteorological phenomena, to heat, to electricity, and magnetism. In short, there is hardly a leading fact in physical science to which reference is not made. The reader will find much in this volume to awaken interest and excite thought, independently of the leading principles, which as a cord bind the separate facts into a system.

In reference to the extent of the ground passed over, the author remarks, (pp. 223, 224):—

"We pause for one moment to glance at the extent of ground over which we have so rapidly passed. The facts that we have endeavoured to examine are numerous and varied in their character. Had we the ability, we have not the space to present them in their fulness of scientific detail, nor is it necessary in a treatise of this nature. But we have attempted in simple language, with the least possible use of technical phraseology, to group together many phenomena under a new theory for their explanation. The result, in spite of errors and mistakes, we hope may tend in some degree to strengthen interest in the works of nature; for in whatever light the world is viewed, in

whatever aspect it is considered, its beauty is apparent; and though the offered theory be rejected, it may benefit some minds to forget for a moment the established explanations of things, that they may see creation with a light from a new direction touching some of its prominent points. If we have substituted for logical deduction an allusion to the 'laughter' of the exulting wave,—if in place of the formula of the mathematician we have introduced a text of Scripture,—if we have questioned the attractive power of matter, and doubted whether it be indeed the cause of all the varying phenomena about us,—if we refuse to admit the idea that the universe exists in its present form from the necessity of the case, because it could not be otherwise 'considering the known properties of matter,'—it is because when we look at nature we wish to see more than the mere external lineaments;—we would trace out the "Indwelling Spirit' which pervades every part; which is the cause of all change, of all movement; which is to the universe of matter what the life of man is to the body with which he is clothed. We would *feel*

> 'A presence that disturbs us with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky.'"

This quotation introduces us again to the idea to which we have already alluded, as the chief reason why we wished to call the attention of those who are unwilling to see science separated from or opposed to revealed religion to the consideration of this work. It is the reverent spirit which pervades it that so highly recommends it to the Christian student. The author writes with his own soul pervaded with the idea of an ever-present God, by whose constant volition the universe is sustained; not of a "Great First Cause," merely, who in ages long past gave being to the worlds, impressed upon them laws, and now leaves them to take care of themselves. We hail the "Outlines of a System of Mechanical Philosophy" as the harbinger of a brighter era, and in this light deem it a most valuable contribution to science. We are not prepared to embrace the entire system of the author, yet we have found our views of physical science greatly enlarged by his original and ingenious ideas. We recognise in this theory the dawning of a more complete and systematic philosophy than the system which now obtains in our schools and colleges; and we are, therefore, happy to learn that the author has pushed still further his original investigations in this direction, the result of which, we trust, may be a system of mechanical philosophy matured and perfected by the most extended observation and the most thorough analysis.

Art. VII.—LAYARD'S SECOND EXPLORATION.

Discoveries among the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan, and the Desert; being the Result of a Second Expedition, undertaken for the Trustees of the British Museum. By Austen H. Layard, M. P. Pp. 586. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1853.

The region of country lying between the Tigris on the east, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean on the north and west, and the Arabian Desert on the south, presents a geographical trapezoid of more historical interest than any other spot of similar size upon the globe. The natural advantages of this teeming and magnificent territory harmonize with the grand historical events of which it has been the theatre. Delicious in climate, various and beautiful in landscape, and productive to an extraordinary degree, all antiquity has ever pointed to this region as the garden-spot of the earth.

Here, according to tradition, were the bowers of blissful Eden,

> "Whose rich trees wept odorous gums and balm,"

and from whose boughs

> "Each morn Adam brush'd dews mellifluous."

On the northern verge stand the lofty peaks of Ararat, whence Noah and his sons descended to rebuild the ruins of the Flood, and people again the earth. Here was the "land of Shinar," and the Tower of Babel. Here Nimrod, the "mighty hunter before the Lord," commenced his career of conquest, and laid the foundations of empire. Here, indeed, the arts had their birth. Here civilization commenced its career, and science first kindled its torch. Here was the first theatre of heroism, legislation, poetry, and war; and thence they spread, as the overflowing wave of population poured itself out over other lands. Here the great Semiramis and Nitocris achieved their fabulous exploits. Here were mighty cities, with walls three hundred and fifty feet in height. Here flourished and decayed the old Assyrian and Babylonian empires. Indeed, from the age in which the theft of Paris precipitated Grecian valour on its western shores, down to the time when Napoleon essayed its conquest, no century has passed without giving to history some event important from its connexion with the welfare and destiny of mankind. And if there is any truth in the sentiment that "coming events cast their shadows before," the world would not be surprised to see this land again the battle-field of the nations. The Russian

bear and the British lion, in their march to the empire of Asia, in all likelihood will decide their struggle here.

It is wonderful to see how completely the fires of revolution have consumed all traces of ancient Assyria and Babylonia. For many ages their great cities have been buried in the oblivion of utter desolation. Nineveh was destroyed six hundred and six years before Christ—less than one hundred and fifty years after Rome was founded. When Xenophon, four hundred years before Christ, in his celebrated retreat, marched over this country, he heard of the pyramid of Nimroud, but not even the name of Nineveh. Even at that time its widely-extended walls and ramparts had perished; and mounds, covering magnificent palaces, alone remained upon the site of the ancient city—much as at the present day. To the exhumations and discoveries of Layard the world is chiefly indebted for the wonderful interest which these recovered cities are exciting.

The work now before us is the fruit of a second expedition, undertaken and carried on at the expense of the trustees of the British Museum. Having made the necessary arrangements, Mr. Layard departed from Constantinople on board a British steamer for Trebizond. At this place commenced his overland journey, passing across Eastern Armenia and Kurdistan, and proceeding from Lake Van, in part along the celebrated Anabasis of Xenophon, the course of which he was enabled to trace, in nearly a direct line, to Mosul.

As a book of travels merely, independent of its rich treasures in archæological discovery, this second work of Layard, like its predecessor, is a contribution to the current literature of the times of exceeding interest and value. The waves of barbarism, which, consequent on the failure of the Crusades, and the subsequent inundation of Western Asia by the Turks, settled over these haunts of ancient civilization, had long removed them from the eye of observation, and almost of history. Until lately but few travellers have had the curiosity or the courage to venture so far out of the beaten track, or, venturing, have remained sufficiently long to furnish valuable information respecting the country or the people. Niebuhr was here about a century ago, and described the ruins of Nineveh. In 1820 Mr. Rich visited the spot, and his cursory memorials of Nineveh and Babylon, consisting chiefly of a few square sun-dried bricks, with inscriptions, made a profound impression on the public mind. Since 1840, however, a new era has dawned. The hoary ruins scattered everywhere over these desolate plains have at length found a tongue, and are pouring floods of light upon the forgotten nations of whom they are the only memorials.

The nomadic Arabs, also, that wander over them, subsisting by their flocks, and herds, and occasional plunder, under the graphic pen of Layard assume a new interest. These wild rovers of the desert are the successors, but not the descendants and representatives of the ancient Assyrians. Nevertheless, they are an historical people; and in their picturesque appearance, simple hospitality, dress, flocks and herds, and habits of life, we discover the originals of many a Scripture picture—all the more beautiful and interesting from their constant tendency to revive our Scripture recollections. It is aside from our purpose, however, at this time to speak of Layard as a descriptive traveller, though his pen indicates keen and versatile observation, and at times paints with the fancy of a poet. Take the following paragraphs as specimens of his descriptive power; the first a picture of sunset in the desert:—

"As the evening crept on I watched, from the highest mound, the sun as it gradually sank in unclouded splendour below the sea-like expanse before me. On all sides, as far as the eye could reach, rose the grass-covered heaps, marking the site of ancient habitations. The great tide of civilization had long since ebbed, leaving these scattered wrecks on the solitary shore. Are those waters to flow again, bearing back the seeds of knowledge and of wealth that they have wafted to the West? We, wanderers, were seeking what they had left behind, as children gather up the coloured shells on the deserted sands. At my feet there was a busy scene, making more lonely the unbroken solitude which reigned in the vast plain around, where the only things having life or motion were the shadows of the lofty mounds, as they lengthened before the declining sun. Above three years before, when watching the approach of night from the old castle of Tel Afer, I had counted nearly one hundred ruins; now, when in the midst of them, no less than double that number were seen from Tel Jemal. * * * In the distance was the long range of the Sinjar Hills, furrowed with countless ravines, each marked by a dark purple shadow, gradually melting into the evening haze."—P. 208.

Here is a portrait, picturesque and strikingly life-like, of Arab character. An artist could easily transfer it to canvass:—

"A Bedouin youth, thin and sickly, though of a daring and resolute countenance, sat in my guest-tent. His singular appearance at once drew my attention. His only clothing was a kerchief, very dirty and torn, falling over his head, and a ragged cloak which he drew tightly around him, allowing the end of a knotted club to appear above its folds. His story, which he was at length induced to tell, was characteristic of Bedouin education. He was of the Boraij tribe, and related to Suttum. His father was too poor to equip him with mare and spear, and he was ashamed to be seen by the Arabs on foot and unarmed. He had now become a man, for he was about fourteen years old, and he resolved to trust to his own skill for his outfit as a warrior. Leaving in his father's tent all his clothes except his dirty keffieh and his tattered aba, and without communicating his plans to his friends, he bent his way to the Euphrates. For three months his family, hearing nothing of him, believed him to be dead. During that time, however, he had lived in the river jungle, feeding on roots and herbs, hiding himself during the day in the thickets, and prowling at night around the tents of the Aneyza, in search of a

mare that might have strayed, or might be less carefully guarded than usual. At length the object of his ambition was found, and such a mare had never been seen before; but, alas! her legs were bound with iron shackles, and he had brought no file with him," &c.—P. 251.

But these life-pictures of Arab character are the minor attractions of Mr. Layard's book. A resumè of his travels and adventures among these wild and excitable people would be interesting; but we hasten to what is the principal object of this article,—a condensed account of his wonderful discoveries among the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, considered in their relations to history, sacred and profane. Nothing in the century has struck the public mind as more important and replete with interest than these discoveries. From the tomb of buried and almost forgotten ages, the spade and pick of this modern Belzoni have brought up these mighty cities from a sepulture of twenty-five hundred years; and in his magnificent restorations we almost see again those splendid temple-palaces, gardens, towering walls, and busy marts, crowded with merchandise, and echoing the hum of countless voices; while pass before us the thronging multitudes "girded with girdles upon their loins, exceeding in dyed attire upon their heads, all of them princes to look to, after the manner of the Babylonians of Chaldea, the land of their nativity."

The principal treasures of this expedition were found at Kouyunjik and Nimroud, though visits were made to Kalah-Sherghat, Arban, Khabour, Babylon, and numerous other places, and discoveries made of great richness and importance. The value of these is secondary only in view of the superior richness of the discoveries made at Kouyunjik and Nimroud. For the details of these labours we must refer the reader to the book itself,—a work far more replete with incident and instruction than any other book of modern travel.

After Mr. Layard's departure for Europe, in 1847, the excavations at Kouyunjik were continued,—first under the superintendence of Mr. Ross, and afterward of Mr. Rassam, the English Vice-Consul at Mosul. In this time several chambers were excavated—different apartments of the same building. In these apartments, the four walls were found to be occupied, for the most part, by a series of sculptures representing a consecutive history, without interruption, by inscriptions or divisions of the alabaster panelling. A chamber seems thus to have been appropriated to the events of a campaign, or a whole war,—from the going out of the king to his triumphal return. The slabs on which these sculptures were found are from eight to nine feet in height, and sometimes of equal breadth; on the tops of which appear to have been epigraphs, or labels, giving the

name of the conquered king or country, and sometimes of the principal prisoners. Many of these epigraphs, however, have been destroyed. Around one of these chambers the bass-reliefs represented the siege of a castle standing on an artificial mound, surrounded at its base by houses. But let Layard himself describe:—

"The besieged defended themselves on the walls and turrets with bows, spears, and stones. The Assyrian army was composed of spearmen, slingers, and bowmen, some of whom had already gained the house-tops. Male and female captives had been taken, and heads cut off; the victorious warriors, according to custom, and probably to claim a reward, bringing them to the registrars. The led horses and body-guard of the king were still preserved; but that part of the bass-relief containing the monarch himself, probably standing in his chariot, had been destroyed. In the background were wooded mountains. Vines and other trees formed a distinct band in the middle of the slabs, and a river ran at the foot of the mound. The dress of the male prisoners consisted either of a long robe falling to the ankles, or of a tunic reaching to the knees, over which was thrown an outer garment, apparently made of the skins of animals; and they wore greaves laced up in front. The women were clothed in a robe descending to the feet, with an outer fringed garment thrown over the shoulders; a kind of hood or veil covered the back of the head, and fell over the neck. Above the castle was the fragment of an inscription in two lines, containing the name of the city, of which unfortunately the first character is wanting. It reads: 'The city of * * * alammo I attacked and captured; I carried away its spoil.'"—P. 60.

No name of a city corresponding to this, however, has been discovered. It is remarkable that in some of the chambers the sculptures seem to have been purposely defaced by a sharp instrument, so that not a vestige is intelligible. No clew, as yet, to the historical significance of many of these delineations has been found. In some cases the artist has thrown in rude representations of trees, valleys, mountains, and rivers; and by this means communicated a general idea of the country in which the events recorded took place. It is possible that some of these sculptured records may yet be identified with the cuneiform inscriptions on the winged bulls at the entrance of the palace—so minutely described in the former volumes—and which contain a general chronicle of the reign of the king.

The first six weeks of these researches were rewarded by a series of discoveries of the greatest interest. Several entire chambers were explored, and among them a magnificent hall, one hundred and twenty-four feet in length by ninety in breadth. Its walls were completely covered with the most elaborate and highly-finished bass-reliefs. Unfortunately these, as well as the gigantic monsters at the entrances, had suffered much from the fire which destroyed the edifice, many of them being broken, and partly calcined; but enough remained to show the general subject. In one part was represented the whole process used by the Assyrians in removing and placing

various objects used in their building, and especially the human-headed bulls, from their first stages in the quarry to their appropriate place at the entrance of the palace. In one quarter is represented the king standing in his chariot, with his body-guard before him. On the bank of a river is an immense slab of marble, just landed, and which the workmen, having placed on a sledge, are in the act of drawing to its destined place. The two-wheeled chariot of the king forbids the supposition that the Assyrians at that time were unacquainted with wheel-carriages as a means of transportation. The use of the sledge, therefore, in removing so large a mass—not less than forty or fifty tons—is to be accounted for by the consideration, that we of the present day should probably make use of the same means for moving bodies of so unwieldy weight. Beneath the sledge are placed rollers, and in the rear a company of workmen are easing it along by the use of a large lever, while the overseer, standing on the top of the block, is giving his orders through a speaking-trumpet to the four different lines of "trackers," who, by means of long cables, are pulling it up the hill. From these sculptures we learn two things respecting the arts in those early times: First, that the Assyrians were acquainted with the lever as a mechanical power, long before Archimedes demonstrated its properties; and, second, that the speaking-trumpet, an invention generally conceded to be modern—claimed by Samuel Moreland so late as 1670—was known, in all probability, three thousand years ago.

Next in the series follow sculptures representing the erection of the artificial mounds on which these palaces were reared; and these by others, showing the process by which the human-headed bulls, lions, and other colossi were put in their places.

Satisfactory evidence seems to have been found, that the king represented as superintending the building of the mounds, and the placing of the colossal bulls, was Sennacherib himself; and that "the sculptures celebrate the building at Nineveh of the great palace and its adjacent temples, described in the inscriptions as the work of that monarch." Unfortunately, the epigraphs above the bass-reliefs have suffered so much from the effect of fire and violence that but two or three of them could be deciphered, and that imperfectly. Over the king, who is superintending the removal of one of these colossi, is the following short inscription in the cuneiform character, translated by Dr. Hincks:—

"Sennacherib, King of Assyria, the great figures of bulls which in the land of Belad were made for his royal palace at Nineveh, he transported *thither*." (?) —P. 98.

Over the bass-reliefs which represent the building of the mound were found two epigraphs, both precisely similar, but greatly mutilated. As far as they can be restored, they are thus interpreted by Dr. Hincks:—

"Sennacherib, King of Assyria. Hewn stones, which as the gods willed were found in the land of Belad, for the *walls* (?) [or foundations—the word reads '*shibri*'] of my palace, I caused the inhabitants of foreign countries (?) and the people of the forests [Kershani] the great bulls for the gates of my palace *to drag* (?) [or bring."]—P. 99.

If this inscription is correctly interpreted, it furnishes direct evidence of a point of historical interest otherwise pretty clearly indicated by the sculptures themselves; to wit, that the captives taken in the wars of the Assyrian kings were compelled to build their great public works. The Jews themselves, after their captivity, no doubt were condemned to rear the monuments of their conquerors. Many of the workmen on these bass-reliefs are represented as prisoners in shackles or chains; sometimes singly, the fetters being fastened to their ankles; others bound together in pairs by an iron rod, attached to rings in their girdles.

From one of the epigraphs it appears that objects of wood "were brought from Mount Lebanon, and taken up [to the top of the mound] from the Tigris." The correctness of this was subsequently confirmed by the discovery among the ruins of numerous beams of cedar, in all probability brought from Lebanon; and much of the rubbish in which the ruins were buried consisted of charcoal of the same wood. The attention of Mr. Layard, one day, was called to it by the sweet smell of a burning beam, with which the Arabs had kindled a fire; the wood still retaining its fragrance after a lapse of nearly three thousand years. Thus the "goodly cedars" of Lebanon appear to have furnished their treasures, not only for the temple of Solomon, but also for the temple-palaces of Nineveh.

In the month of December, however, the richest discoveries rewarded the diligence of these remarkable researches. The whole facade of the southeast side of the palace, forming apparently the grand entrance to the edifice, was discovered. Here ten colossal bulls, and six human figures of gigantic proportions, were grouped together; and the length of the whole, without including the sculptured walls continued beyond the smaller entrances, was one hundred and eighty feet. On the great bulls forming the centre portal of the grand entrance was found a continuous inscription, in the cuneiform character, of not less than one hundred and fifty-two lines. On the four bulls of the facade were two inscriptions, one inscription being carried over each pair. These were found to be

the annals of six years of the reign of Sennacherib, besides numerous particulars connected with the religion of the Assyrians—their gods temples, palaces, &c.—all of the highest interest, as bringing to light the lost history of those times.

To give a general idea of these annals, we present an abridgment of the account as made out by Dr. Hincks and Mr. Layard. The inscriptions begin with the name and titles of Sennacherib. He calls himself "the subduer of kings from the upper sea of the setting sun [the Mediterranean] to the lower sea of the rising sun," [the Persian Gulf.] In the first year of his reign he defeated Merodach-baladan, a name already familiar to the reader as the king mentioned in the Old Testament for sending letters and a present to Hezekiah. It was to his ambassadors that Hezekiah boastfully showed "all the house of his precious things, the silver, and the gold, and the spices, and the precious ointment, and all the house of his armour, and all that was found in his treasures: there was nothing in his house, nor in all his dominion, that Hezekiah showed them not."

In these inscriptions Merodach-baladan is called the King of Kar-Duniyas, a city and country frequently mentioned in these Assyrian records, and comprising the southernmost part of Mesopotamia, near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, to the borders of Susiana. This king had recently recovered Babylon, from which, in the twelfth year of his reign, he had been expelled by Sargon, the father of Sennacherib. We hence see the reason why in Isaiah he is styled "Merodach-baladan, the son of Baladan, King of Babylon." The result was, that Sennacherib totally defeated Merodach-baladan, who fled to save his life, "leaving behind him his chariots, *wagons*, (?) horses, mares, *asses*, (?) camels, and *riding horses with their trappings for war*." (?) The victorious king then advanced to Babylon, where he plundered the palace, carrying off a vast treasure of gold, silver, precious stones, men and women-servants, and a variety of objects not yet satisfactorily made out. No less than seventy-nine cities, (or fortresses,) all the castles of the Chaldæans, and eight hundred and twenty small towns (or villages) dependent upon them, were taken and spoiled by the Assyrian army; and the great wandering tribes that dwelt around the cities of Mesopotamia, —the Syrians, (Arameans,) Chaldæans, &c.—were brought under subjection. Sennacherib, having made Belib, one of his officers, sovereign of the conquered provinces, proceeded to subdue the powerful tribes who border on the Euphrates and Tigris, and among them the Hagarenes and Nabathæans. From these wandering people he carried off to Assyria, probably to colonize his new-built

cities and villages, "208,000 men, women, and children, together with 7,200 horses and mares, 11,063 *asses*, (?) 5,230 camels, 120,100 oxen, and 800,500 sheep."

The "Belib" mentioned above appears to be the "Belibus" of Ptolemy's canon, which throws light upon the chronology of Sennacherib's accession, and enabled Dr. Hincks to fix its date at 703 B. C. This date is consistent with the Scripture chronology. Merodach-baladan was on the throne of Babylon at the time (712 years B. C.) he sent his ambassadors to congratulate Hezekiah on his recovery.

Our further statements respecting these annals we shall limit to the records of the third year, as more interesting from their direct reference to facts recorded in the Scripture history. Indeed, the facts of history elsewhere found throw wonderful light on the general accuracy of these inscriptions, while the inscriptions themselves incidentally give valuable confirmation to the historical record. In the third year of his reign Sennacherib appears to have overrun with his armies the whole of Syria. The Syrians are called by their familiar Bible name—the Hittites—the Khatti, or Khetta, by which they were also known to the Egyptians. The King of Sidon, Luli, (or Luliya,) was the first to oppose him; but he was soon compelled to fly from Tyre to "Yavan, in the middle of the sea." This "Yavan" is identified by Dr. Hincks with the island of Crete, or with some part of the southern coast of Asia Minor, and with the Yavan of the Old Testament, the country of the Ionians, or Greeks; an identification in which Mr. Layard concurs. After having overthrown all the kings of the sea-coast, together with Ascalon and its dependent cities, he came to Judæa. At this time the King of Egypt sent an army, the main part of which belonged to "Milukhkha," (Meroe or Æthiopia,) into Judæa, to aid his Jewish allies. Sennacherib joined battle with the Egyptians, and totally defeated them near the city of All . . ku. Padiya, having been brought back from Jerusalem, was replaced by Sennacherib on his throne. In the inscriptions occurs this remarkable passage: "Hezekiah, King of Judah, who had not submitted to my authority, forty-six of his principal cities, and fortresses and villages depending upon them, of which I took no account, I captured, and carried away their spoil. I *shut up* (?) himself within Jerusalem, his capital city. The fortified towns, and the rest of his towns which I spoiled, I severed from his country, and gave to the Kings of Ascalon, Ekron, and Gaza, so as to make his country small. In addition to the former tribute imposed upon their countries, I added a tribute the nature of which I fixed."

In the course of this remarkable record, it is stated that the Assyrian king took from Hezekiah the treasure he had collected at Jerusalem,—thirty talents of gold and eight hundred talents of silver, the treasures of his palace, besides his sons and his daughters, and his male and female servants, and brought them all to Nineveh. Compare this with the account of this expedition as given in 2 Kings, chap. xviii:—

"Now in the fourteenth year of King Hezekiah did Sennacherib king of Assyria come up against all the fenced cities of Judah, and took them. And Hezekiah king of Judah sent to the king of Assyria to Lachish, saying, I have offended; return from me: that which thou puttest on me I will bear. And the king of Assyria appointed unto Hezekiah king of Judah three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold. And Hezekiah gave him all the silver that was found in the house of the Lord, and in the treasures of the king's house. At that time did Hezekiah cut off the gold from the doors of the temple of the Lord, and from the pillars which Hezekiah king of Judah had overlaid, and gave it to the king of Assyria."

In these independent accounts occurs a remarkable coincidence of historic testimony. The number of "talents of gold" is precisely the same in both statements. In the amount of the silver there is a difference of five hundred talents. These discrepancies, perhaps, without further light, can never be explained; but it is a proud reward of antiquarian labour to have thus won from the earth such a confirmation of the Scripture history, after a burial of twenty-five centuries. The value of the history is apparent also in confirming the general correctness of the translation of the inscriptions.

In the latter part of Mr. Layard's residence at Mosul, a chamber was discovered in which the sculptures were in much better preservation than any before found at Kouyunjik. On a series of thirteen slabs were bass-reliefs representing the siege of a fortified city, evidently of great extent and importance. Around it were seen the Assyrian warriors plying all the usual weapons of warfare known in those times: archers, spearmen, slingers, battering-rams, and scaling-ladders appear on every hand; the composition conveying to the mind of the observer all the excitement of an animated siege. From the battlements and towers the besieged are hurling down showers of arrows, javelins, stones, and blazing torches upon the assailants. The city is at length taken. The captive people march forth from the gates, and the king receives them seated on a gorgeous throne. Many of the prisoners are surrendered to the torturers, some are flayed alive, others are slain by the sword in the presence of the king. These bass-reliefs doubtless represent the entire history of the expedition in which the city was taken, and, fortunately, the epigraph, which explained the event, was found complete. It is

written, like all the rest of these inscriptions, in the cuneiform or arrow-headed character. The following is a fac-simile, which, as a specimen of this style of writing, we are happy to be able to introduce for the sake of those of our readers who have not access to the work itself:—



This is translated thus:—

"Sennacherib, the mighty king, king of the country of Assyria, sitting on the throne of judgment, before [or at the entrance of] the city of Lachish, [Lakhisha,] I give permission for its slaughter."—P. 128.

Now we know that Sennacherib was engaged in the siege of Lachish at the time he sent his generals to demand tribute of Hezekiah; for it was to this place, as the Bible informs us, that he sent his submission, and here that Sennacherib dictated his terms,—"three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold." Here, then, would seem to be evidence conclusive that the Sennacherib who caused these sculptures to be engraved was the Sennacherib of Scripture,—the same who is described as besieging Lachish. It appears, however, that the interpreters are not exactly agreed on this point; Colonel Rawlinson maintaining that the Lachish of Scripture is the same with All . . ku, the name of another city, which he finds in some of the inscriptions on the bulls, and which was on the sea-coast, not far from Gaza. It is but right however to add, that Dr. Hincks, in this question, concurs with Mr. Layard.

An indirect but important confirmation of this point results from another curious discovery, made about the same time. It appears that in one corner of this wonderful palace, the archive-chamber was stumbled upon, in which were found many seals of fine clay. These seals had every appearance of having been used for official purposes, like seals of wax attached to parchment treaties, and other official documents, now-a-days. The parchment or leather to which the seals were attached, of course has perished, but the holes of the strings by which the seals were attached are still visible. In some instances the ashes of the string were yet in the holes, and on the seals themselves unmistakable marks of the thumb and finger.

Some of these seals are Egyptian; but the most remarkable and important of the Egyptian seals, says Mr. Layard, "are two impressions of a royal signet, which, though imperfect, retain the cartouche, with the name of the king, so as to be perfectly legible. It is one well known to Egyptian scholars as that of the second Sabaco, the Ethiopian of the twenty-fifth dynasty. On the *same piece* of clay is impressed an Assyrian seal, with a device representing a priest ministering before the king,—probably a royal signet." Now, it so happens that this very Sabaco was on the throne of Egypt at the time that Sennacherib came to the throne of Assyria. Let the reader carefully peruse the following paragraph:—

"This Sabaco is probably the So mentioned in the Second Book of Kings, (xvii, 4,) as having received ambassadors from Hoshea, the king of Israel; who, by entering into a league with the Egyptians, called down the vengeance of Shalmaneser, whose tributary he was; which led to the first great captivity of the people of Samaria. Shalmaneser we know to have been an immediate predecessor of Sennacherib; and Tirakhah, the Egyptian king who was defeated by the Assyrians near Lachish, was the immediate successor of Sabaco II. It would seem that a peace having been concluded between the Egyptians and one of the Assyrian monarchs, probably Sennacherib, the royal signets of the two kings thus found together were attached to the treaty, which was deposited among the archives of the kingdom."—P. 134.

The document itself has long since perished, but singularly enough this proof of the alliance has come up from the oblivion of ages, furnishing a most remarkable instance of confirmatory evidence. The Scripture history is established; and its reflex light shows how correctly modern skill and ingenuity have interpreted the lost language of the Assyrians.

As frequent reference is made to the "cuneiform character" in which these inscriptions are written, a few words on this subject will not be out of place. The uninitiated will be surprised to learn that this written language of old Assyria has for thousands of years been entirely lost. Until recently *nothing* was known about it. It was *dead, buried,* and *forgotten,* without a living interpreter, and without a record in any known tongue capable of throwing light upon its curious forms. Among the ruins of Persepolis modern antiquarians knew there were remains of an ancient system of writing, in which all the characters were formed by different combinations of one simple element; but mystery profound, conscious of the safety of her secrets, laughed at the inquisitive researches of critics and philologers. The inscriptions found on bricks brought from ancient Babylon were evidently written in the same character, with considerable variations. The name "cuneiform," or "arrow-headed," was given to it because of the exact resemblance of its prevailing element to the wedge, or arrow-head.

Various conjectures were thrown out by scholars respecting the interpretation of these characters; but it is believed no clew of any value was found previous to the discoveries of Champollion, in reference to the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Some had thought it to be an alphabet of syllables; some supposed it must consist of signs of words or of ideas. The first hint which threw light upon the mysterious figures was the two-fold inscription upon an Egyptian alabaster vase, found by Champollion to present the name of Xerxes, both in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and in these Persepolitan arrow-heads. Here was the first ray of light. It became, however, the thread of Ariadne to unravel the dark mystery. The multitudinous inscriptions in this character, found among the ruins of Nineveh, gave a wonderful impulse to philological inquiry and invention; and the result is a complete triumph. The cuneiform writing can now be interpreted, if not with as much certainty as the Hebrew and Greek, at least with a success truly astonishing, when we consider the few and feeble hints which laid the foundation for its recovery.

At the time of the publication of Layard's first work, in 1849, but little progress had been made in deciphering this character, and of course the contents of many highly interesting and important inscriptions could not then be made known. Since then, however, the sagacity and learning of two English scholars—Colonel Rawlinson and the Rev. Dr. Hincks—have been crowned with singular success. In France, also, the labours of M. Botta and M. de Saulcy, have contributed much to the successful deciphering of this lost language. When the inherent difficulty of such a work is considered, it is not surprising that doubts should be entertained by some distinguished critics as to the progress actually made in the interpretation of this cuneiform writing. In some cases, perhaps, theories and conclusions were too hastily adopted, and subsequent investigations have compelled them to be thrown aside. But when we consider that several independent translations of numerous inscriptions and writings have already been made, with substantial agreement in all,—and that numerous names of persons, cities, and nations, have been detected in historical and geographical series, corresponding with events recorded elsewhere in sacred and profane history,—we have a cumulation of testimony which challenges the assent even of the sceptical. The candid inquirer can hardly follow Mr. Layard through his book, without feeling that these exhumed cities are a mine of prodigious antiquarian wealth, and of priceless value, for the floods of light which they are destined to throw upon the early history of the world. In one chamber, called the "Chamber of Records," was found an immense number of tablets, varying from six and a half to nine inches in

length, closely written over with the cuneiform character. These, no doubt, are important records—perhaps the history of expeditions and wars undertaken by the Assyrian kings. Some, perhaps, are royal decrees, registers, chronological tables, astronomical observations, &c. We elsewhere know that the Babylonians wrote such things on tablets of clay, which were afterward hardened in the fire. Many cases of these tablets have been sent to the British Museum. Their early publication would be a valuable service in facilitating investigation in this new and wonderfully interesting department of inquiry. Much, doubtless, remains to be done. Multitudes of these recovered records are destined to yield up their secrets, and furnish perhaps an original history—hitherto completely lost—of the most splendid and mighty of the empires of antiquity.

Thus far we have spoken only of discoveries made at Kouyunjik; but enough has been said to show the general condition and character of these mighty ruins, and the startling nature of the discoveries which they have revealed. At Nimroud—eighteen miles below Kouyunjik, on the Tigris—the treasure-seekers were rewarded with nearly equal success. Two temples were discovered, and in one of them four chambers explored, by tunnels carried through the enormous mass of earth and rubbish in which the ruins were buried. The principal portal was formed by two colossal human-headed lions, sixteen feet and a half high, and fifteen feet long. Here were found inscriptions of many hundred lines, containing complete annals of the reigning king. These annals are remarkably minute in details, and will be exceedingly valuable in recovering the lost history of those times. In one of the chambers was found a great variety of objects of art,—bells, rings, copper caldrons, and other objects in metal; bronze bowls, cups, and dishes, with curiously-wrought embossings; shields, ivory ornaments, glass bowls, a lens, and, strange enough, the *royal throne!* It is not necessary, however, to pursue these descriptions further.

As connected with this subject, a question of no little interest has doubtless occupied the reader's mind, namely, How far do these researches confirm the accounts given by ancient writers of the extraordinary extent of Nineveh and Babylon? The description of Nineveh, in the Book of Jonah, makes it "an exceeding great city of three days' journey." Now, it is well known that twenty miles in the East is the usual "day's journey;" and this, perhaps, is the chief authority for the impression so widely prevalent, that the circuit of Nineveh was sixty miles. But we have the authority of Strabo that this city was even larger than Babylon; and according to Diodorus Siculus, its dimensions were one hundred and fifty

stadia on its two longest sides, by ninety on the shorter, making four hundred and eighty stadia, which also gives us about sixty miles, as above. A city thus eighteen and three-fourth miles in length by eleven and one-fourth in breadth, and containing, therefore, a superficial area of more than two hundred and ten square miles, surrounded by massive walls one hundred feet high, and of so great thickness that three chariots might go abreast on them with ease, is so stupendous a work, and so far surpasses all the standards of comparison with which our minds are familiar, in the great cities of Europe, both in ancient and modern times, that it is difficult not to reject the whole story as an immense exaggeration, or tale of Arabian romance; but the "exceeding great city of three days' journey" of the Scriptures, and the concurrence of the Greek historians and geographers, some of whom collected the evidences whereof they wrote by travel and actual visit to the place, forbid this idea; and we are forced, therefore, to seek a solution of the difficulty by adopting theories of city-building quite unlike anything known elsewhere, except in Babylon, either before or since.

It is evident that the ruins of Kouyunjik, opposite Mosul, cannot be identified as the ancient Nineveh, for they are only about five miles in circumference, and do not, therefore, cover much more than one superficial mile. Nimroud—situated eighteen miles below Kouyunjik, near the junction of the Zab with the Tigris, and which until recently has been considered by travellers as marking the site of Nineveh—for a similar reason, must be given up. In his former work, Mr. Layard ventured the conjecture that the four great mounds—Kouyunjik, Khorsabad, Karamles, and Nimroud—might mark the four corners of a parallelogram, whose sides would correspond very nearly with the four hundred and eighty stadia, or sixty miles, of the geographers, and the "three days' journey" of the Prophet Jonah. Within this space are many large mounds, including the principal ruins of Assyria: such as Karakush, Baasheikha, Baazani, Husseini, Zel-Yara, &c.; and the face of the country is strewed with the remains of pottery, bricks, and other fragments.

These great mounds mark the site of the magnificent palaces, temples, and other public edifices which adorned this mighty city; and the spaces between may have been occupied with private dwellings, streets, parks, extensive gardens, and other cultivated grounds. The absence of the remains of such buildings can be accounted for by the perishable nature of the materials employed—sun-dried bricks. Yet there seems to be sufficient evidence to indicate that buildings were spread over much of the vast space described,—small mounds being everywhere visible, and scarcely a

husbandman driving his plough over the soil without turning up the vestiges of ancient habitations. Yet so completely had these ruins disappeared, that more than twelve hundred years ago, (A. D. 627,) when the great battle was fought between Heracles and Rhazates, the vacant space here described afforded a spacious field for the operations of the two armies.

Since the utterance of this conjecture, a trigonometrical survey of the country by Captain Jones proves that the great ruins of Kouyunjik, Nimroud, Karamles, and Khorsabad, form very nearly a perfect parallelogram, as supposed. If this solution be adopted—and we know of no other which harmonizes with the accounts of the city, given in the Scriptures, and by the Greek geographers—it is not by any means necessary to suppose this large area built over with the compactness of a European or American city. Indeed, ancient historians inform us, in reference to *Babylon*, that there was space enough within its walls to cultivate corn for the sustenance of the whole population in case of siege, besides gardens and orchards. That large areas of land for tillage were included within the limits of Nineveh, is altogether probable. This, indeed, may be inferred from the language of the Bible, Jonah iv, 11:—

"And should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, *and also much cattle?*"

These "much cattle" being mentioned in the same category with the "sixscore thousand persons," it is a fair presumption that they also were reared and kept in the city. Indeed, the spacious limits of a city eighteen and three-fourth miles long by eleven and a quarter wide, would preclude the idea of these much cattle being driven back and forth to find pasturage out of the city, and of course require us to provide ample fields and pasture-grounds within.

Though this solution is plausible, it does not, it must be confessed, remove all difficulties. If this "great city," as historians inform us, was inclosed by a wall "one hundred feet high, wide enough for three chariots to pass each other abreast, and surmounted by fifteen hundred towers, each two hundred feet high,"—we can see no probable exercise of human power, no silent action of the elements, though continued through more than twenty-five centuries, nor indeed any convulsion of nature which could so perfectly obliterate these towering and massive ramparts as to leave *no trace* behind. We should expect to find some well-defined outline, at least, to mark where so mighty a city stood. These walls, indeed, were among the most notable monuments of Assyrian power; and no reason can be assigned why they also should not have remained, as

well as the temple-palaces, to tell their tale to modern times: but no such linear mounds or mural embankments appear to exist. While therefore there is evidence sufficient to believe that Nineveh was an "exceeding great city," fit residence for such splendid despots as Sennacherib, Pul, Sargon, and Tiglath Pileser, we are forced to the conclusion that the accounts given, by the Greek historians at least, of the walls and defences of Nineveh, are gross exaggerations, if not pure fables.

The explorations in Babylon were not attended with discoveries either so numerous or important as those of Nineveh. Of the present condition of those ruins the following passage is both eloquent and picturesque:—

"The mound of Babel is the first great ruin seen on approaching Babylon from the north. Beyond it long lines of palms hem in the Euphrates, which now winds through the midst of the ancient city. To the vast mound of Babel succeed long undulating heaps of earth, bricks, and pottery. A solitary mass of brick-work, rising from the summit of the largest mound, marks the remains known to the Arabs as the 'Mujelibé,' or the overturned. Other shapeless heaps of rubbish cover for many an acre the face of the land. The lofty banks of ancient canals fret the country like natural ridges of hills. Some have long been choked with sand; others still carry the waters of the river to distant villages and palm-groves. On all sides fragments of glass, marble, pottery, and inscribed brick are mingled with the peculiar nitrous and blanched soil, which, bred from the remains of ancient habitations, checks or destroys vegetation, and renders the site of Babylon a naked and hideous waste. Owls start from the scanty thickets, and the foul jackal skulks through the furrows. Truly 'the glory of kingdoms, and the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency, is as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah. Wild beasts of the desert lie there; and their houses are full of doleful creatures; and owls dwell there, and satyrs dance there. And the wild beasts of the islands cry in their desolate houses, and dragons in their pleasant palaces:' for her day has come."—P. 413.

During Mr. Layard's stay at this place, excavations were made in different parts of the ruins, but nothing of importance was reached. Confused heaps of ruins, and standing masonry, with enormous accumulations of rubbish above them, were all that met the spade of his Jebour explorers. Scarcely a detached figure in stone, or a solitary tablet, was dug out of the vast heaps. No sculptures or inscribed slabs—the panelling of the walls of palaces and temples, as in Nineveh—were found. That such was the case is somewhat remarkable, considering the acknowledged richness and splendour of this ancient city, "the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency;" but some future explorer, aided by more favourable circumstances, may possibly yet reap a harvest of antiquarian discovery, equal to anything which Nineveh has afforded. Far down in the depths of those stupendous mounds are palace-chambers and festal-halls, where oriental art and wealth once displayed their glittering magnificence, and where royalty

strutted its brief hour, decked in its purple and pride. On almost all the bricks found among these ruins are inscriptions in the cuneiform character; but they simply record the building of the city by "Nabukudurruchur, the son of Nabubaluchun."

Babylon, in magnificence and extent, was the wonder of the ancient world. The descriptions which have come down to us through Herodotus and other historians, make so large a draft upon our faith, that credulity itself staggers under the amount, and protests the claim. Its stupendous walls rising up three hundred and fifty feet—an enormous superfluity of altitude—its hanging gardens of equal elevation, reared by Nebuchadnezzar in the mere wantonness of power, to emulate the height of the hills of Media, and gratify the rural taste of his queen; the prodigious artificial lake near by, one hundred and sixty miles in circuit, and thirty-five feet deep, constructed to receive the superfluous waters of the Euphrates in seasons of flood, and capacious enough to float all the navies in the world; and the Temple of Belus, according to Herodotus "a furlong in height," on whose level summit was an observatory still higher, constructed for the convenience of Babylonish astronomers:—these are works the glowing descriptions of which, as they have come down to us from the old historians, never fail to excite the amazement where they do not provoke the scepticism of mankind. If works such as these were not purely fabulous, they were at least colossal exaggerations. How such accounts could have been transmitted as sober history, we are unable to conceive, unless the evidences of Assyrian or Babylonian power were so impressive and overpowering as to excite unduly the imagination, and, like the mirage of the desert, cause the writers from whom these descriptions come to see what never existed, or greatly to exaggerate what did.

In the reputed extent of Babylon we experience the same difficulty as in the case of Nineveh. It is described as lying in an exact square, each side being fifteen miles, and its superficial area being therefore two hundred and twenty-five square miles—a surface to be built over as a city, or even enclosed with substantial fortifications, utterly incredible. The difficulty may, perhaps, be surmounted by adopting a like hypothesis as in the case of Nineveh; but according to the observation of Layard and other travellers, no traces of this stupendous wall are found, to afford a basis for conjecture. If a vast line of fortifications, with gates and equi-distant towers of so enormous dimensions, once existed, it is incredible that the face of the country at the present day should furnish *not even a trace.* But no trace is there. Evidences of mural fortifications on the left bank of the river do indeed exist; but they correspond with the

descriptions neither in form nor in extent. Instead of a square, we find two sides of a trapezoid; and, instead of fifteen miles, an extent of not more than three. On the right bank of the river, if ever such ruins were found, the changes in its channel have long since swept them away. It is evident that these enclosures could never have embraced all of this mighty city. For miles around, low heaps of ruins and scattered embankments are seen. "By imagining," says Mr. Layard, "a square large enough to include the smaller mounds scattered over the plains, from Mohawill to below Hillah on one side of the river, and the Birs Nimroud, at its south-western angle, on the other, the site of a city of the dimensions attributed to Babylon might be satisfactorily determined;" but then it is clear that the outer wall and ditch so minutely described by Herodotus never existed.

But we are drawing out these discussions to a point quite beyond our original intentions, and must therefore bring them to a close. From what has been said, the intelligent reader will be able to gather the character and value of these antiquarian researches. They present a mass of information of the most interesting and important kind. On many points Scripture history is illustrated, and, on many more, profane. No other archæological labours of these or other times have so thrilled the public mind, or excited so general attention. Hoary antiquity, with its curious records, damp with the reek of forgotten centuries, comes forth from the tomb to hold converse with the living generations, and thrill us with its deeds of renown. The sealed archives of old Assyria unlock their treasures; mysterious inscriptions, in language long since forgotten, are forced by modern sagacity to yield their secrets; and at every step, as we advance, light breaks in upon the lost history of the past. From the sepulchre of hopeless oblivion come unexpected voices, startling the nations by telling of valour, power, learning, art, and the fame of glorious exploits achieved when the world was young, and over which Time had long since rolled his Lethean wave. Greece and Rome, though dating back into the heroic ages quite beyond the reach of authentic history, were modern compared with old Assyria. When Cadmus was planting his colonies, and Romulus pressing the paps of the wolf, the land of Ninus and Semiramis was in the meridian of its political splendour and power. By these wonderful exhumations the dead seem to stand before us. The lapse of so many centuries is annihilated; and the times of Nimrod and Asshur, Nitocris and Abraham, leaping the chasm of three thousand years, commune with the present, to correct the fables of history, and declare the magnificence of their civilization, the majesty of their arts, and the splendour of their power.

Art. VIII.—HORACE BINNEY WALLACE.

Obituary. Horace Binney Wallace. Philadelphia. 1853. Pp. 12.

In the preface to the third volume of M. Comte's *Système de Politique Positive*, just issued in Paris, the following passage occurs:—

"Je dois maintenant achever cette préface en déplorant la catastrophe exceptionnelle qui me priva récemment d'un éminent disciple, destiné, sans doute, à devenir l'un des meilleurs appuis du positivisme. En signalant, dans la préface du volume précédent, la digne adhésion d'un noble citoyen de Philadelphie, j'étais loin de prévoir qu'une fatale maladie allait m'enlever l'infortuné Wallace, à l'âge de trente-cinq ans.

Quoique nos relations se soient bornées à trois entretiens décisifs, séparés par une correspondance aussi courte que précieuse, elles m'ont permis de juger la perte que fait en lui l'Humanité. D'après un rare concours entre le coeur, l'esprit, et le caractère, il devait puissamment seconder la difficile transition réservée au dix-neuvième siècle. Exempte de toute affectation, sa culture spéculative, tant esthétique que scientifique, correspondait pleinement à sa belle organisation. Mais ses confidences spontanées m'autorisent à penser, malgré les essais littéraires de sa jeunesse, qu'il se serait surtout illustré par la vie active, dans un pays où les grands citoyens prévalent sur les magistrats. J'ose résumer sa véritable appréciation en le comparant au plus éminent des hommes d'état Américains, quoique l'inégalité du dévelopement et la diversité des situations empêchent de sentir assez les rapprochements, intellectuelles et moraux, entre Wallace et Jefferson."*

This is indeed a rare panegyric. The man who could draw it out—not to say deserve it—must have had qualities far above the

* "In concluding this preface I cannot help deploring the misfortune which has recently deprived me of an eminent disciple—one destined, without doubt, to have become one of the chief pillars of Positivism. When mentioning, in the preface to the second volume of this work, that a distinguished citizen of Philadelphia had given in his adhesion to my principles, I little foresaw that I should so soon have to lament his loss at the early age of thirty-five.

"Though our personal intercourse was limited to three interviews, with intervals of correspondence as short as precious, I yet knew him well enough to be entitled to judge of the loss which Humanity has sustained in his death. In him heart, intellect, and character united in so rare combination and harmony, that he would have aided powerfully in advancing the difficult transition through which the nineteenth century has to pass. Free from all affectation, his culture, both æsthetical and scientific, was in perfect harmony with his fine organization. Although he gave his youth in part to literary efforts, his spontaneous and free communications to me authorize the belief that he would have distinguished himself in active life in a country where the noble citizen is greater even than the officer of state. I do not exaggerate his merits in ranking him as the equal of the greatest American statesmen; and if I name Wallace and Jefferson together, men will fail to recognise the moral and intellectual points of accord between them, only because of the *difference* between them in development and in public position."

common endowments of humanity. And although HORACE BINNEY WALLACE filled no public station, and shunned rather than sought, during his whole life, everything like notoriety, it is fitting, now that he has passed away, that some permanent record of his virtues and his aims should be made. Moreover, as M. COMTE has given world-wide publicity to the fact of Mr. Wallace's adoption of the Positive doctrines, it is due to his memory to show how far his mind went along with those doctrines, and where it stopped.

Mr. Wallace was born February 26, 1817, in the city of Philadelphia. His father, John Bradford Wallace, was for many years an eminent member of the Pennsylvania bar—a man of large capacities and of fine nature. In a touching tribute* to his memory from the hand of one who knew his whole inward and outward life as no other could, we find it beautifully said that the great rules of the gospel were so settled in his mind "that he scarcely deliberated or seemed to pause between degrees of virtue. The purest and the best was the immediate selection of his will, and the impelling power of his conduct. To do good to others, forgetful of himself; to plan with care and pains, and execute with indefatigable fidelity whatever could subserve individual interest, or embody humanity and justice in permanent institutions; to fulfil in its apostolic delineation the entire law of charity, scarce conscious of effort and unmindful of risk: these were among his comprehensive outlines; these, the sterling issues of his opulent stores; and were purchasing for men, wherever he went, the most valuable benefits in morals, in politics, and in religion."

His mother combined rare intellectual gifts with the highest graces of person and manner. Both his parents were members of the Protestant Episcopal Church; and the atmosphere of their abode was that of refined yet thorough Christian piety. The home influences, therefore, under which Mr. Wallace was educated, were of the purest and most elevating class. His academical education was completed in the University of Pennsylvania, where we remember him as one who was held to dwell apart in a world of higher thoughts than those which usually occupy young men of his age.

He chose the law for his profession, and studied it not merely practically, but philosophically. It was not long before the fruits of such devotion to the science from such a mind began to appear. In the brief obituary named at the head of this article, (the author of which is one of the brightest luminaries of the profession,) it is stated that Mr. Wallace "contributed to his profession in notes, or, more properly speaking, in commentaries, upon Mr. Smith's Selec-

* Unpublished.

tion of Leading Cases in various branches of the Law, upon White and Tudor's Selection of Leading Cases in Equity, and upon decisions of American Courts in several departments of the Law, (a work of kindred design undertaken by himself and his associate in all these publications, the present Judge Hare,) the fruits of as accomplished a legal mind, as any man, in any country, at his early age, has shown. It is, indeed, an injustice to him to speak of these works in relation to age or years. There is no professional mind, here or elsewhere, that would not have left as many, perhaps more, traces of youth, or immature thought, or defective research, among the clear, precise, beautifully written, and, in several instances, bright and radiant criticisms, which have proceeded from his pen in each of these works. The best judges in the country have received them, and spoken of them with the highest respect; and the profession have accredited them in all our States by calling for edition after edition of them in quick succession, as the demand has repeatedly exhausted the bookseller's supply. It is almost marvellous that a man of thirty, who had no time or chance to file his opinions and thoughts by the thoughts of other men in bar discussions, should have attained to so true, and uniform, and firm an edge, and to so sharp and penetrating a point, in all of them. There is not a note or remark in the whole body that does not show the mind of a lawyer, imbued with the spirit of the science, instinctively perceiving and observing all its limitations, its harmonies, its modulations, its discords, as a cultivated musical ear perceives without an effort what is congruous or incongruous with the harmonies of sound. They manifest the true distinction between a lawyer and a random speculator upon law. His pen, moreover, was the true emblem as well as instrument of his mind: it was strong, pointed, clean; delicate enough for the finest thoughts, and firm enough for the strongest, making no hair-strokes that elude the sight, or blurs that deform the page. There is a beautiful concord between his thoughts and his language. And all this was effected with inconceivable facility. He possessed a real and true genius for legal disquisition. The outside world commonly think that the genius of the bar lies in speech, and not in thought or in writing; and that there is something in the dissociating action of legal studies that drives off all that finer essence that obtains for its effects the name of genius; but it is a great mistake, and no profession has given more proofs of it than the bar. One of the causes of the deep grief that Mr. Wallace's death has occasioned to his young professional friends is, that as he had a decided inclination for this species of employment, and was of habits and in circumstances that disposed and enabled him so to

devote himself, the American world has lost in him the inappreciable advantage of possessing a great legal critic and writer, in the midst of those surges of judicial opinion, which sometimes make the sway of the law among us shake like a thing infirm."

But law was not the only, nor even the chief occupation of his thoughts and studies. "His mind was excursive far beyond the ordinary degree, even among the most liberal and cultivated lawyers, and to an extent which proved that the study of the law had imposed no fetters upon his range of thought. He had accomplishments by education that enabled him to read with perfect selection, and to think with accuracy and constancy. He was a fine mathematician, an excellent classical scholar, and of the purest taste. His imagination made him a poet, to appreciate what is most excellent in poetry; but with it were associated profound and susceptible feelings, which caused him to shrink from a large proportion of what passes under that name. Before he was twenty, he was the projector of a new theory of comets, which he subsequently discarded as too playful for the grave science which is endeavouring to bring these eccentrical bodies into system. At the same early age he wrote, and sent to the press, a novel in two volumes, which was published anonymously both in this country and in England, and which he never claimed, nor, after he had measured it by his improved judgment, wished to claim.

"It is in his later years, however, and in the periodicals in our country as well as in works not periodical, that are to be found the best evidences of his refined taste, his philosophical mind, and his powerful and polished pen. Except in the law, he wrote and published anonymously. His modesty, rather than indifference to reputation, was the cause of it. Time may, and probably will, disclose a part of these works, which will be honoured, and give honour to him, by being connected with the author's name. He had no special or limited walk in these things. His topics were as various as his reading; and his recollections of all that he had read were as fresh at the end of years, as they were at the end of a day. His memory took the impression of what he read with attention, like softened steel; and it hardened when the book was closed, so as never to lose the most delicate lines of the author. He was, moreover, deeply read in the BIBLE, as might be inferred from parental instruction and example. He had its noble passages and its encouraging truths by heart; and he had publicly professed his faith in it by receiving confirmation in the Church of which all his family were members. It is in the highest degree consolatory to his friends to learn that, in the short intervals of calmness that were allowed by the access

of his distemper, he gave almost the last look of his eyes to the divine pages of THE BOOK."

But all his other studies were only preliminary and preparatory to the one great science of Sociology, to which, had he lived, his mature powers would, we think, have been exclusively devoted. His researches in philosophy, properly so called, had a very wide range; and for years before Comte's *Philosophie Positive* was much known in England or America, he was thoroughly acquainted with it. During his visits to Europe at different times for his health, he had become personally acquainted with M. Comte, and gave in "his adhesion" to the system—with what qualifications, however, will appear from the paper introduced below. In the summer of 1852 he showed signs of disease which were attributed to dyspepsia; but they became referable, a short time before his departure for Europe in November, to diseased cerebral action, induced by some lesion of the blood-vessels of the brain. So far as we can learn, there was little or no improvement in his health after his arrival in Paris, and on the 16th of December he died suddenly. After his death, the following unfinished letter, addressed to the editor of this journal, was found in his portfolio. The reader will understand that it had no revision from the author's hand.

"Although the copy of the January number* of the Methodist Quarterly Review, which you were so good as to mail for me, has not come to my hands, I have obtained another copy of it, and read the paper on M. Comte's work.

"I have been much interested by the general commendations of the book, with which it opens. They show that the writer is possessed of a profound, enlightened, and fearless intelligence. The observations on page twenty-one on the moral imbecility of the age,—its sordid and self-idolizing character,—have my full sympathy. The extensive and correct knowledge exhibited in the paper, and the great superiority to the narrow and vicious metaphysics of the time and country, have surprised me with the utmost pleasure. Your note to me gave the impression that you yourself were not the writer; but however that may be, I beg to be allowed to express, through you, and to you—as the fact of authorship may be—my cordial respect and thanks for the contribution to public literature of so able and important a paper.

"Nevertheless, I must be excused for saying that I cannot quite accept the article as a satisfactory philosophical estimate of the Positive System as displayed by M. Comte.

"The pervading error of your critic's views,—his considering that *scientific* forms and methods are of limited application to the objects of human interest and knowledge, and that there is a class of things which lie beyond the domain of *science*,—springs from his not having fully considered the law of the *hierarchy of the sciences;* which I look upon as the most important truth which M. Comte has conceived,—the very *core* truth of the system of Positive Philosophy. Bacon undoubtedly contemplated, in prophetic vision, the application of the inductive method to morals; Descartes, however, pushing the conquests of exact method up to the very limits which separate the external and material from the mental, undertook *there* to set up the Pillars of

* For 1852.

Hercules, and to say that the great ocean of subjective consciousness which lay beyond was never to be traversed by science. Comte, taking not so much an opposing as a more profound view, which supersedes the partial view of the other, affirms that mental and moral subjects are capable of being embraced and analyzed by science; but under this qualification, that science must assume a very different character in becoming adapted to that class of matters from what it had in lower and more limited regions. It is in this point—the rectification of the philosophical notion of science, the determination of what is the appropriate character of science as applied to various classes of objects—that Comte's great contribution to truth consists. Philosophically considered, the law of the hierarchy of the sciences is the law of the successive modifications which the nature and character of science undergo in its applicability to successive ranges of phenomena.

"Had your acute and candid reviewer more carefully weighed this affair of the hierarchy of the sciences, he would have understood that *science*, as applied to mathematics, is an essentially different thing from science as adapting itself to chemistry, vitality, and society. Mathematical science has been developed so long,—chemical and biological so short a time; it was so long true that mathematical subjects were the only ones which had come under the domain of *science*, that we had all fallen into the custom of thinking that science and mathematical science are the same thing; whereas the latter is only one form and variety of science, though destined always to be the most developed and complete. This great liberating and enlightening truth we owe to M. Comte; and it is the key-stone of the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive.'

"Your critic says that he passes over the subject of the hierarchy, for want of space. I venture to suggest to him whether he has not a little too hastily passed over it in his own studies. Other entrance or induction, intellectually or morally, to the social philosophy which figures in the later volumes of the 'Cours,' than through the gradation of sciences, mathematical, chemical, biological, &c., framed in the earlier volumes, there is none. The conception of the mental characteristics of those sciences, and the transition from one to a higher, constitute the indispensable intellectual preparation and training for the social part, which comes last. I consider that no man can justly apprehend the views developed in M. Comte's later volumes without having mastered, and assimilated into his mental sense and knowledge, the preceding explications of the inferior sciences. Why did M. Comte labour through long years of painful toil, in the elaboration and publication of those preliminary generalizations upon mathematics, chemistry, and organic life? The object of his study and teaching was, and is, *Social Philosophy:* but he felt the logical necessity of not merely stating, but illustrating practically the different characters and qualities of *science*, as it is addressed to different subjects,—the successive expansion of the notion and style of *scientific conception*—truly understood,—as we come up from those phenomena, in which relation or reaction are only mechanical or mathematical,—first, to those in which they are according to the laws which we call chemical,—secondly, to those in which they are according to the laws of material life or organization,—and lastly, to those in which they are according to the laws called spiritual, moral, political, social. For it is scarcely possible for any man to apprehend *how* the scientific method must be expanded and qualified in passing from biology (in its lower forms) to social subjects, unless his mind has been informed and disciplined by following the modification which the scientific idea underwent in passing from mathematical subjects to chemical, and again from chemical to vital.

"What is *science*, according to the positive conception of it,—which is Bacon's and Comte's? A knowledge of the laws of the relation or reaction of things. And there are as many different sciences, or sorts of sciences,—that

is, sciences essentially discriminated in their manner and habits,—as there are in nature different modes of relation or reaction. M. Comte has classified these according to a law, which is both the law of their mental arrangement, and the law of their historical evolution. It proceeds from the more abstract, simple, and constant, to the more concrete, complex, and variable. And this is the law of the hierarchy—which I take to be *the* great discovery of M. Comte.

"According to such a law, the first and lowest science is that which considers objects in their relations of number, quantity, extension; or, to use the most general expression, magnitude; for that is the most general and permanent conception that can be abstracted from real objects. The laws of the relations of magnitude, or of things considered under the notion of magnitude alone, and abstracted from everything else, is, therefore, the first science. This is mathematics; which is not, as is popularly imagined, in the nature of a "philosophia prima," or "scientia scientiarum;" but is a special, definite science; the science of certain limited, particular considerations derived from the material world. The laws with which it deals are not mental and subjective; they are derived from observation; they are truly inductive: only *that* observation is so constant, and that induction is so easy and immediate, that we fall easily into an impression that those laws are intuitive, whereas they are truly experimental. The axioms and postulates which are the basis of Euclid's Geometry are not metaphysical—written on the intellect, or drawn out of the brain—they are only statements of laws, observed and experienced; and they have but a limited truth; they are true as referring to considerations of mere magnitude, and to nothing beyond. When you contemplate things in any other relations than those of simple magnitude, you have got beyond the sphere of mathematics. Mathematical science has no application to such things; and yet those things may have an appropriate science of their own.

"Ascending in the scale of relations, we come to a class of objects which have a relation which is not mathematical, but chemical. The axioms of mathematics no longer apply. The whole is not equal to all its parts any longer. If you add or subtract equals to or from equals, the sum or difference will not necessarily be equal any longer. We are in the domain of chemical reaction. Yet the chemical reactions of bodies have fixed laws; and the existence and knowledge of those laws make chemistry a science.

"Now the great point to be noted in a philosophical view is this: that though chymistry is a *science* as veritably as mathematics, it is not a science of the same kind, or in the same sense. Scientific conception, as applied to chemistry, is a very different thing from scientific conception as applied to mathematical subjects, being far less abstract; and scientific reasoning in chemistry is also different from scientific reasoning in mathematics, being far less logical. The logical part of mathematics is so immense, because the conceptions which mathematics deals with are so highly abstract. The establishment of mathematical relations or laws, of the lower sort, occupies but a small part of the science: it is the reasoning upon them which fills the volumes of the analysts. As we go up in the scale of sciences, the conceptive part, or that which is occupied in establishing the primary laws, becomes larger and more laborious, and the logical part smaller. Chemistry is a science, and scientific methods are applicable to it; yet it is not, and in its completest developments never can be, (to man's intellect,) capable of the simplicity and generality of mathematical conception, nor the rigour and exactitude of mathematical reasoning.

"Mounting yet higher, we come to a class of bodies which have a relation or reaction which cannot be referred to chemical laws, but has been called vital. As this reaction obviously follows laws of its own, some of which have been determined with more or less exactness, there has been founded the science

of biology; yet more concrete, special, indeterminate, and variable than chemistry. No one doubts that the physiological action of organized beings is entirely subject to a system of laws,—the study of which is of the first importance,—though they are infinitely more elusory, complicated, and embarrassed than those of mechanical relation.

"When, in the last stage, we arrive at political relations, with the various branches of intellectual, moral, and spiritual, the question whether these are the subjects of positive science depends only on the question whether there are *laws* of social action and development. That there are such laws was not for the first time suggested by M. Auguste Comte. It was affirmed, with all the dogmatism of inspiration, by King David, centuries ago; and before him by a long line of prophets which have been since the world began. I need not refer *you* to a production known as the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm, to find, in every several verse of that sublime service of adoration, a several reassertion of the establishment and eternal duration of the moral, spiritual, and social laws which God has founded in the nature of man. These are the statutes, the testimonies, the judgments, the ways, the word, the understanding, the knowledge, the wisdom for which David prayed, and which were revealed to his heart thousands of years antecedently to the time when men have begun to apprehend that there *are* such principles, capable of being explored and known; and which enabled him to foretell the swift destruction of the wicked, and the certain, though deferred triumph of the righteous. That there are such laws, *in the view of the divine mind*, no religious person doubts. What M. Comte affirms (and he was by no means the first to suggest it, though the ablest in giving it a philosophic base and a systematic consistence) is, that these laws are capable of being contemplated and comprehended by man's mind, in more or less completeness; at least, that they are worth being studied by him. He says, therefore, that there is a positive *science* of moral and political truth. But, in accordance with the nature of the subject, that science will be almost indefinitely less exact in its premises, less certain in its processes, and less particular and applicable in its conclusions, than the lower and simpler science of mathematics. Scientific conception, as applied to social subjects, will, perhaps, hardly ever get beyond some very general notion of the character of the laws, or some one or more of them, that preside over the evolution of society; and scientific reasoning upon it will never pass beyond the indications or monstrations of a rational instinct. M. Comte, I apprehend, never uttered so monstrous a fallacy and sciolism, as that *mathematical* science is applicable to social subjects. His first four volumes are written for the special purpose of proving and exhibiting, by a regularly ascending scale, how extremely remote from a mathematical character are the subjects with which morals and politics deal, and how alien from mathematical processes must be the mode of reasoning applied to them. But, fortunately, just as the certainty and distinctness of scientific [theory?] *diminishes* in its ascent from the material to the moral, the importance and applicability of the least degree of scientific truth *increases*. In regard to politics, the establishment, as a probable and reliable principle, of the mere *fact* that the subject is governed by inherent laws, though no one of those laws should ever be discovered, or even remotely indicated, would be the greatest benefit ever conferred upon the world of a temporal kind: *because* it would at once enable us to repel and destroy the assaults of all those metaphysical sophisms—as that all men have equal rights—all political power rightfully springs only from the consent of the governed—which have tormented and vexed society like diseases. We should at once be able to say, We cannot indeed yet establish the general theory of political government; we cannot tell the law or laws of the evolvement or construction of government; but as for these democratic maxims of the rights of man, they are clearly false and mischievous, *because* they

are metaphysical, and not consistent with the phenomena of society as recorded in history. Those notions are clearly not the *laws* implanted in the social nature of man, because society has never obeyed them, or been consistent with them. By thus paralyzing the force of the disorganizing elements of metaphysical axioms, upon which all the disturbing agencies of modern life are based, we should do incalculable service to the social patient; for though we should administer no new remedies, we should withdraw the sources of ailment on the one hand, and the appliances of false treatment on the other, and afford free action to the recovering powers of the social constitution.

"So much for what I suggest as one of the errors of your reviewer, in thinking that scientific or positive methods are not applicable to society; an error into which he fell from not sufficiently attending to M. Comte's scale or hierarchy of sciences.

"I think, also, that he has not done full justice to M. Comte's law of the three successive modes of philosophizing, which he calls the theological, metaphysical, and positive. I take this to be a true law, and of general application. It is to be considered as a law of the human mind, founded upon the structure of our nature; but it has no higher truth than in its application to man's nature, as it has thus far been developed. Bacon fully established the distinction between the metaphysical and the positive; but the law of the relation and succession of the three may be considered one of M. Comte's discoveries. I think your reviewer errs in considering that theological, in this use, is synonymous with religious or spiritual. M. Comte's use of that word is not altogether appropriate; and I agree to what your reviewer says, on page thirty-one, in there being something of unfairness and prejudice in the use of it.

"I do not understand that M. Comte explodes, as destitute of truth, the theological and metaphysical methods or forms of philosophy. They are just and true, according to their own point of view; but they contemplate different purposes from the positive. He does not, I think, deny, but admits and asserts the coexistence of these three systems; not only in different minds and on different subjects, but also in the same mind, and on the same subject, and even at one time. I see no reason why, in their complete development, they should not all exist together.

"I cannot follow your critic's meaning when he speaks, at page twenty-nine, of M. Comte's 'entire negation of *logic* and metaphysics.' Metaphysical processes, as applied to scientific investigation, he certainly explodes; but as to his denying *logic*, if he has ever done that, I should say that he must have taken leave of his sense.

"On one other small point I cannot quite agree. Your reviewer says, on page twenty-one: 'Lord Bacon, whom he regards, most erroneously, as the apostle of Positivism.' I think that he was so; unless you prefer to call him the inspired prophet of the system of which Comte is the enlightened demonstrator. Of the positive method, as applicable to all subjects, Bacon had a perfectly true apprehension. I find scarcely anything in Comte that was not beforehand in Bacon. But Comte, by his profound and perfect exposition of Positivism, has enabled us to understand much in Bacon that without him we should probably not have understood. In speaking thus of Bacon, Lord Verulam, I am, of course, aware of the circumstance to which Forster long ago called attention, that much of the doctrine of the Novum Organon is to be found in the Opus Majus of the elder Bacon, to which also your reviewer alludes.

"I ought not to end without adding a word or two in respect to my position in respect to M. Comte, and his position in respect to Positivism. From his Atheism I totally dissent. Atheism may be the accident of the individual; it is not a characteristic of the system. In my view, the positive system is a

certain and universal method; and religion—the religion revealed to the Church and recorded in the inspired Scriptures—is a reality as certain as life itself; and the correct application of the positive method to the subject of religion, so far from upsetting, will verify and demonstrate the catholic faith. In attempting this application M. Comte has altogether broken down.

"I think that I can state to you precisely the character and extent of M. Comte's intellectual merit, and draw the line within which he is an oracle and beyond which he is a babbler.

"It is almost a law of man's intelligence, that abstract and logical reasoning is a different sort of mind, or an opposite mode of application, from special and practical sagacity in investigation; that they are distinct faculties or reversed actions of the intellect; and that a person is gifted with immense perfection in one of these ways only under the condition of becoming thereby incapacitated in a corresponding degree as to the other. Thus it was with Bacon. After apprehending and defining with infallible justness the true method of investigation and discovery, and foretelling with accuracy the results that would follow from employing it—after himself fashioning the instrument, and explaining precisely how it was to be dealt with—when he attempted himself to apply it in particular use, as in his collections in natural history, he fell into fooleries the most inconceivable. He seems not to have been in the least degree competent to conduct the operation of the machine which he had invented. M. Comte's failure is not greater than Bacon's, and is quite analogous to it. When he generalizes, philosophizes, and systematizes—when he reasons upon what has been done, determines upon what principles it has been done, and thence points out what ought henceforth to be done, we are astonished by his piercing analysis, his all-comprehending wisdom. When he attempts to apply his own method to the exploration and establishment of truth in a new department, he exposes himself. The 'Cours de Philosophie Positive' is a monument of his prodigious powers in an abstract and analytic way: the Système de Politique Positive, in its bearing upon religion, an equally significant measure of his puny capacity as an original investigator. In applying Positivism to spiritual matters, he proceeds in a style directly repugnant to all his principles and teachings. He sets out by stultifying history, and the experience of forty centuries, and sets up the metaphysical contrivances of his own brain in opposition to the collective and traditionary sense of the race. The attempts of M. Littré and the Republique Occidentale, to make an application of the positive method to politics, are equally distressing. Those synthetic suggestions toward a so-called reconstruction of society exhibit a complete departure from the principles of the positive method. M. Comte thinks that Positivism is Atheistic. M. Littré thinks that it is republican or radical. I agree with neither. I am a conservative of the conservatives: and it is upon the positive system, as applied to morals and politics, that I found my confidence in the ultimate triumph of sound principles.

"M. Comte's writings are of inestimable value to those who know how to use what is valuable in them; dangerous to undiscriminating minds. To derive the fullest benefit from him, we must try him severely and judge him fearlessly. As a guide in regard to the philosophy of philosophy, he is the most enlightened that has appeared since Bacon. I cannot speak of him but in terms of enthusiastic reverence. He is an object of boundless admiration and gratitude to me. But at a certain point his inspiration stops. His illumination extends only through a certain department; beyond it he sees less than the dullest; like the son of Balak, whose common sight was darkened as much as the eyes of his mind were open, who, when he stood upon the mountain-rock, foresaw the advent of Messiah and foreknew the countless hosts of the spiritual Israel, yet upon the road thither pushed against the armed angel of the Lord, more blindly than the ass he bestrode.

"We have abundant means of judging M. Comte. He was not the discoverer of the Positive Method; nor is he the highest authority in respect to its characteristics. He was not the first to apply it either to science, or to politics, or to theology. It had been brought to bear upon history, religion, and social subjects before he appeared; and with results eminently conservative and satisfactory. A student of Bacon and of those great men who after him had taken up and extended the inductive method, I was myself engaged in applying it to politics, morals, and spirituality, before I heard of Comte. From the perusal of his works I have derived immeasurable benefit; but when he comes to fit his method to spiritual affairs, he ciphers entirely, and I proceed without him upon my own original and independent course. As I consider that the religious bearings of Positivism ought to be brought right, before it is introduced to the public, I have been long endeavouring to elaborate that part of the task, and to rectify M. Comte's aberrations in respect to it. I think myself able to contribute some slight suggestions toward founding the true positive conceptions of the religious subject, and developing it demonstratively; and as the results thus arrived at will be found identical with the system of the Church, both in doctrine and in operation, it will follow that the Scripture system was a true revelation. The time is not distant when Christianity will rely entirely upon the positive philosophy for its argumentative support. That philosophy is destined to furnish the demonstration of the Christian truth, and thereby to convert the world.

"As I look upon the positive system, also, as affording the only protection in politics against the disorganizing maxims and passions of the revolutionary and destructive parties of the day, I have thought it most important to present the political bearings of this system in a complete and satisfactory way. I have, therefore, occupied myself for some time upon a history of political philosophy, which I shall perhaps complete in the form of a report to the Smithsonian Institute. I desire therein to trace the rise, and operation, and failure of all the metaphysical systems, and the rise, and partial developments, and imperfect apprehension of it down to the present day. The positive philosophy, as applied to politics, has been used by many before Comte; most of all by Burke, whose mind was imbued with it in a concrete way, and who always reasons according to it. M. Comte taught us the true philosophy of that philosophy: he estimated and analyzed the method; but the method was in use before him, not only by Burke, but by Montesquieu, Machiavel, and, greatest of all, the half-inspired Vico."

Of the profound and comprehensive intellect which this letter bespeaks, we need say nothing—but to mourn that its light has been so suddenly extinguished. Of its doctrines, this is not the place nor the time to speak. It may be proper for us to say, however, in justice to the author of the papers on the Positive Philosophy that have appeared in this journal, that M. Comte himself goes even far beyond Mr. Wallace in his estimate of the ability of those articles. In private letters to the editor he has said, in substance, that they are fairer, fuller, and more thorough than any criticisms of his work that have appeared in Europe. Sir William Hamilton—with whom no living critic on such topics can be compared—has also expressed to us his high sense of their value.

We trust that Mr. Wallace's literary remains will in due time be given to the public. Even the unfinished productions of such a man must be inestimable.

ART. IX.—MISCELLANIES.

Narrative of a Journey round the Dead Sea and in the Bible Lands, in 1850 *and* 1851. By F. DE SAULCY, Member of the French Institute. Edited, with Notes, by the Count Edward de Warren. 2 vols., 8vo. London: Bentley. 1853.

THIS work has excited much attention in Europe. As, through some mishap, our copy has not reached us, we avail ourselves of a notice in the October number of "The Journal of Biblical Literature," (London,) in order to give our readers an idea of the book:—

"The idea of an Eastern journey was suggested to M. de Saulcy by 'a severe domestic bereavement,' (the loss of his wife,) which made him desire to absent himself for a time from Paris and its familiar scenes. Wishing to turn his absence to the best account, he determined to visit, with his son, Greece, Syria, and Asia Minor. Indeed, he conceived that a journey of this kind was calculated to complete advantageously the education of a young man who had just finished his college course. It was also his hope, for himself, to find subjects sufficiently new and interesting to be offered to the distinguished Academy to which he belonged. He considered, further, that it would be no advantage to science to tread again the beaten paths already traced by hundreds of other tourists; and that the object of his travelling would be completely lost if he did not attempt to visit countries still unexplored. *Hence* his attention to the Dead Sea and its valley, as a scene over which mystery still hung, and where danger might still be worthily encountered. This sounds strangely in our ears. We did suppose that the Dead Sea was no longer an unexplored region, and that through the labours of Seetzen, Burckhardt,° Irby and Mangles, Robinson, and Captain Lynch's expedition, we were already pretty well acquainted with that lake, its shores, and its valley. The whole coast had been examined at a little distance from the shore, and often on shore, by Lynch; considerable parts of the western coast have been explored on shore by Robinson and others; and the entire of the southern backwater and peninsula by Irby and Mangles, and others. The eastern coast has not been examined by land-travellers, and this precisely—being about one-third of the whole, and the least known, though not unknown, portion—is that which M. de Saulcy left unvisited. So far, therefore, his journey is not one '*round*' the Dead Sea; but what he has done is, that by traversing the entire western margin, he has visited the parts thereof not previously explored by land-travellers, though surveyed by Lynch, and that he struck out a new route to Kerek from the Dead Sea, returning however by the usual route. In the other parts of the country, to and from the Dead Sea, we do not perceive that any new routes have been followed, or any new country explored. We may say, also, that the indications of Scriptural sites, in the quarters away from the Dead Sea, are very generally the same as those first indicated by Dr. Robinson, without anything to convey to the mind of the reader of the work before us that the discoveries and conjectures are not here offered for the first time. Still M. de Saulcy, who names that learned traveller with high and just commendation, frequently differs from him, and advances ingenious, plausible, and often good grounds for the difference.

°Burckhardt did not visit the lake itself, but he got some good information concerning it at Kerek, and explored the neighbourhood lying east from its shores.

"However, as our space is limited, we must pass over much that invites our attention, and get at once to the Dead Sea. Here the great point of our traveller is, that he identified the sites of *all* the five cities of the plain. To be able to find these upon the existing shores of the lake, implies that before the day 'when the Lord overthrew these cities, *and all the plain*, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground,' the lake existed as at present, (except perhaps that it was not salt.) This is contrary to all recent conclusions, which go to show that the present bed of the Dead Sea was then wholly or in part a plain through which the Jordan flowed, and *in* which most of these cities lay; but the other position, strange as it seems, our author stoutly affirms, and labours with much critical learning to establish. He maintains that it is not possible to find in sacred or profane antiquity a single passage from which it might be inferred that the Dead Sea arose suddenly at the time of the destruction of the Pentapolis; and still further, that all these early authorities unanimously establish that the towns were never overwhelmed by the waters of the lake. The argument is well worth reading, although we cannot here follow it, and are not convinced by it. We can only observe that no authorities are of any value, save that of the original record upon which all others are founded; that, in such cases, circumstances respecting which history is silent may yet be critically deduced, and may be all but demonstrated by physical conditions, which reduce the alternatives until one only remains possible; and that no one has ever affirmed that the *primary* catastrophe was the submersion of the plain, but that this submersion was the *result* of that catastrophe. All our author's arguments and illustrations are therefore very much beside the mark. We strongly suspect that this theory grew in the writer's mind out of his grand discovery of what he regards as the site of Gomorrah, his identification of which would be impossible without it. But even granting all he requires, this identification, which is evidently in M. de Saulcy the crowning feat of his expedition, stands in serious and self-convicting incongruity with the rest of his identification. *All* the other cities, as thus identified, are placed around the small bay or backwater at the *southern* end of the lake, whereas his Gomorrah stands alone, apart, and far off, near the northern extremity of the lake, at least twenty-five[o] miles distant from Sodom, which is the nearest of the other cities. Now if one thing in this matter be plainer than another, it is that Gomorrah could not be thus distant from all the other cities, and least of all from Sodom, next to which and together with which it is always mentioned in Scripture, so as to suggest to every one—and to suggest rightly, according to Scripture usage—that they were not greatly distant from each other, or at least that Gomorrah was nearer to Sodom than any other of the cities were, instead of being, as our author wishes us to believe, far more distant from Sodom than any of them.

"The remains are those of Cyclopean foundation walls formed of great stones, which the careless observer might pass as mere heaps of stones, but which when intelligently surveyed, mark out with sufficient distinctness the skeleton of a large town with some large enclosures, the ground-plan of which can be recognised, but their use as public edifices only conjectured. That these remains, which cover an extent of four miles, mark the site of Gomorrah, our

[o] As measured by scale from the map in the work itself, but fully thirty miles by other maps; but the text says, "twenty-five leagues, or seventy-five English miles!" which, but that it must be a blunder, seeing the lake is but forty miles long, would make the matter still worse.

traveller endeavours to prove by two considerations. First, the analogy of name. The ruins are called 'Kharbet Goumran or Oumran,' unfortunately not given in Arabic characters, which would have enabled us better to estimate the value of the analogy by comparison with the Hebrew. However, as it stands, the resemblance is, it may be allowed, sufficiently striking, and quite equal to those on which important identifications have been founded by Dr. Robinson. The other consideration is contained in the question, 'What city, unless it be one contemporaneous with Gomorrah, if not Gomorrah itself, can have existed on the shore of the Dead Sea at a more recent period, without its being possible to find the slightest notice of it in either the sacred or profane writings?' The argument, from the *silence* of history, is of little weight here; and although one would certainly not expect that a town of any note would be founded upon the shore of the lake *after* its waters had acquired their present intensely saline and nauseous qualities, yet that these shores were not regarded as uninhabitable even at a comparatively late period, is shown by the fact that Herod established upon them his great palace-fortress of Masada, the ruins of which are still in existence.

"In identification of the other 'cities of the plain,' M. de Saulcy, of course, finds Sodom at the Esdoum, (Usdum,) a name which is just that of Sodom with the article prefixed, and which therefore he properly enough writes Sdoum, in which others have recognised the name of the doomed city. They, however, merely supposed that the names marked the spot on the shore over against which, now submerged, is the site of the ancient Sodom. But our traveller's theory requires or authorizes him to find the site on the existing coast, at the spot denoted by this name, and there he accordingly finds existing traces of the town. In going southward, at this point, he passed by a hillock fifteen yards in diameter, covered with large rough stones that looked as if they had been burnt, and 'which constituted at some remote and unascertainable period a part of a round structure immediately commanding the shore.' The sea was here only thirty yards off, and the mountain, (Jebel Esdoum,) or projecting cliff, not more than twenty in the opposite direction. On returning a few days later the locality was more closely explored, and at a spot where the beach widens into the mouth of a ravine were found other remains.

"'Large blocks of stone worn by time, and in the midst of them we soon distinguish regular ruins, being the foundation of ancient walls. We are now unquestionably in the midst of ruins, apparent and distinguishable, covering a space of nearly four hundred yards in extent. . . . . To our left the Djebel-Esdoum [Mount Sodom] has ceased to form a single mass, and we have arrived in front of the vast excrescence, or projecting hillock, bordering the northern point of the mountain, exhibiting positive and infallible evidence of the existence, on this point, of a very considerable town.'

"And this town is declared to be Sodom. It may be so; and we are not at all disinclined to *this* identification. But we fear to rely upon it. Bearing in mind the instance of Masada, lately mentioned, and that of Engedi, also on this shore, and which is mentioned in Scripture as a cultivated and inhabited site ages after the destruction of the cities of the plain, and the ruins of which are also found at this day, it seems that at some points of the shore, especially where there are fountains of fresh water, or where ravines open inland and bring down streams of water, there were inhabited sites on the shores long after the great overthrow. Indeed, only about two miles north of this, M. de Saulcy finds other

ruins which he identifies with those of Thamara, a place not known until considerably posterior to the Christian era, which we find occupied as a military post by the Romans, having doubtless been originally founded and occupied by the Jews, as the Jewish name Thamara, which in Hebrew means palm-trees, implies. Besides, we know that one of the original cities (Zoar) subsisted after the catastrophe. This Zoar is placed by M. de Saulcy a little to the north of Sodom, where there are some hillocks (of ruins) flanking the Wady-ez-Zouera, and called by the natives Zouera-et-Tahtah. The analogy of name is here very important, occurring as it does in such local connexion with that of Esdoum. We have always felt this, and yielded reluctantly to the considerations which tend to place Zoar on the opposite or eastern side of the lake. Our traveller's arguments are very weighty from his own point of view, but lose much of that weight if we suppose that Sodom more probably stood in what is now the basin, than on what is now the narrow shore of the lake. In fact they apply at all only upon the latter supposition; and the difficulty, which he answers satisfactorily, is entirely of his own creating in abandoning the hypothesis which assumes that if not the entire lake, at least the southern bay or backwater, was formed in consequence of the great catastrophe.

"'We need only read in Genesis the narrative concerning the destruction of Sodom, and the flight of Lot, to remain perfectly satisfied that Zoar—where Lot, who had left Sodom by day-break, arrived at sunrise—cannot possibly be looked for on the opposite shore of the Dead Sea, and still less at Kharbet-en-Nemaïreh. For were we to agree with the indefensible hypothesis of the sudden formation and rise of the Dead Sea, there would still remain, as the crow flies, several leagues between Sodom and the pretended Zoar. However rapid may have been the flight of Lot with his daughters, it would have been impossible for them to accomplish one-tenth part of the distance between these two points in the short interval that takes place in this country between dawn and sunrise.'

"This assumes that, in any case, Sodom must have stood where he places it, and not possibly in the bed of the present lake. Still the argument has some remaining weight; for if Sodom did stand in the area which the lake now occupies, it seems reasonable to infer that it stood nearer to the mountains on the west of the valley, from which it derived or to which it gave its name, than to the *opposite* shore; and still, therefore, the distance of Zoar, if placed on the eastern side, would seem to have been too great to suit the circumstances.

"At the place on the eastern side where Zoar has lately been sought by others, M. de Saulcy finds Zeboïm. The name of Taala Sebaan, as resembling that of Zeboïm, with the presence of extensive hillocks of ruins, and traces of foundation walls, seems to form the grounds of this conclusion. There are besides evidences of volcanic action in the vicinity, though how that should tend to the special identification of Zeboïm we do not see.

"As M. de Saulcy's theory allowed him to look for *all* the five cities of the plain upon the existing shores of the Dead Sea, it was not likely that any one of them should be left undiscovered. We have accordingly to report that Admah also has been found at a place where no one would have been likely to look for it, being about four miles away from the western shore of the Dead Sea, upon the route from Esdoum to Hebron. This is at least the pretension of the map, in which Admah is set down at this place (Qasr-el-Adadah) in the capital type appropriated to the cities of the plain. But we cannot find this in the text, which seems rather to identify this Qasr-el-Adadah with the Adadah of Joshua xv, 22,—a much more probable identification.

"We have done with M. de Saulcy's Dead-Sea inquiries; and we do not mean to follow him in the other parts of his travels. It is not our fault if the tone of exception which we have in this part been sometimes constrained to assume should seem to give an unfavourable impression of a work we really think well of as a whole, and regard as a valuable contribution to Biblical geography.

"We shall not, however, close the work without indicating briefly a few points that struck our attention in passing through its pages.

"At Jerusalem our author has a tremendously long, but learned and ingenious, dissertation to show that the so-called tombs of the kings are really the tombs of the royal line of David. Of this we are not clear; but M. de Saulcy seems to have fairly met some of the difficulties which opposed themselves to that conclusion.

"At Shechem our author discovered the foundation ruins of the Samaritan temple upon Mount Gerizim, and was enabled to make out a ground-plan of the temples, of which he gives a representation. This reminds us that we have seen doubts expressed recently as to the existence of any temple on Mount Gerizim so late as in and after the time of our Saviour. None of these doubters seem to be aware that there is a representation of this temple, with a flight of steps leading to it, upon the reverse of a coin of Flavia Neapolis, of the time of Antoninus Pius, whose head appears on the obverse. The coin is in the Bibliothèque du Roi at Paris, and there is a figure of it in Mr. Ackerman's excellent *Numismatic Illustrations of the New Testament.*

"M. de Saulcy stands up for Kafr-Kenna as the Cana of Galilee, in opposition to Dr. Robinson, who wants to transfer the identification to Kana-el-Djalil, which he says is exactly 'Cana of Galilee.' But our author will not admit this translation.

"'The words Cana of Galilee, supposing even that the country of Galilee should ever have been called El-Djalil in Arabic, could never have been expressed by Kana-el-Djalil. The last word is positively an adjective, meaning great or illustrious. I then most conscientiously declare that, according to my interpretation, and I dare say according to the interpretation of any native scholar, the words Kana-el-Djalil cannot have any other meaning than that of *Kana the great*, or *Kana the illustrious.*'

"Our author objects, with Dr. Robinson, to Tell-Hum as the site of Capernaum; but he also objects to Khan Minyeh, where Robinson finds it, preferring another place, Ain-el-Medaouarah, where the learned doctor would have been glad to find it, but could not discover any such traces of a former site as seemed needful for the identification.

"In regard to Bethsaida, our traveller is at issue with the theory of two Bethsaidas—one on the east of Jordan at its entrance into the Lake of Tiberias, the Bethsaida Julias of the tetrarch Philip; and the other to the west of the same, the Bethsaida of the Gospels. He contends that Julias was on the right bank of the Jordan; that Bethsaida Julias is the Bethsaida of the Gospels; and that the fine ruins at Tell-Hum are undoubtedly the ruins of both. This is all well worthy of attention. Let us add that in the land of Moab, east of the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, M. de Saulcy discovered a curious monument, of which he thus speaks:—

"'We arrived at the foot of a circular mound, formed of squared blocks of lava, partly covered over with earth, which seem to constitute the base of a small round tower. This ruin is called the Redjom-el-Aabed, (the mound of the slave.)

When I reach it I find our Bedouins sitting near a large block of lava, which they point out to me saying, "Look, there is a stone like those thou art in quest of." I look, and find myself in front of a magnificent *stélon*, in black compact lava, representing a bass-relief, of an antiquity the date of which I shall not presume to determine, even approximately. It consists of a figure as large as life, with the whole of the lower part wanting from the knees, but which, notwithstanding this mutilation, exhibits a monument of art of immense value. To a certainty we have before us a Moabite sculpture. A personage, wearing a helmet of Assyrian shape, holds with both hands a javelin with a large iron head, with which he seems to strike a man supposed to be in supplication at his knees. The upper part of the body is naked; but from the hips down to the knees he is clothed in short close tunic, exactly similar to that worn by the Egyptians. Over the right shoulder of this personage, and behind his back, is hung a bended bow, without any apparent string. Behind the warrior is the figure of a lion, of small dimensions, which appears to be merely the ornamented leg of a throne, judging by its diminutive size. The relievo of this figure is well defined, the expression of the face strongly marked, and characterized with a savage energy.'

"We should have stated before that M. de Saulcy travelled at his own expense, but solicited and obtained permission to do so with the title of Chargé d'une mission scientifique en Orient."

Art. X.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) Dr. Judson tells in his journal of a Burman metaphysician, Moung Long by name, who carried his scepticism so far as to quarrel daily with his wife on some fine point. For instance, if she said, "The rice is ready," he would reply, "Rice! what is rice? Is it matter, or spirit? Is it an idea, or is it a nonentity?" Perhaps she would say, "It is matter;" and he would reply, "Well, wife, and what is matter? Are you sure there is such a thing, or are you merely subject to a delusion of the senses." Now, to say the truth, few of the metaphysicians have ever got beyond this point. Their task is never-ending, still-beginning. But they do not tire of it; nor is it a wonder. The great problems of life and thought have an irresistible attraction for the highest class of minds; and when these problems are entirely neglected in any land, you may be sure that the highest class of minds do not grow there. The only metaphysician, in the proper sense of the word, that Great Britain has produced in the last half-century, is Sir William Hamilton, and he is rather destructive than constructive,—a critic rather than a philosopher. His principal writings are now made accessible to American readers by two works, published simultaneously in this city. The first is, "*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., with an Introductory Essay by Robert Turnbull, D. D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 8vo., pp. 764.) This volume consists mainly of contributions to the Edinburgh Review, enlarged and modified by the author. A large part of it is taken up with discussions on education, full of profound and practical wisdom, and worthy the careful study of all teachers. The philosophical part treats mainly of the nature of percep-

tion and of the limits of philosophizing, in opposition to Cousin; and also of the true theory of logic, which Sir William claims to have enlarged by his doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. Dr. Turnbull's Essay gives a brief but sensible and judicious account of the history of speculative thought from the earliest period to the present time. The second work is the "*Philosophy of* SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., *arranged and edited* by O. W. WIGHT," (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 1853; 8vo., pp. 530,) which contains all, except part of an unfinished dissertation, that Sir William has published directly upon metaphysics. It includes, therefore, the philosophical part of the "Discussions" named above, and also the ample notes on Reid, which could heretofore only be had by purchasing the costly English edition of Reid, as edited by Sir William. Mr. Wight has undertaken the exceedingly difficult task of arranging the fragments of thought scattered through his author's very voluminous writings, into a systematic whole; and we must confess that our first impression of his effort was astonishment at his temerity. This feeling has given way, on closer examination, to something like admiration of the skill with which he has put his mosaic together. He divides the whole into three parts: I. The Philosophy of Common-Sense, or our Primary Beliefs considered as the Criterion of Truth; II. The Philosophy of Perception; and III. The Philosophy of the Conditional. Mr. Wight promises that when Hamilton's "General Preface to Reid" and the "Sequel to the Dissertations" are published, he will reprint them here in a separate volume, with a general index to both; but from what we can learn of Sir William's health and habits of work, we fear that we shall have to wait for the "Index" until the Greek Kalends.

(2.) ANOTHER treatise on the same topics, though handled from an entirely-different point of view, is "*An Attempt to Exhibit the True Theory of Christianity as a Consistent and Practical System*, by WILLIAM S. GRAYSON." (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 364.) Instead of despairing of the problem, like Dr. Beecher, Mr. Grayson undertakes, without resorting to transcendentalism either of time or space, to explain the origin and design of moral evil, and to show that it is consistent with the benevolent attributes of the divine character. Instead of believing that the so-called insoluble character of the problem tends to make men deists, he cannot perceive how infidelity can resist the "force of the argument in favour of the divinity of the Scriptures, drawn from the existence of moral evil in a world so physically beautiful." In the second chapter Mr. Grayson undertakes to show that "human depravity is congruous with a scheme of human redemption upon the basis of free agency;" in the third he attempts to conciliate the doctrine of justification by faith with that of justification by works, and to show that diversity of creeds may co-exist with unity of the faith; and in the fourth, he undertakes to reconcile the divine fore-ordination with the free-agency of man, and thus to bring the system of Christianity into harmony with the laws of moral philosophy. This is certainly the outline of a very high argument; but Mr. Grayson brings many qualifications to the task. His mind is singularly acute; his analytical faculty is a rare one; his grasp of thought is very comprehen-

sive. The book, however, is not, as a book, equal to the capacity of the author; he is evidently an unpractised writer, and fails to offer to his readers as clear a view of the subject as he evidently possesses. Many even of his sentences are incomplete and obscure. But, on the other hand, he is entirely free from the wearisome prolixity of which we have complained in Dr. Beecher, and there is, occasionally, a *curiosa felicitas* in his expression rarely met with in American writers; for instance: "Evil is not sin, nor is sin evil. If evil were sin, then God would be the author of sin; if sin were evil, then man would be no longer a free-agent." But we have neither space nor time to characterize this very able and acute book at present: there are many things in it with which we should wage sharp battle on a fitting field. It may be embraced, perhaps, in the same article with the "Conflict of Ages" in our next number.

(3.) THE profoundest questions of theology and metaphysics are taking hold of the American mind. Within the last few months no less than three books have appeared which discuss the *quæstiones vexatæ* that have, from age to age, perplexed the strongest minds. The first of these, "*The Conflict of Ages; or, the Great Debate on the Moral Relations between God and Man*, by EDWARD BEECHER, D. D.," (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 552,) is an earnest exposition of the great problem of theology, by an earnest man, who feels and thinks strongly. That man should come into the world newly created, with a bad nature, and then to be subjected to bad influences, and to the seducing power of bad spirits—this is the problem; and Dr. Beecher thinks the solutions offered by the prevalent theologies are altogether inadequate. He proposes as his solution the old doctrine of the preëxistence of man, somewhat modified. In the preëxistent state man was free, and sinned; he comes into this world, not a new-created being, but a fallen one. But Dr. Beecher does not remove a jot or tittle of the old difficulty; if anything, he makes it greater. The book is very able in many respects; but is painfully diffuse, and not seldom obscure. It will be noticed more at length in our next number.

(4.) THE third book referred to above—and the most important and valuable of the three—is "*A Theodicy; or, Vindication of the Divine Glory, as manifested in the Constitution and Government of the Moral World*, by ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy in the University of Mississippi." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 8vo., pp. 356.)

We have no space left to notice it: a full review may be expected hereafter. In the mean time we commend it to our readers as one of the clearest and ablest expositions of the moral government of God that has ever appeared.

(5.) "*Homes of the New World*, by FREDRIKA BREMER." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 2 vols., 12mo.) In these two fair volumes Miss Bremer gives us her "impressions of America,"—all love-impressions. Rose-colour

prevailed over earth and sky while she remained in this country. Never was a land so bepraised, or its people so magnified before. The fair authoress has the largest and most comprehensive organ of admiration: she sees the good there "is in all things evil;" she loves men and women of the most diverse feelings, opinions, and characters, with an equal love. Much of the book is twaddle; more of it sentimentalism; a part of the remainder is clear good sense. One of the oddest things in it is the way in which households are laid bare, family secrets unfolded, and private opinions made public. Not a few Southern men and women will be alarmed to find that their hidden spirit of Abolitionism is here brought to light; but they may comfort themselves with the reflection that people everywhere know that the dear, good, loving, baby-like Fredrika is very much given to romancing in general.

(6.) "*The Book of Nature*, by F. SCHŒDLER, Ph. D., *Professor of the Natural Sciences at Worms*, translated by Henry Medlock, F. C. S." (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1853; 8vo., pp. 692.) This book is one of those thorough *compendiums* of knowledge in which the German teachers so much excel. It contains an elementary introduction to the sciences of Physics, Astronomy, Chemistry, Mineralogy, Geology, Botany, Zoology, and Physiology, founded on a scientific basis, but expressed in clear and untechnical language. No text-book has a higher reputation in Germany; and as it has passed through its successive editions, the author has added the new discoveries made in the different branches of science. The English translator and American editor have each made valuable additions; and we have no hesitation in saying that the book is now without a rival among works of its class.

(7.) "*Scotia's Bards.*" (New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers; 1854; 8vo., pp. 538.) The preparation of this fair volume has been obviously a labour of love on the part of both editor and publishers. It does not claim to be a complete collection of the Scottish poets; but to give a selection—in most cases complete poems—from each of the best or most noted poets, especially from the minor poets who are least known in this country. Brief sketches of the different poets accompany the selections. The editorial work is done with taste and skill, and the printing and paper are equal to anything yet produced in this country. The volume will be in deserved demand for a holiday gift-book, and is worthy a place in every parlour book-case.

(8.) "*Abbeokuta; or, Sunrise within the Tropics*, by MISS TUCKER," (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 1853; 18mo., pp. 278,) is an outline of the origin and progress of the Yoruba Mission on the Western Coast of Africa. It is written in the same clear and pleasant style as the "Rainbow in the North," by the same author, noticed in our pages some time ago. That part of the narrative which treats of slavery and the slave-trade on the west coast, is full of painful interest.

(9.) "*Men and Things as I saw them in Europe,*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 285,) is a rapid sketch of travel, (by the author of the celebrated letters of KIRWAN,) which will not add much to a previously well-earned reputation.

(10.) "*History of the Insurrection in China,* by Messrs. CALLERY and IVAN." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 301.) This book has been put together in haste, and clumsily. It contains, however, a good deal of information, which the reader must pick out and classify in his mind as he best can. It were greatly to be desired that some man of sense would give time enough to the subject, to put what little knowledge there is extant about China into a clear and intelligible form.

(11.) ONE of the best signs of the times is the multiplication of books for the illustration and elucidation of Scripture, adapted for use in schools. To this class belongs "*Outlines of Scripture Geography and History, illustrating the Historical Portions of the Old and New Testaments,* by EDWARD HUGHES, F. R. G. S." (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1853; 12mo., pp. 355.) The compiler has made use of all the recent researches in the lands of the Bible, and quotes largely from Robinson, Olin, Durbin, &c. His book would have been better for use, as a text-book, if he had digested these quotations into a continuous description; but yet he furnishes a large amount of information in a readable form. There are several well-executed maps, reduced from those of Kiepert & Wilson.

(12.) MESSRS. CARTER & BROTHERS have reprinted, in a neat form, "*The Christian Father's Present to his Children,* by J. A. JAMES," (18mo., pp. 416,) a work so well known as to need no special notice at our hands. No less than seventeen editions have been sold in England.

(13.) "*Peruvian Antiquities,* by ROVERO & VON TSCHUDI: translated from the Spanish by Francis L. Hawks, D. D." (New-York: George P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 8vo., pp. 306.) The translator of this work is engaged, as is well known, in the preparation of a work on the Antiquities of America. In the course of his researches he found the book before us to contain a more particular description of the most ancient architectural remains of Peru than is to be found elsewhere. He has done well to present it to that class of readers, rapidly growing in this country, which takes an interest in archæological researches. Without a blind admiration for the ancient culture of the Peruvians, Rovero has yet enthusiasm enough to carry him through a most careful inquiry into the antiquities of his native country, and discrimination enough to separate the wheat from the chaff in the narratives of the old Spanish chroniclers.

(14.) "*Salad for the Solitary,*" (New-York: Lamport, Blakeman & Law; 1853; 12mo., pp. 344,) is the quaint title of a book of the D'Israeli stamp, and quite as pleasant reading as "The Curiosities of Literature." It could only have been produced by a man of nice tastes, varied reading, and much knowledge of the world. Full of odds and ends about the habits and haunts of literary men, about books and their makers, buyers and readers, about the pleasures and the pains of authorcraft; it is yet so deftly and pleasantly put together, that all tastes and appetites may find dinner and dessert, meat and music, within its composite pages. It has been one of the most successful books of the season—and deservedly.

(15.) THE Bourbon Question has had a nap for the last few months,—not, however, without occasional intimations of a forthcoming awakening on the part of the Rev. Eliezer and Mr. Hanson. In the mean time, Messrs. Harper have reprinted, in full, Beauchesne's "*Louis XVII., his Life, his Sufferings, his Death,*" (2 vols., 12mo.,) of which they published a brief abridgment some months ago. The present work gives a full and minute account of the captivity of the royal family in the temple, and of the severities practised upon the unfortunate dauphin. It has a separate value, moreover, from the light which it throws upon the terrible history of the times. On the vexed question of the death of the dauphin the work in reality throws no new light:—our decision must still be, as heretofore, that however probable it may be that the unfortunate prince died in the Temple, the fact is not *proved.*

(16.) "*A Visit to Europe in* 1851, by Professor BENJAMIN SILLIMAN, of Yale College." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 2 vols., 12mo.) These volumes have a special interest hardly ever attached to books of travels, in the fact that the writer passed a year in Europe nearly half a century ago, and wrote an account of his travels. He now compares his impressions of to-day with the old ones, in a way that would relieve his book from dulness if it had no other merit. Apart from this, its chief interest lies in the accounts (which no one is better qualified than Professor Silliman to give) of scientific men and scientific institutions, in which the volumes abound.

(17.) THE periodical literature of England and America for the last sixty years embodies an immense amount of literary and scientific discussion of the very highest order. There is scarcely any subject in philosophy or criticism, the science or the arts, politics or religion, that has not been treated in the quarterly journals by the first writers of the age. A full collection of the great reviews is more valuable than any Encyclopædia that has ever been issued; but their contents have not heretofore been available to students, for want of general indexes. The Edinburgh and Quarterly have, indeed, published three or four indexes at different periods, and their value is incalculable;

but what has been most of all needed is a general index to the subjects of the *articles* (not the pages) in all the chief periodicals, to which one could turn for information on any subject. This desideratum is now supplied in "*An Index to Periodical Literature*, by W. F. POOLE, A. M., Librarian of the Boston Mercantile Library Association." (New-York: C. B. Norton; 1853; 8vo., pp. 521.) The plan of the work is excellent; it embraces nearly all the Reviews and Magazines of any note in Great Britain and America; and it gives for each of them a sufficiently minute index to enable one to use any extended discussion contained in the fifteen hundred volumes of periodicals which it covers. We should be glad, if our space allowed, to speak further of the merits of Mr. Poole's book, for such labour is precisely the kind which in this country is *most* needed; but our limits forbid. It must suffice, at present, to say, that we would not be without the volume for five times its price.

(18.) THE study of language, in the proper sense of the term, is almost unknown in the schools and colleges of England and America. The science of Comparative Philology has grown up in Germany into vast proportions, but as yet few of its treasures have been accessible to English students during their elementary course. We are glad, therefore, to announce "*Outlines of Comparative Philology*, by M. SCHELE DE VERE, of the University of Virginia," (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 434,) which, though not exactly what we could wish in a class-book, is yet an excellent introduction to the science. Professor de Vere adopts the true view, that language is the gift of God. On the question of the primitive unity of the human race, and of language, he does not speak so decidedly, but states that although "Comparative Philology does not as yet irrefutably confirm such a belief, it furnishes, at every stage of its rapid development as a science, new arguments and new proofs in its favour." After discussing these topics, the author gives a clear account of the history and literature of Comparative Philology, and then develops its practical results in illustrating the laws of language. The second part surveys the languages of the world in their separate character, in the several groups into which philologists have classed them, and in their relations to each other. The third and concluding part treats of the history of the art of writing. The work will find its way, we trust, into all our colleges as a text-book. It is a great shame that such a book should be published without *indexes*.

(19.) "*Christian Baptism and the Lord's Supper*, by the REV. T. SPICER, A. M.," (Albany: Pease & Co.; pp. 166,) is a neat little manual, setting forth the evangelical view of the sacraments with much conciseness and clearness. The only point on which it does not speak as definitely as we could wish, is that of the relation of baptized children to the Church—a subject which greatly needs clearing up. The Methodist Church, like other Protestant denominations, (except those who deny infant baptism,) seems to be quite at sea on the question.

(20.) THE recluses of Port Royal will never lose their hold upon the affections of mankind: we never tire of their history, no matter who writes it. A new contribution to that history is now offered in "*Jaqueline Pascal; or, a Glimpse of Convent Life at Port Royal*, from the French of Cousin, Faugère, Vinet," &c. (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1854; 12mo., pp. 318.) The younger sister of Pascal had many of his high qualities, and was, like him, in many ways, a martyr to her views of Christian truth and duty. The present volume is full of Christian and literary interest. Prefixed to it is a valuable introduction by the Rev. W. R. Williams, who touches nothing that he does not adorn.

(21.) *A Church Dictionary*, by W. F. HOOK, D. D., revised and adapted to the Protestant Episcopal Church, by a Presbyter of said Church." (Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co.; 1854; 8vo., pp. 578.) Dr. Hook's ability and industry are well known to our readers. His "Ecclesiastical Biography," as well as the work now before us, have found large sale in England, and we have no doubt that the American reprint will be acceptable to the clergy of this country. It is, to be sure, not a *theological* dictionary, but a special *Church* book; nevertheless, ministers of all denominations need to know the views taken by Puseyites and High-Churchmen of ecclesiastical matters, and in this dictionary they may be found.

(22.) MR. PUTNAM is fast becoming the Murray of American publishers. The last of his good works (up to this writing) is the beginning of a beautiful edition of "*The Works* of JOSEPH ADDISON, edited, with Critical and Explanatory Notes, by G. W. GREENE." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; vol. 1, fcp. 8vo., pp. 500.) Every requisite of a good library edition, in point of form, size, convenience, *readableness*, and completeness, is to be found in this edition of Addison. It will be comprised in five volumes, containing the whole contents of Bishop Hurd's edition, with letters and other pieces not found in any previous collection. The present volume contains the Editor's Preface, Macaulay's Essay on the Life and Writings of Addison, and Hurd's Prefaces, as preliminary to the text itself, of which this volume has the Poems and Dramas. The five volumes will include all of Addison's writings, inclusive of his contributions to the "Tatler," "Guardian," and "Spectator." The other parts of those celebrated works—namely, the papers of Steele, Swift, Pope, Tickell, &c.—will be given separately, in two additional volumes, uniform with this edition of Addison, thus forming a complete edition of the most remarkable essays in the English language.

(23.) "*A Memoir of the Life and Labours of the Rev. A. Judson, D. D.*, by FRANCIS WAYLAND." (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co.; 1853; 2 vols., 12mo.) This book is not so much a biography as a collection of valuable materials for one. But we could ill spare any of its contents, and commend Dr. Wayland for the patience and skill with which he has edited the documents committed to him, instead of taking the more ambitious course of pre-

paring from them an artistical and continuous narrative. Dr. Judson was one of the heroes of Christianity; no apostle, missionary, or martyr has surpassed him in entire self-devotion, in unwearied toil, in unshaken faith, in abundant usefulness. Even his constitutional fault of self-reliance and self-confidence was overruled, and, so to speak, sanctified for the furtherance of the great work to which he devoted himself. His intellect, though good, was not of the highest order; but his untiring industry enabled him to accomplish great intellectual labours. The man who translates the whole Bible into a foreign tongue—and that an oriental one—must have no common powers and endowments. The book abounds in instruction, in information, even in amusement, —above all, in practical exhortations and encouragement to Christians with reference to the great task of the Church, the work of missions. We hope to present a full survey of the book hereafter.

(24.) "*The Young Minister; or, Memoirs and Remains of Stephen Beekman Bangs, of the New-York East Conference*, by W. H. N. MAGRUDER, M. A." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1853; 12mo., pp. 388.) The subject of this memoir was a young man of beautiful character and of rare promise. Naturally well endowed, both in his intellectual and moral nature, he was converted at an early period of life, and became an *earnest* Christian. His education was careful and thorough before he commenced the work of the ministry, and the beginning of his career augured a brilliant future of usefulness and eminence. But it was ordered otherwise: he fell at his post soon after putting on his armour. The present memoir was written by his brother-in-law; and while it bears throughout marks of the love and sympathy with which the writer's heart abounded, it is yet not a mere eulogy, but a kind though discriminating biography. The preface (by the Rev. E. O. Haven) speaks of the adaptation of the work to certain classes of readers, as follows: "Young ministers of the gospel may deduce from it the elements of a happy and prosperous professional career. Students may be led to inquire closely into their duty, and may be prepared conscientiously to decide whether or not God is calling them to the responsible work of the Christian ministry. Parents may see the effect of a careful and rigid and truly kind training of their children. And finally, all may be stimulated to a holy life by the energetic and eloquent discourses that follow. With these observations this tribute of affection is committed to the world with the happy consciousness that it is good seed, and that, rightly used, it can bear only fruit to ripen in the skies." We heartily join in this commendation, and trust the work will find wide circulation, especially among the young men of the Church, and in our Sunday Schools.

(25.) "*Mr. Rutherford's Children*" (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; pp. 265) is a very pretty story for children, by the author of the "Wide, Wide World." The moral tendency of this lady's writings is so unquestionable, and they have so many excellent qualities besides, that it is a great pity her style is marked by so many of what are called "Yankee" peculiarities.

(26.) THIS journal has spoken again and again, within the last few years, of the duty of the Church with regard to the Christian nurture of children; and again and again has it expressed a hope that some treatise upon the relation of baptized children to the Church, adapted to the wants of Methodism, should appear from a Methodist hand. Signs are not wanting of a great revival in this department of the Church's duty; and we cannot but hope that with a more general obedience on the part of our clergy to the law of the Discipline on Catechization, there will spring up a better feeling and a purer practice in the treatment of baptized children than has been common among us for the last twenty years. Among these signs we may rank the appearance of a new book by a Methodist preacher, entitled "*Infant Church Membership; or, the Spiritual and Permanent Character of the Abrahamic Covenant*, by the REV. SAMUEL GREGG." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Poe; 1853; 18mo., pp. 370.) The fundamental position of the book is that the spiritual covenant made with Abraham permanently secures to the infant children of believing parents the right of membership in the Church, together with religious instruction and pastoral care. This position is, we think, the true doctrine of Methodism; yet how far is the practice of the Church from according with it. Again we repeat the cry: There needs to be a *revival* of primitive usages among us; and more, there needs some thorough *plan* of procedure, incorporated into the Discipline of the Church, and made obligatory upon its pastors and people.

(27.) "*Anecdotes of Painters, Engravers, Sculptors, and Architects*, by SHEARJASHUB SPOONER." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 3 vols., 18mo.) A miscellaneous collection of incidents illustrative of the habits and fortunes of artists,—a class of men whose personal histories are almost always abundant in interest to their less gifted fellow-beings. Mr. Spooner has had the best possible opportunity for collecting such anecdotes in the studies necessary to the preparation of his "Dictionary of Painters," &c., and he has made good use of them. You cannot pick up this book, and open upon any page at random, without being interested.

(28.) "*Notes, Critical, Illustrative, and Practical, on the Book of Daniel*, by ALBERT BARNES." (New-York: Leavitt & Allen; 1853; 12mo., pp. 494.) These notes were mostly written before Mr. Barnes commenced his Commentary on the Revelation, though the latter work was first published; in fact, the one volume is almost necessarily a complement of the other, as well from the nature of the subject as from the commentator's mode of treating it. The "Introduction" contains an elaborate and valuable essay on the genuineness and authenticity of Daniel; but it is strange that Mr. Barnes, after so many years of authorship, has not learned that such an Introduction ought to have a full table of contents. Mr. Barnes has been as careful and industrious in preparing this as his other volumes of commentary; and this conscientious painstaking makes up, to some extent, for his lack of that exegetical *instinct* (so to speak) with which Calvin, Olshausen, and some others, have been so largely endowed.

(29.) "*City Architecture*, by M. FIELD," (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 8vo., pp. 75,) contains a series of designs for dwelling-houses, stores, hotels, &c., in twenty plates, with descriptions, and an essay on the principles of design. Its aim is to develop the taste for ornamental building now prevalent in the American cities, by presenting designs not only novel here, but just in their architectural character. Most of them are adaptations of the street-architecture of Rome, Florence, and Venice.

(30.) "*Asbury and his Coadjutors*, by the REV. W. C. LARRABEE, A. M." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Poe; 2 vols., 18mo.) Professor Larrabee has struck upon a style of biography which suits at once his own special talents and the wants of the Church. In the neat volumes before us he gives the best account of Bishop Asbury that has yet been published, and follows it with brief and excellent sketches of Coke, Whatcoat, Garrettson, Ware, M'Kendree, George, Roberts, and Emory,—all venerable names, and worthily classed among the "coadjutors" of the great Apostle of American Methodism.

(31.) "*A Complete Analysis of the Holy Bible*, by the REV. NATHANIEL WEST, D. D., (New-York: C. Scribner; royal 8vo., pp. 958,) must have been a work of immense labour for the compiler, as it certainly will be one of vast utility to all its readers. It contains *every passage* in the Old and New Testaments, arranged under thirty heads, in as many books, which are subdivided into chapters and sections, each with appropriate titles. For instance, Book VIII. treats of *Holy Days*, divided into four chapters: I. The Sabbath; II. The Sabbatical Year; III. Passover; IV. Various Feasts. The chapter on the Sabbath-day is again divided into twenty-nine sections, treating of the Preparation, Prohibitions, Observance, &c. Ample tables of contents are prefixed, which, with a copious general index, afford perfect facility in turning to any head or subject. It is needless to dilate on the advantages of such a handbook; every preacher, student, or Sunday-school teacher, who desires to study the sacred word thoroughly, should, if possible, procure it. It must be understood that the work is not a *logical* but a *topical* analysis of the Bible; but, as such, it is vastly superior to Gaston's, or any other book of collections that we have seen. Indeed, it is the *only* one that includes every passage of the Bible in its compass.

(32.) "*The Rhetoric of Conversation; or, Bridles and Spurs for the Management of the Tongue*, by GEORGE W. HERVEY." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 380.) This book is intended as a manual in the art and morals of talking. It gives rules for silence and for speech; for intercourse in the family and in the street; for the talk of Christians with each other; and for the talk proper to Sunday. The last chapter contains an entertaining and instructive account of conversation-clubs, with specimens of the conversation of Johnson, Coleridge, and others.

(33.) "*The Epistle to the Romans, in Greek and English, with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary*, by SAMUEL H. TURNER, D. D." (New-York: Stanford & Swords; 1853; 8vo., pp. 234.) In this Commentary sound learning and exegetical sagacity are combined, in a rare degree, with reverence for the word of God as the only "solid foundation for divine truth." We have read nearly every extant Commentary on the Romans, more or less thoroughly; and, among them all, we do not know one which—in the qualities of being clear without superficiality, decided without dogmatism, and liberal without surrender of sound doctrine—we deem equal to this. Dr. Turner avoids *extreme* interpretations, but does it without falling into a tame and meaningless compromise. The drift of his views on the most controverted parts of the epistle may be seen in the following extract from his note on chap. viii, 28:—

"Further, this predestination and choice have heavenly blessings in view. No candid man can read and reflect on what the New Testament says on this subject without acknowledging this. It is impossible to limit these representations to a merely outward covenant relation, existing on earth and temporary, as members of Christ's visible Church. It is also internal, spiritual, heavenly—an adoption intended to be perfect and eternal; a purpose having in view our ultimate holiness and consequent happiness.

"God's purpose, then, embraces the whole series of divine arrangements, appliances, and operations, connected with salvation by Christ. It was his purpose to redeem fallen man by the atonement of his Son and the agency of his Spirit; and, so redeemed, to unite them under Christ in one holy body with the angels of heaven. Consequently, they are called out of the world into his Church, and supplied with whatever is necessary to their ultimate and universal happiness in glory. God's purpose has in view all that this result requires, and also the result itself. That this result shall really take place, however, is not a necessary consequence of this divine purpose. The language of Scripture by which the whole subject is explained, is not philosophical. When, in this connexion, it speaks of God's will, it is universally acknowledged that it speaks in terms adapted to the ordinary mind; and *his will may fail of accomplishment.* This is undeniable with regard to all such places as 1 Tim. ii, 4, where it is said that God 'will have,' literally, *willeth* 'all men to be saved.' And there is no good reason for supposing that the same is not true of what the Scripture calls his *purpose* and *determination* represented as formed before the foundation of the world. Will any one venture to prove that God's *will* is less absolute and certain than his *purpose*."

(34.) "*The Hunters of the World*" (Philadelphia: W. P. Hazard; 1854; 12mo., pp. 159) is a very attractive illustrated book for children, containing graphic descriptions of wild sports and adventures, in encounters with wild animals in every part of the world. It is from the German, and is admirably translated; at least we judge so from the smoothness of the English, as we have not seen the original.

(35.) *The Missionary of Kilmany*" (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1853; 18mo., pp. 253) is a memoir of Alexander Paterson, a Scotch peasant of great good sense, who was converted under Dr. Chalmers's ministry, and was afterward for many years "street-missionary" in the Old-Town of Edinburgh. A more edifying record of Christian zeal, humility, and devotion, we have rarely read.

(36.) "*Notes on the Twenty-five Articles of Religion, as received and taught by Methodists in the United States*, by the REV. A. JIMESON, D. D.," (Cincinnati: Applegate & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 407,) is a good and simple explanation of the Articles, well adapted for popular use.

(37.) "*A Dictionary of the most Important Names, Objects, and Terms found in the Holy Scriptures*, by HOWARD MALCOM, D. D.," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 18mo., pp. 335,) is an excellent compendium of Scriptural knowledge—adapted, however, for use only in Baptist schools.

(38.) "*A Guide to English Composition*, by the REV. DR. BREWER," (New-York: C. S. Francis & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 415,) contains one hundred and twenty themes for composition, analyzed and illustrated to aid beginners in the art.

(39.) "*The American Statesman*, by the REV. JOSEPH BANVARD," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 18mo., pp. 334,) is a sketch of the better features in the life and character of Daniel Webster, designed to hold up what was commendable in that great man for the admiration and imitation of American youth.

(40.) "*Egeria; or, Voices of Thought and Counsel*, by W. GILMORE SIMMS," (Philadelphia: E. H Butler & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 319,) is a collection of aphorisms of sentiment and opinion, the accumulation of many years of thought and observation. Many of them are expressed with point and beauty. There are some verses scattered through the volume which do not add to its value.

(41.) "*The Czar and the Sultan; or, Nicholas and Abdul Medjed*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 195,) is a timely reprint. The account of the Czar is less reliable, we should think, than that of the Sultan. A brief account of the Eastern Question, in its recent phases, closes this useful little book.

(42.) "*Sketches of Eminent Methodist Ministers.*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 8vo., pp. 370.) The "age of chivalry" was renewed in its noblest aspects in the beginnings of Methodism. Its history, especially in America, is a record of moral heroism unsurpassed in any age of the Church. The story is yet unwritten. The historians of the country have generally ignored, in utter blindness, one of the richest fields open to them; and the historians of the Church have done but little toward a true and ample account of the vast and valorous labours of these modern apostles. Every memorial, then, however slight, of the lives and toils of the fathers, is at once a blessing to the Church and a contribution to the true history of the civilization of the

age. To this class belong the sketches of Wesley, Fletcher, Garrettson, M'Kendree, Roberts, Pickering, and Hedding, given in this volume.

To a later period belong the lives of Fisk, Emory, Levings, and Olin; but the very names will justify their collocation here with the elder fathers. They are illustrations—wonderful illustrations, in fact—of the vigorous and healthful growth of Methodism; each of them affording a noble specimen of high intellectual power and large accomplishments devoted, with entire self-denial, to the service of the Church of God.

One memoir, and only one, of a living person is given: and the name of JABEZ BUNTING, the great leader of English Methodism, will justify that deviation from the plan of the volume, if any name could.

The names of the authors of the sketches are given in the table of contents, except in two instances not left to the editor's discretion.

Should this volume meet with the favour of the public, it will be followed by another, and perhaps by several, in succeeding years, printed and illustrated in the same beautiful style.

ART. XI.—RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

OUR readers are aware that two volumes of Smith's "Sacred Annals" have been reprinted here by Messrs. Carlton & Phillips, under the titles of "The Patriarchal Age" and "The Hebrew People." The third volume is now announced in London, under the title of "*The History and Religion of the Gentile Nations that were placed in proximity to the Jewish People:* containing a succinct Account of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans; carefully collected from ancient Authors and Holy Scripture, with the best aid afforded by recent Discoveries in Egyptian and Assyrian Inscriptions. Being the THIRD *and concluding* SERIES of *Sacred Annals;* with Indices and Tables adapted to the whole work; and forming a complete connexion of the Sacred and Profane History, also a full Elucidation of the Fulfilment of Sacred Prophecy. By George Smith, F. A. S." Crown 8vo.

THOMAS CONSTABLE & Co., of Edinburgh, propose to publish "*The Letters of* JOHN CALVIN," translated from the original Latin and French Manuscripts, with Dr. BONNET'S Introduction and Historical Notes, in four handsome octavo volumes, at 10*s.* 6*d.* per volume. The arrangement of the letters will be chronological, and it is expected that the first volume will be ready for publication early in 1854. Their prospectus states that a few days before his death, in one of their latest conferences, Calvin, when showing to Theodore Beza the most highly valued of his possessions—the manuscripts in his library and the documents included in his extensive correspondence with the most illustrious persons of his time—requested that they should be carefully collected after his death. This request of the dying Reformer was but tardily and imperfectly fulfilled. Nearly three centuries have passed since his death, and notwithstanding the numerous elaborate works which have been devoted to his memory by eminent authors in France and other lands, the earnest desire of the Reformer has never been fully complied with: the precious documents of his correspondence have remained forgotten amid the dust of those libraries and other places of record, whence for the first time this inestimable treasure is now drawn forth, to be added to the history of the world. The collection of which we have to announce the approaching publication is the fruit of five years of assiduous labour and research in the libraries of France, of Germany, and of Switzerland. Intrusted by

the French government with a scientific foreign mission, which afforded him an opportunity of gathering together a portion of this correspondence dispersed throughout the whole of Europe, the editor has spared no pains in rendering as complete as possible a collection which cannot fail to cast a flood of light upon the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century.

We have received the first number of "*The London Quarterly Review*," (the new journal established in London, in the interest of Wesleyan Methodism,) but at so late a period that we can only give it a very brief notice. In form and getting up it equals the best of the British Quarterlies, containing three hundred pages, beautifully printed. In matter, it is sterling in almost every article. The first paper gives much valuable and well-arranged information as to the "Christian populations of the Turkish Empire," and is one of the best in the number. The second, on "Wesley and his Critics," has some very sensible and acute observations on Taylor's "Wesley and Methodism." An elaborate article on "Public Education" illustrates the backward state of the English mind on that subject: it cannot get beyond the theory of parochial or sectarian schools. Then follows an excellent paper on "Ultramontanism: its threatened supremacy in Europe," from which the following passage—a somewhat ominous passage, by the way, in a Wesleyan Journal—is taken:—

"In America the State refuses to enter into a partnership with any Church, simply because it has nothing to gain by such a bargain. Power has there become so much diffused that every man has his share. Each section of civil society is sufficient for itself: the parish rules the parish; the state, the state; and the federal government is not the master, but the guide and servant of the whole. 'We are,' said General Pierce, who, after sustaining a high position in the Senate, has himself volunteered to carry a musket in his country's service,—'we are,' he said, uttering his first address as President, 'a nation of sovereigns.' Be it so. But what conspiracy can a nation of sovereigns enter into with a Pope? The only pontifical accomplice for a nation of sovereigns would be a nation of popes, which is a contradiction in terms. Were fanaticism to seize upon the American government, and induce it to make an offering of that magnificent country to the Holy See—to subject the Alleghanies and the Rocky Mountains to the Seven Hills, the Hudson and the Mississippi to the Tiber—how could the subjection be effected? There is no vast standing army in America to subdue the multitude at the order of a bureau; but there is a great, an irresistible army, similar to that which won popular freedom for England,—the manhood of the country. The very machinery by which the Romish Church establishes its hold is wanting; and therefore it is that the Americans admit the adherents of Rome among them freely and fearlessly.

"And thus has it come to pass that America offers an absolute contrast to France;—America, where Franklin Pierce accepts the free and noble suffrages of a young power, champion of civil and spiritual freedom for the world; a trust which is the more noble, since it cannot be betrayed, and therefore cannot be accepted by a traitor for his own base purposes;—France, where one man snatches power from seven millions of his countrymen, maintains it by a vast standing army, trained and dieted to his service, and uses it, in complicity with Rome, for the subjugation of soul as well as body. American practice confirms the grand truth taught by philosophy, that civil and religious freedom are inseparable. God has ordained that men shall enjoy the former, only in proportion as they prize and improve the latter. There lies one antidote to the venom of Popery, a principle that, in conjunction with other and higher principles, will ultimately work its destruction. A contest is being waged between a human institution and the everlasting laws of the Creator,' between human 'eternity'—the man made 'perpetual' by leasehold of Rome—and the Infinite Eternity: it is a contest between the Pope and God: he would be bold indeed who should doubt the issue."

As a whole, the first number of this new journal is vigorous and promising. We look for great results to British Methodism from an organ for the extension of independent opinions of this high class.

Professor Tischendorf has made a second journey to the East in search of Biblical MSS., &c. The following extract from a letter of his to Dr. Tregelles, dated July 11, 1853, and published in the Journal of Sacred Literature, contains, in brief, the results of his researches: "I have brought back with me seven Greek Biblical MSS. Three of these contain parts of the Old Testament. One, which is a

palimpsest, as old as the fifth century, contains parts of the Pentateuch; a second, of the eighth or ninth century, is a veritable supplement [as to text] of the Vatican MS.; the third, the writing of which perfectly resembles that of the Dialogues of Plato, at Oxford, contains the whole of the Book of Judges, and that of Ruth; its text is very curious and important.

"But the others, which relate to the New Testament, will be of greater interest for you. Twenty-eight leaves of a palimpsest, in uncial letters of the fifth century, take a place among our MSS. of the highest class. Such readings as that of the MS. A, *εἰς τὸν τόπον*, (John xx, 25,) are confirmed by this palimpsest. Two other MSS. are of the eighth and ninth centuries; one of these contains the two Gospels of St. Luke and St. John, the other fragments of St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. John, and the whole of that of St. Luke. Both of these are more curious, in a critical point of view, than E G H K M S U V. One of them, in the passage St. Luke iii, 23–38, confirms almost all the readings of B L. The other has in John v, 1, *ἡ ἑορτὴ τῶν ἀζύμων*; it is enriched with scholia, which sometimes possess a critical value. My fourth New Testament MS. is dated 1054; it contains the Acts of the Apostles, wanting six or seven chapters. I was much surprised at the perfect agreement of this MS. with A B C, and the other ancient MSS. But I must tell you that I have not yet found more than a few moments to devote to an exact examination of all these MSS., as well as of others which are not Biblical.

"Among the Arabic fragments which I have brought with me there is one MS. of the eighth century, (the date of another fixes the century of this one;) it contains five epistles of St. Paul; this version is as yet unknown.

"I also possess a Syriac palimpsest of fifty leaves, as old, at least, as the fifth century. The fragments of the Gospels which M. Tuch has deciphered prove that this Syriac version adheres more scrupulously to the Greek than any other Syriac text that is known."

The Sixth German Evangelical *Kirchentag* (or Conference of Evangelical Ministers) was held at Berlin, September 20–23, 1853. Its proceedings were of great interest, and the results of the meeting were, in more respects than one, highly auspicious. Two subjects of great importance occupied the attention of the Conference: 1. The relation of the German evangelical clergy to the Augsburg Confession; and 2. The relation of the Church to sectarianism,—especially to the Baptists and Methodists. We abridge the following account of the results from the *Watchman*:—

1. As to the *Augsburg Confession*, the central committee had charged several persons, possessing the confidence of the Church, to introduce the subject, for the various reports. On this occasion they had designedly chosen men belonging, through conviction, to the various shades of Evangelical Protestantism. The first among them who spoke, as a Lutheran, was Sartorius, General Superintendent of Königsberg, a theologian, the author of several excellent works. He treated the question principally in relation to its history, and showed what an important place the Confession of Augsburg has taken in the development of the universal Church of Christ and its confessions of faith. After him spoke Doctor Nitzsch, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, and member of the Superior Consistory of Prussia. Nitzsch is one of the most profound theologians of Germany,—a man whose piety and sagacity all Christians regard as equal with his learning, and whose conciliating character has given him free admission into the *consensus* of the two Churches, Lutheran and Reformed. It is from this point of view, at once comprehensive and believing, that he has studied attentively the Confession of Augsburg, and which, as he says, truly expresses the evangelical faith without in any way shackling freedom of teaching, or the developments of true science. The question had now to be treated under the *Reformed* point of view, after having been considered in that of Lutheranism and of the United Church. Pastor Krummacher, court preacher at Potsdam, was charged with this third duty. Lastly, Doctor Stahl, Professor of Civil Law in the University of Berlin, who has for many years filled an eminent post in the Chambers of the Prussian Parliament, and who is Vice-President of the Kirchentag, next spoke, saying that he only wished to render his testimony to the Confession of Augsburg, because this document of the faith of our fathers lays the foundation of the Church in justification by faith alone in the fully-sufficient merits and death of our Lord Jesus Christ.

After these official reports, presented in the name of the central committee, the general discussion commenced. Here, again, the Augsburg Confession was freely discussed, under the most various points

of view, by Lutheran, Reformed, and members of the United Church. Not a single speaker refused to adhere to this Confession. How is this unanimity to be accounted for, which was again manifest almost completely in the vote? Only by the fact that the committee had the wisdom to add to the original proposition a clause which preserves entire the rights and the liberty of conviction to the members of the Reformed Church there present, and which recognises, by implication, its confessions of faith. Its position being thus guarded, a Reformed Church might, without hesitation, join in the vote of adhesion to the Confession of Augsburg, as Calvin himself did in his day. So that when, about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th September, the question was put to this immense assembly, it was seen to rise in mass, almost simultaneously, and then thundered forth a hymn of praise under a lively and profound impression.

2. The report on *Sectarianism* was happily confided to Dr. Snethlage, a member of the Superior Consistory of Prussia, and a preacher of the Cathedral at Berlin. M. Snethlage has been long a pastor in the Prussian provinces of the Rhine. He is one of the Reformed, and has learned in these Reformed and Presbyterian Churches of the Rhine to respect the conscience and convictions of his brethren, even when they differ from himself on certain points of doctrine and of ecclesiastical constitution. What, then, did he do? From the commencement of his report, he took it as a point of fact that evangelical Protestants hold religious liberty to be one of their acknowledged principles. He therefore *repudiated* the word *sectarianism*, establishing a profound difference between this word and that of *separation*. He affirmed that separation from an existing Church is frequently laudable: he illustrated this by some examples, such as those of the Free Church of Scotland, the Free Church of the Canton de Vaud, Methodism in England, the Church of the Moravian Brethren, &c., while yet the word sectarianism is always used in a bad sense. But even sectarianism should be tolerated, so long as it neither rejects nor assails the fundamental principles of Christian morality. Civil power and police avail nothing against sects: to contend with sects no other methods ought to be employed than care for souls, prayer, manifestation of the truth, charity, patience. After having developed these principles, M. Snethlage proposed a resolution in four parts, of which the following is the first: "The Church ought to have neither the will nor the power to coerce or to oppress Separatists and Sectaries." And the three other parts enumerate the means, *all of them spiritual*, by which, according to this *rapporteur*, the Church of God should combat separation.

A discussion was then opened on this question. Several pastors presented their complaints, lamenting the divisions which dissent causes in their parishes; but not a single voice was raised to invoke the temporal power as an engine of repression. This fact was so striking, that a politico-religious journal of Berlin, the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, known as possessing little sympathy with public liberties, either in State or Church, after having acknowledged this very fact, adds these words: "So the principle of evangelical toleration toward those who differ from the Church, and from her doctrine, has been unanimously expressed." This is much more than could have been expected. And, without concluding from this that the cause of religious liberty is definitively gained in Germany, it may, at least, be affirmed that it has advanced a long way in Berlin.

The views which were elicited during the debate may be summed up thus:—"The distinction between Church and sect is justified by the example and precept of the Reformers. A distinction is to be drawn between sect and secession, or separatism, such as the Moravian Brethren in Germany, the Methodists in England, and the Free Church in Scotland. Where separation has not yet taken place, dissent is to be met by prayer, long-suffering, charity, and increased zeal in the cure of souls. Where, however, the sect is fully formed and declared, the Church can no longer admit fraternity with its followers; in this case, also, the latter forfeit all claim to the blessings of the Church. Those who deny the efficiency of baptism cannot be admitted to the Lord's supper; those who repudiate the holy office of matrimony can have no claim to burial at the hands of the Church. The existence of sects must be recognised as an exhibition of a morbid state in the Church, and should serve to incite the pastor to greater watchfulness, zeal, and charity. The formation by the Church of societies and associations for special objects is to be recommended, as satisfying that desire for nearer connexion and increased activity, for the want of which

many of the best members of the Church leave her.

"The recommendation made by Dr. Snethlage, and enforced and added to by many eloquent and impressive speakers, was not put to the vote, such a proceeding being considered unsuitable and unnecessary, as there was no difference of opinion on the subject.

ANOTHER volume is added to the vast pile of Commentaries on the Apocalypse, namely, *The Interpretation of the Apocalypse, and the chief prophetical Scriptures connected with it*, by WILLIAM HENRY SCOTT, M. A., late Fellow of Brazenose College, Oxford. (London: Longman, 1853.) The main points which Mr. Scott aims to establish are stated by himself as follows: "That the principal subject of the Apocalypse is the Roman empire, and Rome, the capital of that empire; that a minute prophecy of events, times, and persons, connected either with the one or with the other of these, is there given; that, in particular, the abolition of the empire is represented, and that the date of this occurrence is assumed to be the year 476, when the emperors of Rome ceased. Further, that the millennial period following the fall of Rome corresponds to those ten centuries of the reign of the Church known as the Middle Ages; that an interval of forty years is represented as separating the fall of the Roman from the beginning of the Church empire; that the latter, therefore, definitively began in the year 516, and ended with the year 1516; that its overthrow was in fact the immediate result of the Reformation of 1517; that the imperial power of the Church was taken away at the Reformation in punishment for the sins of the Church during the thousand years; that our position from the year 1517 to the present day is analogous to the captivity of Israel in Babylon during the seventy years; finally, that this captivity is not to be perpetual, but that a complete restoration of the Church to her former supremacy is now to be expected; and that this is to be brought about in the midst, and by the agency, of judgments upon the temporal kingdoms of the modern world, analogous to those which overwhelmed the empire of Rome in the fifth century, and so opened the way for the Church empire of the Middle Ages."

THE Rev. George Steward (author of "Religion the Weal of the Church," published by Carlton & Phillips) withdrew from the Wesleyan ministry at the Conference of July, 1853. He has since published a treatise on the "*Principles of Church Government, and their application to Wesleyan Methodism*;" the object of which, according to the British Banner, is not so much "to delineate a New Testament Church, as to show that Methodism is at utter variance with the Sacred Scriptures." This remark refers, of course, to the *government* of the English Wesleyan Church. We have not yet seen the work, but will give an account of it as soon as it reaches us.

WE have received the fifth part (pp. 321–400) of Herzog's "*Real-Encyclopædie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*," which carries the matter down to the word "Anti-trinitarier." We have nothing to retract of our former high commendation of this work; it will be, when finished, *the* encyclopædia of theological science.

WE have also received, but have not been able to examine, the first part of Dr. Tholuck's new history of the origin of Rationalism, entitled Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus, I. Thl. Das akademische Leben des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Beziehung auf die Protestantisch-theologischen Fakultäten Deutschlands, nach handschriftlichen Quellen. I. Abthlg. Die akademischen Zustände. Halle. 8vo., 327 pp.

AMONG the new works recently announced in England are the following:—

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, by the Rev. W. Archer Butler, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. 2 vols., 8vo.:—The Genealogies of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, as contained in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, reconciled with each other; by Lord Arthur Hervey, M. A., Rector of Ickworth. 8vo.:—The Lord's Prayer and other Sermons, by C. P. Reichel, B. D., Professor of Latin in the Queen's University. Crown 8vo.:—Hippolytus, and the Christian Church, at the commencement of the Third Century; with a copious Analysis of the newly-discovered MS., and a translation of all its most important parts, from the original Greek; by W. Elfe Tayler, author of "Popery: its Character and Crimes." Fcp.:—Christ and Christianity. A Vindication of the Truth of the Christian Religion, grounded on the Historical Verity of the Life of Christ. By William Lindsay Alexander, D. D., author of "The Connexion and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments:—Phraseological and

Explanatory Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis; by Theodore Preston, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Small 8vo.:—St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians, edited, with Critical Notes and Dissertations, &c., by Rev. Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, M. A., Editor of "The Life of Dr. Arnold." 8vo.:—St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans, edited, with Critical Notes and Dissertations, by Rev. B. Jowett, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Baliol College, Oxford. 8vo.:—A History of the Christian Church from the Seventh Century to the Reformation; by the Rev. Charles Hardwick, M. A., Fellow of St. Catharine's Hall. With four Maps. Cr. 8vo.:—An Introduction to the Study of the Canonical Epistles; including an attempt to determine their separate purposes and mutual relations. Cr. 8vo.:—The Sensibility of Separate Souls Considered, by Caleb Webb. 12mo.:—A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, by the Rev. Professor Eadie. 8vo.:—A Manual of the History of the Christian Church to the Pontificate of Gregory the Great, for General Readers as well as for Students in Theology; by Rev. James C. Robertson, M. A.:—History of Latin Christianity, including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicholas V.; by Rev. H. H. Milman, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. 3 vols., 8vo. (to be completed in 5 vols.):—The Atoning Work of Christ considered with Reference to Current Theories—Bampton Lectures for 1853; by the Rev. W. Thomson, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. 8vo.:—The Fall of Nineveh and the Reign of Sennacherib, chronologically considered, with a view to the Readjustment of Sacred and Profane Chronology; by James Whatman Bosanquet, Esq.

Among the new works in Theology recently announced on the Continent of Europe are the following:—

Hilgenfeld, Dr. A., Die apostolischen Väter. Untersuchungen über Inhalt und Ursprung der unter diesem Namen erhaltenen Schriften. Halle. 8vo., 311 pp.

Lange, Dr. J. P., Die Geschichte der Kirche. I. Bd. Das apostolische Zeitalter. Braunschweig. 8vo., 373 pp.

Noack, L., Die biblische Theologie. Einleitung ins alte und Neue Testament und Darstellung Lehrgehaltes der biblischen Bücher. Halle. 8vo., 392 pp.

Noack, Dr. L., Die christliche Mystik nach ihrem geschichtlichen Entwicklungsgange im Mittelalter und in der neuern Zeit dargestellt. Zwei Theile in einem Bande. I. Thl. Die christliche Mystik des Mittelalters. II. Thl. Die christliche Mystik seit dem Reformationszeitalter. Königsberg. 8vo., 332 pp.

Graetz, Dr. H., Geschichte der Juden vom Untergang des jüdischen Staates bis zum Abschluss des Talmud. Berlin. 8vo., 564 pp.

Hand-buch, kurzgefasstes exegetisches zum Alten Testament. 14. Lief. Die Psalmen erklärt von J. Olshausen. Leipzig. 8vo., 504 pp.

Lipsius, Dr. H. K., Die Paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre unter Berücksichtigung der verwandten Lehrstücke nach den vier Hauptbriefen des Apostels. Leipzig. gr. 8vo., 220 pp.

Ranke, Dr. F. H., Das Leben in Christo. Predigten über die Episteln des Kirchenjahrs. I. Thl. Erlangen. 8vo., 223 pp.

Rinck, W. Fr., Apokalyptische Forschungen oder Grundriss der Offenbarung Johannis und Anleitung zu ihrem Verständniss. Zürich. 8vo., 77 pp.

AMERICAN.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading American Theological and Literary Journals:—

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) for October:—I. Phrenology, by Enoch Pond, D. D.: II. Professor Edwards's Life and Writings, with Selections from his Fragmentary Thoughts: III. President Edwards's Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue: IV. The Prophet Jonah, by Professor Stowe: V. The Indivisible Nature of Revelation, by Professor Barrow: VI. Relation of Grecian to Christian Ethics, translated from the German of Neander.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) for October:—I. Letters to a Millenarian: II. False Teachers; their character and doom: III. Mercantile Morals: IV. Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews: V. The Presbyterian Review on Millenarianism: VI. The Eclipse of Faith: VII. The Revival of the French Emperorship: VIII. A Designation and Exposition of the Figures of Isaiah, Chapter XXIV.: IX. The Symbols of the Sixth Vial.

Universalist Quarterly, (Boston,) for October:—I. Egypt, Assyria, and the Bible: II. Apostolic Comprehensiveness:

III. The Doctrinal and the Practical in Christianity: IV. The Man Luther: V. The Divine Goodness versus Endless Misery.

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia, S. C.,) for October:—I. Reformation in England: II. Action and Reaction of Mind and Body, as affecting Insanity: III. Who are members of the visible Church? or, Infant Baptism: IV. The Sufficiency of the Scriptures—The Pharisees and Sadducees — Rationalism and Traditionalism: V. Address to the Society of Alumni of Union Theological Seminary, Va.: VI. The Province of Reason, especially in Matters of Religion.

Presbyterian Quarterly Review, (Philadelphia,) for September:—I. Thoughts on Theology: II. "The Presbyterian Magazine" and the "Spirit of American Presbyterianism:" III. Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement: IV. Chillingworth: V. The General Assembly: VI. Dr. L. Rumei's Translation of Vinet's Pastoral Theology.

Free-Will Baptist Quarterly, for October:—I. Theodore Parker: II. Parsonage Libraries: III. Canadian Colonization: IV. System in Beneficence: V. Exposition of Romans v, 12–19: VI. Spiritual Blindness: VII. Oliver Cromwell: VIII. Contemporary Literature: IX. Periodical Literature.

Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, (New-York,) for *October*:—I. Commerce of the United States: II. Dominion of the Seas, and the Fisheries: III. Mercantile Library Associations: IV. Traits of Trade—Laudable and Iniquitous. *November*:—I. Commerce of the United States: II. On the establishment of a line of Mail Steamers from the Western Coast of the United States on the Pacific, to China: III. Trade and Commerce of New-Orleans in 1852–53: IV. Traits of Trade—Laudable and Iniquitous: V. Money and the Measure of Value.

North-American Review, (Boston,) for October:—I. Society of the Cincinnati: II. The Life of Thomas Cole: III. The Early History of Massachusetts: IV. Russell's Memorials of Fox: V. Charles Dickens—Bleak House: VI. Canals of Irrigation in India: VII. Uncle Tom's Cabin—The Possible Amelioration of Slavery: VIII. Mary Tudor.

Brownson's Quarterly, (Boston,) for October:—I. The Eclipse of Faith: II. Gaurean's History of Canada: III. "Errors of the Church of Rome:" IV. J. V. H. on Brownson's Review: V. Cardinal Wiseman's Essays.

Southern Methodist Quarterly Review, (Richmond,) for October:—I. The English Language: II. Asmodai, translated from a Hebrew Theological Dictionary: III. John Foster: IV. The Old Testament Church: V. Neander on the First Epistle of John: VI. The Two Wesleys: VII. Syriac Metrical Literature.

Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, for October:—I. Religious Endowments: II. Education in the High Schools of Germany: III. Recent Doctrinal and Ecclesiastical Conflicts in Connecticut: IV. History of the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century: V. Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews: VI. Visibility of the Church.

New-York Quarterly, for October:—I. Athenian Democracy: II. Life of Las Casas: III. Alexander Smith: IV. Science in America: V. Trees: VI. Contemporary Literature of the last Three Months.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

We have received the first volume of a new and very neat edition of "*P. Ovidii Nasonis Metamorphoseon Libri* XV, *übersetzt und erklärt* von H. Lindemann," (Leipzig, 1853, 12mo., pp. 372.) The text is carefully revised, embodying the results of the latest criticism; and the translation, so far as we can judge, is meritorious.

"*Reallexicon des Classischen Alterthums für Gymnasien*, von Dr. Friedrich Lübker, erste Abtheilung," (Leipzig, 8vo., pp. 224.) Dr. Lübker has had the assistance of a number of eminent teachers and literary men in the preparation of this dictionary, which combines fulness with compactness to a remarkable degree.

"*Lateinisch-Deutsches Schul-Wörterbuch*, von Dr. C. F. Ingerslev," (Braunschweig: 1853, 8vo., pp. 945.) This dictionary has been received with great favour in Germany. We have only looked at it sufficiently to see that its plan is excellent. The typographical execution of the work is beautiful.

Dr. Karl Peter has commenced a new History of Rome, to be completed in three volumes, of which the first has appeared, (*Geschichte Roms*, erster Band, Halle, 1853, 8vo., pp. 616,) containing the his-

tory from the earliest period down to the Gracchi.

"*Die Kirche und Schule in Nord Amerika*, von Dr. HERMANN WIMMER," (Leipzig, 1853, 8vo., pp. 368,) is a very full, and, so far as we have examined it, satisfactory account of the state of the Churches and of education in the United States.

"*Die Religion der Hellenen, aus den Mythen, den Lehren der Philosophen und dem Kultus entwickelt und dargestellt*, von W. F. RINCK," (Zürich, 1853, 8vo., pp. 368,) is one of those *thorough* books which Germany alone produces in these days. The first volume (the only one that has yet appeared) treats of the heathen idea of God, and of the relation of man and the world to God.

A NEW edition of KANT'S "Critique of Pure Reason," (*Immanuel Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, herausgegeben von G. Hartenstein.* Leipzig: 1853; 8vo., pp. 669,) has just appeared. The text follows that of the edition of 1787, but gives the omitted portions from that of 1781. As a specimen of typography, the book is one of the most beautiful that we have ever seen.

AMONG the new miscellaneous works recently announced in England are the following:—

The Early History of Yucatan, from its Discovery to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, by Charles St. John Fancourt, Esq. With Map. 8vo.:—A New Latin-English Dictionary, by William Smith, LL. D., Editor of the Dictionaries of "Greek and Roman Antiquities," &c. One large volume, 8vo.:—A Life of Horace, by Dean Milman. Uniform with Milman's "Works of Horace." 8vo.:—Lives of Eminent British Poets, from Chaucer to Wordsworth, by Rev. Whitwell Elwin, B. A. 4 vols., 8vo.:—The History of the Guillotine, by the Right Hon. John Wilson Croker. Fcp. 8vo.:—Life in Abyssinia; being the Personal Narrative of Three Years' Residence and Travels in that Country, by Mansfield Parkyns, Esq. With Map and Illustrations. 2 vols., 8vo.:—The Russian Shores of the Black Sea, in the Autumn of 1852, &c., by Laurence Oliphant, author of "A Journey to Nepaul:"—Narrative of a Journey through Syria and Palestine, in 1851 and 1852, by Lieut. Van de Velde, late of the Dutch Royal Navy:—The Theory of Knowing and Being; Institutes of Metaphysics: by James F. Ferrier, A. B. Oxon., Professor of Moral Philosophy, &c., St. Andrew's. Post 8vo.:—The Fifth and Sixth Volumes of Thomas Moore's Memoirs, Journal, and Correspondence; edited by the Right Hon. Lord John Russell, M. P. Post 8vo., with portraits and vignettes:—Memoirs of the Whig Party during My Time, by Henry Richard Lord Holland: edited by his Son, Henry Edward Lord Holland. Vol. II, post 8vo.:—Speeches of the Right Honourable T. B. Macaulay, M. P., revised and corrected by himself:—Library Edition of Sir James Mackintosh's History of England; reprinted from the "Cabinet Cyclopædia;" and revised by the Author's Son, R. J. Mackintosh, Esq. 2 vols., 8vo.:—History of India under the House of Taimur, (1526 to 1707,) by William Erskine, Esq., Editor of "Memoirs of the Emperor Baber." Vols. I. and II., 8vo.:—Egypt's Place in Universal History, by the Chevalier C. C. J. Bunsen, D. D., D. C. L.; translated from the German by C. H. Cottrell, M. A. Vol. II., 8vo.:—A New Edition of the Chevalier Bunsen's Work on Hippolytus and his Age, corrected, remodelled, and extended. 8vo.:—Travels in Siberia, by S. S. Hill, Esq. 2 vols., post 8vo., with Map:—A Schoolmaster's Difficulties. Fcp. 8vo.:—Sketches of German Life, from the Decay of the Empire (1760) to the Expulsion of the French in 1814; by Mrs. Austin. Reprinted, with large additions, from the Edinburgh Review:—The Hon. F. St. John's Rambles in Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, in Search of Sport. Post 8vo., with coloured plates:—Niebuhr's Lectures on Ancient Ethnography and Geography; Comprising Greece and her Colonies, Italy, the Islands of the Mediterranean, Spain, Gaul, Britain, Northern Africa, and Phœnicia. Translated from the German, by Dr. L. Schmitz. With additions and corrections from his own Notes. 2 vols., 8vo.:—The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte; translated and condensed; by Harriet Martineau. 2 vols., large post 8vo.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1854.

ART. I.—THE CONFLICT OF AGES.

The Conflict of Ages; or, the Great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Man. By EDWARD BEECHER, D. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 18mo., pp. 552. 1853.

THE issues of the press are significant indications of the tendencies of the public mind, as the flight of birds of passage, or the aspects of the vegetable kingdom, constitute a reliable natural calendar. The publication of the work named at the head of this paper, with others on kindred themes, within the past few months, shows that there is abroad a disposition to examine the first principles of religious belief. The old foundations of thought and opinion have been shaken; men are no longer content to receive their *credenda* by authority, and therefore the venerable symbols of the faith by which the religious ideas of former generations have been shaped and directed, are evidently to be subjected to a rigid and thorough reëxamination. In this we rejoice, not doubting that their "gold, and silver, and precious stones" will be only purified by the fire that shall consume their "hay, wood, and stubble,"—that earnest inquiry, directed by a rational philosophy, and in the diffused light of the Christian revelation, will most certainly result in great good.

We are not of the number of those who take alarm at every attempt to look deeper than the surface of religious truth, and account it impiety to bring the enlightened understanding to worship with the sanctified affections before the throne of God. We are fully aware that this kind of theologizing has been conducted often unskilfully, and sometimes irreverently, as almost every good thing has been misused through human folly and the temerity of ignorance. But we have great confidence in the adaptation of Christianity to man's intellectual character and requirements, as well as to his moral

and spiritual wants, and do not doubt that it can bear the strongest light that may be thrown upon it; and that in proportion to the clearness of the light in which it may be set will its intrinsic excellences be manifest. The true policy of the friends of our holy religion is to enter fearlessly, though reverently, into this scrutiny, and so to present the great doctrines of Christianity that they shall be in harmony with the elementary principles of holiness, which it reveals as its own eternal basis.

The theology of a large portion of evangelical Protestantism has, for the last half-century, given increasing indications of some fundamental fault or misadjustment, while that of another portion has lacked the philosophical embodiment requisite to commend it to speculative and ingenious minds. The controversies of the past three hundred years have become effete. The inauguration of a spiritual philosophy of mind, in the place of the scholastic materialism of the middle ages, requires a readjustment of the science of theology to adapt it to its new condition and relations. It is indeed very probable that this cannot be done without producing some agitation, by which timid conservatism will be frightened, and headlong progressiveness run into extravagances. But all this is no cause for alarm. The light struggles with the darkness before the day fully replaces the night; and sometimes the rising sun evolves the very mists by which its own radiance is, for a while, obscured. This tendency, we think, we see in the theology of the times. Minds but half-emancipated from the tyranny of some worn-out system will, doubtless, continue to run into strange fancies; but the tendency, on the whole, is to a more rational, Scriptural, and catholic mode of thinking.

To effect this end is, we presume, the laudable purpose of the work before us; and though its author may have accomplished less than he fondly supposes he has done,—and though the pavilion of the Almighty is still as much as ever in the thick darkness, yet he has exposed many venerable errors, and has set some valuable truths in a clear and steady light. The drift of thought is in the right direction, and it may be confidently hoped that the land of truth will at length be reached, though many another adventurer may yet be lost in the search. In such a discussion it often happens that, while the final conclusion is wholly fallacious, much valuable truth may be incidentally elicited; and, on the contrary, the result may be just but the modes of argumentation defective, and the subordinate parts untrue: but, in either case, the cause of truth is advanced by the discussion.

The name of the author whose book we propose to review is not

altogether a new one in the walks of contemporaneous literature. Both from his relations, and in his own right, he enjoys a somewhat extensive and not discreditable notoriety. The son of an eminent American divine, who has long been distinguished for mental energy, honest zeal, and purity of purpose, as well as for great intellectual independence, and a manifest though not extreme mental eccentricity, he inherits a good share of his father's excellences, and peculiarities also. Trained in the school of New-England orthodoxy, which his father has borne as a yoke during a ministry of half a century, and against which his whole life and ministry have been an earnest protest, his theology was necessarily at bottom Calvinistic, but incidentally quite another thing. The united influences of a home-education that spurned the bounds and metes of creeds and platforms, and of an honest and inquisitive spirit incited and controlled by true piety, seem to have quite unfitted him to tread with measured steps the rounds of a forced and artificial orthodoxy. Ecclesiastically associated with a body whose symbols of belief but ill accord with his views of Christian doctrine, his position has been anomalous and uncomfortable; and it would have been strange had such a mind, in such a case, consented to stop short of a thorough reëxamination of its theological system, and a strenuous effort so to readjust the whole as to commend it to his own understanding.

There is no condition more worthy of honourable sympathy, and a commiseration that reflects no shame upon its object, than that of an honest and ingenuous man hopelessly dissatisfied with the doctrinal forms in which he has been educated, and which have become sanctified by all the associations of early piety and youthful consecrations,—and, above all, with which he has become entangled by his Christian associations and Church relationship. To break away from such entanglements is no easy matter; nor do we wonder, in view of these things, that men live and die nominally assenting to a form of doctrine, some of whose parts are quite repugnant to them. So widely does this state of things obtain in some of the nominally Calvinistic Churches in this country, that one's ecclesiastical creed is but an uncertain index to his personal beliefs; yet, even in such cases, the creed exercises no inconsiderable influence over men's minds. Few attain to such a degree of originality of thinking as to invent for themselves their modes and processes of thought; and whatever aids in this work generally controls the results as well as assists in the process. It thus happens that in many minds which have rejected the practical results of the Calvinistic theology, all the fundamental elements of that system are retained and cherished. But that system is quite too symmetrical, and its parts

too mutually dependent, to permit such a division without giving rise to gross absurdities; and hence come the jarring and evident discords of the numerous modified forms of semi-Calvinism. It must be rejected as a whole, or adopted entire; or else its *disjecta membra* will prove a perpetual occasion of confusion and disorder wherever they are retained. Of all this we have abundant proof in the condition of the modified Calvinism of the times. Few probably have more fearlessly shaken off its despotism than our author; and yet it still rests upon him with the weight of an incubus.

We do not, however, attribute Dr. Beecher's difficulties altogether to that cause: a man's mental constitution and habits of intellectual action have much to do with such matters. Multitudes have been, or are, in like circumstances, who have either rent the cobwebs that bound them, or else have silently acquiesced in what they neither could believe nor yet desired to deny. Man is generally a patient being; and accustomed to imperfection in everything else, he the more readily assents to an imperfectly adjusted formulary of religious belief. Not so with all, however. Some minds are constitutionally impatient; nor are these always either the boldest or most energetic. Sometimes the impulsive tendencies exceed the directive; sometimes the views taken are partial and in detail, rather than general and concrete; and in other cases a narrow logic is substituted for a broad and comprehensive philosophy, or the imagination usurps the place of the understanding. In all such cases the systems reared will be monstrous in their proportions, and grotesque in their combinations. In some such mental idiosyncrasies, we are persuaded, arises a great part of Dr. Beecher's difficulties. He has no lack of learning; but he lacks the skill to employ it to advantage. He has logic; but only enough to amuse his mind with syllogisms, and to render him self-confident in error. His arguments resemble the feet of Nebuchadnezzar's image, in which the iron was mingled with miry clay, and so the whole was alike powerless. But especially is he, in his intellectual exercises, the subject of his own imagination, so that, instead of viewing things in the clear sunlight of truth, he lives in a world of thought coloured and arranged by his own active but undisciplined fancy. Such a man may have a thousand excellences of character, and possess many amiable and valuable qualities of mind and heart; he may be a truly devout Christian and a highly useful minister of the gospel; but among the intricacies of metaphysical theology he is, and must be, an unsafe guide.

The literary and artistic qualities of this book are not of a high order. It is made up of an almost endless succession of repetitions. In the same chapter some leading thought is perpetually reappear-

ing, while in the different books the same propositions are reproduced, with scarcely enough variation from their former selves to amount to a clever disguise. The reader is wearied to impatience by being detained lingering about some thread-bare thought, which, having passed before the mind and been dismissed for another, returns again and again, till in utter weariness he calls out for something further. The result of this has been to make a large book out of a little matter; for had these five hundred and fifty-two pages been compressed to three hundred,—which could have been done without omitting any portion of the argument,—both the style and structure of the work would have been improved. This evil probably originated, not in any want of rhetorical skill in the writer, but in the confused and indistinct manner in which the subject he was discussing appeared to his own mind; since rhetoric is never so much at fault as when it has to render intelligible the ideas that have not yet assumed a definite form in the writer's understanding.

The work, as the title indicates, is designed to set forth the great conflict that has so long been maintained in the world, and often in individual minds, as to the nature of the moral government of the world; and to harmonize, by an unusual process, the great elementary truths which underlie this subject,—and which the author contends cannot be harmonized while the generally received notions of the origin and relations of our race are maintained. Of these great elementary truths, he first considers what he calls "the principles of honour and right,"—a form of expression which he uses in countless repetitions. The reality of those "principles" will not be questioned; but to his definition and application of them we certainly do not assent. To justify his use of them two things are necessary: first, that it be shown that we do so certainly and infallibly understand their nature and requirements as to effectually exclude all possible mistakes, and even uncertainty in the matter; and secondly, that their demands, thus clearly and forcibly sustained, are not met by the facts of the divine administration in human affairs, as they are generally understood and believed. As to the first, he assumes that,—

> "The elements of this great moving power of Christianity are to be derived from those natural judgments, concerning the principles of honour and right, which God has made the human mind to form with intuitive certainty, and which he designed to be a divine disclosure to us of the principles by which he regulates his own conduct."—P. 19.

Two striking features of the author's method of reasoning are faintly shadowed in this extract,—they are much more fully and objectionably exhibited in the sequel. He first assumes the suffi-

ciency of the human mind to infer by logical deductions, with "intuitive certainty," the great principles that *must* govern the awful and (as we had thought in our simplicity) the unsearchable counsels of the Almighty; thus elevating human reason to a coördinate authority with the word of God—for nothing can exceed "intuitive certainty"—and opening to it a field of investigation which revelation declares to be "past finding out." He next proceeds, in the same spirit of temerity, to declare what God "ought to do," and how he is "obliged" to "regulate his own conduct" toward his creatures. To the first we object, as untrue, believing the human mind inadequate to the task of inferring a system of right and duty, and recognising the absolute necessity of an authoritative declaration to produce in these things a firm conviction of the intellect, and to command the conscience. Here at the very foundation of his argument is a fatal defect, which is itself sufficient to unsettle any superstructure that might be raised upon it. To the manner of treating the subject we have a much more intense dislike than to the argument itself. There is an arrogance and flippancy in thus declaring, as if by authority, by what laws God is "bound," and in what conditions "he could not retain his own self-respect, but would experience infinite self-condemnation and remorse," that to our ears "grates horrible discord," and smacks largely of impiety; though we are aware it is authorized by the example of the whole race of Oberlin theosophists. Upon such a subject, especially, it becomes us to speak reverently, and to inquire with humility rather than to dogmatize with assurance; and if we do this we shall not flippantly assume to decide what "the principles of honour and right *require* of God," or "*demand* of God," nor shall we hastily pronounce that this or that would be "dishonourable to God," nor yet would we attribute to him "the spirit of *self-sacrifice*," as if he were subject to infirmities as we are. We do not attribute to the writer, as a personal quality, the flippancy and irreverence that his mode of argumentation exhibits, though we cannot but think that it betrays an unfitness of character to prosecute to advantage the deep and awful subject upon which he so boldly enters.

The second point to be determined at the outset of the argument, is the nature and extent of the "demands" made by these "intuitive principles" upon the Creator in behalf of the creature. Briefly stated these are,—that the creature shall not be subjected to pain and suffering, except as a punishment for his own individual sins, nor be exposed to dangers that amount to a strong probability that he will be overthrown and ruined; that responsibility shall not extend beyond the power to meet its claims, and that a vitiated moral

character, or a condition of influences to evil shall not be imposed upon him, except as an actual penal visitation for personal offences. To these general statements we would not dissent, if they may be properly guarded in their application; but probably it would be just at this point that we should differ most widely with our author. The conflict of which he is writing arises from the assumed irreconcilableness of those principles, on the received theory of Anthropology, with the character and condition of the human race under the divine government.

After thus establishing, to his own satisfaction, what *ought to be* the character of the divine government over newly-created moral agents, the author proceeds to inquire what are the facts of the case as to our race. Here his purpose would prompt him to paint in dark colours, and accordingly he has given us a picture of human depravity, and of the helplessness and misery of mankind, that ought to satisfy the most rigid Augustinian. For the proof of his statements he refers to the facts of human history,—to the teachings of the Scriptures, and the almost universal assent of all classes and shades of theological writers,—and especially to the convictions wrought by deep religious experience upon the individual Christian consciousness, by which this sense of guilt and misery is both realized and intensified. With these exhibitions of the truth of this great fundamental doctrine of the gospel we are more than satisfied; for we think no one can rise up from their perusal without a clearer conviction and a more lively sense of the radical disease of our moral nature, and of the absolute necessity that a man should be born again that he may enter the kingdom of heaven. But having followed Augustine thus far, and embraced his doctrine of original sin, as a sad reality, he must needs do as thousands before have done,—receive with it the doctrine of the divine efficiency, in the repulsive form in which it is commonly presented by Calvinistic orthodoxy. To do this, indeed, was necessary to his purpose, since without it there would have been no conflict, and so no call for the invention of a theory of reconciliation. Nor could he be expected to do otherwise; for being a Calvinist, as to his theological theory, all acknowledged facts must be arranged agreeably to that system.

Thus we have the two great antagonistic elements arrayed against each other; and at this point the author remarks:—

"In contemplating them as they have been set forth, two things strike the mind as worthy of notice: one, that each in its radical elements is sustained by its own independent and indestructible evidence; the other, that, as Christianity is at present adjusted, there is no possibility of a full and harmonious development

of them both, but, on the other hand, one constantly conflicts with and tends to repress, and even to destroy, the other.

"The evidence which sustains the principles of honour and right, as we have seen, originates from the fact that God has so made the mind that their truth is intuitively recognised and affirmed, *and is*, therefore, *a divine revelation;* and also from the distinct recognition of these principles in Christian experience, and in the word of God.

"But that in some way these moving powers have been so misadjusted as to conflict with each other, is obvious from simply placing them, as above developed, side by side. To say the very least, the preceding statements, as to the ruin of man, do appear directly to conflict with the principles of honour and right which have been set forth, and tend directly to subvert and destroy them."—Pp. 79, 80.

This extract gives a very fair and full view of the whole case. Granting his principles, which indeed contain much truth, and yet error enough to render the whole untrue, there is certainly a terrible conflict, and one, too, from which it would be hard to escape in any other way than by cutting the knot, as he has done. We are now as ever impressed with the conviction that the super-orthodoxy taught by a portion of the old Reformers, and adopted by more modern Calvinists, dishonours God, and cannot be reconciled with those principles of equity and benevolence which God by his word and Spirit—not by logical inferences—has written upon all truly regenerated hearts. But we do not grant that, because Calvinism is thus fruitful of contradictions, and impotent to harmonize the obvious truths of the divine administration, these truths are utterly repugnant to each other, or require a fanciful theory, wholly unknown to the Scriptures, to save them from a collision. It is unsafe to pronounce the ocean boundless, because its shores lie quite beyond our vision,—or bottomless, because it is deeper than the length of our line. It has long been the fashion, in certain quarters, to identify Christianity with Calvinism, and anti-Calvinists have tolerated the assumption, while the adherents of that system have failed to push it to its logical consequences; but we must protest against any attempt to load Scriptural Christianity with the sins of a superannuated theology.

The author next proceeds to exhibit the practical workings of these conflicting agencies, in which he enumerates and examines six "experiences," or types. The first, which he styles "Old School Theology," is unadulterated Calvinism, the doctrine of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, and long the only received orthodoxy of the Puritanical Churches of Great Britain and America. Its fundamental element is a deep conviction of the radical evil and corruption of the human character, with its innate proclivity to sin; an original bent of the soul, that is surely developed in actual sins

by the natural growth and exercise of the soul's faculties. To these just and Scriptural views are conjoined the most unqualified notions of the divine efficiency in human affairs, so considered and set forth as to leave nothing to man's agency, and to make God the sole efficient cause of both good and evil. The character of this system, and of the objections brought against it, are familiar to all who have given any attention to the theological discussions of the past half-century. Its thorough and humbling views of the infinite demerit of sin, and of the fearfulness of the divine holiness to the guilty and defiled, commend it to the truly penitent, with the convictions of whose awakened consciences it so fully corresponds; while the notion of unconditional predestination, because it is presented as an essential part of the same system, is often either passively received, or at last submitted to after severe mental conflicts.

But the same spirit of genial goodness to which that abasing penitence leads the soul, instinctively protests against the hard features of the system of predestination. The conflict is thus produced within the stronghold of the "Old School Theology," the heart of the penitent believer. It has ever been the case that this system has suffered less from attacks from without, than from the dissatisfaction that its own asperities have produced among those who have embraced it; and for this cause especially has it been compelled to give way before the increased light and freedom of thought that distinguish the present age. Yet, with all its faults, it has been a mighty agency for good in the world; and even in its senility, we reverence it as a very giant compared with the degenerate brood of its pigmy successors.

The reaction from high-Calvinism reached its complete development in the form of modern Unitarianism. Starting with certain generally correct, though not justly modified views of the equity and benevolence of the divine government, and wanting that deep religious consciousness in which alone men realize the exceeding sinfulness of the natural heart by an acquaintance with themselves, the advocates of this system began by rejecting the excesses of the old orthodoxy, and ignoring some of its great truths, till forced by logical consistency to cast aside all the distinctive features of the Christian system. These are the Emersons, Parkers, and Wrights of the present time, who as much excel, in consistent adhesion to their system, such men as Channing, Peabody, and Dewey, as these are doctrinally and practically better than those. Unitarianism can flourish only in the twilight of a soulless rationalism; it withers and dies in the clear light and genial warmth of the sun of gospel truth. A trifler in matters of religion, who is a stranger to his own heart,

and whose spiritual vision has never been purified by divine influences, may spend his whole lifetime an unshaken though superficial believer in that system. Not so, however, will it be with him who communes with his own heart, and views with a lively sensibility the wide-spread ruin that exists in the world through sin. By denying the native depravity of the human character, Unitarianism begins with arraying itself against the only rational account that can be given of the obvious moral condition of human society and individual hearts. To deny the facts of the case is madness, and certainly fatal to the system, for they are patent to every observer: to confess them, and pretend to find their cause in something short of a universal depravation of the moral nature of the race, is equally unphilosophical and suicidal; for the common-sense of men will not long permit them to refer a universal phenomenon to a partial and accidental cause. Individual religious experience, also, brings its powerful testimony against this tenet. The soul that has, with a full purpose, chosen the way of right and duty, nevertheless finds within itself evil inclinations and tendencies to forsake the paths of virtue and holiness, which it would not were the fountains of the affections and desires untainted with moral defilements. Such a system, it must be evident to all, cannot harmonize the great, though sometimes apparently conflicting truths of Christianity.

The exhibition of these two great systems, in both their strength and weakness, presents the "conflict" in a clear and strong light. Against some of the positions of Calvinism not only does Unitarianism utter severe things, and the human heart in its best estate rebel, but its own advocates write terrible charges. Calvin himself called its ill-favoured side a "horrible decree;" and more modern Calvinists, though often less ingenuous in the matter, have been compelled to make the same confession. Despairing of success in the attempt to harmonize the system with the ideas of equity and benevolence which God has by his word and Spirit impressed upon our hearts, its advocates resolve the whole into an awful and inscrutable mystery. To this the chastened spirit would willingly submit were the case only *above* reason; but it is rather difficult for a rational mind to conclude that God requires our assent to contradictory propositions. It is, however, only against the peculiarities of Calvinism that the objections of Unitarians have any force,—and it is in this form that they present the orthodoxy against which they direct their most effective attacks; and in these they are seconded by a large body of Christians, whose orthodoxy is as unimpeachable as that of the most strenuous advocates of "the high mystery of predestination." Relieve orthodoxy of the clogs of predestination, and

it need not fear the attacks of its enemies; and even with this terrible burden upon its shoulders, it has proved more than a match for Unitarianism. This, indeed, some of the most eminent advocates of that system, of the present age, have virtually confessed.

Another phase of this "conflict" is discussed at length by our author, and, we think, magnified quite beyond its real importance. By the law of repulsions, Calvinism sometimes engenders a species of Universalism,—a heresy that seldom flourishes except in an atmosphere that has been poisoned by excessive doses of super-orthodoxy. Still we doubt whether any properly-informed and really sane mind could entertain such a system as "orthodox Universalism." No example of the kind has yet been found out; for the case of the justly celebrated John Foster is not in point, since he was a stern ultra-Calvinist, with a highly eccentric intellect, and a morbidly melancholy spirit. Foster never attempted to reduce his vagaries to a theological system, and he confessed that all the teachings of the Scriptures seemed to be against them. It is not strange that upon such a mind as was Foster's, the gloomy dogmas of his creed produced the most painful results,—effects which, even Chalmers confesses, Calvinism tends to produce in some minds. It was not orthodoxy, therefore, but its foreign appendages, that unsettled the judgment and clouded the spirit of the great essayist.

Under the pressure of well-directed attacks upon the indefensible parts of Calvinism, from both orthodox and Socinian stand-points, the advocates of that system at length shifted their position, and abandoning the "Old," originated the "New-School Theology." This was simply an attempt to harmonize contradictory propositions, and by logical subtleties to bewilder the minds of its advocates and others, so that the difficulties of the case should not appear. The attacks from this new position upon the old theology were terribly effective, and quite irresistible; and for a while, by concealing its inconsistencies, and keeping its own antagonistic elements from actual collisions, it seemed to have accomplished the long-sought purpose of harmonizing the apparently opposing verities of Christianity. The triumph, however, was a short one; the failure complete. Retaining in a modified form the indefensible points of the old theology, its corner-stone—the doctrine of original sin—was sapped, and the whole superstructure thus made insecure. As a system of doctrines, the "New-School Theology" is orthodoxy diluted and emasculated. It gives diminished views of the divine law and its Author; of sin and of holiness. In its light, human depravity seems less intense; the nature of repentance is changed; conversion is reduced to an act of the voluntary powers, and the whole of religion

to a system of opinions and duties reacting upon the moral nature. The inherent defects of this system were, of course, seen from the beginning by not a few learned and pious divines, who did not fail to point out its radical inconsistencies and pernicious practical tendencies. These disadvantages are fully conceded by our author, though it is quite evident that his personal sympathies are with its advocates and adherents; but he justly concludes that the conflict does not end here.

Abandoning the hope of effecting an adjustment of the "conflict" on the basis of any of the four preceding "experiences," our author presents two others as the only remaining alternatives. He assumes that either we must abandon the notion that the divine administration is agreeable to "the principles of honour and right," or else conclude, contrary to the generally received opinion, that the human family are not now in the first stage of their responsible existence, but are suffering in this world the penal consequences of sins committed in a previous state of being. The former, it is granted, would effectually eclipse the divine glory, and by constituting the Almighty an object of slavish dread, would quite extinguish all reverential love and chastened filial fear toward him, and transform him into a powerful and unrelenting tyrant. The very thought of this is horribly repulsive; and yet there is cause to believe that under the gloomy influences of the "Old-School Theology," not a few devout but misguided persons have so far entertained this notion as to experience its blighting curse upon their religious peace. The author strongly intimates that its dreadful shadow for some time rested upon his own mind, from which, indeed, he escaped only by taking refuge in his theory of preëxistence.

This theory, which constitutes the chief peculiarity of the work, is briefly this:—The present is not the original state and condition of our race, nor is the new-born child then first issued upon its career of responsible existence: our souls are emigrants from another sphere, sent into this world, as a penal colony; or they are the diseased of other worlds, sent hither as to a hospital, where means are provided for their recovery in the gospel of the Son of God. This assumption of preëxistence, and actual voluntary sinning before birth, is made the key-stone of the arch by which he attempts to span the yawning chasm that, from his delusive stand-point, seems to separate the immutable truths of Christianity. The origin of human depravity, as to its terrestrial manifestations, is thus accounted for; though the difficulty is removed only one stage backward. It has, however, ever been the practice of human folly to conclude that any difficulty was effectually disposed of, when it could be pushed

out of the present world. This theory, too, not only confesses, but requires the most thorough and radical notions of original depravity. By a play upon the word *habit*—using it first in its philosophical sense to indicate the constitutional character, and then in its popular acceptation for the result of a continued course of action—he attempts to demonstrate his theory from the existence of sinful habits, *ab origine*, in our natures. A ready solution is thus afforded of all the difficult questions growing out of the prevalence of evil, whether natural or moral, in the present world,—while whatever good is here afforded is seen to be, in the highest possible sense, a matter of pure and positive grace. To a mind affected to morbidness by studying the crabbed problems of a partial and perverse creed, it is very possible that such a theory would afford relief, and therefore be gladly embraced and earnestly defended. It was under such influences that John Foster fled for refuge to Universalism, a course from which Dr. Beecher has escaped (if indeed he has so escaped) by virtue of a more hopeful spirit, and a more fertile imagination. We heartily congratulate both of them on their escape from the *decretum horribile*, though their temporary resting-places are but frail and baseless structures.

A story is told of a certain fanciful writer who, having promulgated a well-wrought theory, when it was objected that it was opposed to many well-attested facts, coolly replied, "So much the worse for the facts." It would seem that Dr. Beecher has taken much the same course with his theory. It is certainly not altogether repugnant to some of the facts and phenomena of the case in question, and because it brings relief at the very point where relief was needed by him, the theory is adopted with an almost total disregard of many of the most considerable facts and circumstances of the subject. No attempt is made to account for the existence of such myriads of fallen spirits in another, or in many other worlds; nor does the author seem to feel the force of his own arguments, as applied to another sphere, against the prevalence of sin in this world, on the supposition that men are born in innocence and rectitude of character. Nor does he even allude to the objection which must surely arise, that a perpetuation of personal identity, such as to carry with it an entailed responsibility, would necessarily imply a perpetuated self-consciousness; nor is the question examined at all whether the boasted "principles of honour and right" might not forbid the infliction of the penalties due to crimes committed in another state of existence, upon persons who are now quite uninformed that they ever had such an existence, or in any case committed the crimes whose penalties they are now suffering.

The author's theory is produced by him as an elementary truth in Christianity, absolutely necessary to harmonize the other great truths of the system, or to give it practical efficiency among men. And yet he confesses that it is not found in the Bible, nor yet is it so plainly implied, but that for eighteen hundred years the Church, though constantly embarrassed by the "conflict" which it alone is adequate to terminate, failed to recognise it. Did he ask himself whether all this providential arrangement answers the "demands" of the "principles of honour and right?" Is such a state of things agreeable to the conditions of a "fair probation?" A revelation, whether verbal or implicated, which requires a divine interpretation to render it cognizable, till such interpretation is given is not a revelation in reality; and he who shall bring such an interpretation is as truly a medium of revelation as was David or Isaiah. If, then, we yield our assent to this scheme, we must believe that, by divine appointment, the Church was without the knowledge of one of the most important and practically useful truths of religion—a truth without which the Christian system has neither beauty nor adaptation, nor can the ways of God to man be justified—until more than eighteeen hundred years after the day of Pentecost, when it was given forth through the logical acumen of Dr. Edward Beecher! We would not object to the medium, if indeed the revelation is needed; but we fear this new mode of discovering the essential truths of revelation may lead to difficulties. It certainly exalts the human intellect to a coördinate authority with the word of God, so that logic must henceforward occupy the place hitherto assigned to none but the explicit *dicta* of the Bible. We forbear to utter all that we feel on this subject; nor could we preserve (as we do most unreservedly) our confidence in the author's devout sincerity, did we not give him the benefits of Imlac's reflections on "Disorders of the Imagination," as addressed to Rasselas and his companions: "In time some particular train of ideas fixes the attention; all other intellectual gratifications are rejected; the mind, in weariness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favourite conception, and feasts on the luscious falsehood, whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth. By degrees the reign of fancy is confirmed; she grows first imperious, and in time despotic. Then fictions begin to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the mind, and life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish."

We have intimated that the theory of preëxistence is not original with Dr. Beecher; this, however, is rather in its favour than otherwise, since it is a maxim that whatever is new in theology must be false. The only agency he has in the matter is the revival of an exploded

fancy, and applying it as a solvent to the stubborn knots of modern Calvinism. The notion of the preëxistence of souls was not unknown to the primitive Church, into which it was brought among many other oriental fancies, or deduced naturally from the Gnostic theory of emanations. It was then adopted and propagated by Origen, in a form and for a purpose not widely different from those of Dr. Beecher in the present instance. "Origen," says Hagenbach, "following the example of the Pythagorean and Platonic schools, as well as of the later Jewish theology, speaks of the preëxistence of the soul as something real. *He reconciles his doctrine with human liberty and divine justice by maintaining that the soul, entering into the bodies of men, suffers punishment for former sins.*" To Origen's theory of preëxistence, Tertullian opposed the doctrine of the propagation of the soul, *per traducem*,—a doctrine which, stripped of the materialistic drapery in which that father clothed it, is still cherished as the true theory of the origin of souls by a large portion of orthodox Christians, though Dr. Beecher dismisses it as altogether undeserving a serious consideration: an easy method that, of getting by a formidable difficulty. Origen's fancies—of which he had many—made but little progress in the primitive Church; and at the Council of Constance, A. D. 540, this one among other heresies was formally condemned,—from which time to the present it has been considered as one of the creatures of Origen's fruitful but ill-governed imagination.

Having thus exhibited the grounds of the "conflict," and set forth his scheme for an adjustment, the author proceeds, at length, to show that all other attempts to harmonize the truths of religion had signally failed. In his "Historical Outline and Estimate of the Conflict," he examines the principal theological systems as to the point in question, and dismisses them all as "unsatisfactory." We shall notice but a single one. A brief chapter is devoted to "Other Ineffectual Efforts at Relief," in which the semi-Pelagian scheme of modern Romanism, and the Arminian theory—the association is significant—are pretended to be examined. He, however, concedes (an act of justice too often neglected by Calvinistic writers) that the basis of the Arminian theory is as truly orthodox as that of the Calvinian system,—that "Wesley and the Methodists give the same views of the effects of the forfeiture in Adam as was given by Augustine and the Reformers;" and then adds:—

"The modification of the Augustinian system introduced by Arminian divines, is effected by their doctrine that, in consequence of the death of Christ, a gracious ability is restored to all men in a sufficient degree to enable them to embrace the gospel. This is called by Fletcher 'a gracious free-

agency;' and Watson says that by it is communicated 'a power of willing to come to Christ, even when men do not come,—a power of considering their ways and turning to him.' Upon the foreseen use of this power they base the eternal decision of God as to man's salvation; and thus arrive at the ancient doctrine of conditional predestination, although in a different way from the semi-Pelagians and the early Greek Church."—P. 352.

To this statement of the case we make no serious objection, though we might employ other forms of expression in stating the same things. He proceeds:—

"It is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of the points at issue between the Arminians and the Calvinists with reference to this doctrine. I will only say, that under a system of real preëxistence there is an important truth which is very nearly related to the doctrine of gracious ability, although not identical with it, but which I have not now time to develop.

"But my main object is to say, that so long as a forfeiture in Adam is retained, and real preëxistence is denied, neither of the modifications which I have described is effectual to meet the demands of the principles of equity and of honour."—P. 353.

To this no other answer is necessary than "*Non sequitur.*" We indeed differ very considerably from our author as to those "demands," and therefore it is not strange that his objections strike us less forcibly than they do him. Nor can we think that to a mind free from any prepossessions, the Arminian scheme of forfeiture by Adam, and restoration by Christ, would imply the least conflict with any rational view of equity and rectoral goodness. Indeed, the author's manner at this point gives evidence that he has found himself at a loss for arguments against a system which he had already classed among "Other Ineffectual Efforts at Relief," and which, therefore, he was compelled to find "unsatisfactory." To us, his conclusion in this case seems to be specially inconsequential:—

"The Arminians allege that by divine grace, through Christ, free-agency has been restored to all men. Even if this were conceded, it does not bring them up to the point demanded by the principles of equity and honour; for they still have depraved natures, and are full of propensities to evil, which are certain to ruin them *if God does not interpose.*"—P. 354.

But, according to this system, God does so far interpose that no one can be ruined except by his own perverse refusal of salvation, when offered freely and in good faith; and so the whole objection falls to the ground. It is sufficient in this place to notice, in this manner, the author's objections to the Arminian theory; an adequate exhibition of that system we hope to give at another time.

The latter portion of the volume, for nearly two hundred pages, is occupied by what the author terms "The Argument," consisting of a restatement of most of the assumptions of the former por-

tions, with variations and additions. It bears the marks of great labour and painstaking in the preparation; but as an argument it is feeble, confused, and inconsequential,—though, from the air of satisfaction with which its results are stated, and the positive and defiant manner in which they are appealed to, it is evident that the writer deems his positions invulnerable. It is not a very difficult thing for any person of an active but ill-trained mind to weave a chain of sophisms, and evolve imaginary conclusions, with a confident "therefore," or "thus we see," at each stage, though the force or relevancy of the matter is seen by none but himself. Of this kind of rampant ratiocination we have seldom met with so remarkable an instance.

We shall not attempt to review this strange "argument," but only notice a few of its positions. It begins by conceding that the author's theory, which is "alone effectual to harmonize the conflicting powers of Christianity," is not found "in express terms" in the Scriptures. With the great body of orthodox Christians that admission must be a fatal one; but the author seems not so to hold to the sufficiency of the written word, as taught in the creed,—"That whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed;" but rather that "God has so presented to us this system, taken as a whole, that by a careful study of it we may learn the great law of its harmonious action." Of course this all-important truth—if truth it is—can be known only by such as have both the ability and opportunity for "a careful study" of it; the rest must receive it on their faith in the infallibility of the logic of those who thus study it. But we are told that the Newtonian philosophy rests only on inferential evidence, and therefore why may not a great religious doctrine be sustained in the same manner? An unlettered disciple of Christ would answer, that whatever may be the laws of the material universe, he neither knows them nor feels any lively interest in them; but that his interests in the doctrines of salvation are too vital to be trusted to a mere inference;—give me an explicit "Thus saith the Lord." A Christian philosopher would reply, that though a theory in physics may rest on merely plausible inductions, and often is assented to when its reality is seriously doubted, yet no one who realizes the infinite interests involved in the doctrines of the gospel could willingly consent to commit his eternal destinies to such an uncertainty. In such a case we need assurance instead of an inferred probability, and such a conviction as can be effected only by the sure word of God, revealed in the heart by the "Holy Spirit of promise."

The assumption that the Bible contains nothing incompatible

with this theory, can avail nothing; for, in the first place, the assumption is not granted, and secondly, it would not answer the purpose if it were. It certainly cannot be required that a revelation intended for universal use should specifically contradict every strange fancy that fertile imaginations may invent, nor that it should so arrange its salutary teachings that a perverted (not to say perverse) ingenuity may not set up a ridiculous theory among them with some degree of plausibility. The design of the Bible is to teach us the truth, and thus to guard us against error; and if it has at all given us a system of divine anthropology, then we are to receive that, and reject all others. This is, indeed, virtually though indirectly granted, since the attempt is made to show that those portions of Scripture which have very generally been understood to teach such a system have never till now been properly interpreted. The strongholds of the venerable orthodoxy of Protestant Christianity, and of the later Primitive Church—especially Romans v, 12–19—are most earnestly and pertinaciously assailed; and all the powers of the controversialist are brought to bear against the initial article of the New-England Primer,—

"In Adam's fall we sinned all,"

as though some ancient grudge against its crabbed lessons, cherished since early boyhood, was now finding its vent. If never before, the art of hermeneutics received a full trial of its powers and capabilities, the test may now be considered complete.

To the idea of a forfeiture by the human race, in Adam, of any kind or in any degree, the author seems to be especially hostile, constantly and confidently assuming that such a dispensation would be a grievous wrong to the sufferers. That to a mind accustomed to view this subject in the light of the old theology, but over which that system has lost its power, it should appear severe and unjust, is not strange; but a person thus situated is in the worst possible condition for forming a correct and reliable opinion upon the subject, as to which both his intellect and his heart have been thus tortured. We often go too far when, offended by the apparent iniquity of any principle or proceeding, we turn to something more congenial.

Our author's position is as far short of the truth as that which he opposes is beyond it, and has the further disadvantage of opposing both Scripture and manifest facts. On two occasions at which God, of set purpose, declared himself and the nature of his dispensations to Moses, the principles of entail, both of blessings and curses, are explicitly avowed. See Exodus xx, 5; and xxxiv, 7. The history of the divine judgments shows us this principle in

action. Noah and Lot were found righteous among corrupted generations; and the rewards of their righteousness came upon their children. Korah, Dathan, and Abiram sinned, and the divine vengeance fell upon their wives and their little ones, as well as upon their own persons. For a breach of filial duty committed by one of the sons of Noah, the descendants of that sinning individual, *to the latest generation*, were doomed to bear the curse. But why look beyond our own times and circumstances for proof in this matter? Do we not everywhere find abundant proof, that in the divine mind our whole race appears as an aggregated unity, as well as a collection of personal individualities,—that there is much which belongs to the race in common, as well as much that pertains exclusively to the individual? The "Old-School Theology" sinks the individual in the community, and thus violates the first principles of moral equity; our author rejects the community altogether, and by so doing arrays himself against both Scripture and common-sense. Both principles are unquestionably true, but they so modify each other that neither may be applied absolutely. Nor can we see any difficulty in applying these principles to Adam's relations to his posterity, and to the results of his transgression upon his race; since whatever was forfeited in the first Adam has been either restored or compensated for by the second Adam, the benefits of whose grace extend to all the individuals of our race, and in such degree and efficiency as fully to reverse the original loss in all who do not perversely reject that grace.

As is usually the case with those who ride hobbies, our author finds his theory available beyond its original purpose. Like Aladdin's lamp, or the philosopher's stone, his theory is universally useful. In its beams the hitherto unfathomed abyss which concealed from human research the question of the origin of evil, becomes radiant with light, and its vexed problems as plain as the multiplication-table,—though to our feeble vision the solution and the question are about equally obscure. The notion so forcibly set forth by Robert Hall, that "a religion without a mystery is a temple without a God," is left unnoticed as an exploded fancy of an age of darkness, since the far-reaching logic of our author solves all mysteries, and exchanges faith for knowledge. So strange a collection of learned absurdities and grotesque puerilities we have never before encountered. We have, in our day, examined many arguments against our settled convictions, and have been often compelled to hesitate, and rally our thoughts, in order to repel the ingenious sophisms; but in this case we have gone over the whole, and found no occasion to hesitate for a moment for a reply to the strange arguments and positions of the

author, so transparent is the fallacy in every part. To read over these lucubrations is a weariness to the flesh; to canvass them as arguments may excite disgust or mirth, according to the state of the reader's spirits; but to consider them as the teachings of a learned and pious Christian minister, can excite only sorrow in all truly benevolent minds.

With a few general reflections we must close these observations. The book itself, with its theory and arguments, we esteem of very little consequence, and in itself almost equally inefficient of good and evil. The source whence it originates gives it transient notoriety; but we cannot suppose that any one capable of weighing evidence will become a convert to its theory. But its influences upon its author cannot be so transitory. Among his personal acquaintances, an estimable private character and many personal good qualities may secure a continuance of Christian confidence,—for often an upright heart is yoked to a crooked intellect; but as a religious guide and instructor, even his friends must own that he is unsafe. His position among theological questions is all in uncertainty, beyond what is disclosed in this volume; and surely this gives very little satisfaction as to his views, except as to the obvious facts of human depravity. Having placed himself so conspicuously before the public, and in direct hostility to the settled and cherished convictions of the great body of the Christian Church, he must expect his book to be subjected to a searching examination, and to be met by every legitimate form of attack,—not even excepting ridicule, if he has made himself ridiculous. No man has the right to complain when the works which he addressed to the public are fearlessly though fairly responded to; nor should any turn author who is too sensitive to be reviewed, for no amount of deprecation can protect him from the assaults of the "ungentle craft."

The perusal of this volume has given us a quickened conviction that the doctrine of predestination, as held and taught by high Calvinists, cannot be reconciled with the revealed character of God, and with the notions of righteousness and benevolence which his word inculcates. This fault of the system was doubtless, to a considerable extent, kept out of sight in the days when the authority of creeds and the determinations of councils were generally final as to all theological questions; but that time has passed away, and now each tenet or doctrine must stand or fall by its own merits. To the deeply-penitent man the horrors of that system are the less apparent, since his sense of personal guiltiness fully justifies to his conscience the most terrible doom that might be denounced against him, and also hides from his mind's contemplation everything beyond

his own case. Or if at any time a thought is directed to the world, it is seen "lying in the wicked one," and from its character subject to the divine displeasure, while the gift of salvation is seen to be eminently and absolutely of grace. For this cause many devout and intelligent Christians have acquiesced in that doctrine, to whom its hard features have been horribly offensive. But that to which the newly-awakened penitent may yield assent in the immaturity of religious experience, becomes more and more a difficulty as the renewed heart grows in grace and in the knowledge of the truth. Thus two fatally hostile elements are found at the very basis of the system.

The history of Calvinian theology and its off-shoots, for the past century, strikingly illustrates and confirms this view of the case. "New Divinities" have followed each other in rapid succession, and each has usually been less satisfactory, because less self-consistent than its predecessor. Offended by the manifest cruelty of the dark side of that system, some, in spite of the plain teachings of the Bible to the contrary, have tried hard to believe that in some way the blessings extended by it to the elect will be universal. Others, on account of this plague spot upon it, have rejected the whole system of orthodoxy,—its obvious verities as well as its unwarranted appendages; and in turn have found that a theological system which opposes both Scripture and facts is foredoomed to a transient and unquiet existence. And yet others have attempted to cure the evils of the system without changing its identity, but have universally found that it becomes worse for mending.

It is quite evident, however,—as many will be made to feel more sensibly than ever before, by reading this volume,—that no plan of adjustment can be proposed, with any chance of success, that fails to embody and make prominent the manifest and mournful truth, that the human heart is deeply and essentially depraved. This sad truth must be confessed and recognised, and upon that foundation must the gospel superstructure be built. The provisions for man's redemption are adapted to none but the impure, the diseased, and the guilty,—and such the awakened sinner feels that he is; and beyond this even the heir of salvation confesses, "By the grace of God I am what I am." The rejection of this fundamental doctrine has degraded Universalism to a less offensive but equally pernicious form of infidelity with plain-speaking deism. It has set modern Unitarianism adrift on the broad ocean of rationalism, upon which the less scrupulous have gone over to pantheism, or are wandering in the interminable wastes of a shoreless scepticism,—from which their more serious and discreet brethren have escaped by clinging to some

parts of this fundamental truth. Its partial and virtual rejection by the New-School theologians has involved their system in inextricable absurdities, and deprived it of the chief excellence of the old theology, without at all relieving it of the fatal excesses of that system. Especially in that phase of the new theology, known as "Oberlin Divinity," is the awful sanctity with which the earlier system invested the Divine Person and his dispensations rudely torn away, and the whole subject of religious truth treated with a supercilious flippancy that borders very closely on profanity. In every case the rejection of that tenet from the doctrinal system has been the occasion of confusion and inefficiency. A system founded in error can never accomplish any really valuable purpose.

Here we must dismiss the subject, with one or two brief reflections. The examination of this work has given us a lively conviction that it is a great misfortune to be educated to false views of the great truths of religion. Had this writer never studied Calvinistic theology, nor been taught to view the verities of Christianity from a false position, we confidently believe he would never have dreamed of his baseless theory of preëxistence, for he would have had no need of it. Thus, too, would he have escaped whole years of deep mental anguish, which has resulted most disastrously to his modes of thought, and to his settled convictions,—results which are probably rather his misfortunes than his faults. It has also convinced us that, while a due degree of mental independence is a real excellence, its excess is both irrational and dangerous. A free and ingenuous mind cannot submit itself to dictation; yet, if properly instructed, it will be very slow to array itself against all authority, and to assume for itself a preëminence in wisdom. In theology conservatism is especially necessary; for that, unlike most others, is not a progressive science,—though the changing aspects of other sciences may require corresponding modifications in its outward forms. Theology, too, is transcendental in its character, and derived to us by divine tradition: it is received by faith, and, for the most part, lies beyond the range of rational induction and argumentation. Here is Dr. Beecher's great error. He has attempted an impossibility, and the result is an intellectual abortion.

Art. II.—REVIVAL OF THE BLACK ARTS.

1. *The Mountain Cove Journal and Spiritual Harbinger.* Mountain Cove, Fayette County, Virginia, 1852–3.
2. *Rochester Weekly American, Thursday, April 14th,* 1853. *A Discourse upon the Ancient and Modern Arts of Divination.* Delivered in the First Presbyterian Church of Rochester, New-York, Sabbath evening, March 20, 1853, by the Pastor.
3. *A Review of the Spiritual Manifestations.* By Charles Beecher, Pastor of the First Congregational Church, Newark, New-Jersey. New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co. 1853.

It is not very many years since the impassioned and oracular muse of Festus poured forth, in wild and burning accents, a solemn dirge over the forgotten and abandoned dreams of earlier fancy, and lamented with melancholy wail the complete extinction of all the supernatural arts and transcendental reveries which had beguiled the efforts and fired the imagination of less sober and calculating generations than our own. But the tide seems at length to be turning; and the ebb of the current promises to be more than proportionate to its flow. After centuries of growing scepticism, which, commencing in religion, extended itself throughout the whole domain of human speculation, the civilized world is again displaying an amazing alacrity in welcoming all the credulities and superstitions from which it so lately boasted that it had been entirely liberated. The infidelity which was initiated in theology by Abelard, in philosophy by Giordano Bruno and Montaigne, in politics by Elie de la Boétie, Hobbes, and Spinoza, and in science by Galileo,—which heralded its approaching triumph in Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, fought its victorious fight in the first French Revolution, and so recently proclaimed its definite ascendency in Strauss, and its perpetual reign in the Religion of Humanity and the Positivism of M. Comte,—this wide-spread and all-embracing incredulity, which has so deeply branded its mark on the earlier half of the passing century, is losing its hold of the sceptre in the very hour in which it has boldly arrogated to itself the undivided and undisputed sovereignty of the intellect. The emancipation of the human reason from all authority but its own, was not destined to be a stationary phase in the supposed zenith of its unhallowed power. The sun and moon were not to stand still for it at any Ajalon. The meridian splendour of the self-satisfied intellect marked but the transit of the line which separated by a filmy thread its slow ascent from its rapid

decline. But the suddenness of the supervenient change is indeed surprising. We are relapsing by no measured regress, but by immense bounds, into all the alleged follies of the infant ages of history,—into all the dreamy mysteries of mediæval delusion. We are hastening to repeat with equally blind confidence, but with less excuse, the derided miracles of former necromancy and of antique magic. The Black Arts, which have been so long ridiculed by every flippant ignoramus, who measured truth by the scant capacity of popular belief, are once more coming into general favour, though christened with new names to tickle the itching ears of the times. Omens have never been wholly out of vogue, nor have dreams ever been entirely extirpated from the acceptance of the vulgar. Astrology has not yet returned with its ancient pretensions, but we may anticipate their daily resuscitation, for the auguries and oracles of the elder world have been recalled by the inauguration of the various forms of recent divination. Astrology has never been extinct: its public glories waned from the times of Henry Cornelius Agrippa and Giovanni Pico de Mirandola; but it has been cultivated with greater or less assiduity, in secret societies and obscure cells, throughout the late centuries.* Occasional indications of its spasmodic vitality were afforded to the unbelieving world by the writings of Dr. Dee, the prophecies of Mademoiselle Le Normand, and the Almanac of Zadkiel. It is not forty years since a complete Dictionary of Astrology was published in London.† Now, however, a brighter day having dawned upon all delusion, astrology will profit by the genial sunshine, and resume its preëminence among its kindred superstitions. It awaits only the fulness of time, which is diligently expedited by the renovated faith in nearly all that amused or deluded the elder world. The caverns and dells of Greece may be no more vocal with the mystical whispers of ancient inspiration, but the prophetic woods of Dodona, and the snow-clad peaks of Delphi are repeated, under less poetical auspices, at Mountain Cove, in Fayette County, Virginia; while the Cumæan Sibyl and her wandering sisters find strange representatives in the Rochester girls and their numerous imitators. The statues of the divinities may never more leap down from their pedestals in the

* Ego vel in hunc diem latitare per orbem variis in locis talia occulta collegia crediderim, ut olim singulares ordines in arcanorum naturæ memoriam sunt instituti, quorum omne studium in abditis naturæ causis indagandis versatur. Morhofii Polyhistor, ps. i, lib. i, c. xiii, § 51. Late evidence to the same effect is furnished in Leigh Hunt's modernized version of Chaucer, in one of his notes.

† Wilson's Complete Dictionary of Astrology; 1819; 8vo. It has long been very scarce.

sacred temples, because such temples with such habitants no longer exist in the civilized regions of this globe; but the more modern shrine, the dining-room table, with all its household gods, the plates and dishes, will jump up from the floor, cut fantastic capers, and whirl round in a frenzied dance, after a fashion that would have amazed the more sober juggleries of ancient hierophants. If we still abstain from less chimerical imaginations, and seek no longer the philosopher's stone, or the elixir of life, it is simply because the virgin veins of California and Australia have rendered the former unnecessary and inconvenient for the multiplication of gold; and there are easier and more compendious processes imagined to realize the anticipated effects of the latter; which are already partially attained by the wondrous agency of chloroform, and are always constantly promised by every nostrum advertised in the daily papers.

This shifting of the currents of human speculation—this wild transition from one extremity of thought to the appetency for its opposite—this spontaneous return from the most rigid scepticism to the most facile credulity—is not the least curious or significant phenomenon of an age which teems with anomalies and is prolific of monsters. Surely no human device—no project conceived by human forethought and achieved by human agencies—could so transpose the weights in the balance of intellect as to produce this instantaneous alternation in the movement of the scales. It is by no intentional or conscious effort of man that we can satisfactorily explain this sudden eclipse of that coolly-calculating rationalism, which had been so tediously acquired, and so fondly regarded as constituting the noontide glory of the nineteenth century. Nor, if we look to the immediate instruments which have been the ostensible agencies in bringing on this miraculous change, can we readily discover anything in their intellectual power, their attainments, or their prominence, to render it more explicable. They are, for the most part, the feeble revivers of exploded and nearly-forgotten dreams. Mesmer, and Hill, and Cagliostro passed away, leaving behind them no odours of sanctity, but only the reputation of consummate charlatans and knaves; yet the weakest witlings of the age have won acceptability for the endless chicaneries of Animal Magnetism. Gall and Spurzheim laboured with but slight apparent result; yet peregrinating babblers, peddling professors of phrenology, without a smattering of science, and often with transparent imposture, have succeeded in introducing phrenology into the motley inventory of the popular creed. Clairvoyance and craniology proved insufficient to satisfy the growing appetite for the marvellous; the new missionaries of fancy had awakened the faith which could remove mountains; and electro-biology, and all

the varieties of chiromancy followed in their wake. The Rev. Alfred Brunson's communication from Prairie-du-Chien, on the subject of well-digging and divining-rods, introduces rhabdomancy into the Patent-Office Reports,* and embalms this antiquated fancy in the State Papers of the country. We have not within reach our copy of that great magician and repentant theurgist, Henry Cornelius Agrippa, and cannot enumerate the various modes of magic, or the several species of cabalistic spells, nor show how closely recent credulity has approached, nor how far it has outstripped, in some particulars, the much-reviled ages of darkness. But out of a list of a hundred forms of mediæval divination we detect forty which are now practised more or less earnestly; and we have abundant assurance, in the incidents daily transpiring around us, that the Black Arts of the modern world promise to have as many and as sincere acolytes as honoured those of an earlier time.

The grossest and most proselyting of these delusions is the last. The latest state of the man possessed with devils was the worst; for the earlier imps had called in new spirits to themselves, and established a petty caucus of demons within the microcosm. Thus, too, the most prominent, as the most pernicious, of recent superstitions, is the folly or imposture of the so-styled "Spiritualists." The spirit of the ancient Canidias was transmigrated into the Rochester girls, and all the sorcery of the Golden Ass of Apuleius is rendered familiar by the practices of their school. Incantations are once more heard, mediums are again required, and necromancy appears in the full blaze of day, with more than its pristine vigour, and with endless theories to demonstrate its truth. Linking itself on one side with the hallucinations of Swedenborgianism, and on the other with the tricks of jugglers and mountebanks; associating itself with all current delusions, and harmonizing with all forms of superstition, this renovated phantom of the past emerges from its humble cradle as the conquering frenzy of the day. There is nothing new in the Rochester chimera: in its first inception it was only the rattling of the dry bones in the valley of a former Jehoshaphat; in its present amplified proportions it is only the resurrection and agglutination of the long-bleaching fragments of mutilated skeletons. It is such a reproduction of the past as is given in Retzch's outline of the field of Pharsalia. In the simpler as in the more expanded forms of the Rochester mysticism, it approximates closely to many distinct types of former superstition. The Greeks would have attributed much to the intervention of Pan, and the unearthly sounds which were heard in the woods of Arcadia; much would have been referred by the

*Patent-Office Report, 1851. Agricultural, pp. 14–19.

Romans to the Tuscan disciples of Tages; and our own untutored ancestors would have attributed the strange noises to the mischief or malevolence of the denizens of Faërie Land. In the "Salem manifestations," of which Cotton Mather was such an enlightened witness, there was a less pleasing exhibition of like phenomena; and, about a quarter of a century ago, before the New-York witches commenced the practice of their craft, before the land of Mormon (Wayne County) was favoured with the second revelation of deceit, some obscure women, of doubtful fame, in Russell County, Va., are said to have professed the same identical gifts, which have been lately resuscitated with such astounding *éclat*, and have led to such strange and alarming results. The Rochester girls, in succeeding to the unrecognised powers of these Russell performers, have extended their trivial artifices, and expanded at the same time the range of their professions and deceptions. Others have followed with livelier fancies and more ardent aspirations, and have spread abroad the seeds of the fanaticism, clothing it with new colours, and directing it to larger aims, until, by a singular conjunction between the deluders and the deluded, between the dreamers and the believers in dreams, the Rochester pythonesses have blossomed out into the prophetesses of a sect, the inspired missionaries of a proselyting creed, and the living Didos of a strange colony.

Are we bounding, by a violent and involuntary resilience, from everything that has been achieved by the vaunted intelligence, the arrogant pretensions, the self-idolizing civilization of the nineteenth century? Are we floating unconsciously back on some irresistible and refluent wave into the dreamy mists which shrouded the cradle of human speculation? The cock has scarcely crowed the third time since our science denied the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the rationality of Christianity, and pinned its whole faith to the mere processes of observation and induction, and the phenomena of the narrowest materialism. Yet already we have a new revelation dug out of the earth, like the Etruscan Tages, and interpreted by men incognizant of grammar, and confessedly unable to read the unintelligible scratches inscribed on the golden plates of the new dispensation. Mormonism, however, springing albeit from such an original, numbers its thousands and its tens of thousands; it has its political organization and its hierarchy; it is consolidated into a fanatical theocracy; it veils the essence of an hierocratic despotism under the forms of republicanism; exists as a permanent discord to all the institutions around it; and nurses in the desert the fervour and the energies which may result in a second march of rejuvenated Islamism. Even at this time myriads own

allegiance to its standard, accredit the revelation, and revere Joe Smith as a saint and a martyred prophet. The world was disposed to repudiate the revelation of heaven: it rushes to embrace the revelation of earth. Already, while the total negation of the spiritual world is echoed all around us, hosts of ministering spirits from the realms of the disembodied dead are alleged to be in intimate communion with this unbelieving generation, and to hover around us, ready at a word to do our bidding through the intervention of a suitable medium. We may be favoured at any moment with revelations from the world of ghosts, which are made expressly at our request; and, on the payment of *a quarter*, the dead are evoked for our satisfaction from all parts of the dim universe of shadows. Cerberus has again gorged himself with an extraordinary sop, and sleeps equally heedless of the passing spirits, and unheeded by them. The portals of Tartarus are once more thrown wide open; and, in accordance with the wants of travellers and the advancement of the age, old Charon and his leaky ferry-boat are apparently superseded by a suspension bridge over the *irremeable waves* of Styx and Cocytus. Sin and Death are no longer able to guard the entrances of hell, and to deny return to their captives. Hades gives up his invisible hosts without a murmur: the ominous wall of iron, so fearfully described by Virgil, seems to have fallen, and has perhaps been turned into pot-metal in consequence of the late rise in the price of iron. We need no Orpheus now with seraphic lyre to charm back the long-lost, long-lamented Eurydice. The *Limbus Patrum*, and all the other dark resorts of the unsubstantial spectres, hitherto known only to the learned topographers of the nether regions, are now laid open to our invocations. With the establishment of free trade, our communications with the other world have been indefinitely multiplied and facilitated. We need attempt no arduous path, we require no Virgil as our guide, we are compelled to take no perilous journey, in order to receive intelligence from our deceased friends, or other shades; but the secrets beyond the grave are brought home to us with accuracy and expedition, as fully as the knowledge of the Mississippi is conveyed to the inhabitants of Europe by Banvard's panorama. With the coöperation of Mrs. Whitman, whose "social and intellectual eminence" is duly avouched by Putnam's "interpreter of dreams," and with the magic virtues of a bit of silver, we are now enabled to call up and question, at our behest, any named spirit we may desire to spell for us, from the three kingdoms of Dante's Vision. It is a pity these interesting phantoms advance so slowly in their education that they cannot get out of the horn-book into the primer. Even the miraculous branch of gold, which was the con-

juring wand of Æneas and his Sibyl, has been judiciously altered "to suit the times." So far as the outside barbarians are concerned, the glittering twig has been supplanted by the more accessible substitute of a small piece of current silver coin.

A change has indeed come over the spirit of the world's dream! From denying all that is invisible, intangible, indemonstrable, we are passing, almost in the twinkling of an eye, into a rapidly-spreading appetency for the unquestioning acceptance of every dogma which can allege these singular attestations of its truth. From the sturdy negation of God, because we are denied such palpable proof as conquered the scepticism of the doubting apostle, we are gliding, without stop or hesitation, into the confident asseveration of the indisputable validity of our wildest and most feverish dreams. The evidences on which the growing popular fantasy is content to erect its most important convictions, will permit us once again to domesticate centaurs and unicorns, hippogriffs and krakens, and the whole menagerie of imaginary beasts. Intensity of conception and the predetermination to believe, impatience of inquiry and incapacity for discrimination, will henceforward constitute the sole requisites for the authentication of truth. The cumbrous processes of deduction and induction, with the whole elaborate logic of Aristotle and Mill, may be rejected as needless, in accordance with the crude fancy of Poe's Eureka; and internal assurance, no matter how attained, may cheerfully dispense with the coarser and more tedious methods of external investigation.

A change so vast and amazing as this, of which we have such numerous and diversified indications, is beyond human achievement, and almost beyond the range of adequate comprehension. But we may recognise, through the mists which surround it, the mysterious hand-writing upon the wall. The kingdom of Belshazzar is doomed: Babylon the Great has fallen in the hour of its noisiest arrogance. MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN. We detect the finger of God—the manifest intervention of Providence in the crisis of humanity—the evident commencement of a new era, and the approaching overthrow of the exclusive claims of science.

We are not of the number of those who refer every phenomenon in nature and every event in history to the direct and immediate interposition of Deity: we are fully cognizant of both the physical and metaphysical incongruities involved in such a compendious theory. We are usually disposed to recognise the uniform action of natural law, and the regular operation of those secondary causes according to which the will of Heaven is accomplished through the instrumentality of created agents. But there are times when all

ordinary laws, which human intelligence has been able to detect, are completely at fault, and when we are compelled to recognise the more imminent and direct action of Providence. And the anomalies around us in the present day are such as to suggest the belief that the advancing revolution of sentiment and intelligence results rather from the divine wisdom, which confounds the purposes of man, than from any deliberate designs of human imagination.

But, startling as are the portents of the times, and undiscoverable as may be the secret springs of change, they are yet in some slight degree explicable. We may appreciate the character of the new procedure, if unable to comprehend its origin and sudden acceptance. The emancipation of the human mind from the thraldom of superstition, and from the tyranny of intellectual oppression, was not arrested when it had triumphed over the real evils against which it had to contend; but it was prosecuted until the civilized world had run into dangers greater even than those from which it had lately extricated itself. After weaning the adolescent intellect of a new cycle from the dreams, the errors, and the delusions of immature civilization, and at the same time tearing it rudely away from many of its redeeming instincts, intellectual progress has pushed forward its columns into the regions of anarchy and license. Because, in the ignorant infancy of modern civilization, the mind of man had been unduly trammelled by theological dogmatism, and had been overburdened by vain imaginations, we have continued the warfare against these grievances after they have ceased to be real; we have pursued the same direction after we have long passed the vanishing point of the picture; we have nearly rejected all religion; and in the numerous dreams which we have discarded, we have too frequently thrown away the slender substance of truth, which lay hidden under the dense mists of former error. We were not content to continue our blows only until the actual foe had been vanquished; but we fought on in the same way, and with increasing energy and redoubled confidence, until we have exhausted ourselves, and are once more driven back to seek repose in the easy credulity which charmed the infancy of intellect. The struggle for freedom of thought has been persisted in until the human mind recognises no authority but the empire of individual reason, and has arrived at the summary device of repudiating as false everything which lies beyond the restricted circle which it has described for itself. Thus has arisen a universal infidelity of thought and feeling, which is only pushed to its logical results by avowed atheists: but for the last century the large majority of thinking men must have been goaded into atheism by embracing the popular habitudes of thought, if they had only been thorough

and consistent in their speculations. Nor was this incredulity confined to religion; had it been, it might have been readily detected, and expeditiously relieved; it extended to all knowledge, and corroded every manifestation of reason and sentiment. At length we begin to feel the toils into which we have been unwarily betrayed; we are embarrassed and fretted by the net-work of sophistry in which we have involved ourselves; but we have not the patience to retrace our footsteps, if indeed the world ever could go back upon its orbit; and we have not the logical dexterity or sobriety to unravel the meshes in which we are ensnared. A violent and blind reaction is the only resistance which the age can offer; and under its impulse the sentiments of mankind have instinctively rebelled against the crushing, blighting, hopeless tyranny of the mere intellect, whose despotism is felt to be more intolerable than all the wild vagaries of early superstition. The sentiments of humanity, shuddering at the yawning abyss on the verge of which our modern civilization trembled, have thrown back the fancies of enthusiasts into that dreamy sentimentalism from which this feverish intellectual progress originally took its departure. The tide of superstition, which threatens to cast up again on the beach all the forbidden and derided arts of former times, is the natural reaction which has ensued on the instinctive discovery of the perils and extravagances into which the unreined intellect had run. We regard this "Modern Spiritualism," and the resuscitated frenzies of geomancy and necromancy, as no local disease, no passing epidemic; but as the raging fever which has naturally succeeded the long chill of man's nobler appetencies. It is a permanent change of the tenor of human thought, which may be guided and modified, but can scarcely be prevented. The shadow has gone back on the dial of Ahaz. Let us hope that the breathing-spell thus graciously and miraculously accorded to humanity may be turned in time to profit, although inaugurated by all the insane extravagances of old Bacchantes; and let us not despise the warning because Balaam's ass has started back from the invisible sword of the angel, before Balaam has discovered the messenger of God.

Martin Luther was accustomed to say, quaintly, but truly, that the human mind was like a drunken man on horseback, who, if propped up on one side, would fall over on the other. We have now a striking exemplification of this maxim in the present manifestations of intellectual development. The repudiation of early superstitions having been carried too far, threw the world into the horrors of almost universal scepticism. The native repugnance of the human heart to the chilling desolation of unalloyed infidelity, has

repelled it into the opposite extreme of unquestioning credulity. Thus the march of intellect, at the close of its long summer-day's journey, exhibits, as the result of modern illuminism, the speculation of the nineteenth century reeling back with tottering steps to the spot which it had abandoned in its morning sunshine. The correction of this pitiable spectacle is to be sought, not in the determinate prescription of one continuous path, nor in any artificial restriction to an assigned course, but in the removal of that mental inebriation from which both errors, the original mistake and the violent reaction, have alike proceeded. If we can hope to escape from the blighting tyranny of renewed superstitions, we must sedulously eschew the excesses and the extravagances of recent unbelief. We must no longer limit our allegiance to science and demonstration, but must do occasional obeisance to those higher powers of our rational nature, instinct and faith. All extremes will at some period run into each other: credulity and scepticism are twin brothers; they are the offspring of the same parents, the common product of the same age, and are as indissolubly united as the Siamese twins.

The process of human development strangely resembles the machinery of a clock. The hands, which tell the passing hours and mark the advance of time, are moved over the face of the dial by the intricate and regular interaction of wheels within wheels, which are themselves governed by the unceasing vibrations of the pendulum. In like manner the changes of thought and civilization are effectuated by the equally regular but more complicated wheels of the common passions of humanity, and these are regulated by the slower, but not less methodical alternations of human sentiment. The general intellect of humanity, as well as the individual mind of man, is limited on either hand by barriers which it cannot transcend; and as soon as it touches its prison-bars on one side of its cage, its course in that direction is arrested, and it flies back in the hope of a more successful issue to the prison-bars which confine its motions on the other. Thus the world wags on, by an unending series of oscillations, from one extremity of speculation to the opposite extreme of fancy; and by this libration the index of human civilization is moved onward over the dial-plate of time. It may appear singular that this untiring vacillation of the human mind should result in the progress of humanity; but the enigma is solved by the striking expression of Leibnitz, that the beauteous order of the universe springs from the fact that all nature is but the horologe of God.

We do not present these views as any complete explanation of the spiritualistic tendencies of popular sentiment, nor can any theory of

modern spiritualism be extracted from them: we offer them simply as a partial explanation of the sudden revulsion of sentiment which is disorganizing modern thought. So far as this interpretation of the signs around us is applicable, or designed to be applicable, to the specific case of the Rapper sectaries, we are convinced that it is accurate; and we know that it accords with the feelings, expressed or intuitive, of the leading spiritualists. Beneath all the rant and raving of current supernaturalism, in the mysterious vaticinations of its poesy, and in the still wilder flights of its prose, it is easy to detect the latent inspiration which has dictated the frenzy. In the number of the "Spiritual Harbinger" now lying before us, we find the secret spring of the recent movement recognised with a precision and even sobriety which we were very far from anticipating. In a poem, entitled "The Heart of Unbelief," which is transcribed in the same paper, and which curiously blends something of the manner of Tennyson with the fantastic hallucinations of George Lippard, we discover a distinct reference of the reaction to the previous intensity of the prevalent atheism.

Strauss, in his notorious Life of Jesus, considers the mention of spirits and demons as *ipso facto* conclusive evidence of the legendary and incredible character of the gospel narratives in which it occurs. Such an inference is of course an unwarrantable assumption; but it is an assumption which may be addressed with irresistible force to the rigid votaries of modern science and rationalistic philosophy. The position was, indeed, strictly accordant with the whole tenor of accredited speculation; and it could neither be denied, nor its invalidity exhibited, without an entire abnegation of the most deeply-rooted convictions of the unfettered intellect of modern times. The necessary result has been that the pernicious mythicism of Strauss remains to this day unanswered, notwithstanding the numerous illogical attempts of theologians, who have felt that the whole fabric of religion, natural and revealed, is undermined by his exceedingly dexterous attack. The secret of their failure is, that it is not simply a *book* which is to be refuted, but a complicated and ingenious scheme of philosophy. Nor is this all: the habits of mind to which the philosophy addresses itself, with which it is congenial, and by which it is received with the irresistible aptitude of natural affinities, must be completely eradicated before any criterion can be recognised by which the general fallacy can be determined. The sophistry is not confined to the doctrine, but exists still more fatally in the minds to which the doctrine is preached. But, unconscious of the snare, the apologists of Christianity, instead of changing their position, reëstablishing their lines, renouncing

their errors, and reforming their logic, fought on desperately and hopelessly, though the ground on which they stood was giving way under their feet. They thus fell into fatal inconsistencies, of which all soon became vaguely conscious except themselves. It is no wonder that, in such a crisis, multitudes fled from the fortress so vainly defended, like sagacious rats running from a falling house, or a ship about to sink; no wonder that the knot, which the prevalent logic was unable to loose, should be clumsily cut by those who sought some refuge and tranquillity for the mind and heart, even at the expense of logic and sense; no wonder that, in the paralysis of reason, in the ostentatious impotence of the arrogant intellect, those who were disgusted by hollow paralogisms which they were unable to evade, or yearned for the repose of settled and assured convictions, no matter how won, nor whether well-founded or unfounded,—it is not surprising, we say, that, under such circumstances, those who were harassed by the torturing uncertainties of prevailing doubt should have recurred to all the dreams which satisfied or beguiled the earlier generations of humanity. That which is startling, and cannot be explained by any cognizable laws, is the suddenness, the rashness, and the extent of the change which has occurred.

The facts, phenomena, or hypotheses, connected with spiritual intervention and demoniac possession, which were construed by Strauss as patent evidence of artifice or delusion, are strangely enough resuscitated, after the lapse of very few years, as the very corner stones of the new temple of superstition. All the world is again invited to believe, in direct opposition to their late convictions, exactly what the settled convictions of all the world were so recently declared to have irrevocably repudiated. The allegations which were despitefully entreated by science and philosophy as puerile and ridiculous, reappear as the very elements of the renovated faith. The last pretence of science is contradicted and overthrown by the first pretension of revived credulity. The venom of mere demonstration from implicitly accepted premises is sought to be neutralized by the counter-irritant poison of a believing fantasy which proceeds from no premises at all.

In the midst of the confusion, with the jargon of Babel reëchoed on all sides; with the formal proclamation by Sir Archibald Alison of a new dispersion of the human family; with the prospect of a return of the dark ages, presented in the letters of Niebuhr; and with endless varieties of brilliant, seductive, or quaint theories, tempting our adherence on either hand, it is an arduous endeavour to preserve entire sobriety of thought, and to pursue the even tenor of our way, without yielding to despair, or attaching ourselves to

any popular delusion. It was our good fortune to detect the fallacies of the reign of intellect long before they resulted in their present dismal spawn of multitudinous hallucinations; and, as we refused to bend the knee to Baal when the whole civilized world was filled with his temples, and swarmed with his idolaters, we will not now pour forth our adorations and hosannas to the Molochs and Ashtaroths, and the rest of the Syrian hive, which seek to usurp his unhallowed dominion. Hoping to preserve ourselves untainted by either the scepticism of science or the credulity of superstition, we will seek to discover the significance of the recent "spiritual manifestations" with dispassionate sobriety. The lip may curl at the follies and antics which we are compelled to witness; but our judgment will be cool, and our heart sad enough as we prosecute the inquiry. We have no disposition to indulge in the unmitigated and intemperate abuse of the new lights of delusion, which is familiar to their unreflecting and unappreciating antagonists, because we conceive the novel errors to be not more senseless or pernicious than the old ones; and we agree with Lord Bacon in thinking that it is better to believe all the fables of the Koran, and all the legends of the Talmud, than to harden ourselves with M. Comte and the rigid votaries of science in the imagination that the universe exists without a God. We know that in the ordinary procedure of Heaven, one general error is corrected only by the temporary predominance of another, and that one distemper of human fancy or feeling can be ejected only by the access of a new disorder; and, though the Spiritualists are, in our opinion, endeavouring to cast out devils in the name of Beelzebub, the prince of the devils, yet we are glad to witness, anywhere, and under any form, a sincere effort to exorcise the unclean spirits which have lately held uncontested dominion over all the conquests of modern intellect.

The remote aim of the recent reaction, however latent, or however grossly disguised, is itself a healthy one. The scope, which ought to have been clearly contemplated, is far overshot by the mad impetuosity of unreasoning sentiment; but, at any rate, the gaze of humanity is once more withdrawn from the stupid and debasing worship of material idols, to the supposition or recognition of immaterial and invisible powers. If "modern Spiritualism" meet with any genuine acceptance, it will at least render the good service of restoring to the popular creed the wholesome conviction of the existence of the devil, a belief which had been almost wholly destroyed by the supposed results of imaginary science. If the devil were killed,—if he were dead anyhow; if he were even thrown into the pit and bound for a thousand years, a tender-hearted philanthropist, to whom the secret

might be confided, might well rejoice over his fate, provided that nobody else knew it. But in the present constitution of mankind, the death of the old serpent, or the general supposition of his death, could be regarded only as an unmitigated calamity; yet into this pleasant assurance the world was rapidly lapsing, when the Spiritualists reawakened sentiments which are utterly inconsistent with any such consolatory conviction. Every argument, as every credence, which can be alleged in proof of their tenets by the Swedenborgians, the Spiritualists, the Mesmerizers, or the Clairvoyants, strengthens the evidence by which the personality and the vitality of the devil are corroborated. This rehabilitation of "Ancient Nicholas," as the prince of the powers of darkness is euphemistically or euphuistically designated by a recent writer on "Modern Spiritualism," is, as we have said, no trivial boon to society, and we are duly thankful for it. But, in fact, all the vagaries and follies of the new creeds of superstition minister, in some measure, to one useful end: they break the despotic and blighting sceptre of the callous, sceptical, scientific intellect, and lure us back to that innocent faith of childhood when belief was more blessed than doubt, and when the vast universe of the unknown was not ignored because temporarily eclipsed by the petty orb of human knowledge.

What then? Do we recognise the validity of these disinterred superstitions? Do we detect any grains of truth in the mountains of chaff which rise before us? By no means. We abhor the pretensions of the soulless and licentious science of the day; but we repudiate with contemptuous pity the endless delusions which have resulted, and must result, from the spontaneous but unreflecting rebellion against its degrading rule. Through all the mists of renovated error we can see by faith the orb of light, and heat, and life, by which those mists have been raised from the bosom of the earth. We will not venerate the clouds; we reserve our homage for the Cause which has produced them. The truth which the former indicate is not contained in themselves, but is implied by the simple fact of their appearance. That truth is, that human life, social or individual, cannot be satisfactorily guided by mere knowledge, nor governed by the exclusive authority of the hard scientific intellect. "Man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word which cometh out of the mouth of God." Because a great truth may be inscribed on the veil of Isis, and we are refused the privilege of raising the veil, and exploring the more recondite mysteries of nature, we are not disposed to deny the existence of any divinity behind it; and the world will be soon compelled, by the very fervour of insane Spiritualism, to renounce its novel fallacy that the veil conceals

nothing but a void. This is the beneficial result which we anticipate from the very extravagances of modern Spiritualism.

We may advance one step further. For nearly two centuries all the magic arts, the conjurations, the necromancy, the divinations, the prophecies, the oracles, the evocations of ancient and mediæval times, have been scoffed at and scorned as the emptiest humbugs and the most unblushing impostures. It is now one hundred and fourteen years since the amiable but weak Rollin furnished nearly the latest instance of a distinguished man who believed, with even dubious faith, in the demoniac inspiration of Delphi and its contemporaneous shrines. But, have we not now, in the midst of the latest civilization, in our largest cities, and in the most enlightened states, representatives and equivalents of every former aberration which has so long offered a target for ridicule? We may expect even the pilgrimage of Panurge to the Pontiff Bacbuc, and the temple of the divine Bottle, to be repeated at some early day. The former superstitions could not then have been simply the fruits of ignorance and jugglery; they were not the consequences of the rude fancies and undeveloped intelligence of mankind; but, somehow or other, they must assuredly have been the natural and spontaneous products of the intellectual constitution of man.

Whatever truth, then, or semblance of truth, attaches to the new-fledged imaginations, must appertain in like manner, and in at least an equal degree, to the earlier legends. The oracles of Apollo and the prophetic cave of Trophonius can no longer be unceremoniously treated with opprobrious neglect; and our ancient friend, the Cumæan Sibyl, will again be entitled to a reasonable share of popular regard. Faint indications of returning deference for these antique types of spiritual illumination are indeed already apparent. The ordeals of fire and water will cease to be treated as priestly charlatanism, and the legislation against witchcraft may be reënacted, to the delight of the shades of Salem bigots, with a lively conviction that there are actual subjects to whom it may be rationally applied. We have no hesitation in according a deeper truth to astrology than can be presumed for any form of modern divination. May not the odic force of Baron Reichenbach be as legitimately employed for the confirmation of astrology as for the theories of modern Spiritualism? We can discover no unreasonableness in the vaguely-comprehended aims of alchemy, except the folly of its direction and modes, and the insanity interwoven with the intensity of its pursuit. What argument can be brought against astrology which does not oppose clairvoyance with ten-fold strength? What objection can be alleged to alchemy which does not lie in a great measure against chemistry?

But, let us observe, although it does apparently add weighty confirmation to the cause of the revivers of the Black Arts, and has already clouded the judgment of the Rev. Charles Beecher, that all the beliefs, which, in late ages, have been so summarily rejected as empty superstitions, and which are now thrust back upon our acceptance, are abundantly recognised by the common law of every land, and are accordingly asseverated at this day by the jurisprudence of nearly every state in the Union. The provisions on this subject have long fallen into complete desuetude, but, so far as we are aware, they have never been formally repealed. In the ordinary text-book of law, it is said by Blackstone that "to deny the possibility, nay, actual existence of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once flatly to contradict the revealed will of God, in various passages both of the Old and New Testament; and the thing itself is a truth to which every nation in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly well attested, or by prohibitory laws, which at least suppose the possibility of commerce with evil spirits."* The repudiation of the Bible is a necessary consequence of the customary negation of those practices and convictions which have been so complacently branded as mere superstitions. Nearly every form of ancient or "modern Spiritualism," necromancy, and magic, is distinctly accredited in the Bible, as was fully perceived both by Mr. Beecher and the sober-minded and sensible pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Rochester. If, then, we deny them as mere follies, we are inevitably and logically compelled to renounce both the Old and the New Testaments. The thaumaturgy of Moses and the wise men of Egypt, the Witch of Endor, the arts of Simon Magus, the ministering angels who appeared to Abraham on the plain of Mamre, to Balaam and his ass, who instructed Peter and Philip, and opened the prison of St. Paul; and the numerous instances of demoniacal possession—all are cashiered as hallucinations, by the same reasoning or scepticism which habitually assails the credibility of the Black Arts. This is a difficulty which is not solved by the scientific prize-essays on natural theology, and it is fully perceived, and turned to the utmost account by Strauss.

The human mind, in the full blaze of triumphant civilization, has entangled itself in a most hazardous dilemma, from which we do not propose to make any attempt to extricate it, until it has acquired a full sense of the hopeless difficulties, perils, and inconsistencies of its present position. If it absolutely refuses to concede the possession of any truth to the pretensions of Spiritualists, mesmerizers, oneirophants, clairvoyants, odylists, &c., it is logically

* Commentaries, iv, 60.

compelled to renounce Christianity and all religion, and to experience unsuspected difficulties in the mere domain of infidel science. If it resolves to retain or renew its faith in Christianity, or in any substantial religion, it is invited to return to the recognition of all the superstitions which it was so recently its pride to scorn as insane reveries. If it adopts the latter course without restriction, it is obliged to recur either to demon worship or to a purely idealistic Christianity, vamped up and modified by its own unregulated imaginations. To assist in the choice of this alternative of evils, or to provide an escape from the intricacies of this logical labyrinth, we would commend to our readers the sensible Discourse of the pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Rochester, delivered in that city on March 20, 1853, and published in the Rochester Weekly American of April 14. He grapples with no logical difficulties—he seems hardly to suspect their existence—but confining the range of his sermon to his immediate flock, and justly regarding an ounce of prevention as worth a pound of cure, he diligently collects the prohibitions contained in the Bible against the unhallowed rites of supernatural arts, whose existence and reality are thereby admitted. He says that just before Moses, "the great lawgiver, ascended Mount Nebo to die * * * he gives a comprehensive catalogue of almost all the arts and practices of divination that have ever been known in the world, and solemnly prohibits them as heathen abominations, which are sure to bring the curse of God upon their victims." The testimony of the Rev. Mr. Beecher is so far to the like effect.

"Let the dead bury their dead!" We think that those who have brought the world to this dilemma, who have perverted the evidences of Christianity to the level of the incredulous and defective reasonings of science, and have thus given occasion to this arduous problem, should be the first to offer the solution of the riddle. We have only proposed to put into a precise and definite form the enigma of the Sphinx, which demands a lucid answer from the current age. The practical rule on this, as on all subjects connected with religion, is easily given: "Be ye as little children;" without anxiety to compass supernatural knowledge. More than this we do not say, however grieved we may be at the blighting effects of renovated Spiritualism, because we are solicitous that the real overwhelming nature of the difficulty in our path should be appreciated by frequent meditation and sedulous examination, before we present the explanation which would be lightly thrown aside if prematurely offered, and could not be complete until a larger experience and a more serious scrutiny of facts have been secured.

But, for the purpose of more signally exhibiting the true significance of the recent movements of superstitious theories and practices, we remark that in almost every instance they necessitate or suggest the correction of a prevalent and corroding error. The latest declaration of the most advanced science is, that the authority of science is the sole and exclusive rule which the reason should obey; and that all truth falls within the domain of rigid scientific speculation. Every one of the resuscitated superstitions lies beyond that narrow circle, and is a protest against the pretension to any such universal empire. Science had proclaimed the impossibility of contemplating anything beyond phenomena and the laws of phenomena; all of these revived arts necessitate the recognition of real causes operating behind the phenomena. Physics and metaphysics had combined to disprove the credibility of miracles; we have now pretensions advanced which would render the absence of miracles from the delivery of a revealed religion more miraculous than their occurrence. The existence of God had been denied as inconsistent with the uniformity of natural phenomena, and as unnecessary for their explication; we have now clouds of witnesses from the dead—Moses and the prophets, and more confessors than were requested by Dives as missionaries from the grave—all ready to attest the Divine Being, or at least spiritual essences. The immortality of the soul had been frequently discarded as an unscientific dream; the legions of the angel world hover round us to restore our faith. Spirits, ghosts, and all supernatural influences had been forsworn by nearly everybody but Isaac Taylor of Ongar; thousands now declare their constant communion with the shades of the departed. All revelations from heaven had been denounced as fallacious impostures by enlightened science; and in the same age the Book of Mormon, notwithstanding its estrangement from grammar, was received by numbers from the hands of the illiterate Joe Smith as a credible revelation, entitled to the most enthusiastic welcome. While these fancies charm the ignorant vulgar, and meet with rare adhesions in a better class, the educated and intelligent are attracted in a similar direction by the revival of Swedenborgianism; and Mesmerism, clairvoyance, electro-biology, &c., impose on the credulity of men of all degrees and all grades of intellect. Were we not right in saying that the ebbtide of modern thought had arrived? And let us note again that this shifting of the currents of speculation is a sudden, spontaneous, and unconscious reaction against the fatal results of modern science, which modern logic was unable to anticipate, prevent, or cure. For the same reasons that we acknowledge the germs of good to exist in socialism, communism, and the other chimerical

projects of modern social reform, which we reject altogether as systems, we do not shrink from declaring that the rapid resurrection of all forms of superstition marks the revivification of human faith, and announces the possibility, if it does not promise the reality, of a healthier condition of future speculation. The veil of the temple of science has been rent in twain; its walls have been shivered by no conscious exercise of human power from the coping-stones to the foundation; its shrine has been disenchanted, and the altar raised to the sceptical reason may be hereafter dedicated to believing faith. The end has been consummated; the reign of the self-sufficient intellect is over; we may hear again the murmurs of the human mind, whispering with befitting humility,—

> "Make me a cottage in the vale, * *
> Where I may mourn and pray.
>
> "Yet pull not down my palace-towers, that are
> So lightly, beautifully built;
> Perchance I may return with others there
> When I have purged my guilt."

We may suppose that every one has perused, with a sensation of unsatisfied wonder, Tennyson's magnificent Palace of Art; we may also venture to suppose that some have failed to detect the currents of significant allegory by which it is permeated. It is the poetic and prophetic anticipation of the approaching submission of the intellect to religion—that submission which is now inaugurated by the rabid rout of Bacchanals—which is rushing into all the extravagances of frenzied enthusiasm. The Palace of Art is the temple of modern science, from which the idea of God has been sedulously excluded: the bewildered, desponding, and despairing sovereign of that palace is the paramount intellect, disclaiming all other authority than its own.

In the speculations which we have hazarded we have pursued our own course, and have scarcely touched upon any of the topics, either for eulogy or blame, which the subject might have been expected to suggest. We are no partisans of either wing. We own allegiance neither to the modern theory of the universe from which the Spiritualists have revolted, nor to the wild imaginations which the rebels have set up as their idols. In accordance with our ordinary procedure, we have looked behind the signs to the thing signified,—beyond the phenomena to the cause of their appearance. In the decay of old convictions and the crash of systems,—in the midst of the conflict and confusion of inconsistent and heterogeneous theories, we

endeavour to preserve our equilibrium, and watch with sobriety the ruin which takes place around us, hoping that from the elements of declining and of rising errors we may yet witness the evocation of a purer spirit of truth. We propose to maintain a position in the centre of the wreck, ready to receive instruction and suggestion from every quarter, and trusting that when chaos is once more reduced to order, we may not have attached ourselves to any of those types of delusion which will be ultimately submerged. We entertain a confident belief that the secure platform will be strengthened and extended by the concurrent efforts of the numbers of right-feeling and right-hoping men who yearn for the same results as ourselves, who already think with us, or will teach us to think more accurately and justly with them.

We have still some further observations to add before we dismiss the subject of "modern Spiritualism." It will be readily noticed that the whole swarm of renovated superstitions hang together like bees. It is natural. Science had crystallized into one symmetrical shape the excesses and the divagations of the incredulous reason; and it might have been expected that, at the opposite pole of human speculation, the errors of the distempered imagination should also cluster together. Each of the new dreams of mystical sentiment is linked by many ties to the others; each runs into the others by many obvious and many unsuspected ways; yet the harmony is more apparent than real in the details. Already there are separate schools, and we detect in the Spiritual Harbinger, the organ of the Virginia colony, the germination of the principles of schism in that wing of the mystics which it represents. We may already look forward to that early day when domestic heresies in the bosom of the new Church, and internecine feuds between the different sections of the new hierocracy of prophets, will destroy the fabric of "Spiritualism" by the internal commotions excited. The house will be divided against itself, and must fall: the smaller devils will make a confederate war on Beelzebub, and all will be overthrown. But the bones of the slain will be like those which sprung from the dragon's teeth of Cadmus: they will furnish the originals of a new progression of human speculation. For that event we wait in confidence.

It may be objected to us that we have presented no definite criticism, no tangible theory, to be employed by those who incline to Spiritualism, or by those who are anxious to make war against it. But it has not been our intention to furnish weapons for either party. We stand by as spectators of the struggle, and watch with interest the fortunes of the fight, conscious that it is a battle of

Kilkenny cats, in which both antagonists must perish, but assured that the good sense and sober reason of humanity will rise triumphant from their common grave, and will once more resume the onward path of civilization under better auspices. The only competent rival for scepticism is credulity; it is scarcely possible to discover any intermediate ground of argumentation from which to address either extravagance, with the hope that the voice of dispassionate judgment will be heard or heeded. Let them fight on, then; we can look forward with confidence to a beneficial result. We may mourn over those whose minds are shattered by the conflict or by the access of the frenzy; we may lament over the poor victims who are driven to a lunatic asylum by the fever of the fantasy; we may desire some adequate medicine for the alleviation of such sufferings; but we must look beyond the present sacrifices to the anticipated blessings. Let the two extremities of speculation fight on, then. We wish to see the reasonings of science, which have been so long consecrated mainly to infidelity, once more sanctified to God; we are anxious to see at length the noble aspiration of Bacon realized, and knowledge pursued not only for the further advantage of man, but principally for the greater glory of God. We cannot hope to disenchant the vulgar mind of the irreligious delusions of science, without the aid of a partial revolt of the popular favour to the vagaries of superstition. Let the battle rage, then; and when the double slaughter is ended, the world may be content to acknowledge with humility, and without too curious prying into the unknown, that there are still, and must ever be, more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy, or than can be embraced within the contracted boundaries of rational speculation.

To descend from this loftier view, and return from this inquisition of the probabilities of the future, we cannot say that we are sorry to have the belief, or the semblance of belief, in those dark problems which distracted the earlier ages of the world once more partially restored to us. We have never regarded astrology, alchemy, necromancy, magic, &c., with that unmitigated and supercilious contempt which has so strongly coloured the opinions and theories of recent generations. In all these follies or iniquities we have discovered the earnest struggle of the human mind in the pursuit of unknown and often forbidden truth. It is well that man should contemplate the possibility of knowledge and realities transcending the limits of acquired science, and lying beyond the sphere of his ordinary capacities of attainment. It is well that the range of his intellectual conceptions should not be rigidly limited to the mere spheres of knowledge which are generated by the methodical revolution of his own

scientific systems of thought. It is desirable that the vague terrors or the wild hopes of conceivable but uncomprehended realities should attract his thoughts sometimes from the actual conquests of scientific speculation, and from the narrow circles of intellectual dominion, and direct them toward the illimitable regions of creation which are filled with the unknown, or the imperfectly known. We could never have assented to the eulogies bestowed by Lucretius on Epicurus, even if Epicurus had achieved the result for which he was commended. Man cannot live by the fruits of the intellect alone: an unsatisfied want, an aching void, is left after the mind has appropriated all its possible triumphs to itself. The sentiments, the heart of man, yearn for more ambrosial food; the imagination springs away from the hard and insufficient fact to the sublime significances which cluster round it, but are not contained in it. The instincts of humanity raise their view from all that science can teach to all that science cannot attain, but can only deny or ignore. Thus we are led, by the very constitution of our nature, toward the indulgence of spiritualistic fancies, and are drawn onward through the labyrinths of mystical lore toward those types of belief which can receive a definite form only through revelation, and practical truth only through Christianity. In this way,

"Through the shadow of the world we sweep into the brighter day."

If all knowledge can be compassed by the orbit of science, religion becomes an impossibility or an absurdity. To this conclusion the van of modern intellect had apparently arrived; to this goal all modern speculation was obviously tending. The human heart asked for the bread of life; the human intelligence offered it a dull, inanimate stone. From this deception the sentiments of humanity are turning away in disgust, and are conjuring up for themselves a paradise of hallucinations, in which their parched and famished spirits may revel with uncontrolled license. The blinded eye cannot be opened to the perception of truth; the palsied imagination cannot be quickened to the recognition of realities in the spiritual world which are logically and absolutely denied by the whole tenor of modern systems; but the merely distempered vision may be cured, and the over-excited fancy and the heated sentiment may be reclaimed to the sobriety of divine revelation. Such is the change which is, in our opinion, now lifting the veil of darkness from the science of the world; and the prevalent follies and excesses are a fit retribution for past incredulity.

"New times come on. A race is springing up,
That think not as their fathers thought before!"

These, and innumerable other transitions of like kind, are at times effectuated by the Nemesis of humanity,—the divine avenger of past impieties, the heavenly remunerator of virtuous actions. She, as the sovereign of causal change, the judge and arbitress of sublunary events, guides the urn of chance, alternating the vicissitudes of accident. She, when she resumes her sceptre, confounds the multifarious devices of human will, leading the actions of men to very different issues from those which they had contemplated. She, too, fettering the empty pride and vain-glory of mortals, in the inextricable meshes of necessity, and changing the inclinations of increase and decay, as she alone knows how, at one time crushes and breaks the stubborn neck of intellect; at another, raising the virtuous from the depths of contumely, elevates them to the blessings of a holy life.

There are not many who would suspect that we were indebted for this last paragraph to a heathen historian of the age of the apostate Julian; yet such is the fact.*

Art. III.—SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

There remains yet a great deal to be done to remove the discrepancies between the popular religious faith and the teachings of true science. Many good but ill-informed men seem alarmed at what appears to them the hostile attitude of several facts and established positions of science against divine revelation, and too easily persuade themselves that the study of nature, to the extent now carried, is not conducive to religion, but that a sly scepticism is gaining continual vantage-ground from the daily-added new acquisitions of scientific truth. It does not seem to occur to this class of persons that their course is a reckless surrender of the stronghold of truth which science furnishes, and is really doing bad work for religion; that

* Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xiv, c. xi, §§ 25, 26. "Hæc et hujusmodi quædam innumerabila ultrix facinorum impiorum, bonorumque præmiatrix, aliquoties operatur Adrastia. Hæc, ut regina causarum, et arbiter rerum ac disceptatrix, urnam sortium temperat, accidentium vices alternans: voluntatumque nostrarum, exorsa, interdum alio, quam quo contendebant, exitu terminans multiplices actus permutando convolvit. Eademque necessitatis insolubili retinaculo mortalitatis vinciens fastus tumentes incassum, et incrementorum detrimentorumque momenta versans, ut novit, nunc erectas mentium cervices opprimit et enervat: nunc bonos ab imo suscitans, ad bene vivendum extollit."

their feeling on the subject is an extreme and unwarrantable jealousy, not so much in behalf of the Bible itself, as of old and heretofore accredited interpretations of some portions of it. This is an inconsiderate conservatism, founded, it is feared, in many cases, in ignorance and bigotry; and the mischief it commits on some minds is most deplorable. Besides checking the spirit of investigation, through fear of some dreaded innovations, it induces the general habit of dogged tenacity on all subjects.

But while holding this language respecting it, there are some acknowledged palliations. We all feel a powerful friendship for our principles. When long-established they become rooted, so to speak, into every part of our nature; they take no stronger hold upon our reason or our better judgment than upon our sensibilities. Hostility to them is apt to be met by a storm of feeling, especially if the foe is likely to prove invincible. When theory, or opinion, or interpretation dogmatizes; when, disregarding the ordinary amenities of dispute, theory makes arrogant and ruthless invasion upon theory, demanding submission without show of title; then our nature proves to us the justice of deep feeling in the case, by our indignation against the one and our sympathy for the other. But when theory is demolished at one blow by facts, tenacity has no apology; it is then fanatical and absurd. We justify in this way our reprobation of wilfully holding on to popular Biblical interpretations that are shown to be utterly untenable by the undeniable facts of science—facts of astronomy and geology, for instance.

Another palliation is, that though this age is all alive with scientific excitement, it is occupied chiefly with the utilities of science, with its aids to wealth and advancing enterprise, and is engaged too little, if at all, with the sublime religious truths it teaches, and the tallying of those truths with the Bible. The ideal tendency of the times—that which would, if permitted, seek to associate high moral and intellectual uses with material acquisitions—is overmastered by the prevailing rage to transmute all knowledge into profit. This gross materialistic element is the atmosphere in which the masses live and breathe. Legislation is a function suited solely to this element. All state encouragement to science, all authorized surveys, all appropriations for institutes, observatories, and exploring expeditions, are made with the sole and professed motive of ministering to wealth. Provisions for the pursuit of knowledge as an end, in and for itself, as indispensable aliment to a hungry mind, are never thought of. To talk of refreshing intellect by the pure enjoyments of liberal, quiet, and enlarged study, is to many a sign of lunacy. He only is the man worthy of your notice who will tell you

of commerce and of stocks in trade. Words of sickly adulation are abundant enough toward philosophy, and she is perseveringly courted, but with the base design of prostituting her to mammon. Nature opens wide provinces of thought to at least three departments of study, —departments that by a just distinction may be denominated the poetry of nature, the philosophy of nature, and the theology of nature. But to the first of these the amount of attention is sparing; to the second, in the sense just explained, nearly exclusive; to the third, scarcely nothing. It is uttering nothing new to say, that mental character is truly balanced when a due proportion of systematized study is given to each of these. If the mental character of our age is distorted, having Cyclopean power at one point and infantile weakness at others, the cause is not far to seek: it lies in the taste, the *mania* of the age. Aims at aggrandizement and power, at whatever will pamper purse-pride, have no appreciation of the true, the beautiful, and the good,—no conception of the splendours of excellence that burst often on the view of the truly cultivated; but they nourish a coarse spirit and taste, and darken the conscience and the sacred relations of man to God.

It is not greatly surprising that men committed to conservatism in sacred interpretation, should be cautious of innovations in such an age. Though strenuous adherence to dogma against fact is in no case justifiable, it is not surprising that a suspicion of the irreligious tendency of science should still be indulged, when, in accordance with the ruling spirit of these times, many an elaborate work of science is so desolate of moral recognitions. The devout philosophic mind surely has occasion to feel pained when it sees in scientific writers no avowal of divinity, of creative and upholding power, no reverent mention of intelligent design and goodness indicated in the works of God, no manifest moral interest in the plan of creation as it lay in the mind of Deity. These writers are engaged generally with subjects in which the thoughts are pressed into the closest neighbourhood of divine indications, to notice which, it would seem, were the easiest work imaginable.

It would be unfair, however, in our partial analysis of the reigning spirit on this subject, not to acknowledge a palliation for these also. When the object of a writer is wholly professional—to promote, for instance, a particular branch of philosophy, for either a speculative or a business purpose—he may not improperly confine all his thoughts within the immediate range of his object. It may not be consistent; it may, indeed, be utterly irrelevant for the writer's abstractions to show the least tincture of his religious temper. Circumstances may likewise justify the same thing in

works of a more general character. Philosophic minds differ by as many shades of mental aspect, nay, by as many varying combinations of the elements of mental structure, as can well be made out under the arithmetical law of permutations. This variety is nowhere so obvious as in the different modes in which the same subjects are treated by a multitude of writers. The articles which come from different hands in a scientific cyclopædia abundantly testify this. Take for, perhaps, a familiar illustration, though not on a very extended scale, the "Natural History of New-York." It seems to have been a natural and unconstrained mental process with some of the writers of this great work of nearly twenty quartos, to reveal the moral hue of their minds by dropping, without seeming to be aware of it, an occasional easy inference of the eternal power and wisdom concerned in originating and fitting up our globe. With the other writers, equally orthodox, no doubt, in essential religious faith, it was just as natural from intellectual bent, strengthened by professional habit, to adhere closely—too closely—to the dry details of merely technical science. We can excuse this difference, because we know it cannot be charged to any indifferent respect for religion. We know the men. They explored and wrote under state employment, merely for the useful or economical applications of science; and however much on the same subject their views did coincide, each writer treated his subject in his own natural way, and stamped upon it his own mental and moral complexion.

These considerations ought, in all fairness, to be accepted as an apology for the cold moral aspect, and for the absence of theologic inferences, which characterize some of the productions of the ablest scientific writers. Had their object been other than to notice the useful or philosophic bearings of facts under their investigation, this apology could not be fully claimed for them. Had it been suited to the scope of their inquiries to offer incidentally some palpable illustrations of divine contrivance, standing so directly in their way as to be stumbled over, if not taken up and duly noticed, not only would such writers be likely to be without excuse, but with men of devout principles, though not of extended scientific views, their candour would be suspected, perhaps forfeited.

There have been such writers. Prominent among them are to be named Laplace, Oken, Lamarck, Cabanis, and Geoffroy St. Hilaire. Till recently, Agassiz also was suspected of belonging to this school of philosophers. Let us see how far suspicion in respect of these writers is justifiable,—on what grounds the religious world has a right to be intolerant of them.

They are men of chiefly deductive habits. The point on which

they stand to survey physical nature is rather in the centre of the great field, not at its frontier entrance, where, by the inevitable use of means and ends, their inspection must be slow but certain, and of necessity progressive in all directions. They scarcely add anything to the domain of new truths. They make no new discoveries, and they pretend to none. Their province is merely to systematize truths and laws furnished to their hand. Their thoughts dwell little upon what is probable or what is possible, but almost solely upon what *is*. The reality of facts must be settled for them by those engaged in the toilsome labour of inductive inquiry. It is not their business to know by what process a new law or new physical truth is discovered; what weary months or years were spent in evolving it, and what delighted interest rewarded this toil, as brighter and brighter the light, seen first only in gleams, opened up till it poured itself broadly and full upon the truth discovered, —all this is indifferent to them. Theirs, however, is no ordinary work. To apply the logic of calculus in the fullest elucidation of principles furnished by a Kepler or a Newton, the rarest and most commanding deductive talent is required. Laplace, Lagrange, Euler, Clairault, Somerville,—are names of highest renown among mathematical expositors. They have developed the laws of motion, of universal gravitation, and other incidental principles which come within the purview of this region of science. Their labour required the severest tasking of the most active invention, of the most tenacious power of inference, of the widest spirit of combination, as well as of the most consummate subtilty in the analysis of cases and consequences occurring on a scale too vast for comparison, but commensurate only with the physical universe, whose laws they investigated when discovered and brought to their view. This mighty force of intellect they were required to exert.*

But we must remember that into abstract science, in which they were engaged, the idea of cause does not enter. Into the origin of principles submitted to their analysis, into the reasons for the existence of physical law, to what use it ministered and to what ends it was adapted, it was no part of their duty to inquire. They solved problems in relation to it, left unsettled by previous discoverers. For aught that pertained to their province to consider, these principles, truths, laws, and even the universe, might have originated themselves, or might of necessity have existed always. Back of present cognizance they gave themselves no trouble to penetrate. It was enough for them to ascertain the law regulating the action of these principles, then to rest on it implicitly. This, we mean, is the

* See Whewell's General Physics.

tendency of abstract, deductive science—of science requiring no comparison with adjacent truths, but only of a confined exposition within its own local field of truth.

Not that its cultivators are necessarily atheists,—that they really deny efficient First Cause, or final cause,—but that they have no occasion to employ or refer to either in their investigations. The tendency of their studies is to make them distrust all merely suggestive truths, all merely rational presumptions, and every class of inferences which they cannot reduce to mathematical certainty. They live, and think, and labour by exactitude; and whatever squares not with this is rejected as of no value. All this explains the cold, sceptical aspect of their writings; they lack that vital, religious warmth which characterizes most inductive inquiries,—the denial, in some cases, of apparent intention and contrivance in the works of creation. But it does not require us to believe them entirely destitute of devout reverence for the Supreme Power; it does not compel us to withhold all charitable judgment, and to suppose them infidels from the necessity of the case. We lament their moral reluctances—we lament their apparent apathy to everything in nature adapted to minister to devotion; yet are we bound from many circumstances to believe this to exist in appearance only, and to charge its apparent existence not so much to their moral temper on the subject, as to the abstract character of their investigations, and to the isolated position they occupy in making their investigations.

Much the same explanation is to be made also for those who, from a similar position of study, search for the true exponents of law as discovered in less exact sciences. A great field is opened for this in physiology, and its applications to kindred sciences. In the centre of this field men have taken their post, with the view to descry every object in the reach of their vision; not so much to classify them as to hunt for analogies among them that will support plausibly generalized theories. It is in their favour that they really aim at what they profess,—that is, to be governed by rigidly scientific conditions, and to leave theories to their appropriate fate when they fail of these conditions.

For a time it seemed that Lamarck in his "Transmutation of Species," and Geoffroy St. Hilaire in his "Theory of Analogies," had, so far as their induction extended, scientifically put to rest the questions involved in their deductive speculations. Contemplating *unity of plan*, chiefly, in their system of nature, they had little or no use for the idea of final cause, or of wise and benevolent contrivance, in the works of creation; and they therefore repudiated it. This

they had no need to do, but to leave themselves uncommitted in regard to it. This was virtually denying any Creator, excepting some mechanical cause or power inherent in every object to produce itself. Whether to charge this, not to blank atheism in themselves, but to the influence of fashionable scepticism around them; whether it be right or no to consider them as directly aiming at this consequence, and laying a deadly blow on the spontaneous convictions of mankind respecting their Creator, and their relations to him; whether the one or the other, we cannot but see the vicious tendency of exclusively abstract deductive study: how it narrows the mind in relation to the religious teachings of nature; how it leaves men—in a hundred cases unjustly, never illegitimately—liable to suspicion with the conservators of orthodoxy; how it plays into the hands of ill-disposed charlatans to overthrow the authority of the Bible; how it licenses unscientific speculations; and in the instance of theories just mentioned, how it precipitates itself in those sweeping generalizations, those overgone conclusions found in the notorious "Vestiges of Creation." Writers of this cast, from their contracted sphere of observation, are liable either to omit all considerations of the theology of nature, or to give an indefinite and unsatisfactory statement of them; and nearly always, as a matter of course, to incur serious misapprehensions of their real views on the subject.

Not so with the truly inductive student. The universe lies before him a mass of incoherent facts and principles, and the problem is to find their connexion and uses pursuant to a law running through and governing the whole.

The work of philosophy here is a divine work, requiring the investigator to enter into communion with the thoughts, the constitutive ideas of God, impressed everywhere on his divine handiwork. There is a certain kind of inspiration—a growing elevation of intellect—beguiling the toil of the inquirer, as, from a suggestion here, a hint there, and a principle yonder, he proceeds onward in his collation of facts, and in his detection of plan, purpose, and suitableness in them; and as he sees successively falling into their appropriate place those regulative types of thought by which God has made and still governs his universe. The interest heightens in proportion to the importance of the truths discovered, and to the time and labour expended in reaching them. Witness the overwhelming joy of Newton in several of his discoveries. Witness the outbursts of delighted frenzy in old Kepler, as month after month his mind went up struggling and prophesying among the stars, till the three great laws he sought—since so serviceable, so indispensable to all true

advancement in astronomy—fell into definite shape and certainty before him. "It is now eighteen months," he cries out, "since I got the first glimpse of light; three months since the dawn; very few days since the unveiled sun, most admirable to gaze on, burst upon me. Nothing holds me. I indulge my sacred fury! I triumph over mankind! The die is cast: the book is written, to be read either now or by posterity—I care not which. It may well wait a century for a reader, since God has waited six thousand years for an observer."

It is not a little wonderful that the pure forms of geometry, which always were, before the human mind conceived them, and always will be, have drawn so few intellects of highest excellence into profound communion with the thoughts of Deity. Words fail us in our regret that Laplace and his school, by dint of drilling in abstractions, should have so frittered away their spontaneous convictions of final cause as to see the power, wisdom, and goodness of Deity *nowhere;* while Kepler, Newton, Copernicus, and others, who were greater philosophers, and carried discovery infinitely further, saw them everywhere. This difference among philosophers and students of nature is to be referred partly, perhaps, to moral feelings, yet mostly, no doubt, to peculiar constitution of mind.

Geoffroy St. Hilaire, in his natural history investigations, declared, with no disguise, that "he ascribed no intention to God." He looked from far another point of view than to observe purpose or suitableness of function in animals. He knew "of no part which they had to play in nature." On the other hand, Cuvier made all his matchless achievements in comparative anatomy wholly on the principle of creative purpose and suitableness, seen no matter where, nor in what; whether in line, process, texture, size, or shape of any disinterred organic fragment, he had sufficient to reproduce, on the safest induction, the veritable form and true knowledge of the functions of any animal of the old geologic world, or among the anomalies of living natural history. His discoveries were always in the highest degree brilliant and beneficial.

And yet these cultivators of science are not to be pitted against each other,—the one class as believers, and the other necessarily as unbelievers of the great scheme of religion as taught in the word and works of God,—but are compared with each other to show how sadly embarrassed are the latter class, when, from their point of observation over the works of God, they are led theoretically to deny the doctrine of final causes in nature, but practically to adopt and make a large use of it in the application of all their studies. There is such a thing as adherence to unsustained dogma in philosophy

as well as in religion; and to dogma, too, not intended to upset the foundations of religion, though inevitably looking toward this result. Sometimes men of genuine philosophic spirit may assume a speculative starting-point as the best, in their judgment, to facilitate their inquiries,—but which in the end, the world, if not themselves and their charlatan followers, finds to be fallacious, ill-fitted to promote true science, and mischievous in sceptical tendency.

But for all this, it is a very needless alarm which many good people feel when they perceive infidel empiricism to be not only current, but also, for a time, apparently prevalent. Error of wicked intent always outdoes itself. Almighty Providence takes care of truth. The laws of science are merely ideas of Deity, which he reveals as fast as men are able to receive them. Human error is but another name for human ignorance; and *this* God will dissipate as rapidly as intellect can develop enough to comprehend the full truth. Complaint of some of the misuses of science is proper enough; but an inordinate fear or fright at the seeming innovations of an occasional new and startling physical truth, is an impolitic reflection upon genuine confidence in *revealed* truth,—as if it *may* be possible for God to contradict himself in his works and in his word. "A truth in nature challenges belief as urgently as a truth uttered among the thunders of Sinai." Instead, therefore, of sensitively deprecating the coming up of an occasional false theory, and, in the spirit of alarm, charging upon it a tendency against religion—as if religion could easily be thrown into jeopardy—it were far wiser not to yield to such unwarrantable timidity. It would be wiser, indeed, to regard the announcement of such theories as doubtless providentially permitted, if for nothing else than to quicken thought and provoke an industry that shall collect and arrange a body of scientific evidence in favour of religion, too formidable for any adverse theory, however plausible, to presume to attack.

What has Christianity lost by all the attempts at its overthrow and destruction? A thousand times the stronger is it for the ordeal through which it has passed. Had onslaughts upon the power of Christianity never been made by Celsus, and Gibbon, and Hume, and others, there probably would not now be within our reach the powerful defences of Origen, and Watson, and Lardner, and Paley. Truth gains in vigour, clearness, and beauty, by *conflict*. A hundred pens were instantly wielded by scientific hands to demolish the system based on the surprising though plausible assumptions of the author of the "Vestiges of Creation." Points of high interest in the theology of nature were suggested by the development-theory of this specimen of scientific charlatanry, which otherwise might not

have been thought of in a whole age. An army of inquirers have entered the field, and nobly are they fortifying the outworks of the great scheme of truth, physical and moral, against the attacks of false philosophy.

You may, therefore, do no possibly worse work for truth, for religion, for the Bible, than to sanction the outcry of an unintelligent and uncandid conservatism against the teachings of true science.

We have called up every apology we can think of for this infirmity of good men. We have also offered, at some length, all palliations due to insufficiently applied science,—to its being legitimately open to suspicion, in some instances, with devout persons, on the score, not of bitter intention, as is often supposed, to divorce science from religion, but of the impolicy, in other respects, of adopting a point of view in the field of scientific study, which, in the hands of third or fourth-rate philosophers, is employed to effect such divorcement.

We have seen that this position opens but a contracted view for a survey of the domain of nature, and is fruitful of no discoveries. On the other hand, those who have added most to the world's knowledge in scientific discovery, have invariably been led by the principle of final causes; a principle founded in the ultimate convictions of our minds that every effect must have a cause, every design a designer,—and that wherever design exists it is responded to in our convictions, unless they have become perverted, or have been schooled out of us by the interest, the prejudices, and the pride of an opposite theory.

By hints from this principle Galen was led to find the true functions of skeleton and muscle; Harvey, the circulation of the blood; Cuvier, the animate forms of the races buried in the ancient rock strata; Dalton, the laws of chemical combination; Copernicus, the motion of the earth around the sun; Kepler, his laws of periodic times; Newton, the tides, and gravitation as binding the solar universe together; and Le Verrier and Adams, from disturbances in the track of Uranus, the planet Neptune. The tendency of studying nature from final cause, is to lead the mind onward to the great First Cause. Accordingly we find the greatest philosophers usually humble, reverent, and devout. With them the God of nature is one with the God of the Bible. Third and fourth-rate philosophers have sometimes been sceptics; but Newton, and Boyle, and Bacon, and Harvey, and Linnæus, and others, were never ashamed to bow to the authority of the Bible, with their reverence and humility vastly enhanced by their study of Deity in that "elder Scripture writ by God's own hand."

The most palpable and popular grounds for alarm on account of the apparent hostility of science to revelation, are to be found in the positions of modern geology. It is incumbent on the scientific teachers of this age to remove the panic, and turn the current of theological thinking to the vast resources to religion which theology opens.

In all ages of the Christian era such alarm has sprung up occasionally; and new interpretations of portions of the Bible have several times yielded to the force of scientific fact, at a cost of the severest mental revulsion. At one time the firmament, mentioned in Genesis as dividing the waters above from the waters below, was conceived to be a kind of transparent floor, on which the superior waters had descended in rains; and severe was the struggle here with new facts in a developing meteorology. At another time the earth was supposed to be a vast plain, terminating nobody knew where; because a thousand figurative expressions in the Bible were adapted to this appearance of things. Again, on the gradual dissipation of these illusions, the earth was admitted to be spherical, yet it was contended that it must be stationary, and that it receives the sun's light and warmth in his daily circuits around it: and it has passed into schoolboy knowledge what humiliations Galileo met with from Church authority on this subject.

These have all passed by; and we look back with mortification that the human intellect should ever have believed these things. But the same weakness is as manifest as ever, when a new scientific truth breaks through the enclosure which human interpretation has thrown around the Bible. Perhaps it is well that it is so. We should call it weakness in no disparaging sense. We are scarcely entered into even the *portal*, when we fancy ourselves advanced far into the *midst* of the temple of knowledge. None are so consciously knowing as the dolt; none so humble and unpretending as the most learned and wise. The great Newton closed his sublime achievements of intellect, appropriately likening himself to a child picking up pebbles on the beach, while the great ocean of truth lay still before him. This is a fair statement of this world's best intellectual condition. Our relative knowledge is yet inconceivably deficient. How then can it be a matter of surprise that the religious community is slow to receive the geological announcement that this globe is countless ages older than the Bible appears to them to reckon it? Let it be remembered that it takes time for it to be fully understood that the conflict of geology is really not with Moses, but with a favourite, a cherished interpretation of the meaning of Moses. When the struggles of prejudice, and fear, and sus-

picion are fully over, and the geologic truth settles into general and unhesitating belief, the religious world will then look back and laugh as heartily at its own simplicity in this matter as it now does at the follies of the age of Pope Gregory.

The issue now stands thus: According to an average chronology, it is only about six thousand years, the popular faith will have it, since the stars and planets, with this globe and everything in and upon it —man, animals, plants, rocks, soil, everything—were created; and all these came into being, just as we now see them, in the short space of six days. Those remarkable forms called fossils, sometimes found miles deep in the solid rock, and indicating organic life of animals having not the slightest affinity to any species now living, offer a serious difficulty; but this is usually solved by pronouncing them freaks of nature, or by regarding them as animals destroyed in the deluge of Noah. Any opinion of the earth different from this is supposed to be flatly contradictory to the narration of Moses; and if this be thrown into discredit, the whole Bible may as well be, and mankind be doomed at once to a dismal infidelity.

This with many is a very sincere opinion; and though a very foolish one, in this age of light, is yet entitled to a respectful hearing, to prepare it to be patiently rebutted by facts thoroughly established, which never have been, and probably never will be, with good reason, called in question. Ascertained by the most laborious induction, and by the highest authorities in science, these facts extend the age of this globe to an immense antiquity. No truth in inductive philosophy is scarcely more settled than this. He who predicates an argument of assumed fact different from this, will find no other place among the savans of science than that of an ignorant pretender. Accordingly, the theologians of highest note are abandoning this old ground of the earth's recent origin; and volume after volume is now issued to show how the truths of the Bible beautifully harmonize with the truths of the great "stone book."

The ground taken by geologists is, that the first two verses of Genesis afford the whole scope required for all geologic action, ages on ages previous to the creation of the present races. On the details respecting the six days in that chapter geology presumes not yet to decide. Hypotheses have often been advanced to explain them; but for these geology as a science is not responsible. It is the fundamental rule of all inductive science that no hypothesis shall be admitted merely because, if true, it would explain the facts. Hypothesis may excite study and lead to facts; but the time has probably not yet arrived when the true understanding of the days of

creation can be made out. Geology has no quarrel with any view yet advanced respecting them. They may have been of twenty-four hours, or have extended each of them to an immense epoch: geology only requires the declaration, "*In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,*" to stand independently of the narrative following. And no less does astronomy require the same thing; for if the creation of the heavens were contemporaneous with the present living races of the earth, the vaulted sky would perhaps have remained to this hour comparatively starless and gloomy: the light from those distant spheres might not yet have finished their vast journey to us.

It falls not within the province of our subject to affirm more for geology than that the facts mentioned are settled. There are other facts. This science is yet in its infancy; but its investigations are so conducted that no possible countenance can be given to any hypothesis which is not sustained by stern and settled fact. When fact fully sustains it, it leaves its character as hypothesis, and passes directly into its appropriate character as science. Over so great a field as geology ranges, its inductions will continue as long as the world stands. There is hence a large opportunity for the play of imagination, for much theory, and for much quackery on the subject; and smatterers in geology would do well to ascertain the limits within which imagination is warrantable and useful. No more useful field can scarcely be conceived for the genius and the pencil of the artist to play in, in bringing out the panorama of the different geologic eras, restricted though they be to the only liberties which the science will grant. A descent through an ideal section of the crust of the globe, as far as it has been penetrated, will exhibit ages of divine economy, and purposes of divine power and wisdom, to which there is but little similitude in the present appearance of the globe. This is merely saying, in other words, that the living surface of this green earth is but the uppermost floor of the immense scaffolding which the Creator has been during countless ages preparing for his last fiat in producing man, and the races subordinate to man. In this great preparation we may observe, as we penetrate downward, a series of surprising adaptations to the object for which the scaffolding was built. In plainer terms, submit the complete section of this earth's crust to close examination, and we may see the fossils therein embedded exhibiting an upward succession of improving organic types, each advancing toward the perfection which is consummated in man, and each displaying power, wisdom, and goodness, on a scale, as to number and magnitude, never dreamed of by our friends who are so alarmed at the strides which science is taking.

Let us make a descending journey through the earth's crust, so far as yet examined. The first downward step takes us below the dust of Adam, and beyond the limits of recorded time.* A little further on, all traces of human remains disappear; and at each foot of our progress thereafter, an age flies past. We are travelling rapidly by the later into the earlier and still earlier cycles of a past eternity, and yet we have but just commenced our journey,—just in the outermost edge of the earth's crust, among the beds of the tertiary. The organic types with which we are familiar are gradually left behind, and we are in the midst of the wonderful forms of the once animate creation in the secondary rocks. First, the beautiful conchology of the chalk formation; then the catacombs of the great saurians in the oolite and lias; then the marsupial and the bird footsteps in the new red sandstone; then the luxuriant jungles, and heavily charged carbonic atmosphere of the coal period. Passing still onward into other miles of the sublimely ancient depths, we enter "new walks in an old field,"—the old red sandstone, noticing the remarkable asterolepis, and seeing how just are Hugh Miller's theologic conclusions therefrom. We then complete our survey of the fossiliferous worlds in the silurian eras, nowhere better brought out than in our own familiar New-York system of geology. And here we pass the last memorials of death among the old races, because we have passed the last traces of organic life. The night of ancient time thickens upon us as we look into the abyss of unknown depths, in the primary foundations. As rapidly as we have descended let us now retrace our steps, noticing, cursorily, on our return, the petrified denizens of the sediment of old oceans, and we observe an elevatory economy, with an occasional exception, in each exercise of the creative fiat. The lower forms of organization first appear in the long dynasty of the brachiopods, the monotony of which is relieved somewhat by the constant introduction of new genera and species of this family, with signs, now and then, of a tendency to an organic advancement in the creation of that most interesting of the ancient articulates, the trilobite, in various kinds. After this the lowest forms of the vertebrates appear in the case of the fish, when a long pause occurs, and the creative tendency is apparently backward; sufficiently, at least, to spoil the infidel development-theory of that enticing work before alluded to—the "Vestiges of Creation." But in immeasurable time ahead the production of higher existences is resumed, and successively the reptilian and the mammiferous dynasties come on, till the terminal creation, the crown of all of earth's existences, is man!

* Harris's Pre-Adamite Earth.

But why stop here? We have made our descent and returned, witnessing along the whole immense flight of our passage subjects enough of profound thought on the power and intentions of Divinity, in his physical creations, to occupy our finite intellects forever. To persons recognising the moral government of God on earth, commencing with the creation of man, it is easy to see that God has not ceased the elevatory exercise of his power, wisdom, and goodness; but that these continue still on a scale of moral magnificence greater than they were ever displayed in the material universe. They are less visible to the eye of sense; but to the eye of faith, directed by God's verbal revelations, they appear in unspeakable beauty and glory. It is enough for the question just proposed to say that God's progressive work, the physical part of which was completed in man, does still go on, but is involved in a business engaging the interest and ministration of angels. It is the work of REDEMPTION.*

Here, however, our subject has reached a point where it would soon assume a professional air not exactly suited to the purpose of this article. We have barely epitomized the teachings of geology, to show how the student therein, as he descends into the laboratory of divine power, and witnesses all the operations going on there, has enough to make him the most devout adorer of the great Father of the universe. Every science legitimately contributes to religious adoration. Atheism and every form of religious infidelity stand aghast before the facts, and in the light of true science.

The truths of the Bible—not every interpretation of the Bible—are every year gaining additional confirmation from the accumulating facts of science. The duty of all is to reverence the truth, wherever found; to search for it in the Bible by studying that *certainly* none the less, and in nature by studying that all the more. The duty of all is to prosecute, either professionally or by pastime, the subjects of science, till there shall have been done what can be done to cleanse the popular religious sentiment, on these subjects, of all its prejudices and all its fallacies.

* Hugh Miller's Footsteps of the Creator.

Art. IV.—THE POINT OF POWER.

Δὸς ποῦ στῶ, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κινήσω.

Give me where I may stand, and I will move the world.

Archimedes.

Sublime was the conception and noble the aspiration of the ancient mathematician. But his feet were fastened to the whirling sphere, and there was no platform whereon he might leap and be independent of the mundane revolutions; and where he might plant his fulcrum, and erect the mighty lever, and rally the world-moving apparatus, and apply the mysterious energy. There lacked *the point of power.* The ποῦ was a nonentity; and hence the ambitious philosopher must sigh in vain.

There is another world, however, whose laws, though fixed and regular, yet tally not precisely with the arrangements according to which the physical universe is ordered.

In this other world there is movement indeed; and it is as real and as constant as the everlasting revolution of the terrestrial planet. Yet it is not a movement in one direction merely, as when we of this same planet are carried irresistibly and forever from west to east. It is true there is a prevalent motion—fatally prevalent with mankind—pervading the moral world; yet is this great and melancholy movement neither universal nor irresistible. A man shall not be borne upon its bosom without his full consent. If he so elect, he shall spring forth from the revolving mass—stand still and firm against the gravitating energy beneath him, and the baleful rush of the atmosphere around him; or, breathing defiance both at the one and the other, he shall move off triumphantly in the opposite direction, and shall find solid ground and firm; nay more, he shall light upon the very spot imaged forth by our motto, and not only shall the world not move this man, but, placing skilfully his lever, and applying the appropriate forces, he shall check the world itself in its fearful revolving, and even turn its motion backward.

There is a point of power; there is, somewhere, and within reach of every good man, a position where, if he stands permanently, and acts vigorously, he shall move the moral world—and move it toward God and heaven. Where is this point? and how shall it be gained and held in firm and strong possession? These are inquiries of the sublimest moment, and worthy the investigation of the mightiest and purest mind. The writer affects

not to have mastered so lofty a theme; he would only submit a few suggestions as they have arisen before his own view.

There is presupposed, of course, a man of ordinary or common capacity; and cases of imbecility of intellect, whether constitutional or acquired, are left out of the account. Knowledge also is supposed; while moral goodness is to be included in the given data. These being given, the problem for solution is, to find the one position where they shall be exercised at the very maximum of power; where the hand's movement shall vibrate along the race, and the keys it may touch awaken music that shall thrill through the world.

Nor let it be hastily asserted that the data specified contain the solution also. Innumerable facts are every day before us that go to falsify such an assertion. For ofttimes there stand before us strength and beauty, combined with large erudition and moral worth withal; while yet that polished instrument remains, through days and years, comparatively powerless, and does but remind us in our sadness that

> "Full many a gem of purest ray serene
> The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear;
> Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
> And waste its sweetness on the desert air."

Not that the fair combination introduced above "is born" to comparative obscurity and inefficiency. There are no such fell destinies dooming an upright man to insignificance, and pressing him down so that he shall never rise and shake himself for the fulfilling of Heaven's high commission. Where, then, lies the difficulty? The man is not in the precise place. The point of power is not reached. He is like the ancient hero whose strength, while touching with his feet the earth, was irresistible; yet whosoever would chance to lift those feet would find him weak as other men. So the steel, when in contact with the mysterious magnet, seems endowed with wondrous strength for bearing up the suspended weight; yet if separated, for only a little space indeed, from its point of power, its force suddenly subsides.

1. Commencing, then, up at the very source of every weakness and infirmity, it seems superfluous to submit that the point of power is nowhere within the dark precincts of transgression. However it may be before, yet when a man puts forth his hand to sin, that hand, by such an act, is palsied. There was strength with Israel's greatest king ere his eye wandered, and his heart faltered; but when lust had conceived, and sin was born, and innocent blood covered him, he grew suddenly to be the weakest of all men. Such, too, is the scenery as his predecessor moves before us, at whatever time after

he withdrew himself from God by transgression. Behold how he trembles before the serene and awful Samuel! See how he bows himself in his weakness! Contemplate the sad afterpart of inefficiency and folly, till the self-same day when he lay stretched in death upon the mountain. And who has not wept while viewing the imbecility that befel one of the very chief of apostles at the moment Satan—who was longing to sift him as wheat—had gained an advantage over him? A frail maid, as she confronted him in that sad hour, was stronger than he who just before had exclaimed to his Master, "Though all men forsake thee, yet will not I!"

Nor need we limit such remarks to mere overt transgression. They have a solemn application to all that "hidden man of the heart" which is seen and known only by the being himself and by the eye of Omniscience. If this hidden man be yielded up to be, for more or less, the haunting-place of pride,—if anger, wrath, malice, envy, deceit, hatred, uncleanness, or whatever kindred evils be lurking there, then is it true that so far as such "secret sins" exist and bear sway, just to that extent there is weakness and not power. All these are so many fell and ruinous diseases, directly sapping the very foundations and pillars of strength. They are themselves strong men armed—hedging in and grappling the man, and binding him fast with chains; they are a brood of poisonous, deadly vipers, and their horrid work is to crush, and enervate, and spoil the spirit, while their victory is the overthrow of every energy. Sin—all sin—whether hidden and silent, or obvious and noisy—all is essential weakness; the wages thereof is death—the very negation of power—the dreary, empty, breathless region of absolute and eternal faintness.

On the other hand, there is wonderful strength whenever a man moves firmly along the fair eminence of righteousness and holiness. Walking there, he shall never be moved. Power—the maximum of power—is certainly somewhere there. If the world is to be moved, it will be from this sunny area; and here it is that a man shall vanquish every adversary in the universe, ere these shall vanquish him.

2. The point of power is nowhere within the regions of error. Error is darkness. It is a dreary waste, whose atmosphere is deception and disease—whose hopes are baseless—where the feet are stepping ever upon crumbling precipices; where are perpetual stumblings, and mishaps, and disastrous falls, and sorrows multiplied, and spirits crushed,—and where every vigorous impulse tends straight toward death. There is blasting at the first moment when a man treads along these gloomy quicksands. In all its length and breadth

it is eminently the abode of weakness. There is seen no uprising, —no graceful and vigorous movement,—no strong and beauteous flight. There is floundering rather, and dire confusion, and interminable sinkings, and death instead of life.

It is far hence—away upon the firm and impregnable field of truth—that power lives, and where must be planted the world-moving lever. It is truth and not error that is mighty; and it is truth that must prevail. Here is light, and one sees and knows, and his step is assured and firm; and he is invincible, like the pillars of eternity. Nay, he seems to partake of omnipotence; he is pervaded and informed by infinite strength, and it is not among possible things that he can be overthrown. It is not among possible things but that, standing in the brilliant focus of truth, and "having no part dark," he shall reflect a beauty and a glory such as shall move and charm the world. Thus Saul of Tarsus, wandering in error, groped and staggered like a drunken man, and there was no genuine energy or efficiency. In aftertime, this same Saul stood high up amid the illuminations of truth; and then and there, with a sublimity approaching the Infinite, he exclaims, "I can do all things!"

3. Again: the mysterious point for which we are searching is not in the province of unadaptedness or unfitness. We have all heard of such a phenomenon as that of great strength operating at a disadvantage; and under such circumstances there is so far, of course, a loss of power. Perchance thou hast seen a locomotive jostled from its appropriate track, while yet, for a moment, its awful energies were working, and its wheels of iron, in their revolutions, were fretting and tearing the underlying sand; and yet, though the engine was operating in the perfection of its strength, there was no progress, meanwhile, save what was slight or ruinous, or both combined. So there has been full many an intellectual engine attempting to operate aside from the paths adapted to its genius and movement; while no more sure and certain was the failure of the displaced and material instrument, than that of the discordant mental action. Who has not pitied some generous youth, toiling for long months and years amid pursuits for which he was never born, and which he could never love; and where he pines, and wastes himself, and his young life's energies seem well-nigh sacrificed? In another sphere this same youth would have purposed and executed a lofty flight. The world in which he moves, instead of being a tissue of discordances, had proved an arena of sweet and holy harmonies: while catching their glad inspirations he would have raised a note worthy an angel's harp.

Far too numerous and complicated to be named are the unfit-

nesses that, in their operation, repress human power. There is unfitness of *place;* and a man out of his place is so far away from efficiency. He may have all other appliances and means; yet he is, at best, a bound and fettered Samson. He is in some damp prison-house, and not abroad inhaling the full vigour of his native air. How many a prince and princess who, when in retirement, shone with radiant and cloudless brilliancy, have afterward assumed the throne and the diadem only to become a spectacle of weakness as well as wretchedness! Or, descending to more humble stations, how many a conspicuous agriculturist has seated himself in the legislative halls only to be unnoticed and forgotten! And how many a literary genius has meddled, to his disgrace, with the cultivation of the soil! And how many a teacher, whose crowded lecture-room evinced his power within his appropriate province, has passed into the pulpit only to stupify the scattered and drowsy hearers; and how many a gospel minister has seemed some mighty apostle here, while there his words were as idle tales!

O! if, amid the shadows of time, we have seen one of these same shadows more sombre and melancholy than the rest, it seemed to be when we have looked upon some great man cramped and bowed down with worse than Philistine cords, out of which he never rose. He was a glorious being, and made for producing wondrous movements; and there was somewhere a place for him—the genial region where, for him, was the arena of power. Yet he never came thither—and as he passed away he glided to the right or left; and his step was silent, and his voice was hushed. A long eclipse darkened the star that ought to have beamed supernal beauty over the race!

There is unfitness, too, of *instrumentality.* What would have proved the sledge of power in the hands of one, might be weaker than the slender reed when wielded by another. So the boy David more than suspected as he declined the proffered armour of Saul, and made choice of other weapons wherewith to confront his mighty adversary.

And there is unfitness of *use* or *action*, even though the instrumentality be suitable. So witness innumerable failures of human enterprises, the ruins whereof proclaim the weakness rather than the power involved.

Power—the height of power—is somewhere away from discordancies and confusions. The man has attained his own exact stand-point. He has found his centre of harmony,—whence every voice he utters, and every note he raises, finds its own appropriate and beautiful response. Here it is that the man stands firm and strong,—here every movement is as successful as it is facile and graceful. Occu-

pying the fit position, there is not a being of the race that is not subject to feel the energy of his arm, and to be moved, more or less, by the magic influence of his touch.

4. Further: no one shall realize his maximum of power anywhere within the dreary realms of doubt. All along this wide-spread region are grim clouds, and sombre shades, and mournful cheerlessness. The atmosphere seems charged with unwholesome vapours; and the man, as he imbibes it, becomes at once benumbed, and sluggish, and edgeless, and comparatively powerless. Thus the skilful general, in view of an impending battle, labours to banish from the minds of his legions the last vestige of misgiving. Thus the wise physician, too, will aim to attract his patient from doubt, that does but debilitate and weaken, to the pleasing and exhilarating hope of recovery. Everywhere, doubt is weakness in respect to the object toward which it exists. Amid its whisperings the artist's pencil trembles—the author's pen moves but heavily—the pulpit's voice falters—the Christian's energy tires—the benefactions of philanthropy diminish—the arm of industry is unnerved—the wings of prayer are clipped—the student's zeal languishes—every glory fades. Power lives not amid this valley. It is rather a land of faintness and of dying; and if ever a man shall find the position we are contemplating, he will certainly light upon it somewhere aloft above these fogs and damps where dwell firm conviction and unwavering assurance. All along this sunny elevation, power lives and blooms forever. Here walked in serene and solemn grandeur the father of believers, as he turned away from his native country, not knowing whither he went; as he sojourned in a strange land; and resigned to a bloody death the child of promise; and lived a pilgrim; and trod the world beneath his feet, and saw clearly in the distance a better and a heavenly country—a city having foundations, whose builder and maker is God. This man was "fully persuaded;" and hence he was a man of power—standing out conspicuously along the generations as one of the mightiest of all men. There also stood his illustrious grandson, when he grappled with Omnipotence, and when the man in his might refused to yield without the victory—and his name was changed to Israel, because as a prince he had power with God and with men, and prevailed. The eminence—the exact point of power—was attained just then. On that same height stood, in aftertime, the great Moses. There was he when he refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter—and chose rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season—and esteemed the reproaches of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt—

and endured as seeing Him who is invisible—and kept the passover —and walked through the Red Sea as on dry land—and lifted the rod of God to the discomfiture of Amalek—and ascended Sinai—and spoke face to face with Jehovah.

But the instances illustrating the connexion between faith and power are far too numerous for specification: "For the time would fail us to tell of Gideon, and of Barak, and of Samson, and of Jephthah, of David also, and Samuel, and of the prophets; who, *through faith*, subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens."

5. Still further: for the point of power a man shall search in vain amid the precincts of sorrow, care, embarrassment, discouragement, despondency. These—all these, bear a near relation to sin, and error, and doubt,—too near, in fact, that the weakness inseparable from the latter should not affect, more or less, the domains of the former. Survey carefully that man as he moves amid these cheerless regions. He is of noble bearing, and seems formed for great achievements; but his cheeks are pale and wan, and his ample forehead is furrowed, and his eyes are heavy, and his form is inclined, and his countenance is toward the earth, and his movement is slow and unsteady, and his sighs are mingling themselves with the sweet breath of spring, and his hands seem emaciated and feeble, and his dress is careless, and some dead weight is pressing upon his heart, and association is but the inlet of all unwelcome thoughts —a perverted channel, flooding the soul with all poisonous and bitter waters—and the world is hung with sackcloth, and friends seem few, and prospects darken, and hope has died, and life is a burden. Now count up the steps which this man has trodden into these gloomy vales; and then assure yourself that he has wandered just so far from the point of power. Sorrow is weakness—weakness that worketh death. The hands thereof are hands that hang down, and the knees are feeble knees; and every effort is as faint as it is reluctant, and as inefficacious as it is sluggish and painful. Alas for the influence of the "sorrow of the world!" Everywhere are its blighted victims strewn, and everywhere is their power sacrificed; while thus uncounted blessings—blessings that would gladden immortality—are lost to the universe.

Nor should the eye fasten upon graver sorrows merely. Even the gentler touches of sadness or of care—the transient shades that cross our pathway—the almost daily tumults that arise to disturb the soul's equanimity—even these fail not to work in their degree

debility and ruin; and he who yields himself to their influence, for only one brief hour, shall find his feet already slipping beneath him.

Power—great power—dwells not in the land of sighs and tears. Look for it, rather, somewhere in the realm of serene and holy happiness. It is along yonder landscape, where the peaceful sun is shedding its mildest, softest radiance; and where such demons as woe, care, dejection, and discouragement are banished afar: the blessed abode of peace and hope, the land of holy resignation—of smiles, and love, and joy—where the soul springs forth unencumbered and free, and where genius awakes like the sun coming forth out of his chambers, and rejoicing like a strong man to run a race; where all the air is as invigorating as it is pure, and, amid its deep cisterns, there floats no poisonous vapour to infect and destroy.

The connexion between genuine happiness and commanding power is far more intimate than many philosophers—Christian philosophers—have been ready to admit. "Great usefulness in preference to great happiness!" Specious, it is true,—almost as much so as to prefer perfect activity and health before a salubrious and genial atmosphere. What God hath joined together let not man put asunder. It is within the salubrious air that activity is generated. Also, it is from within the circle of happiness that "great usefulness" must flow forth. Hence the beckoning of the inspired voices. "Take no thought!" they whisper. "Be ye not of doubtful mind!" "Cast thy burdens upon the Lord!" "Be careful for nothing!" "Peace be unto you!" "Rejoice, and be exceeding glad!" "Rejoice evermore!" "Hope unto the end!"

And glance at this peaceful and rejoicing man. There looks upon thee a countenance suffused with light, and brilliancy, and intelligence. There is fire in that eye—there is directness in that look—a sunny fascination in that aspect. He steps; and his movement is as buoyant and cheerful as the bird of spring. He acts; and there is nerve, and energy, and sprightliness, and efficiency. He thinks; and his thoughts are wholesome, and rational, and burning thoughts. He speaks; and his voice is a clear and well-tuned instrument,—and its notes awaken animation, and hope, and joy. He writes; and his pages are luminous, refreshing, and effective. He converses; and out of the abundance of the heart there are diffused, amid the circle, the pleasant instruction and the calm delight. In whatever attitude, he is impressing his mark. He is a rejoicing being; and because he rejoices he is powerful.

6. Once more: no man will be borne up to the maximum of

power by the influence of low and grovelling motives. That there is strength in such motives—such strength as to urge on the man to almost superhuman effort, and the exertion of wondrous power—it were idle to deny. History is pregnant with examples illustrative of such a phenomenon. At the same time, the height of human power —the point whereon we are to "move the world"—is not thus reached. He who rises thither must get himself up out of the mire; he must cease to be selfish, low-lived, or sordid. Aspiring to transcendent strength, he must hasten to assume an elevated position in moral virtue. He must abandon selfism, and court with all diligence, and all skilful address, the pure and mighty impulsions that emanate from things holy and everlasting. Celestial influences must fan him, and voices, as if from deep heaven, must thrill through him evermore. Earth's dust must not cleave to him—terrestrial songs must fail to allure him; while the man must be linked to energies that are unearthly and godlike. How mighty was the man of God whenever, amid his awful ministry, his eye was single, and his spirit moved as by the breath of infinite energy and purity! At his nod, storms came and went—and seas opened before him—and armed legions vanished more quickly than the summer cloud: and he seemed standing on this earth in the place of Omnipotence itself. But, alas! for the moment when another than a heavenly influence seized and impelled his arm, and when, as he struck the pregnant rock, he failed to sanctify the Lord God in his heart. It is true, there was the gushing forth of waters, but weakness from that day seized upon the mighty; and when Israel was crossing the Jordan to inherit the promised land, the great minister and leader had fainted. And what was Paul, when he no longer conferred with flesh and blood—and when he had done glorying save in the cross of Christ—and when he looked not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen—and when heaven lived in him, and this world died out of him? Where stood he then but at the point of power? And nations listened, and idols were cast to the moles and the bats, and Satan fell like lightning, and the establishments of nations crumbled to atoms, and hell was moved with "uncommon wrath,"—and the world, with a better than an Archimedean lever, was "turned upside down."

Let the earth pause, when there is standing somewhere upon its surface a man whose movements are impelled by an energy springing forth from the bosom of eternity. There are foundations laid by some men that stretch immeasurably away from this planet, and have to do with a world that will never sink or crumble; and it were easier to compute the force requisite for moving this terres-

trial sphere, than to sum up his power, who, standing upon those everlasting foundations, is moving and acting there.

7. It must be submitted yet again that the point of power will be looked for in vain everywhere amid the fluctuations of a weak and vacillating will. There are great minds and great hearts that fail here. Weakness of the will is essential weakness; and under its baleful influence the feet forever slide away from the point of great efficiency and commanding power. There may be, ofttimes, an approach to this point, and the step is rapid for a moment, and expectation is awake, and propitious impulses are present to urge and allure. Yet when adverse impulses come in—as come they certainly will—and other voices swell on the air, and here and there a discouraging note breathes its chill chorus on the listening ear—then there is staggering, and veering, and pausing. There is weakness now, as when some beautiful and struggling engine fails in its propelling element; or when some tall and graceful ship trembles and careens in the teeth of opposing gales. There might still have been progress upward—perpetual, triumphant progress; but an essential element was missing from the machinery. They tell us of those mighty steamers plying, of late years, the Atlantic seas,—that, unlike the wind-ship, they yield not exactly to the awful sporting and upheaving of the tempestuous billows; but rather, under the amazing impulse that is forever driving them onward, disdaining to mount the rushing wave, they dash with almost horizontal line through its raging bowels, as if heedless of its opposition, and breathing defiance at its power. Behold there the fit emblem of that man's movement who is destined to reach the highest point of efficiency within the capability of a human being. An iron will is secretly working within him; he is laughing at what most men deem impossibilities. There is a flintiness of face, a significant compression of the lip, a clear, steady directness of the eye: it is the eye of the lion springing upon his prey. There may be a conspiracy of the elements; but thou shalt see him emerging from the storm unblanched and unscathed. The nations may join hands in one vast and fearful league of opposition; yet he shall pierce through those deep and armed legions, and his shout of victory shall overpower the hostile clamour of a world. Nay, unearthly foes, and wielding the strength of gods, may marshal themselves against him. Yet, as on that field of conflict he wrestles with principalities and powers, and every prince of darkness, he shall not fall even then: he shall stand, rather,—he shall prevail—he shall shake earth and hell both!

8. Finally; and though this latest thought may seem to imply all that has preceded, yet let us utter it distinctly,—to wit, that a man

will never tread upon the point of power so long as he is wandering —whether at distance greater or less—away from God. Such wanderers are most of our fellow-men; and this is as truly a fact of philosophy as of religion. He who doubts the divorcement of man from his Maker is as deficient in understanding as he is perverted in heart. The multitude may affect to laugh at revelation; yet are they compelled to bear witness to its exceeding pertinency and propriety, as it declares that man goes astray from his birth—that he is far from God—that God is not in all his thoughts—that all have gone out of the way—that there is none righteous. Men are wanderers; they are without God in the world, and hence they are weak, like the fragile plant that is struggling for life away from the beams of the blessed sun—like the poor dead hand that is sundered from the vigorous body—like the branch cut off from the living stem, and cast forth to wither and to perish. It is a "far country," when a man takes up his goods and strays and dwells away from God. The prodigal son is his apt emblem; and there is want, and leanness, and nakedness, and faintness, and bitterness, and starvation. The Fountain of living waters has been forsaken, while the attempt is to substitute broken cisterns that can hold no water. Power—the only power which, in comparison, is worth possessing and wielding—is prostrate.

He must walk with God who would tread upon the high places of strength, and grasp and retain the staff of full and perfect accomplishment. The chasm intervening between the divine and the human must be annihilated; every discord must be hushed, to be replaced with holy harmony and perfect love. There must be absolute reconciliation, and profound and abiding peace. According to the sublime language of inspiration, God must dwell in the man, and the man must dwell in God. These two parties—once distinct, distant, alienated—must become leagued and blended in holy fellowship and partnership. There must be—let us utter it with reverence—there must be identical breathing, feeling, seeing, sympathizing, desiring. The union here must be the most intimate and vital possible. It is to be that of the branch and the vine; it is to be that of the body and the limb,—and the divine nature is to be transfused into the human.

And when such mysterious union transpires—when the great and Almighty God dwells with and in a man—then there is power! This is the one man that shall "chase a thousand;" this is the man that can do all things; this is the man to whom nothing is impossible; this is he who can say to the sycamine or the mountain, "Be thou plucked up and cast into the depths of the sea," and it shall obey:

in a word, this is the one who has attained the πού of Archimedes—and the world itself must move beneath his power.

And now, should it be inquired concerning the means of the attainment specified, it might be sufficient to respond that the designations above submitted—whether positive or negative—seem, so far as they are correct and adequate, to suggest of themselves such means. Yet a remark or two additional, and bearing more specially upon this great inquiry, may prove acceptable.

He, then, who purposes to stand one day upon what shall be to him the pinnacle of power, should sit down to a protracted and most careful contemplation or survey of himself. By all the assistance he may command—whether by his own faithful investigations, his ponderings of the experience already gained, by extensive reading, or repeated and judicious conversations—let him come, if he may, to "know himself." Let him submit himself to the most unsparing analysis—take in pieces, so to speak, his whole intellectual, moral, and social constitution—examine and test each element separately and accurately; and arrive, if possible, at tangible and full conclusions respecting every feature of his complex character. Thus he shall see the strong, and prepare himself to retain and improve that strength; he shall see the ill-formed and the half-formed, and may set himself to a more full development; he shall see the positively weak, and be able to apply the requisite gymnasium; he shall detect the discordant and confused, and may address himself to the work of all necessary rearrangements; he shall mark the overgrown and the exuberant, and thus be prepared to perform the necessary excisions: in a word, he shall see what he is—what is his furniture—what is its character, its excellences, deficiencies, and needs.

This is a capital step, and one not to be dispensed with. Happy, indeed, would it be for all science, art, and all true religion—happy for the attainment of unwonted power—were all our academical and professional students, and all good people, whether students or not, to give good heed to this one suggestion. Many are the men, both young and old, who appear to prefer every other study to the study of themselves. Their eyes are forever turned outward; and they ponder not their own natures, and never reach a proper estimate of their own abilities, or of the beauties or defects pertaining to such abilities. Straight off from this neglect, as a starting-point, radiate ten thousand erroneous paths, every one of which passes aside from the glorious eminence at which this discourse has been glancing. Ay, in multiplied instances, the divergence has been wide and mournful,

whereby what was formed for wondrous brilliancy and strength has gone out in everlasting darkness.

It is hazarded, as a second remark, that a lofty view of the capabilities of a gracious man is extremely pertinent and necessary for him who purposes to gain possession of his greatest power.

What thoughtful man has not stood appalled at the power which, in the history of man, has been joined with certain individuals of the race? And how like the exaggerations of poetry appears the inspired presentation touching what man has done, and what he may do! We call it a miracle, when a certain man proclaimed in the sight of all Israel, "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon!"—and when, at his word, the sun paused in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day. So also we call it extraordinary when a certain other man wrestled with the great God, and prevailed; and when another still laid hold of the arm of Omnipotence, and moved it for the shutting up of heaven's windows, so that for successive years there was no rain; and when he grappled with that arm again, and reopened those same windows, and the heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit.

We need not be too careful here to inquire about what is technically named miraculous, or what is not. All this seems to matter but little—very little. The question is, Has ever power like this been lodged with man? It is needless to repeat that this being, without God, can do nothing. The same exactly was true of the man Gabriel, when, "being caused to fly swiftly," he traversed, during Daniel's brief prayer, the inconceivable distance between the heaven of heavens and the terrestrial city called Babylon. It is at once admitted that man of himself is weak—weak as the dust whence he was taken. Yet all this is not to the point. We are inquiring how powerful the mighty God has ever made him—how powerful he is thus still capable of being—how powerful it is consonant with his genius to be.

And now what if one should enter calmly and solemnly within the sanctuary of revelation—there, with holy simplicity, to wait the answer to this momentous inquiry? All voices there will be startling, and every token will be significant of a human elevation, dignity, and power, whereof the contemplation is as awful as it is wonderful. There is somewhere a suspicion that the sublime mystery of "God manifest in the flesh" has never yet attracted, with sufficient intensity, the admiring study of even holy men. The Deity has wedded himself to man as he is not joined and related to any other race of created intelligences. He took not on him the nature

of angels, but the seed of Abraham; and the Lord of glory is God and man combined. Such is the Being that has ascended far above all heavens, that he might fill all things. Such is He who sitteth at the right hand of power, who will judge the world in righteousness, and dispense the retributions of eternity. Righteous men will see God in their own form, and will see him thus forever and ever. He will wear this form when they and all good beings of the universe will cast their crowns at his feet as they exclaim, "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty!" It is this Being that saved men will resemble along the undying ages that shall follow the great resurrection; for the bodies of these shall be formed and fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body, by the effectual working whereby he is able even to subdue all things to himself. Human beings saved are to be the nearest relatives,—and bearing the family likeness of the King of kings and Lord of lords. The grace that "hath much more abounded" will bear them aloft to an elevation which is at present utterly inconceivable; and the destiny of kings, and thrones, and crowns, and transcendent dignity, and ineffable happiness, is awaiting them as certainly as a revelation has been given.

Riveting the astonished eye on facts like these, we seem prepared, in some sense, for the exhibition of greater power by man than what we have ever learned or conceived to have been exercised by angels or archangels, cherubim or seraphim; and such, thus far, is man's history. In the past he has, in the name of God, cleaved earth and sea—he has arrested the diurnal revolution "about a whole day"—he has shut up the heavens for years, and then opened them again—he has banished wicked spirits to their native perdition—and he has raised the dead to life. In the future he shall, in the same great name, trample on death and the grave—he shall rise to meet the Lord in the air—he shall judge angels—he shall reign forever.

But what of all this? Much every way; but chiefly, that wonderful, incomprehensible power is congenial with man, and with the nature stamped upon his being,—power in this world, and in the world which is to come.

"But is man to reënact the miracles of revelation?" Perhaps so,—although we do not know this, and are careless about knowing. It is sufficient to be assured that he may either do this, or perform something else equally great—equally glorious—equally beautiful and blissful. Press not too severely the charge of fanaticism, if a man record his utter inability to assign limits to the exaltation and power of the being for whose redemption that being's very form and nature were assumed by Divinity, to be

worn forever, and a greater ransom was paid than all the universe besides.

Let a man, then, ponder himself,—and especially let him do this amid the light of inspiration, as it blazes upon his history and his prospects,—and let him thus imbibe the true view of his capabilities and his destiny.

Let it be remarked, in conclusion, that he who would stand upon the point of power should, in his mind, and resting on infinite strength, diligently and earnestly assume this position,—and assume it at once.

We are not unaware that a suggestion like this is in danger of being passed over among the vagaries of sheer enthusiasm; nor will there be wanting those who shall count it preposterous in us to claim for such a proposal that it is as philosophical as it is important. It may be so that men have not even yet clearly perceived all the marvellous prerogatives belonging to their nature. At all events, it is quite certain that a man's power, as well as happiness, is affected, to an extraordinary degree, by one and another position of mind, which it is possible for him suddenly and voluntarily to assume. What public speaker has not, at times, realized all this in vivid experience, in the progress of a single discourse? It is related of a name fragrant amid the American Churches, but now passed into the skies, that attempting once to preach on an occasion of importance, his words, for a time, dropped from his lips as mere dead and useless words, and there was no opening of sweet fountains—no gladsome impulses—no buoyancy and liberty of thought—no eloquence —no power; till, at length, the good man ceased entirely—sunk upon the sofa—and in his embarrassment and grief covered his face with his hands. There for a moment he sat—and the sympathizing audience was waiting in silence, till, presently, springing upon another position—violently assuming a different mental altitude—he rose a second time, and launched forth upon the astonished multitude such a torrent of holy eloquence as that, under its strange power, the vast assembly trembled like an aspen leaf, and realized an impulse so singular and so effective as essentially to modify the destinies of many for endless years.

Truly, man is a wondrous being; and great things are expected from him by the One who formed him so "fearfully and wonderfully," and who knows all his gracious capabilities. "Build an ark, and survive the coming catastrophe of the world!" he saith to Noah. "Be strong, and very courageous!" saith he to Joshua. "Be thou a defenced city, and an iron pillar, and brazen walls, against all the kings, priests, and people of Judah!" he saith to Jeremiah. "Be

dead to sin and alive to God;" "Be blameless;" "Be holy, and perfect, and entire, wanting nothing—illuminate all nations!" These, and such as these, are the challenges breathing from lips infallible to the ears of redeemed men and women. And what do such challenges suppose—what is the spirit of these heavenly beckonings? "Seize"—they appear to say—"seize immediately and directly upon the handle of power! Plant thy feet firmly, and abide resolutely, and thoughtfully, and obstinately. Be as steel against every adverse influence, coming from whatever source. See your calling; remember your position without a moment's interval. Live there, walk and converse there, work and recreate there; eat, drink, sleep, and rejoice there. Reach forth thy withered hand; in a moment, and in the act, it shall wax into vigour and strength. Stand up upon thy feet, prostrate one; and as thou endeavourest, thou shalt stand, and stand firm. Rise up and walk, thou fainting spirit! and if thou springest at the word, thou shalt bear thy bed rather than thy bed shall bear thee. Awake, awake! Put on thy strength, O Zion! Put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem!"

Human pointings seem to bid us away along some far-reaching, steep, and cragged path, tending toward the fair eminence we would gain; but the inspired voices proclaim to us that we at once, and now, stand upon that eminence. Human philosophy discerns nothing but the toiling and rowing, and the cold sea heaving afar between it and the sunny shore. Another voice peals over the waves, and another influence touches the labouring craft, and immediately it is at the land whither it was bound. Some lovely and promised land is near us. "*Possess it!*" saith a startling voice darting from mid-heaven. But the way is long—the people are mighty—the cities are walled and high—and giants are there, and we are as grasshoppers. "*Possess it!*" echoes that voice again; and out from amid the multitude I hear a solitary response saying, "Let us go up at once, and possess it; for we are well able!"

Art. V.—THE PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW.

The character of drunkenness, and of whatever tends to drunkenness, admits of no doubt, if we take the Scriptures for the rule of judgment in the case. It is only when we leave the high ground of religious morals, and come down to the comparatively low position of merely civil order, that any difficulty occurs in treating intemperance. The reason is plain enough: Churches are voluntary, select, and elevated, professedly taking for their rule of life the practical code of the New Testament; but states are mostly made up of involuntary members, have little selection of character or elevation of purpose, and rarely if ever adopt the New Testament as the only constitutional law. Hence, in the treatment of moral questions the state must always be less efficient than the Church.

But such is and has been the character of the liquor traffic,—such its power for good or evil, in the public estimation,—that civil government could not pass it by. In all countries not absolutely savage, the traffic has been the subject of legislation in some form; but most commonly the object aimed at has been restriction and regulation, rather than extirpation. The excise laws—usually tolerant enough—have too generally been an embodiment of all the legislation on this important subject. While the use of intoxicating liquor was deemed necessary to health, of course no greater severity was demanded than might be considered essential to the revenues of the country. No punitive measures were called for, because the traffic was not deemed an offence against the best interests of society. On the contrary, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors were considered honourable pursuits, and justly entitled to the encouragement and protection of the law. Licenses were issued for the simple reason that meritorious individuals—that is, individuals of "good moral character"—asked for them; and asked for them, too, for the accommodation of the public at large. It was supposed that such provisions or refreshments as a license called for, could not be denied without injustice. So necessary, in fact, was this kind of commerce that, in selecting staples for taxation, the liquor traffic was placed side by side with the salt business, the tonnage of ships, and foreign importations. The paltriness of the expense attendant upon license, when viewed as a fine for the purpose of checking the sale of ardent spirits, is such as to forbid our regarding it in that light. It was not designed to repress the traffic; it could not have been designed for such an object, for the very sufficient reason that, at the time the

excise law was granted, the traffic was esteemed useful. Spirituous liquors were ranked among the necessaries of life. They were often regarded as a luxury also—thus combining two characters in the same article. This double use of intoxicating drinks is still recognised by the Temperance Pledge, which makes us promise that "we will not provide them as an article of entertainment, or for persons in our employment."

As things stood at this period, the license law was justified by every consideration that can uphold any law which has for its object an increase of the revenues of the government. It was as unexceptionable as the duty on salt, or the tonnage on ships,—fiscal expedients that surely never were designed to produce discouragement in the branches of enterprise which they represent. The expenses of government, unless collected by direct taxation, must be assessed upon some branch of manufactures or commerce, which, from its intimate connexion with the wants of all, will most effectually equalize the burden. And this necessity still exists in all its force; so that, but for a change of public opinion, the income arising from licensing the sale of ardent spirits would be as popular and as much approved at this hour as that arising from the duty on salt. In the course of Providence, an entire revolution of opinion has occurred touching the nature of ardent spirits, and the commerce in them. Alcoholic liquors, instead of being regarded as an essential, or even an innocent beverage, are now justly deemed as one of the most needless and ruinous articles ever brought into public use. Alcohol, once pronounced genial and wholesome in the highest degree, is now known to be a pernicious stimulant and a virulent poison.

The change which passed over the public mind of this country some years since, was more than sufficient to produce the numerous voluntary associations that sprung up either at that time, or not long subsequently. But these temperance societies, diversified and multiplied though they were, did not possess power to crush the evil against which their efforts were directed; nor did the advance of these societies, through successive changes greatly for the better, render them competent to their task. The Total Abstinence and Washingtonian organizations failed, as did those which only exacted abstinence from distilled spirits. The same is true of the various orders of temperance societies having, among other peculiarities, secrecy as one of their elements. None of them, nor all of them combined, have been able to suppress the liquor traffic. Much they have done, and they are entitled to high credit for their exertions; but there is a further work to which they are manifestly incompetent. Intemperance has a power for evil which is altogether beyond the corres-

tive force of voluntary organizations, constituted as temperance societies have been and must continue to be. These societies cannot clothe themselves with civil powers; they have no right to deal with property or person, except in the feeble and limited manner peculiar to such organizations. A society for the promotion of honesty might expel the thief from their communion, if he had by any means joined them, but they would have no right to pursue him further; they would have to avail themselves of the civil law for the infliction of adequate punishment, and the restoration of stolen property. The same necessity precisely now rests upon the friends of temperance. They have pursued their objects—the extirpation of the traffic and the suppression of intemperance—as far as the means in their power will go, and are now obliged to fall back upon the civil law for assistance. Further argument and persuasion have their uses, but they are not so much in demand at this juncture as is a readjustment of the municipal law.

We are aware that civil law is not to be relied on for Christian reformation. Something more is requisite to reach the heart and sanctify it; but at the same time it is just as obvious that the gospel is not always available for these slighter reforms demanded in merely civilized society. We do not depend upon Christian morality for the collection of taxes or the suppression of riots. A less refined and exalted species of goodness will accomplish these subordinate reforms. While, therefore, we do not depend upon legislation to do the work of religion, neither do we depend upon religion to do the work of legislation. The appeal to law has reference only to what properly belongs to law; it is no anxious alliance which the Church is seeking to form with the state, in order to strengthen the spiritual by a coalition with the secular power. Society is solicited to do its own work, and that only. Let the civil authorities guard what belongs to them, and the Church will ask no more. The necessities of the case have been amply developed, and for the most part by the Church, in the use of purely voluntary associations; but in this direction she can go no further, inasmuch as it is not hers to compel by other than moral means. She may render the guilt and shame of the liquor traffic as palpable as that of counterfeiting; but in the former case, as in the latter, she is, "and of right ought to be," wholly without the power of physical coercion. In a word, there are certain faults the existence and character of which the Church may demonstrate, although the state alone can apply a remedy.

Here, however, a grave question arises. The right of the state to interpose for the suppression of the liquor traffic is boldly denied; and it is also affirmed that the law, if enacted, must prove a nullity,

as its execution is believed to be impossible. Happily, at the present time, experience may be brought to the aid of legislation. A prohibitory liquor law has already been enacted in several states, and no unusual difficulty has attended its administration. The experiment thus far is hopeful indeed, and fully justifies similar action on the part of other states. The Maine Law, in Maine,—despite the wilful and shameless misrepresentations of its enemies,—is a beneficent fact in the history of legislation. A similar law in Massachusetts is, with slight exceptions, effecting equally beneficial results; and the same is true wherever the people have had courage to undertake this work. So much for actual results of the experiment. Guided by these, there need be no mistake; but we are not obliged to wait and judge of this law by its practical developments. It is one of those obvious requirements too imperatively necessary to gain any additional force from their effects. An argument does not increase hunger; nor can legislation augment the instinctive grasp of our nature for protection. However defective *a priori* reasoning may be in some cases, it is abundantly conclusive here. Those who know the nature of alcohol and the nature of man, cannot require to be told what will be the effect of the former upon the latter. As well might one be ignorant of the effects of fire upon the human system. But the exercise of legislation and the application of law to society are matters of great importance; and so many causes combine to mislead both law-makers and law-keepers, that it is often necessary to state and restate the reasons which govern, or should govern, in the enactment of wholesome statutes. We shall, therefore, present a brief view of the argument in favour of the proposed law. In the outset of this discussion two questions, and but two, meet us:—1. What are the rightful conditions or antecedents of municipal law? 2. Do these conditions or antecedents characterize the Prohibitory Liquor Law?

On the first of these questions but little need be said, and we shall barely lay down a few general principles. The following conditions seem to be required in the enactment of municipal law:—

1. The law should be demanded by the public good.

2. It should relate to such things as human authority is competent to determine.

3. It should apply equally and impartially to every member of the community.

We will now apply these principles to the law under consideration.

1. In showing that a prohibitory liquor law is demanded by the public good, the traffic necessarily comes under review in its length and breadth. Its economical, physical, moral, social, and political

aspects demand attention. It will be impossible to exhaust either of these topics, or even to give any considerable portion of the reliable statistics which may be brought to bear upon the argument. But we shall venture a few remarks upon each point:—

(1.) The cost of intemperance has never been fully estimated, and never can be by human powers. Its boundless ramifications of waste and ruin set at defiance all but the Infinite Mind. The cost of this traffic involves a great variety of particulars: as *first*, the materials wasted in the manufacture of ardent spirits; *secondly*, the money paid for the article when manufactured and brought into market; *thirdly*, the loss of time, and disqualification for business, occasioned by the use of such liquors; *fourthly*, the expense of criminal and civil prosecutions made necessary by the crimes and poverty engendered by the traffic; *fifthly*, the sickness, pauperism, decay, and idiocy consequent to the inebriate himself, and to most or all connected with him.

Some of the items in this catalogue are overwhelming. We have no means of estimating the vast amount of grain and other materials consumed in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, and therefore must of necessity pass over the first and most egregious loss to the public. What numbers might be fed on the grain destroyed by a single distillery in the course of a year! But as we have no data for calculations of this kind we pass to the second particular—the cost of the article when manufactured. A very careful hand prepared, a few years since, the following statement of the quantity of liquor drunk annually, and the amount paid for it, in the countries here named:—

	Gallons.	Cost.
France	1,053,793,854	$234,333,329 88
Great Britain	284,041,952	176,234,640 38
Sweden	22,500,000	59,540,000 00
Prussia	30,000,000	39,960,000 00
United States	80,624,182	35,793,127 05

These incredible sums, be it remembered, are to be added to the loss sustained by the waste of grain in the process of distilling. But taken alone, these sums are nearly equal to the entire annual revenue of the countries respectively above named; and when we add the loss occasioned by the destruction of valuable grains in the manufacture of alcoholic beverages, the expense far exceeds the cost of government in any country on the globe. The annual consumption of ardent spirts in Ireland alone, is twenty-three million three hundred thousand gallons, the cost of which, as it reaches the consumer, cannot be much, if any, less than thirty-five million dollars; and this enormous waste of money and of bread-

stuffs was actually going on while the country received donations from abroad to prevent the starvation of its inhabitants. It is true that the extraordinary labours of Father Mathew diminished the whisky revenue for a time; but the traffic has recovered from this check, and will probably flourish more than ever unless government interposes.

Loss of time and disqualification for business are matters obvious enough, but their results are not easily classified in the form of statistics; the former item, however, is usually of far less consequence than the latter. The innumerable disasters growing out of intoxication form a melancholy chapter in the domestic and public history of this country,—a chapter of heart-breaking woes which, though costly in the extreme, are nevertheless more tolerable in that respect than in any other. It is almost profane to enter upon an estimate of pecuniary losses in this connexion: in the presence of death and disgrace, the heart recoils from the consideration of an injury so trifling as the loss of money.

A very large proportion of all the lawsuits in this country originate in the use of spirituous liquors. Certainly more than half, and in all probability more than three-fourths, of our criminal suits are traceable to this one cause. Those who know the cost of administering justice, will readily perceive what a draft is thus made upon the finances of the state. There is great paucity of information as to the proximate causes of crime, and the more so because intemperance is not allowed to be pleaded in extenuation of guilt; but we have some light here. In 1834 Mr. Samuel Chipman made a Report, founded on a personal examination of all the jails and poor-houses in the several counties of the State of New-York. From this document, than which none more reliable or more important to the cause of temperance has ever been published, it appears that at least three-fourths of all the inmates of the jails and poor-houses of the state were decidedly intemperate, and in all likelihood were brought there through intemperance. We will present an exhibit of the jail statistics of a few counties, selected at random, but from different parts of the state. It will be understood that the numbers, with one exception, represent only the committals for a single year:—

County.	Whole number in jail.	Temperate.	Doubtful.	Intemperate.
Albany (one month only).....	114	15	17	82
Alleghany.....	57	...	8	49
Broome.....	18	...	3	15
Columbia.....	153	12	17	124
Herkimer.....	49	5	7	37
Ontario.....	69	7	12	50
Erie.....	213	30	48	135
Queens.....	70	9	6	55

The other counties of the state exhibit the same appalling ratio of inebriates among their jail commitments; and we are warranted in assuming that the other states of the Union, if examined in like manner, would present a similar result. In the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of these criminals, a heavy expense is, of course, unavoidable. But there is another class of suits,—a species of litigation provoked by the fumes of alcohol, and urged on by a constantly-stimulated madness, till proud estates sink in ruin. By this infuriated resort to law have many independent fortunes been absorbed in bills of cost.

On the loss resulting from disease and other poverty-producing consequences of intemperance, we can do no better than draw upon the above Report once more. The counties shall be different from those selected before, and the showing confined to poor-houses only:—

Counties.	Whole No. in Poor-house.	Temperate.	Doubtful.	Intemperate.
Cayuga	221	70	9	142
Duchess	442	29	60	354
Niagara	164	22	29	113
St. Lawrence	154	14	50	90
Ulster	111	4	4	103
Chenango	108	20	14	74
Washington	94	16	35	43

Thus it is seen whence we derive the greater share of that abject poverty which has to seek refuge in the public alms-house. It is caused by the wasting influence of a traffic that first robs men of their reason and character, and then of their money.

With these five sources of drainage to individual and national wealth, all in constant operation—and all not only without any remunerating advantages, but, on the contrary, fraught with immeasurable collateral evils—how can the people fail to demand a prohibitory liquor law? or how can any say that such a law would not be for the best good of society?

(2.) The physical effects of the traffic are precisely such as might have been expected had we known the deleterious nature of alcoholic potations. It was ignorance alone that permitted the hope of beneficial results from the use of so pernicious a liquid. While intemperance kills with its accustomed despatch, we shall never need the testimony of physicians to confirm our impressions of its deadly character. The medical faculty, however, have with great unanimity united their voice to that of the public at large against the excessive use of intoxicating beverages. We shall not trouble the reader with statistics here; it would be lighting a candle to search for the sun. A pathway where all is death cannot be made more revolting by any array of facts. The reeling, blear-eyed, bloated, ghastly-visaged thing called

a drunkard, is but the shadow of a man—a cruel mockery of humanity. It is impossible that a being through whose veins is coursing in abundance a fatal poison should have health. No one who has the slightest knowledge of intemperance can require to be told that its inevitable result is death. Surely if this single effect of the traffic could by any means be evaded or mitigated, one of the most commanding reasons for a prohibitory law would no longer exist. But no, it may not be; the inebriate is doomed to perish as the victim of his depraved appetite, and there is no relief for him short of an abandonment of his cups. We charge upon the traffic, therefore, the certain, if not the intentional, destruction of all inordinate consumers of ardent spirits.

But even what is called the temperate use of alcoholic beverages is fraught with death. While the drunkard plunges deliberately into the vortex of ruin, the moderate drinker, though his appetite may never get the mastery of him, is in an enfeebled and imperilled physical condition. The ratio of mortality among temperate drinkers is known to be much greater than among those who practise total abstinence. The poisonous, debilitating effect of alcohol unnerves the system, and prepares it to fall a prey to any invading disease. Health tables show the difference between the use and the disuse of intoxicating liquors. We shall borrow an illustration here from Dr. Carpenter's valuable Prize Essay on the "Use and Abuse of Alcoholic Liquors." We will only observe that the favourable health reports of certain regiments in the East India service as compared with other regiments in the same service, led the doctor to search into the hygienic causes which controlled these reports:—

"The following returns are of value as showing the proportion of sickness between the members of temperance societies serving in India, and the soldiers not members of those societies; the average daily number of men in hospital of each class being stated for each of the first six months in 1838, and the percentage being calculated with reference to the strength of each division:—

Months.	Strength of Temperance Societies.	Strength of remainder of Regiment.	Relative proportions admitted to strength.		Average daily percentage of men in hospital.	
			Temperance Society.	Remainder of Regiment.	Temperance Society.	Remainder of Regiment.
January.	1,953	2,569	1 in 18.77	1 in 9.22	2.54	8.15
February	1,840	2,639	1 in 20.10	1 in 9.24	2.27	8.27
March ..	1,542	2,879	1 in 14.44	1 in 7.14	2.94	8.66
April ...	1,359	3,081	1 in 10.9	1 in 5.26	5.47	10.28
May....	1,282	3,161	1 in 18.44	1 in 6.35	5.24	10.66
June ...	1,364	3,075	1 in 19.53	1 in 6.37	4.55	10.35
Total .	9,340	17,404	1 in 16.47	1 in 7.28	3.65	10.20

Thus it appears that, on the whole, the daily percentage of invalids among the temperance societies was but 3.65, while in the remainder of the troops it was 10.2, or nearly three times as great."—Pp. 86, 87.

It is well known that these temperance societies, though they prohibited the use of distilled liquors altogether, did not wholly exclude the use of fermented beverages; and if societies thus imperfect conferred such advantages, what may we not expect from a law that shall exclude all kinds and all qualities of these nefarious, death-dealing stimulants?

(3.) The moral effects of the traffic are disastrous in the extreme. While the keenest eye and the most indulgent appreciation can detect no good resulting from it, none can dispute that in a great variety of instances it is productive of immense evil. We have not space for details, but the following general effects of the traffic sufficiently indicate its bearing upon the question of morals: 1. It leads almost inevitably to drunkenness, which is a crime of the highest enormity as judged by the law of God, and by all rightly-constituted human laws. 2. It incites three-fourths of all the overt crimes committed in civilized life. This it does by inducing and ministering to a morbid excitement, by dethroning reason and depraving the appetites, until the individual loses all self-control and all shame, and winds up his career by perpetrating acts which place him in the cell of the felon or the grave of the suicide. The reader who wishes to see what proportion of the culprits in our jails are intemperate, is requested to turn back a few pages and examine the first table which we quoted from Chipman's Report. Any amount of statistical confirmation might be had if it were necessary. 3. Besides being a general excitant to crime, it incurs the guilt of wasting the best gifts of Divine Providence, and the noblest endowments of the human constitution. Time, money, health, intellect, character, are all sacrificed, either directly or indirectly, by this abominable business.

(4.) We have long thought that the social evils of intemperance would alone justify a much more stringent law than that recently enacted by several states. The family is a legal institution, and as such ought to have the protection of the law; and, in our opinion, the state neglects its duty as often as it subjects this sacred institution to the cruel and bestial domination of the drunkard. What sight is more common than that of a wife and children hurried into the depths of wretchedness, if not into death itself, by their natural protector—an intoxicated, infuriated husband? Now we contend that as the family exists by authority of law, the law should guard its own creation, and not suffer it to be broken down by the brutal

conduct of any of the parties to the family compact. Must the wife remain to be slaughtered, starved, disgraced, by her sworn protector? Must tender babes and prattling children be given up to the brutal ravings, the deep poverty, the filthy, profane, besotted, delirious presence and management of a drunken father? These evils will readily be acknowledged to be great; but there are others still more intolerable. We see not the full measure of the blight and curse which intemperance inflicts upon the family, till we view the drunken father as the immediate agent of reproducing his own crimes in his own offspring; nay worse, for his children too frequently not only inherit his impure, tainted blood and criminal tendencies, but are doomed to idiocy. It is known that by far the greater part of the idiots born in this nation are the unfortunate offspring of a drunken parentage. But it may be said these are extreme cases, for which the traffic is no more responsible than the marriage institution itself is responsible for occasional abuses. We, of course, admit that even good things may sometimes be abused, and that it would not be fair to make the liquor traffic suffer for a merely incidental outrage; but facts show, beyond all contradiction, that what we have stated is the common result of the traffic, and that any better condition of families participating in it is only an exception to the general rule.

But apart from the family altogether, the social intercourse of the world is poisoned and degraded by intemperance. Those who were conversant with the social gatherings and public assemblies, other than religious, twenty or thirty years ago, know well the dreadful scenes enacted in consequence of the use of intoxicating liquors. Then the means of intoxication were everywhere present, and their constant use kept society infested with brawls and demon-like conflicts, such as must ever be unknown among a thoroughly temperate people.

(5.) One of the strangest features of the traffic in spirituous liquors is its legality. Notwithstanding it has been for years a fact, "known and read of all men," that the making and vending, as well as the drinking of ardent spirits, tended directly to the irretrievable injury of the public in various ways, yet up to this hour, in a great majority of the states, no prohibitory law has been enacted. We cannot account for this neglect except by supposing appetite and avarice combined to arrest the course of legislation. But we doubt if even these could have induced such long forbearance, had it not been for a lingering impression that the traffic was in some way useful—if not wholly so, yet enough to screen it from instant destruction.

There are two considerations—one relating to the excise law, and the other to the traffic itself—which render a longer continuance of the rum business ineffably ridiculous. All our excise law contemplates is revenue: licenses are sold for money, and the money thus obtained goes into the general fund for the maintenance of government. A pittance is secured in this manner; but what are we to think of the rationality of government, when for every dollar so obtained, at least a hundred, and perhaps a thousand dollars must be expended in criminal trials, poor-houses, and pauper taxes, damages to persons and property, and general losses to society? What government can afford to raise money in this way? What people can endure such taxation? Yet this is only the better side of the affair. Alcoholic beverages are unquestionably a powerful incentive to crime; and what right has the state to enact laws against crime, and then furnish, or authorize to be furnished, an article that shall induce innumerable violations of the law? Why legislate against sin, and then instigate the practice of it by spreading a crime-producing liquid through community? This seems to be either a shocking absurdity, or a refinement in cruelty. We maintain that consistency, not to say common decency of conduct, requires that our law-makers should make drunkenness a valid plea for all the wrong-doing to which it leads, or else withdraw their sanction from the business of drunkard-making.

Such are the incontestable evidences that a prohibitory law is demanded by the public good. We venture to affirm that no law now on the statute-book of any state has been called for by a stronger array of facts than we have presented here. Take what other law we will, and if we inquire into the reasons for its enactment, we shall find them neither more numerous nor more weighty than those which demand the suppression of the traffic in spirituous liquors. The crime of murder is no exception; for that impoverishes no one, disgraces not its victim, propagates no baleful appetites, inflicts no guilt on the soul of the murdered man, plunders not the government, and brutalizes not those whom it consigns to the tomb. In all these respects ordinary murder is less a crime, and less requires the interposition of law for its suppression, than the wretched traffic in question. It follows, therefore, that we should have a prohibitory liquor law, or else repeal all law, as none of our existing laws have any pertinency if the reasons for this have not the requisite force.

2. We have now to ascertain whether or not human authority is competent to enact a prohibitory liquor law. A law might relate to things not properly cognizable by man; and indeed there has been,

first and last, no small amount of legislation on topics which, from their abstruse nature, lie beyond the grasp of finite power. Of this character are laws which assume the regulation of religious belief. Hence toleration in matters of faith has proved not only the wiser course, but the only course consistent with the existence of civil government. All governments and political institutions that attempt to force uniformity of creed, are no other than priestly tyrannies. The reason is obvious enough: man is too ignorant of doctrines, and of the capacities of the soul, to justify his enacting any laws compelling uniformity. Without malignity or carelessness, great wrong might be done through the total incompetency of the law-making power. There is also a class of things which, from their insignificance, as well as from the perfect manner in which they are provided for by instinct, or by the natural powers of mankind, should never be made the subjects of legal enactment. The mode of walking, the mode of eating and drinking, the kind of apparel, and the place of residence, are instances in point. Now if this temperance law were, for these or other reasons, placed beyond the supervision of human government, it would be an idle display of authority; and the least that could be hoped from its enactment would be that it might do no harm. But that it does not belong to either of the above classes, and is not by any means excluded from the legitimate province of legislation, is sufficiently evident. The traffic has always been regulated by law. Those engaged in it have enjoyed the same protection in person and property as other citizens; and the vending of alcoholic beverages has long had the special care of government, because of the revenue derived from it. We must, therefore, either admit that the state has erred in presuming to tax the traffic, or else acknowledge that the subject is entirely within the range of legislation. Yet this is not the only way in which the government has had to do with the traffic. Debts for intoxicating liquors have been as collectible as other debts, or if not it was no fault of the law. Had the business been deemed contraband, and every sale worked a forfeiture of the article sold, or a fine, or imprisonment, the result must have remained the same, so far as our argument is concerned; for it would have shown that the state had assumed to act in the premises. The opponents of a prohibitory law cannot be permitted to shield themselves from a restrictive statute by going back of all former precedents,—by denying at this late hour what they never denied before, namely, that the state has a right to grant license. If there is wrong in bestowing political recognition upon the traffic, it is wonderful that the wrong never was discovered while the law contemplated only tolerance. It was not till prohibition became probable

that the traffic was considered as lying beyond the rightful province of civil law. This is suspicious, and reminds us strongly of the Hudibrastic couplet:—

> "No rogue e'er felt the halter draw,
> With good opinion of the law."

But conclusive as might be the evidence drawn from immemorial usage, we are not obliged to depend upon it. Such is the character of the traffic in question, that it not only may be, but inevitably must be, in one form or another, the subject of legislation. It has to do with the business, the government, and the preservation of society. Nothing that enters largely into all these different interests can avoid legislative interference. The fact or relation of citizenship carries with it an inalienable right of protection; and when the making, or vending, or using of spirituous liquors infringes upon that right, the state is bound to interpose for the relief of the sufferer and the fulfilment of its own obligations. Again, if the rum-traffic is not such that it deserves to be treated as a nuisance, the state ought to defend and foster it as it does other pursuits. Unless this aid is extended to the business it cannot flourish, because people will not invest their capital where the collection of debts has not the sanction of law.

Not a single statute enacted by this or any other government is more completely and indisputably within the customary limits of legislative authority. The prohibitory law has to do with the very interests that have occupied the attention of legislatures ever since the enactment of laws was confided to such assemblies. We could not legislate at all with reference to civil order, if this class of subjects was eliminated from the programme of legislative proceedings. Milk might be saturated with arsenic, and meat might be putrid with disease, but law could not abate the evil; swindling and robbery, violence and murder might obtain on every hand, but there would be none authorized to arrest these abuses. Such must be the condition of things where the right to prohibit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic stimulants is denied.

We shall not be understood as saying that all laws enacted by the legislature, while acting strictly within its proper limits, are right, and should be obeyed. Far from it. Authority is often perverted, and legislative authority quite as often as any other. The subject may be right; but if the action of the law-making power is wrong, such action is without authority. Legislatures must not only keep within their sphere, but act properly in that sphere, or their rules have no binding force.

It is one thing to forbid the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors, and another to forbid the use of them when made. We may prohibit the sale of diseased meat, but it would be superfluous to pass a law against eating such meat. The reason of this distinction is quite obvious. Where the consequences of wrong-doing are chiefly confined to him who does the wrong, it is needless to superadd restrictive legislation, Providence having made retribution so immediate and effectual that human interposition, in the grave form of law, is seldom requisite. The instinct of self-preservation is usually sufficient to prevent this species of crime. We do not enact laws against suicide, nor against self-mutilation, for the simple reason that nature abundantly teaches people not to commit these sins. Proper instruction is all that any sane individual can be supposed to need in relation to such things. But the traffic in alcoholic beverages does by no means belong to this class of wrongs. The evil effects of the business are always pernicious to those engaged in it; yet the mischief in its aggregate passes over to others. The manufacturer and the vender are units, but their dealings are with thousands. They cannot limit the disastrous consequences of their business to themselves, else the public might pass these offenders by, as it does those whose offences produce their first and most disastrous effect on the immediate agent of the crime. Tried by the standard we have now named, both the tippler and the drunkard may safely be left to other restraints than formal legislation. They injure others, irretrievably, it is true, but not until themselves have fallen into the deepest misery and disgrace.

We, however, reach the source of intemperance so completely by extirpating the traffic in spirituous liquors, that evils growing out of the use of such liquors are cut off without specific enactment. If the fountain fails, the stream must cease; drunkenness cannot continue when the means of drunkenness are at an end. It is the traffic alone that makes drunkards; and hence, in this war against intemperance, we need only bring law to bear on what law has always regulated—namely, manufactures and trade. The destructive character of the business under consideration has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of all impartial inquirers, and indeed is so obvious, that even those engaged in it no longer attempt to justify themselves by appealing to the consequences of what they do: their dependence is on the law which authorizes their action. It is the traffic that kills, and there is no occasion for an experiment in legislation. Either governments should not pretend to regulate trade, or they should banish a commerce so directly subversive of the best interests of society. Every legislative body to which the evils of intemperance

are known ought instantly to define its position; there is not the slightest ground for hesitation or delay. If it be right to oppose wrong, then it is right to prohibit the liquor traffic.

That the public good is the supreme law, has long been an established principle of legislation in all enlightened governments. A maxim so fundamental cannot be called in question without destroying the entire basis of political institutions. But as an inevitable corollary from the above we have this proposition,—That government has a right to protect not only itself, as some have said, but those under its care. Hence the right to suppress a vicious traffic is, and must ever be unquestioned. The only ground of controversy lies in a difference of opinion as to the nature of the business against which legislative aid is invoked. In the present instance diversity of opinion is out of the question, because the trade in alcoholic beverages is fraught with evils too momentous to be overlooked by any one, however careless or prejudiced. There remains, therefore, no valid reason for an hour's delay; the law should be passed at once, and by every law-making power on the globe.

So palpable is the evidence in favour of a stringent prohibitory liquor law, that it is difficult to reconcile any evasion of the question with a decent regard to the public welfare. Procrastination looks like conspiracy. When not only widowhood and orphanage, but humanity itself, in all its boundlessly varied conditions, implores the law, how can the legislature withhold the boon, and yet be guiltless?

Were there any disposition to retaliate, or to go to extremes, a far more effective statute might be demanded. This abominable traffic, if judged by its effects, will be found to have a blacker character than is at all common in the annals of human wickedness. A law which should place the making and selling of intoxicating drinks among felonies of the highest class, would not deserve to be considered unduly severe. We send the counterfeiter and the thief to the penitentiary, and their fate, however it may be regretted, is not thought improperly severe; yet, on any just comparison of offences, the crimes of these men will appear as mere peccadilloes when contrasted with the diabolical outrages perpetrated by the rum-traffic. Taking facts for a basis, a simple prohibition of the nefarious business, backed by only such penalties as appeal to pecuniary interest rather than loss of character, must be regarded as highly forbearing. We fear the effort is too indulgent for success, and that a sterner enactment will be required.

3. The third requisite in the case is complete applicability. Legislation cannot well be wrong when it relates to man as man; but class-legislation, or laws made for persons rather than charac-

ters, are almost inevitably corrupt. A rule of conduct not adapted to the race is too circumscribed for the ends of justice and public order. Laws that take hold of classes only, or that treat society as if the institution of *caste* was in force, are not demanded by the general good, nor can they be executed without tyranny. Such laws are foisted upon the community by power simply; that is to say, they are an abuse of the legislative function. In confirmation of the position we have assumed it may be remarked:—

(1.) That all law springs from want. The whole of civil polity, however diversified in form, is but a creation dictated and made necessary by the nature of man. He is a being whose consciousness of individual weakness will always prompt him to form alliances, and to environ himself with the safeguards of law. In a word, he cannot dispense with government, so vital is it to his welfare; but then it is equally requisite that government should be unperverted. Government may be—indeed must be—a positive curse, if not restricted to proper limits.

(2.) That such legislation as is dictated by human wants must have the highest authority and the most perfect adaptation, since those wants are of God, and speak as from him. When the people feel that their necessities require a given enactment, speculation is at an end; the success of such a law is not problematical. A statute that meets the wants of all has every claim that can belong to law.

(3.) That no law can be superfluous or mischievous if carefully adjusted to society as a whole. As our wants are the origin of law, so are they the rule of legislation and the guaranty of success. Now, prohibition is grounded on a common necessity; the demand is as universal as the susceptibility to injury from intemperance. It is, therefore, not in any sense a special enactment. It is no innovation, no experiment. Substantially it is altogether common-place; and would be so considered by every people who cultivate the love of virtue, were it not for the lingering hallucination of former years. The traffic was once esteemed a blessing, and honest men pursued it under this erroneous impression; but the error has been detected, and such as are disposed to know the truth cannot fail of being convinced that both justice and humanity imperatively require the business to be abandoned. Honest men can no longer engage in such a work, or countenance it in any shape. If the traffic was productive of no other evil to the consumer than the mere loss of his money, all upright minds would scorn it,—they would abhor to take money in exchange for a worthless commodity; but how much more abhorred and detested must the traffic be, when the article sold is understood not to have even the negative virtue of harmlessness,

but to carry devastation and death to a vast majority of all who use it! It is utterly impossible that any community should sanction a business of this kind unless ignorant of its true character; the instinct of self-preservation would guard them effectually against such a practical enormity. Where any law exists, it must take hold of so palpable a violation of all rectitude as the traffic in alcoholic liquors is known to be by those who do not guiltily shut their eyes to the light. And were it not for custom, which has neutralized, in a great measure, the tendency to make general laws available for specific purposes, we should hardly need any further legislation on the subject. All laws against crime are, in fact, laws against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks. Men engaged in this business might with propriety be arrested under any statute protective of the rights of society. Their business is a war against society in every conceivable form, and to the utmost extent that vice can prey upon virtue. There are crimes, or rather forms of crime, so monstrous as not to be named in legislation. Take, for instance, the murder of near relations—parricide, matricide, fratricide. None of these are specifically forbidden by our laws, for the reason that their very enormity makes it self-evident that they could not be tolerated among a people abhorrent of homicide in all its forms. If, therefore, we enact a law against swindling or murder, and apply that law rigorously to the man who simply cheats or kills, it is a mockery of all justice if we do not also apply the law to him who not only cheats and kills, but degrades and pollutes the soul of his victim.

The prohibitory legislation now called for is only a provision dictated by that instinctive desire for safety which is common to human nature. It is only such a protection as originates necessarily in every government where the wants of humanity are consulted rather than insatiable avarice and brutal appetites. No legislation not wickedly circumscribed can possibly spare a traffic the effects of which are so unmistakably pernicious. The hazard, if any there be, is not in legislating against it, but in delaying to act. A prohibitory law cannot be enacted too soon.

The course of reasoning which we have pursued makes it unnecessary to appeal to authority in support of the argument; but were there occasion for aid of this kind, it is at hand, and the enemies of reform must acknowledge that it is of the most decisive character. The general right of government to prohibit such uses of property as would create nuisances, and to restrain all demoralizing and injurious pursuits, is a conceded fact. No jurist of respectability would hazard

his reputation by denying a truth so entirely self-evident; but notwithstanding this admitted principle some have held that prohibition would conflict with the federal government, to which the right of regulating commerce belongs. This question, however, was set at rest long ago, by the men whose duty it is to determine such points. Some years since a suit was brought into the Supreme Court of the United States, to test the constitutionality of prohibitory laws passed by several of the states. These laws were far less important than the Maine Law, though they had the same general object in view, and were stringent enough to embarrass commerce somewhat. In giving his decision Chief Justice Taney said:—

"If any state deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating or restraining the traffic, or *from prohibiting it altogether*, if it thinks proper."

The other justices of the court fully concurred with this opinion, and expressed themselves in language equally plain. Justice Catron said:—

"If the state has the power of restraint by license to any extent, she has the discretionary power to judge of its limits, and may go to the length of prohibiting sales altogether."

Said Justice Grier:—

"It is not necessary to array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism, and crime, which have their origin in the use and abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which is exclusively in the state, is alone competent to the correction of these great evils; and *all measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect that purpose, are within the scope of that authority.*"

The entire constitutionality of the law is thus placed beyond a doubt, if the highest legal authority in the land is capable of deciding the question. But with most who are enlisted in the temperance cause the sanction of a still higher authority is requisite. They are governed by the law of God, and cannot stoop to a wicked traffic, nor fail to seek its extirpation, whatever may be the estimate placed upon it by human jurists. We have not thought it best to bring out, in this article, the strong reasons which the Bible presents against intemperance, and in favour of its prohibition by the civil law. The occasion does not demand it. Those reasons, moreover, have their appropriate bearing elsewhere. We surely can find good cause for removing nuisances, arresting pickpockets, confining the dangerous, and protecting the exposed, without appealing to the Scriptures. Common-sense, apart from revelation, is fully equal to these hum-

ble services in behalf of humanity. Religious considerations are pertinent when the work to be done is a little elevated above the dust.

We had intended to meet some of the objections usually urged against a prohibitory law, but our limits will not permit; nor, on further reflection, do those objections seem to merit a formal answer. He that reasons in favour of vice from the difficulties of virtue, must be aware that he saps the foundation of all morals, for every virtue has its difficulties. We can hardly conceive how the most studied contempt for moral excellence could find a stronger expression than in the language of objectors to this law. It is characterized as "arbitrary—based on falsehood—antagonistic to commerce—destructive to agriculture—invading the right of property—opposed to the Bible—impracticable." Now there is no law, human or divine, but what may be objected to on the most or all of these grounds; and would be, by wicked men, were it not that such objections avail nothing. Our law against murder is quite arbitrary, interfering at times essentially with personal liberty; the law against nuisances is decidedly antagonistic to all commerce in nuisances, and destructive to agriculture in so far as it supplies any materials for the manufacture of nuisances; the law against trespass is a serious invasion of the right of property, and so also is that compelling the payment of debts; the law against bigamy is clearly opposed to the Bible, for not only was a plurality of wives permitted, but in certain cases it was positively enjoined, as appears from Deut. xxi, 10–14; and more particularly Deut. xxv, 5. Our laws of every kind against crime have been found impracticable at some times and in some places. They either could not be enforced at all, or only to a limited extent. Infractions are always occurring, and neutralizing influences are perpetually at work. And what is more, the laws of God, which none will accuse of being needless refinements in legislation, or an injudicious exercise of power, are subject to precisely the same contingency; they are, in fact, even more contemned and disregarded than human laws. It follows, therefore, that the non-enforcement of a law is no reason why the law should not exist, though it may be a very sufficient reason for devising better executive measures.

ART. VI.—A THEODICY.

A Theodicy; or, Vindication of the Divine Glory, as manifested in the Constitution and Government of the Moral World. By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, Professor, &c., in the University of Mississippi. New-York: Carlton & Phillips. 1853.

HERE we have a goodly volume of three hundred and sixty-five pages, octavo,—well bound, of fine paper, with broad margins, large and clear type, and leaded,—just such a specimen of book-making as almost tempts one to read for the pleasure of the exercise, and to continue reading till weariness denies him further pleasure. Blessings upon the men that make such books; and happy are the authors—"so far forth"—whom they introduce to the public; and happy are the readers that have only such books to read. But the reviewer's business is with the contents of the volume rather than its dress; though, very possibly, even his proverbial acerbity may be mitigated by these things; for if "good looks buy nothing in the market," they sometimes avail somewhat in a court of justice; and why may they not at the bar of public criticism?

The favourable impressions thus begun are deepened by the style of the composition, which is pure, plain, and forcible English, at once natural and easily understood. As subjects of the kind here discussed are rather out of the usual range of thought and conversation, it is sometimes supposed that any verbal statement of their propositions must seem harsh, and difficult to be understood by the unpractised reader; but we confess that the perusal of this volume has shaken our former opinion, that the abstrusities of metaphysics are inherent, and not merely incidental; and has half-inclined us to charge such writers as Kant, and Coleridge, and even good Bishop Butler, with darkening the themes they attempted to illustrate by a jargon of hard words and crabbed sentences. We have no doubt the reader will concur with us in the desire that all our metaphysics may be done into good plain English; nor would we object to their being garnished with the more modest flowers of rhetoric,—a thing which is here seen as a fact, and therefore proved to be a possibility.

The author's conduct of the argument is also highly commendable. It is rather remarkable, that upon the abstruse questions of metaphysics, where the clearest intellects see only dimly, we often find men dogmatizing the most confidently, and showing themselves the most intolerant of dissent. Among the objectionable practices of such combatants is that of deducing some odious and ridiculous

result from a writer's premises, and then holding him responsible for such inferences. Though we cannot entirely exempt this writer from the censure here implied, yet we may say that it applies to him only in a modified degree. He very generally treats his antagonists respectfully, even while he assails their positions with all the force of his logic. With equal taste and judgment, after adducing his arguments, he usually submits his cause without proclaiming his triumphs, real or imaginary, with a flourish of large words and strong assertions. The earnestness of the debate ceases to be offensive when it is seen to be both honest and courteous.

The subject of the volume is comprehensively stated on the title-page,—a transcript of which stands at the head of this paper; and the work itself is an earnest, thorough, and fearless discussion of the profound and often perplexing theme of the moral government of the world: and if we are compelled to confess that the writer has not wholly avoided the errors into which his predecessors have fallen, we may also claim that he has disturbed the repose of many prescriptive errors, and demonstrated some highly important truths. One could scarcely expect that an original and independent thinker, who, after seizing upon certain leading truths, sets out to frame a system agreeable to their requirements, would construct the whole of the same chosen and tried materials. It is not pretended that no part of this treatise is made up of imperfectly considered matter, though it bears indisputable evidence that it has cost its author whole years of thought and earnest intellectual endeavour.

The author of this volume has not been hitherto wholly unknown as a writer, having some time since sent forth a treatise covering a part of the more general subject which he here discusses. By all who know that work it will be expected that this attempt to harmonize the various and often apparently variant elements of the subject taken in hand, will not proceed according to the method of Edwards and the necessitarians. The further fact that this volume bears the imprint of the principal Arminian publishing house of the country, may lead some to suspect that it is but a restatement, in a new form perhaps, of that side of the interminable controversy of the "Five Points." Such a conclusion, however, would be not only premature, but unjust to both the author and the publishers; for while he holds himself quite independent of all previous systems, whether theological or philosophical, the publishers are not to be held accountable for the opinions he advances. As to the author's antecedents, so far as they have any bearing on the subjects he discusses, he has sufficiently informed us in the Introduction. At first he was more an Arminian than a Calvinist, though his views

were yet too crude and imperfect to constitute a self-consistent system. But even then he was without any strong prejudice against the system he least favoured; and with his advancing experience he was so much gratified with the personal piety of the Calvinists, and delighted with "the great masterpieces of reasoning which Calvinism has furnished," that he at length embraced it as the truth. Still his mind was not at ease, as there still remained unexplained difficulties in his chosen system, which, after occasioning long and painful struggles of thought and feeling, resulted in the rejection of the system as a whole, and the adoption of an opposite one,—though not altogether that of its former opponents. These things, he thinks, have been specially favourable to a successful prosecution of the speculations to which this volume is devoted,—an opinion in which we do not fully coincide.

A condensed analysis of the work will best set the subject before the reader. Two great truths are recognised and conceded throughout—to wit, God's absolute perfection, and the existence of evil; and to show the harmony of these two truths is the purpose of the work. Evil exists under two principal forms,—moral evil, or sin; and physical evil, or suffering. This distribution is carried into the plan of the book, which consists of two "Parts," devoted severally to the discussion of these two departments of the subject; and these, with an "Introduction," maintaining the practicability of the object taken in hand, and a "Conclusion," consisting of a summary of the preceding arguments, make up the volume. Part first is distributed into seven chapters, severally discussing these propositions, namely: 1. "The scheme of necessity denies that man is responsible for the existence of sin;" 2. It "makes God the author of sin;" 3. It "denies the reality of moral distinctions;" 4. "The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity;" 5. "The relation between the human will and the divine agency;" 6. "The existence of moral evil, or sin, reconciled with the holiness of God;" and 7. "Objections considered." The second "Part" has five chapters, severally entitled: 1. "God desires and seeks the salvation of all men;" 2. "Natural evil, or suffering, and especially the suffering of infants, reconciled with the goodness of God;" 3. "The sufferings of Christ reconciled with the goodness of God;" 4. "The eternal punishment of the wicked reconciled," &c.; 5. "The dispensations of the divine favours reconciled," &c. These chapters are subdivided into sections, each devoted to some specific but subordinate proposition, tending to prove or illustrate in detail the more general one to which the chapter is devoted. An inspection of this summary, we think, will not fail to convince the reader of the excellence

of the plan of the work. As a whole it is simple, yet comprehensive; its divisions are natural, and its classification philosophical; thus securing all necessary fulness, with much conciseness and compactness of structure. It will also be seen, from the subjects of the several chapters, that the author shuns no questions on account of their intricacy, and that his discussions relate to some of the most profound themes that ever engaged the human reason. How he succeeds in his bold attempts will appear in the sequel.

The question of "the possibility of a Theodicy" arises naturally at the commencement of such a treatise. This subject is happily stated in the introductory paragraph, agreeably to the author's view of it:—

> "How, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, evil could have proceeded from a creature of his own, has ever been regarded as the great difficulty pertaining to the intellectual system of the universe. It has never ceased to puzzle and perplex the human mind. Indeed, so great and so obstinate has it seemed, that it is usually supposed to lie beyond the reach of the human faculties. We shall, however, examine the grounds of this opinion before we exchange the bright illusions of hope, if such indeed they be, for the gloomy forebodings of despair."—P. 11.

He confesses that all his predecessors in the same enterprise have failed; that Plato attempted to solve the mystery, and was unsuccessful; that Leibnitz exercised his unequalled powers upon it, but left his "*Essais de Théodicée*" only a fruitless essay; and that Calvin, Descartes, and Edwards, each tried his powers upon the difficult theme, and left it as dark as he found it. Still he thinks there is ground to hope for success, since "the cause of their failure may be traced to the errors of their own systems, and not to the inherent difficulties of the subject." The true theory of the physical universe was not discovered till after many ineffectual efforts had been made; and this he conceives is an analogous case. The analogy, however, is very imperfect; for were we certain that that great problem is indeed solved,—which is very doubtful,—still the unlikeness of the modes of inquiry, and the utter dissimilarity of the subjects, preclude the idea of a close analogy. Natural science is inductive, and therefore accretive; theology is traditional, and so admits of no augmentation: and a theodicy is so completely dependent on theology—that is, on the direct teachings of God's word—that wherever the word of God is, there are at least the elements of all the theodicy within the compass of human reason. The subject of the first chapter of Part first is substantially the same that has agitated and divided the Christian world ever since the times of Augustine and Pelagius. The chief objection against the scheme of necessity, as it was involved in the theological system of Augustine—called Calvinism

since the Reformation—has ever been, that it exonerates men from all just responsibility for their actions. Men intuitively associate power and responsibility in the relations of prevenient condition and necessary consequence: the separation of these is the very essence of tyranny, and therefore cannot be supposed to exist in the divine government. And since the scheme of necessity denies that men have really any power of action, it must also remove from them the responsibility of which such power is the necessary condition.

These elementary truths are conceded by the advocates of the scheme under notice, some of whom admit the inference and deny the existence of responsibility in man; while others endeavour so to modify the scheme as to make it consistent with such a degree of power as may carry with it a just responsibility. With the former we have nothing to do at present, since they concede all that is here attempted to be proved, and their positions come under notice in another place; the coëxistence of an absolute and universally efficient providence, and human responsibility, is the problem here discussed. In the original Pelagian controversy the philosophical aspects of this question were but little regarded, and the freedom of the will was simply affirmed and denied as a theological tenet. The Reformers were more philosophical; and both Luther and Calvin acknowledge the original freedom of the human will; but contend that this was among the things forfeited by Adam in his federal character, at the fall. Still they concede a kind of freedom to the will of man in his fallen estate, which they make the ground of a personal responsibility,—that is, the absence of all external compulsions, leaving the will free to act out its own volitions, though these are determined with absolute certainty by the native bent of the soul. Nor is the scheme the flimsy and absurd thing that some have taken it to be. That our volitions are free in their action is a matter of personal consciousness; and it is universally granted. But in many cases both freedom and necessity may be predicated of the same thing in different relations. A man may be said to be free to go out of his own house and walk abroad, if the doors are open and there be none to hinder him; but he is not free to do so if he is prostrated by sickness. He is free as to his external circumstances, but not free by reason of his personal condition. But real freedom, such as may entail a just responsibility, must be more than relative,—it implies the absence of all and every form of restraint, whether actual or privative. If, then, we grant that the will is free because its volitions are not compelled by anything beyond itself, but is effectually determined by its own depraved instincts to the evil and against the good, its freedom is only relative and not real. But, say

the advocates of this scheme, if the soul is so effectually inclined to evil that it has no power even to choose the good, that depravity itself is its great fault; for surely that state of the soul which enslaves it to sin cannot excuse the sins to which it gives being. The holy law of God condemns "all unrighteousness," whether manifested as the attribute of a person or of an action; and in relation to persons it predicates guilt of all, of whom the divine knowledge first predicates "unrighteousness." This objection to the scheme of necessity appears, therefore, to be not well founded; and further, if it proves anything, it proves too much. For if the fact that the will is necessitated by its own moral tendencies removes all moral properties from its volitions, then are lost spirits no longer responsible agents; nor is there any moral worth in the worship of a seraph, or the love and gratitude of a glorified saint,—since all their acts are thus necessitated.

It is no difficult matter for the Augustinian thus to overthrow his Pelagian antagonist; but when he has done this he is as far as ever from the end of his troubles. His fortress may be impregnable from without, and yet it is untenable. If we grant that the heart is thus depraved and the will enslaved; and that the depraved volitions of such a being are really unholy, and therefore objects of God's displeasure, the question will still force itself upon the mind as to the proper location of the responsibility for this state of things. To escape the force of this objection the Reformers, and their successors in the faith, endeavour to cover themselves under the hypothesis of a real existence of all the individuals of the human race in Adam; or such a representation in him, that while to him personally was given the power by virtue of which human responsibility is justified, the consequences of his abuse of that power have come upon his posterity. We shall not delay to examine this strange position, which has been a thousand times set in its true light. A qualified representation of mankind in Adam is not denied, and a modified responsibility for his actions is also conceded; but we cannot but think that these extreme views of the case are favoured only because they seem to afford relief from greater difficulties. Nor does this reach the whole of the difficulty; since the scheme includes Adam's acts in its iron bands, as well as those of his posterity, and so removes the responsibility from the whole race together. If, therefore, as is granted on all hands, freedom is an essential condition of responsibility; and if, as is claimed, all human volitions and actions are really necessary, though relatively free, then is man not "responsible for the existence of sin."

So long as the advocates of the scheme of necessity maintained

their system in its integrity, and adopted with it its logical consequences, it was at least a self-consistent whole. The fatalists—the only rigidly consistent necessitarians—used it to annihilate all responsibility, and to efface the distinctions between right and wrong. The hardy Reformers employed it to explain the method of grace according to their system of adamantine predestination. But modern Calvinists, finding the stronghold of the Reformers untenable, have conceded the freedom of the individual will as the ground of his responsibility. But as they go no further than their predecessors have gone in this matter, they only attempt to cover a difficulty in the confusion of a false logic. We have already seen the insufficiency of this merely relative freedom, as a ground of responsibility, and therefore these seeming concessions amount to nothing. A freedom that shall devolve responsibility upon its subject must be real as well as relative—positive as well as negative; since the method of restraint is not the matter in question, but the fact itself. But this freedom of the will is as stoutly denied by Edwards, and by all consistent Calvinists, as by Hobbes or Spinoza. These last indeed were the better practical logicians; but they maintained their logic at the expense of all virtue and moral excellence; while the mighty energies of the great metaphysician of New-England were taxed to their utmost in the vain attempt to reconcile a real responsibility with only a relative freedom of the will.

We fail entirely to discover any advantage in the scheme of necessity, as it has been modified, over that which it had as it came from the hands of Calvin and his fellow-reformers,—who indeed recognise that degree of freedom in man, but speak of it as merely a shadow of real liberty without any of its real value. If the volitions are determined by some cause over which the will has no control, what does it avail to say that the will acts freely in obedience to that cause? At best the will is only the instrument by which the disposing cause operates, and its volitions belong to the will only as the work belongs to the instrument: and surely an instrument is not in equity a responsible agent. To this objection, though a vast amount of learned labour has been devoted to its examination, no satisfactory answer has been given; and it may now be safely assumed that none is possible. At this point the most effective assaults have been made upon the necessitarian system. In a purely logical discussion of the subject, conducted agreeably to the semi-material psychology that leavens our English literature, it might be difficult to overthrow the scheme of necessity as set forth and defended by the mighty genius of Edwards. To appeal to the consciousness against it avails nothing; for that system asserts the

freedom of the will so far as that can be an object of consciousness: the effectual motives, we are told, impinge upon the will at a point beyond the mind's range of perceptions. And who can say this is not the case? True, a better psychology shows the baselessness of this whole scheme; and were it properly inaugurated, it would speedily and forever finish this interminable controversy, with its misty metaphysics, by recognising the self-active powers of the will, which spurn all foreign interference with the disposition of its volitions. But even under all the disadvantages to the cause of truth growing out of the old psychology, the citadel of error is untenable.

Let it be granted that all the volitions are necessarily determined by predetermined causes, which act upon the passive will to produce its volitions, and by the same law of necessity result in actions. In this way one finds himself inclined to piety and devotion, and another to sensual pleasures and vicious pursuits: each necessarily—though without resistance, for he can make none—performs the work assigned him to do; or rather each becomes the passive agent of a secret power that works by him as that power directs. And where, then, rests the responsibility in the case?—upon the passive agents, or upon Him who controlled them in their actions by the secret "counsels of his own will?" If it is absurd and monstrous to charge this iniquity to God,—as we confess it is,—then, since the reasoning by which this conclusion is reached is unimpeachable, we are compelled to believe that the premises upon which the whole system is built are false.

In the second chapter the author undertakes to show that "the scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin." This indeed is clearly implied in the argument of the first chapter; for if man's responsibility for his actions is removed because they are necessitated, that responsibility is carried back to its necessitating cause, which is God,—and therefore if there is sin in the action or volition, God must be its author. Nor has this tendency of the scheme escaped the notice of its advocates, the more unscrupulous of whom have used it to prove the unreality of moral distinctions, while others have vainly struggled to avoid so terrible and yet obvious an inference. The earlier Reformers, however, were not careful to evade this conclusion. Melancthon employed it as an argument to prove the absolute bondage of the human will; and Calvin is quite impatient toward those who hesitate to accept the most extreme results of the doctrine of absolute predestination. In one sense, indeed, Calvin held that God could not be the author of sin; that is, that it is impossible for a being of essential holiness to originate unholiness

or sin. This, however, is only a necessary constitutional want of adaptation arising from his absolute moral purity, but it indicates no disapprobation of sin. Accordingly, when in his sovereign good pleasure he determined that man, who was made in his own moral image, should become depraved and fallen, he employed Satan to effect that purpose.

But Calvin was too good a reasoner to fail to perceive that in such a case, though Satan was the agent, God himself was the principal, or the procuring cause. If the reader should suspect that these statements are too broad, we would refer him to Calvin's Institutes for our justification; and the marginal references in the volume under notice will aid him in finding the right places. But the offensiveness of this conclusion is not all that may be urged against it. At this point Professor Bledsoe well observes:—

> "If Calvin's doctrine be true, God is not the author of sin, inasmuch as he made man pure and upright; but yet, by the same power which created him, has he plunged him into sin and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a sinful nature be inconsistent with the infinite purity of God, will it not be difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in man, after his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence?"—P. 90.

Calvin's great purpose seems to be to exalt the divine sovereignty to the most absolute degree; and in doing this he appears almost wholly reckless of all else. So jealous is he on this point that he cannot hear a word of any such freedom of man's will as can, in any sense, remove him beyond the immediate direction of the divine omnipotence in any act or thought of his life. And yet to escape the other horn of the dilemma into which he had brought himself, he is compelled to award to Satan, in his fall, that very freedom which he denies to man as wholly incompatible with the sovereignty of God.

We must pass very rapidly over the author's strictures on the attempts of Leibnitz to escape the results of the scheme of necessity, especially that part of it which seems to make God the author of sin. Leibnitz was a realist, and by applying that fanciful system to this subject he educed the existence of evil from the essential nature of things; which, though brought into actual being by a wise and infinitely holy architect, have nevertheless brought with them their original perversities, from which arise moral depravity and actual sin. In this way it is shown, that though sin is an inevitable necessity in human character and actions, yet God is not its author, since its origin is seen to be, not in the divine volitions, but in the eternal nature of things. He ought, however, to have informed us why these perverse abstract forms, which in their development have been the

occasion of so much actual harm, were not permitted to remain in their harmless state of abstraction.

But upon this topic, as upon most others, Edwards's scheme for avoiding the difficulty in question occupies the largest share of the author's attention. That subtle and acute metaphysician saw very clearly the whole subject, and grappled vigorously with its difficulties. Here we may again avail ourselves of the comprehensive and concise language of our author:—

"According to the system of Edwards, as well as that of his opponents, sin would not have been committed unless it were permitted by God. But in the scheme of Edwards, the agency of God bears a more intimate relation to the origin and existence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it. 'God,' says he, 'disposes the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow.' And this occurrence of sin, in consequence of his disposing and ordering events, enters into his design. For Edwards truly says, that 'if God disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things *knowingly* and on *design*. God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accidentally and unawares, either *without* or *beside* his intention.' . . . Now here the question arises, Is this doctrine consistent with the character of God? Is it not repugnant to his infinite holiness? We affirm that it is; Edwards declares that it is not."—Pp. 98, 99.

All these objections, however, are anticipated and discussed by that great metaphysician, and his various positions fortified by arguments which we may presume were satisfactory to himself, whatever may be the case with others. It should be remembered that in all his discussions of the divine efficiency in human actions, he constantly assumes the existence of sin in the world. His scheme, therefore, cannot avail to elucidate the origin of evil, but only to explain the modes of the divine administration in relation to it as a fact in the dominions of the Almighty. That sin exists cannot be denied; and if one philosophizes on the subject at all, he must either conclude that it exists by God's permission while he might have prevented it, or else against his will, because he could not hinder it. Of these formidable alternatives Edwards chose the former; and we regret to have to add, Professor Bledsoe chooses the latter. For our own part, we are compelled to believe that upon this subject all philosophy is at fault. That evil exists in the world we know, and that the divine perfections are absolute and infinite we steadfastly believe; the relation of these two great truths to each other we do not pretend to explain. Here reason fails; and we confidently commit the whole subject to the divine direction with implicit and cheerful faith. The question of the origin of evil is an abyss in which the most profound intellects are as completely beyond their depths

as the most shallow. Faith navigates this abyss, while reason is submerged in attempting to ford it.

Leaving out of the account the whole question of the origin of evil, and recognising its actual existence, the scheme of Edwards is capable of at least a plausible defence, as to its merely theoretical aspect. Here the distinction between sin in its essential being, and sinful acts, must be clearly noted. To bring sin into being is to become its author; and this is not, by that system, in its application to human affairs, charged to God: but so to dispose of things that sin already existing shall be developed in actions is quite another thing. Hence, we are told that the divine providence may so dispose affairs as certainly to educe the praise of God from "the wrath of man," without making him the author of sin, or involving him in any criminal complicity with it; and that whatever of human depravity is not so overruled, is restrained. It is possible that this kind of hair-splitting may satisfy some minds; but we confess that we find no pleasure in it. It is time that human reason had learned its own weakness, and consented to confess there are many very plain and incontrovertible truths in the divine dispensations which it can neither gainsay nor comprehend. Had Edwards gone no further than to maintain the reality of the divine providence, he had done well; but after doing this he proceeds to bring this great and inscrutable mystery within the limits of his own attenuated metaphysics; and by doing this he has exposed his whole system to the most serious assaults. He assures us that when God incites and employs in his service the sinful propensities of men or devils, their works are not sinful as to himself, because they are so incited and employed for wise and holy purposes. To this—though it must be confessed that it looks very much like making the end sanctify the means—one might assent if it were carefully guarded against any possible invasion of men's real free agency; but that is just what, of set purpose, is not done. The necessary inference, then, must be—and this is the inference drawn by the more unscrupulous necessitarians—that after all sin is no great evil, since it is often usefully employed, and its excesses are effectually guarded against by the sovereign providence of the Almighty. This view of the case is vividly exhibited in the following paragraph, which is worth a volume of mere speculations on abstractions:—

——"If the philosophy of Edwards be true, no good reason can be assigned why men should restrain themselves from the commission of sin; for, all things considered, God prefers the sin which actually exists, and infallibly brings it to pass. He *prefers* it on account of the great good he intends to educe from it. Why then should we not also prefer its existence? God is sovereign; he will permit no more sin than he can and will render subservient

to the highest good of the universe; and so much as is for the highest good he will bring into existence. Why then should we give ourselves any concern about the matter? Why should we fear that there may be too much sin in the world, or why should we blame other men for their crimes and offences?"—P. 104.

It seems, then, after all our concessions, in which very probably some of our readers will think we have overdone the matter, that this scheme—by ascribing to God's providence an absolute and universal efficiency in human affairs, and *following this into its logical consequences*—makes God the author of sin, and so effectually defeats itself.

The third chapter charges the scheme of necessity with denying the reality of moral distinctions, and discusses that point with much force and earnestness. Of the soundness of the charge we have no doubt, and only wonder that any who have examined the subject should have failed to see this, which probably would not have been the case had not their perceptions been obscured by their prepossessions. Nor has this tendency of the scheme been denied by all its advocates. It is well known that Spinoza, and the fatalists generally, use this scheme to prove the illusory character of all moral distinctions. Still we are not prepared to join in the praise of the superior logic of that class of sophists, since the conclusion to which they come is a very obvious one; and the readiness with which they grasp it indicates rather a want of regard for morality than an unusual degree of mental acumen. Like their predecessors, the ancient Stoics, these fatalists employ their doctrines chiefly to give license to their own lusts, and to break the restraints of virtue by proving it to be a mere phantom of the imagination. These are the anarchists of the moral world, who would prostrate all law that they may revel without restraint among the moral and social desolations. Logicians they may be, but of that class, however, who assume their premises without proof, and then persist in following out their conclusions regardless of their absurdities. The only good use that can be made of them, is to set them up as beacons to warn others of the dangerous nature of the system by which they have been shipwrecked.

Much the larger portion of this chapter is occupied with an examination of Edwards's scheme for reconciling the doctrine of necessity with the reality of virtue and vice,—or of the moral distinctions denominated *good* and *bad*. But while the author succeeds very well in placing his antagonist in a disadvantageous position—and in opposition to his own positions in other instances—he is, we think, less successful in his attempts to solve the diffi-

culties of the subject agreeably to his own theory. Edwards insists that in all beings possessed of moral natures—that is, of whom the attributes *right* and *wrong* may be predicated—a moral character must be presumed. Accordingly, when God made man with such a constitution, he was of course either morally good or bad; and as nothing corrupt or unholy could proceed from the divine hand, we must conclude that by a kind of necessity man was created holy. In this "original righteousness," agreeably to this scheme, consisted that "image of God" in which we are told Adam was created,—which is said to have comprised a real "righteousness and true holiness." So far, it seems to us, Edwards proceeds safely, and in accordance with the teaching of the Scriptures. He errs, however, in making man, after his creation, just as passive in all that he does or becomes, as he was in the work of his creation; for if indeed the good and the bad in human character and conduct are equally the result of divine efficiency, we must conclude not only that God is the author of sin, but that our distinctions of good and evil are illusory.

Our author readily succeeds in convicting the scheme of necessity of the charge he had brought against it; but we are compelled to dissent entirely from his reasoning on this subject. He begins by confining the whole of moral good and evil to the *actions* of free moral intelligences, and asserts that "there can be neither virtue nor vice in the breast of a moral agent prior to his own actings and doings." Now if the words here used are construed according to the author's own definition, given in another place, they announce a mere truism; for in that sense "virtue" and "vice" can be predicated only of actions. But this is not his meaning. He uses these terms as denoting abstract qualities, and as synonymous with the kindred but not always synonymous terms *virtuousness* and *viciousness*. Again: to speak of a moral "agent" that has never acted, is certainly not strictly philosophical; for only by *acting* can any one become an *agent*. It is evident, however, from accompanying remarks and illustrations, that by the phrase "moral agent," our author intends to designate only a being of whom moral properties may be predicated; and if so we would humbly but firmly dissent. If moral distinctions are found only in actions, then not only is the "agent" without them "*prior* to his own actings and doings," but subsequently also. If the human being has no moral character and qualities in himself, and distinct from his actions, then whenever he ceases to commit sin, *for any cause whatever*—whether from inability, or weariness, or sleep—he ceases to be a sinner. Between the first positions of our author and that of his mighty antagonist, we must therefore choose the latter; for to us nothing appears

plainer, or more agreeable to both reason and Scripture, than that a rational soul, made after the divine image,—from the necessities of the case, and wholly independent of its own agency, because anterior to its actings,—has certain moral characteristics which are developed with the growth of the mind. If man comes into existence with a moral constitution, he must have a moral character also; for to suppose a nature or entity without a character is absurd. This nature, which in a man since the fall has appeared under the form of a moral depravity, though neither actual sin nor positive guilt, is of the nature of sin, and it is most certainly obnoxious to the divine displeasure; and, by virtue of this native depravity, both actual sin and positive guilt certainly result, unless its tendencies are prevented by divine grace. It should also be observed that actions do not impart a moral character to their subject, but his character determines that of the actions, just as the fountain gives character to its streams, or the tree to its fruit.

We find similar confusion of terms, leading to like fallacies, a little further forward. "The truth is," he remarks, "that a virtuous act does not require an antecedent virtuous disposition or principle to account for its existence; nor does a vicious act require an antecedent vicious principle to account for its existence." Can the author mean that men perform really virtuous or vicious actions without any disposition to do so?—or is the question concerning the antecedency of disposition? But the very nature and office of a disposition supposes that it is antecedent to that as to which it is a disposition. We confess that here he is too hard for us,—that his positions appear not simply incorrect, but palpably absurd. He is, we are aware, an earnest advocate of the real and original freedom of the human will, and herein we agree with him; but surely he must have a strange idea of the nature of the will, if he can thus separate it from the dispositions in which, we hold, resides the whole of the moral character. And then how can that which has no moral character, nor any prevenient disposition to good or evil, perform a moral action at all? If, therefore, we understand the term *will* in its philosophical sense, as embracing the whole intelligent soul—the *me* in its most absolute manifestation,—then is it simply absurd to separate it from its essential properties and conditions: for a will without a disposition is a contradiction in terms. But if by the will is meant only the volitions,—that which Coleridge calls *the surface will*,—then is his position manifestly incorrect, since volitions are but results of the will's *dispositions* carried one stage forward; and they depend entirely, both for their existence and their character, upon the "antecedent dispositions or principles" of the will itself.

The theological consequences of this removing moral qualities from the person to his acts, and of denying that there can be holiness or unholiness prior to, and independent of the acts and deeds of the subject, are at once extensive and ruinous. Of course, under this theory there can be no such thing as "original or birth-sin;" and the penitential confession of the Psalmist, that he was shapen in *iniquity*, and conceived in *sin*, must be interpreted agreeably to the Socinian system, as relating to the actions of his parents, and not to his own depraved nature "prior to his own actings and doings." Then is it alike absurd to say that Adam was created in holiness, or that his posterity are born in sin; and the whole system of theological anthropology must be adjusted on the basis of the Pelagian philosophy. There are some bitter ingredients in the scheme of predestination which we greatly dislike; but as an alternative for this we would choose it nevertheless. But, thanks be to God, we are not compelled to have either of them.

Nor can we at all agree with our author's notions as to the character of those original and involuntary impulses, by virtue of which we entertain certain definite sentiments toward objective moral properties. His words are:—

> "The first man, by means of his intelligence, could contemplate the perfections of his Creator; and doing so, he could not but feel an emotion of admiration and delight. But this *feeling* was not his virtue. It was the natural and necessary result of the organization which God had given him."—P. 120.

Here is again a confusion of terms—a playing upon words—by reason of which the same proposition may be both true and false. If by "virtue" is intended that heroic quality which is exercised in overcoming difficulties, and resisting temptations to evil, it is very obvious that there was no *virtue* in the "admiration" and "delight" in God which swelled the bosom of Adam in Paradise; nor is there any in the adorations and praise of seraphim and cherubim. But will Professor Bledsoe also affirm that "there is no moral excellence in these feelings?" Does the fact that such emotions are "the natural and necessary results of the organization that God has given" them, take away all the virtuousness of these holy exercises? Love to God is itself only an emotion, and in certain conditions it is an involuntary and irresistible one; and yet we had fondly supposed that it is the highest manifestation of holiness in a creature. We can conceive of a degree of holiness of heart which may render the will completely subservient to its tendencies,—when piety shall become the necessary habit of the whole mind. Such we presume is the case with all spiritual beings that dwell in the beatific vision; and

yet we cannot doubt that the angels are holy beings, and that when they do the will of God, they do well, and act virtuously.

While, therefore, we fully concur in the truth of the proposition with which this chapter begins, we dissent from both its arguments which we have now noticed, and from its conclusions which we subjoin, to wit:—

"1. No necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice.

"2. In order that any act of the will should partake of a moral nature, it must be free from the dominion of causes over which it can have no control, or from whose influence it cannot depart.

"3. Virtue and vice lie not in the private state of the sensibility, nor in any other necessitated state of the mind, but in acts of the will, and in habits formed by a repetition of such free voluntary acts."—P. 131.

From all which we dissent, *toto cœlo.** The qualities designated by the words *virtue* and *vice* do not originate in the volitions, but reside in the interior will,—the intelligent soul,—and thence impart their own characters respectively to the acts of the will. Essential holiness, which is the highest form of virtue, dwells in infinite fulness in the divine nature. Thence it is derived to man, who was made in the divine image,—that is, in concreated virtue. Of this holiness in his creatures God's law approves, because it is conformed to itself, and for the opposite cause it condemns whatever is unholy. This essential and indwelling virtue operates as a virtuous disposition, and at length manifests itself in virtuous actions. But in all cases, wherever we detect the action of real virtue, we must refer it to the *will* itself, and not to the *acts* of the will.

We shall detain the reader but a little while with the consideration of the fourth chapter. Here we find much to approve and very little to condemn, and heartily concur in the truth of the leading proposition, that "the moral world [is] not constituted according to the scheme of necessity." The arguments upon this subject are compact and forcible, and very generally satisfactory. The fundamental error of the author's theology, arising from his philosophical misapprehensions, may indeed be traced even here, though not in an offensive form. His objections to the psychological basis of Calvinism are well taken, and both clearly and forcibly stated. We only regret that he has not been more successful in his attempt to develop a better system.

Near the close of this chapter we have a condensed summary of the author's objections to the scheme of necessity, which we transcribe, as a forcible and felicitous statement of the whole case:—

* We cannot concur in this broad dissent. Mr. Bledsoe means "necessitated *ab extra*;" and in that sense we deem his positions correct.—EDIT.

"But we have clearly shown, we trust, that the grand demonstration of the necessitarian is a sophism, whose apparent force is owing to a variety of causes:—First, it seeks out, and lays its foundation in, a false psychology; identifying the feelings, or affections, and the will. Secondly, by viewing the opposite scheme through the medium of this false psychology, it reduces its main position to the pitiful absurdity that a thing may produce itself, or arise out of nothing, and bring itself into existence; and then demolishes this absurdity by logic! Thirdly, it reduces itself to the truism, that a thing is always as it is; and being intrenched in this stronghold, it gathers around itself all the common-sense and all the reason of mankind, as well it may, and looks down with sovereign contempt on the feeble attacks of its adversaries. Fourthly, it fortifies itself by a multitude of false conceptions, arising from a hasty application of its universal truism, and not from a severe inspection and analysis of things. Fifthly, it decorates itself in false analogies, and thereby assumes the imposing appearance of truth. Sixthly, it clothes itself in deceptive and ambiguous phraseology, by which it speaks the language of truth to the ear, but not to the sense. And, seventhly, it takes its rise in a false method, and terminates in a false religion."—Pp. 164, 165.

The subject of the fifth chapter is one that has generally been esteemed peculiarly difficult; and not a few have declared it incapable of a complete elucidation. Many of the clearest thinkers, while maintaining that many things are well known as to both the human will and the divine agency in human affairs, nevertheless have believed that their line of contact cannot be definitely drawn; and we confess that with this view we entirely agree, and all the more strongly from the impressions made by reading this volume. But this is not our author's notion of the case. He remarks:—

"To describe these two spheres with clearness and precision, and to determine the precise point at which they come into contact without intersecting each other, is still a desideratum in the science of theology. We shall endeavour to define the human power and the divine sovereignty, and to exhibit the harmony subsisting between them, in such a manner as to supply, in some small degree at least, this great *desideratum* which has so long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences."—P. 168.

While we entirely doubt the possibility of what is here promised, but nowhere performed, we also deny that it is a "desideratum," or justly any reproach to the science of theology. The discussion that follows consists of an examination of the Pelagian and Augustinian "platforms," in which it is shown that the diverse stand-points of the disputants, as fixed by their diverse experiences, led to their discrepant observations:—

"Thus, the complex fact of consciousness, consisting in a state of the sensibility and a state of the will, was viewed from opposite points by Pelagius and Augustine. The voluntary phase of it was seen by Pelagius, and hence he became an exclusive and one-sided advocate of free-agency; the passive side was beheld by Augustine, and hence he became a one-sided and exclusive advocate of divine grace. If we would possess the truth, and the whole truth, we must view it on all sides, and give a better interpretation of the natural

consciousness of the one, as well as the supernatural consciousness of the other, than they themselves were enabled to give."—Pp. 177, 178.

But we look in vain for this "better interpretation,"—or at least we find none here that meets the difficulties of the case, by defining the line of contact of the two "spheres;" so that we are still compelled to trust something to God's superior wisdom.

The sixth chapter discusses that knottiest of all the questions that ever perplexed the human mind,—that of the existence of evil under the government of an infinitely wise, benevolent, and almighty Sovereign. So difficult has this question appeared to most who have considered it,—profound thinkers as well as devout worshippers,—that it has generally been given up as a mystery, which God has purposely revealed as a mystery, to teach men their own littleness, and to incline them to trust in God. Atheistical fatalists make use of the fact that evil exists, to prove that there can be no such Sovereign of the universe as theists pretend; but we deny their inference by denying their ability to judge in the case: otherwise we see not how to answer them in such an argument as our author frames for them:—

"Sin exists. This is the astounding fact of which the atheist avails himself. He has never ceased to contend, that as God has permitted sin to exist, he was either unable or unwilling to prevent it. God might easily have prevented sin, says he, if he had chosen to do so; and therefore his love of virtue is not infinite, his holiness is not unlimited. Now we deny this conclusion, and assert the infinite holiness of God."—P. 189.

We, too, "deny this conclusion;" but we find ourselves able to do so only because we are convinced that, as the subject is beyond our powers of investigation, any conclusion by mere inferences must be unworthy of confidence. All attempts to meet the atheists on other grounds have signally failed. The only ones that seem worthy of notice are those which propose to account for the existence of the present mixed state of affairs, as a system of *optimism*. But let not the reader be deceived by the high sound of the name into the supposition that this "optimism" has any great degree of positive good in it. It is only the best of a rather hard set of alternatives; and one may well exclaim that, if this is *optimum*, save us from *pessimum*. Leibnitz's optimism admitted evil into the world as the result of an eternal necessity in the nature of things, over which the divine will has no control; and this seems to be substantially the theory of some of our modern theosophists, though their metaphysical expositions of the subject are especially inconclusive. The optimism of Calvinism, as set forth by Edwards, makes the divine will the disposing and originating cause of evil, but with the controlling design to make

the present evil the occasion of ultimate good. "All events are ordered for the best," says Edwards, "and the evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness." This hypothesis—it is nothing more—coincides with the scheme of necessity as held and taught by the same theologians; and is, of course, obnoxious to the many and insuperable objections urged against that scheme. If, as we are told, that which appears as evil in its isolated state is found to be good when seen as part of an harmonious whole, then its evil is only relative, while in reality, and "on the whole," it is good. This is indeed a *theory* of optimism which every twinge of pain and every visitation of sorrow assures us is only a theory. It would be difficult to convince one who was suffering from neuralgia or the gout, that all he feels is only another form of pleasure; and especially would the awakened penitent hesitate to believe that his sins are, "on the whole," all for the best. That may be a sublime scheme to contemplate which rears its head to the highest heavens, but rests its foundations in the lowest hell: to the spectator it may seem very symmetrical; but to the sentient beings, whose place in this "harmonious whole" is in the "blackness of darkness forever," it, very probably, would seem quite otherwise. As a system, it has the advantage of great simplicity, which it gains at the expense of all moral beauty and excellence. It may exalt the majesty and power of God; but at the same time it obscures all his moral perfections, and presents him to our conceptions as an almighty tyrant.

But much as we dislike the optimism of the necessitarians, our disrelish of that of the pseudo-Arminians is still more intense. If it only declared the fact, that the creation of free moral agents, such as men are, made sin a possibility, and that the transgressor is responsible in the premises because he is free, we would gladly assent to it. But if we proceed a step further, and attempt to ascertain why God made man liable to such a fearful possibility, we honestly confess that the subject is too deep for our line; and because the most acute minds—including Professor Bledsoe—have been bewildered in the theme, we are compelled to believe that the subject is an inexplicable mystery. Not so, however, thinks our author, who fancies he sees the whole subject clearly. But we have read and reread his arguments and illustrations, and find ourselves never the wiser. Yet his whole manner of proceeding indicates great sincerity, and an unshaken confidence in the goodness of his cause. The position of his antagonist is fairly stated, and his own openly assumed; and then a war of both offence and defence is commenced and vigorously prosecuted. He thus endeavours to meet their objections:—

"Supposing God to possess perfect holiness, he would certainly prevent all moral evil, says the atheist, unless his power were limited. This inference is drawn from a false premiss; namely, that if God is omnipotent, he could easily prevent moral evil, and cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice. This assumption has been incautiously conceded to the atheist by his opponent, and hence his argument has not been clearly and fully refuted. To refute this argument with perfect clearness, it is necessary to show two things: first, that it is no limitation of the divine omnipotence to say it cannot work contradiction; and secondly, that if God should cause virtue to exist in the heart of a moral agent, he would work a contradiction. We shall endeavour to evince these two things, in order to refute the grand sophism of the sceptic, and lay a solid foundation for a genuine scheme of optimism, against which no valid objection can be urged."—Pp. 192, 193.

Of the "two things" here stated we probably have a less elevated notion than the author; for to us the first seems to be only a jingle of words, and the second obviously untrue. To affirm that God cannot work a contradiction, is itself a sophism; for it is the same as saying he can[not *do*] and [NOT DO] the same thing,—that is, to affirm nothing twice over, as any one may see by examining it. God cannot make a circle with the properties of a square; for a figure with the properties of a square is not a circle, and therefore the declaration is only that God cannot make a circle that is not a circle,—he can[not *do*] and [*not do*] the same thing.

As to the second "thing" we join issue with our author directly and in form. We deny that it is any contradiction to affirm that God can "make virtue to exist in the heart of a moral agent;" we affirm that he does this as a matter of fact. "Virtue" is here spoken of in the sense of moral goodness, or holiness,—for only as a property as distinguished from an action can it be predicated of the heart at all; or if this is not the meaning, then are terms used without the most remote adaptation to their purpose. We grant that sometimes the author seems to have in view not essential virtue, but virtuous action, when he uses the term in question; and he even teaches that the soul may be "endowed with the noblest attributes," and yet these endowments "are not its virtue." The question at issue is not on the meaning of a word,—whether "virtue" means "the possession of [certain] moral powers," or "the proper or obedient exercise of those powers;" but whether God is able to create a moral agent so endowed that his obedience and active holiness shall be inevitably certain. We believe that he can do this; and that myriads of happy spirits now rejoice that they were so created and endowed; and that the redeemed of our world who, dying in infancy, are made the passive and non-willing subjects of spiritual sanctification, will forever rejoice that God caused true holiness—the only genuine virtue—to exist in their hearts "in another way than by moral means." To

us it seems very plain that the property of the heart which produces all holy affections and exercises, is itself essential virtue, without reference to the mode of its production. Real freedom of volitionary action is not an essential condition of moral agency, though it is of a just responsibility. To constitute a moral agent it is only necessary to have a soul of which the properties, good and bad—in their moral acceptation—may be predicated, and the power of acting under its moral impulses. With such, for aught men can see, God might have peopled his universe, and so forever have precluded the possibility of sin. Why he has not done so, he has not informed us, and therefore we do not know.

The optimism promised us by our author turns out to be rather a sorry affair. The evil that exists cannot be denied; but we are coolly informed, for our consolation, that the state of things is as good as God could make it. He would have had no sin in his dominions, could he have had things to his liking; for although he is omnipotent, yet,—

"As sin is possible, then, though omnipotence is pledged to prevent its existence, it is clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine power.

"God hates sin above all things, and is more than willing to prevent it; and he actually does so, as far as this is possible to infinite wisdom and power.

"God does not choose sin, or permit it as the means of the highest good, as if there could be any higher good than absolute and universal holiness; but it comes to pass, because God has created a world of moral agents, and they have transgressed his law."—P. 201.

We must leave the reader to make his own deductions from these passages, simply remarking concerning the final declaration, in which the author seems to think he has explained the origin of evil, that this does not meet the question,—which is not by what process did sin become a contingency in human affairs; but why did a holy God, who "hates sin above all things," so constitute his creatures that sin was originally a possibility, and eventually a reality with them? But this question is only deferred; he presently meets it directly,—and in answering it, he makes out the existence of moral evil to be, "on the whole," a very good thing. He shall state the case himself:—

"It may be said that we have not yet gone to the bottom of the difficulty; that although omnipotence could not deny the capacity to commit sin to a moral agent, [*we* do not grant this,] yet God could prevent moral evil, by refusing to create any being who he foreknew would transgress his law. . . . Why did he not, in this way, spare the universe that spectacle of crime and suffering which has been presented in the history of our fallen race? To this we answer, that God did not choose to prevent sin in this way, but to create the world exactly as he did, though he foresaw the fall and all its consequences;

because the highest good of the universe required the creation of such a world," [with its consequences, of course.]—P. 203.

Surely if so much good has come from the existence of sin,—good that could have been reached in no other way,—we must believe that infinite wisdom and benevolence had an efficient hand in its production. An agency, upon which, as an instrumental cause, rest the foundations of the throne of God, and the best interests of all orders of intelligences, was certainly never left to the contingencies of human volitions, without the determinative interference of the divine providence. And if this is *optimism*, we beg to be let alone in the present mixed state, awaiting in cheerful expectation the developments of a higher state, and quite satisfied with such assurances as, "I shall behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness." We have too strong a disrelish for sin to consent to believe that it is among the essential agencies by which the empire of the Almighty is sustained, and that the salvation of angels and the "spirits of just men made perfect" is effectuated only by its existence and results. And we fail to see any single advantage in this scheme of necessity over any of its rivals, against which our author argues so conclusively. On this subject it is no difficult matter to overturn any and all opposing schemes; but to set up a counter scheme is to expose one's self to equally effective attacks.

There is an argument in favour of the usefulness of sin, *on the whole*, sometimes inadvertently used by those who would earnestly reject the details of any such scheme of optimism, that demands a moment's notice. We are told that the incarnation of the Son of God is the divinely ordained means of revealing the divine person and the glory of his name to all his rational creatures; and it is further assumed,—tacitly, and often inconsiderately,—that, but for the fall of Adam, there would have been no incarnation: thus making the introduction of sin into the world a necessary anterior condition to all the glorious results of the incarnation. We object to this, first, because if indeed the incarnation were a result of the fall, we have no right to assume that the same glorious manifestations could not have been made by other means. It is going a little too far to assume that the resources of Heaven are not adequate to all contingencies; and that in the failure of these resources, sin must be brought in to make up the defect. But we deny the right of any to assume that the incarnation is the result of sin in the world, and that it was not among the original designs of the Father of mercies in the creation of our race. Any such assumption is wholly gratuitous, and any inference made from it is without a solid foundation.

Though the sufferings of the incarnate God were caused by sin, we are slow to believe that his incarnation itself was only an after thought, brought in upon man's apostasy. As so, this dismal scheme of optimism proceeds by unwarranted assumptions and complicated sophisms to dishonour God, and cast a lurid shadow over man's destiny.

The final chapter of this "Part" examines such objections as seemed to the author most likely to be urged against his scheme. First among these is, that it may be objected to as "new theology," which indeed is a just ground of suspicion, though not a direct objection. In such a science as theology, which was perfected by its great author nearly eighteen hundred years ago, no truths really new can be brought forth; though we might conceive of the possibility of bringing old and neglected truth out of the rubbish of error in which it had long lain concealed and forgotten. We do not think, however, that our author should be troubled or otherwise affected by the notion that his scheme is a novelty; for it was examined and rejected by the primitive Church more than thirteen hundred years ago. The objection that it limits the divine omnipotence is, we think, well taken; for all the attempts of the writer to dispel this necessary inference from his premises are wholly unsuccessful. An omnipotence that cannot do whatever a rational mind may conceive as a subject of power, is no omnipotence at all. Nor is the author any more successful in repelling the objection that his scheme "presents a gloomy view of the universe." Indeed, he virtually grants as much, but thinks his not quite as bad as that of the Calvinian necessitarians; and we feel no wish to judge between them. That it is obnoxious to the charge of exalting the pride of the human heart, seems to us undeniable; and this itself is a fatal objection. In demolishing the structures of his rivals the author shows no little force, as well as much ingenuity in detecting their fallacies; but, as a builder, he is as unsuccessful as any of them.

We have confined ourselves to the first "Part" exclusively in what we have thus far written, and we have neither the space nor the presumption to proceed in the same manner to the end of the volume: nor is that needful, as the same general characteristics, both good and bad, that have been noticed in the portion discussed, prevail in about the same degree and proportion in the remaining part. The leading sophism of the former part—to wit, that virtue or holiness cannot be caused to exist by divine power—is carried into this part as a premiss, and of course it leads to some strange conclusions. As often happens, the author's opposition to the scheme of necessity and its terrible results, drives him away from the basis of gospel

truth upon which that scheme has been unhappily built. The determination to bring the whole subject of the divine administration to the bar of reason and philosophy, lays upon him the necessity of forcing some things into strange positions and unnatural relations.

We have read this volume with much interest, and, we may add, with much satisfaction as to its general properties, whether of composition or argumentation; and, while dissenting from the writer's theory of the origin of evil, and from his notions of the nature of the divine government, we are far from condemning the work as a whole. It will provoke thought in the minds of all who read it, and properly appreciate its subject and arguments; and, if it finds the requisite humility in the reader, even its errors will be harmless. The book is just what might be expected as the result of the horrible scheme of predestinarian necessity; for we differ with the author as to the supposed influence of his intellectual history upon his fitness for the inquiries in which he has engaged. The deformities of the system he opposes, when fairly seen by the mind that had embraced it as the truth, often produce such an intense hatred of it as to impel the individual to the opposite extreme. Accordingly, we find that many of the most zealous promoters of Universalism and Unitarianism were once Calvinists; but unhappily, in rejecting the errors of that system, they have also abandoned its basis of gospel truth. Evangelical Arminianism has more to dread from this class of persons than from all its ancient enemies. We heartily congratulate our friend on his escape from the iron net of Calvinian necessity, and we consider the intense dislike of that system which he everywhere manifests a very natural and altogether venial state of feeling; but he must not expect that we shall, at his bidding, cast away our ancestral faith,—the genuine Arminianism of the Bible,—though much of its substance has been held by Calvinists. The zeal of a neophyte is proverbial, and perhaps not discreditable to its subject; yet it is not always to be trusted as a rule of judging and acting.

We may repeat, in closing, a remark made in substance in another place: Ours is an age of free thinking; we rejoice that it is so, though we are very sensible that there is danger in the exercise. This danger, however, is not to the cause of truth, but to the individual speculators who may become bewildered or lost in the mazes of their own irrational or unwise dogmatizings; or, overcome by the greatness of the themes they vainly attempt to comprehend, settle down in an equally unphilosophical scepticism. The theology of the times demands a new adjustment; it must have it, and we expect soon to see this needed work accomplished. The *basis* of the old orthodoxy is immovable; but its superstructure is faulty, and must

be remodelled. But we want no new theology; "the old is better." Nor are we prepared to reject all, or the chief part of the theology of modern Protestantism. Whatever destiny may await the name of Arminius, his theology is destined to become the catholic faith of the Church in that state of glorious development upon which the Church is just entering. The thing immediately needed at this juncture is such a delineation of that theology, upon the basis of the better psychology of the age, and agreeable to the plain teachings of the Scriptures, as shall neither hesitate to accept of whatever is there taught, nor presume by unwarranted inferences and deductions to supplement its fancied defects. The hand that shall prepare that work must be guided by an understanding over which the mephitic clouds of a false system have never cast their deadly influences, and impelled by a heart whose lively experience of the fearful demerits of sin, and of the freeness and abundance of the grace of the gospel, shall have caused to coëxist in its deep interior consciousness a genuine penitence and a lively faith in God. That there are such among us we have no doubt; may we not also hope that some such one may speedily perform this good work?

Art. VII.—THE GROUND AND METHOD OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique Philosophique. Par A. A. Cournot, Inspecteur Général de l'Instruction Publique. Paris and New-York.

The author of the work before us thinks "philosophy" too much neglected by the cultivators of the sciences, and endeavours to restore it to a share of favour. And to this end he thinks it requisite to try to prove it to be something different—*essentially* and *permanently* different—from science, in opposition to the French opinion of the day, that they are one at bottom.

In this subsidiary proposition, whether as a means or as a doctrine, it will be indicated in the sequel that M. Cournot is mistaken. But by a fortune, not unfrequent in the history of speculation, the end he aims at is subserved no less by his critical survey of human knowledge; for though he does not, and cannot prove that *true* philosophy is a sort of knowledge fundamentally distinct from real science, he, by his generally excellent delineation of the former, unfolds its bearing on the latter as an indispensable coadjutor.

The *critical* method of the author—which means the absence of all method—will apprize the reader of the impossibility of a succinct analysis of the treatise. We can only take the topics in the random order of the chapters—connecting them, however, when it may casually be feasible; connecting upon occasion the separate results by provisional comments; in fine, collecting at the close those broken threads of explanation at the same time with the author's fundamental error above indicated, into the unity of a single systematic clew.

The author commences properly with the discussion of knowledge in general, which he finds founded on illusion or on reality, the reality being subdivided into relative and absolute. In all phenomena we can know thoroughly only the *form;* the substance is to us mysterious, perhaps unattainable. But on such properties as spring from form, we may reason competently notwithstanding. With little knowledge of the constitution of either light or of crystalline bodies, we have a systematic science of catoptrics. In utter ignorance of the molecular construction of a drop of water, we act and reason on the formal laws of hydrostatics and dynamics; and this because *all* properties proced from "form," only more or less immediate or accumulative. In fact, this universal homogeneousness is precisely what makes it possible to reason safely from a partial knowledge of phenomena. For if such properties as may be known were not congeneric with the unknowable, no doubt the consequences of the former would be sometimes found at fault; if what is called substance had any properties inherent in itself, and thus contrasted, like the mother conceptions, with those of form, it must be manifest that, in their absolute exclusion from our computations, we should never have ascertained a law, or explained a form, of physical nature. The very fact, then, of having done so, and already so extensively, is proof positive that the moot knowledge of the intimate nature of matter or substance were an attainment no less superfluous than it is impossible.

The cause of this impossibility the author well assigns in the following limitation of human knowledge: "We conceive clearly that all perception, that is to say, all knowledge implies a subject perceiving and an object perceived, and consists in a relation between the two terms."—P. 8. A false appearance of such relation, through some derangement of the subject, is that which M. Cournot terms illusion. The perception of it as it exists really he considers a true phenomenon; and this, in fine, may be distinguished into relative and absolute—the latter being a reality which may be conceived mentally, but without hope of actually attaining it. The three divi-

sions are exemplified familiarly in the following case. When a passenger, on board a river boat, imagines seeing the land in motion, the perception is an illusion, a false appearance; and it proceeds from a disturbance of the normal state of the percipient, the transportation of his body through space, without the exercise of muscular action, and which the senses, made to look abroad, refer mechanically to the object. When his eyes report the motion of a man who walks the deck, the perception is, on the contrary, a phenomenon or real appearance. Yet this reality may be but relative to the system of the boat: the motion of the promenader may be right opposite in direction, and just equal in velocity, to that of the vessel, and then the result would be real fixity in relation to the shore. But then, again, the shore's fixity is merely relative to the earth; it is in rapid and double motion with relation to surrounding space. In fine, the earth, which is in turn in real repose as to the sun's centre, is yet in motion, with the solar system, by a more *absolute* degree of reality, around a centre still ulterior, and so on without known end. It is the ultimate of these gradations of relativity that M. Cournot, while allowing it to be unattainable, pronounces to be quite conceivable, and so denominates the "absolute" reality.

In all this there appears a number of inexactnesses. In the first place, the highest possible degree of objective reality could not conceivably be otherwise than relative still to the percipient. The author, in asserting the contrary, must have deceived himself by the supposition of an intelligence placed external to the human subject as well as to the object. Nor, in the next place, does the progression of reality, above exemplified, take place at all in the line of "absoluteness," or the knowledge of "things in themselves;" but in the accuracy or extension of our perception of their relations to us. The conception of the earth's repose, for instance, was not absolute in even the ancients, as the author would seem to argue from their unconsciousness of its real motion: so far otherwise, that the conception, while it was relatively real, was, on the contrary, regarded as *absolutely* an illusion. And such are, similarly, all our notions of rest or fixity in the universe—the sole phenomenon, real or relative, (including perception itself,) being motion.

This latter error discloses further that the author is, on the other hand, scarce less unhappy in the definition of illusion than that of absoluteness. He confines it, as we have seen, to the subjective term of the relation; whereas we have just observed it may be equally occasioned by the objective. So true is this, that the two sources divide the modes of hallucination—the subjective errors

being the cause of insanity, the objective of idiotism. The perception of the intermediate line of *relation* and reality is what we practically term sense, and philosophically science.

The interconnexion of the aggregate of such relations in the universe supplies the subject of the second chapter, under the title of "The Reason of Things."

Reason, like the term judgment, idea, perception, is employed ambiguously; it sometimes signifies a faculty inherent in the mind perceiving, at others it denotes a principle residing in the things perceived. The occasion of this ambiguity in the ontological vocabulary, and which has puzzled so long the writers upon logic and metaphysics, we have just suggested in criticising the author's origin of illusion, and in extending it, alike, to both the terms of perception; for the interchange between the notions would produce, *à fortiori*, an interchange or a community of name. And the common fact of this community is, by the way, a confirmation of our amendment of the theory of cognoscence. As to the import, however, of reason, the author well defines it thus: "The faculty of apprehending the reason of things, or the order according to which facts, laws, relations—the objects of knowledge—are concatenated, and proceed from one another."—P. 29. Here the term, though it seem accorded at once to subject and to object, is reserved effectually to the relation, the correspondence between both factors. And such is also the natural remedy which time and science will administer gradually to all the similar ambiguities of language; their oscillations between the subjective and objective points of view will subside into the fixed and single designation of relation.

But this reason, or harmonical relation of phenomena, the author further well distinguishes from the ideas of *force* and *cause*. "The feeling of muscular tension suggests to man the idea of force, which, being associated with the notions of materiality driven through the senses, becomes the basis of the entire system of the physical sciences. As to the idea of cause, the metaphysicians have cavilled enough to leave it plain, that it proceeds from the intimate feeling of man's activity and personality, and is transferred by him spontaneously into the workings of the exterior world. Whereas, for reason it is impossible to assign a psychical, a subjective origin."—P. 30. And then he goes on at length to explain reason by examples. But this would all have been unnecessary had the author conceived fully the profound import of his own distinctions, just transcribed, or could he recognise the consequences of his definition of human knowledge. For, in truth, *force*—which is the generalized expression of life—represents the *objective* and primitive explanation of

nature; *cause*—which is the generalized expression of will—represents the *subjective* and second conception; what, then, could reason be but the principle of the *relational* explanation, which is precisely what M. Cournot writes a long chapter to define indifferently?

He discusses with no deeper insight the Aristotelian classification of causes, which is perfectly resolvable into the system just suggested; but in this he does no worse than all his predecessors on that moot subject, not excepting even Aristotle himself. He thinks his notion derives more light from the "sufficient reason" of Leibnitz. He criticises, notwithstanding, this famous principle with some acuteness. The epithet "sufficient" he thinks superfluous, as reason *must* be sufficient, for otherwise it would not be a reason. The principle itself he also notices to be negative, but does not thence conclude it to be nugatory. Yet it clearly serves no purpose to say that all things have a reason, since the only question can be: *What* each special reason is? But M. Cournot's very creditable admiration of its great author must have disguised from him the somewhat Germanic *naïveté* of this pretended method.

From the order of things in space, the author passes to their order in time. But in this he does not recognise a similar amplitude of harmony. On the contrary, he thinks the general succession of events to proceed in series often linear, and independent of each other. The crossing or conjunction of two or more of these alien series would be the basis—an objective basis—of the doctrine of chances.

This doctrine is of two kinds, or rather two degrees of application; it investigates *impossibility* and *improbability*. The notion of impossibility (which does not here, however, go so far as to imply an utter contradiction, but merely that which never happens) is again divided into *mathematical* and *physical*. That the only white ball among an infinite number of black ones should be first extracted by a blind man is a mathematical impossibility. That the concussion of two round bodies, rushing aimlessly through space, should pass exactly through the centres is a physical impossibility. The alleged difference between the cases is represented by a heavy body, whose self-support upon its apex is deemed a physical impossibility, although the fact of equilibrium be mathematically very possible. As to the doctrine of *improbability*, or probability, it is irrelative, both in division and definition to the preceding, so that mathematical *probability* is the measure of physical *possibility;* as is physical probability of philosophical certainty—to which the author proceeds accordingly, as we shall find in the following chapter.

On the subject of the present chapter, M. Cournot, as a writer of much distinction on the mathematics of calculation, is quite at home. It is, therefore, with due diffidence that we adventure some objections to his philosophy of chance, of which the foregoing is a condensed abstract. We have, however, the high support at once of Hume and of La Place, of whom the former defined chance to be "our ignorance of the true causes," and the latter explained probability (another aspect of the same thing) to "relate in part to our degree of knowledge and in part to our degree of ignorance." Whereas M. Cournot assigns to chance, as we have seen, an objective reality, and says that even boundless knowledge would not eliminate it from the course of nature.

Yet his ultimate principle of the conception, we mean mathematical impossibility, he rests upon *infinitude*, as in the instance of the black balls. But what is infinity but a negation, a mere name for our positive ignorance? To the savage a small number is a similar infinity, which he accordingly expresses by referring to the hair of his head. Still less could chance be real, then—be other than our ignorance, in what is termed physical impossibility. The author errs not only as to the import of the term chance, but above all in his exposition of the idea. To find this objective reality, he assumes series of causation which would be absolutely independent of each other. We say *assumes*, for of the proposition he has scarce attempted a serious proof. He even makes an indirect surrender of the question. For in defining his distinct series as "developing themselves parallelwise or consecutively, without exercising the least influence upon one another," he adds in a parenthesis, "or (what comes to the same *to us*) without exercising on each other any influence at all *appreciable*."—P. 51. Here, we see, is the alleged objective independence of the series allowed to vanish into the subjective capacity of the percipient! The concession does not comprise the less for being shut in by a parenthesis.

But in addition to all this, the hypothesis is inconsistent, on the one hand with the author himself, and on the other with sound philosophy. M. Cournot is a firm adherent to the doctrine of chances: but that theory consists in holding that, upon a sufficient number of trials, a law of certitude may be discovered among events the most seemingly casual. Now, whence this law, if not from interdependence immediate or original? The author also, in the preceding chapter, had insisted upon the principle of such an interdependence among all things in space, and takes for the motto of his book this phrase of Pliny: *Harmonica ratio, quæ cogit rerum naturam*

sibi ipsi congruere. Now, how could the distinct series, which he pretends to be independent, become emancipated from the action, or at least the impulse of this fundamental harmony? and if they did, how could they afterward compel reciprocal congruity? Here is a dilemma which even hypothesis could not elude. But the hypothesis of M. Cournot is opposed, moreover, we have said, to sound science; for it is a scientific axiom throughout inanimate as well as animate nature, that all causation, all progression in the order of time, is a development or *systematic* transformation of order in space.

To incur this mass of blunders, both logical and philosophical, a man of M. Cournot's eminence must have been under some strong delusion. He was probably distracted by the common prepossession of an imaginary lawlessness in the primordial dispersion of matter. Mr. Mill, in his *System of Logic*, flounders lengthily upon this question, and leaves it finally in a worse condition than that assigned it by despised theology: for theologians find in the Deity an explanation of the distribution—a sort of principle of concentration, if not of order; whereas Mr. Mill, who would doubtless scorn as simply infantile this grand doctrine, resigns the original *constitution* of the universe to rank chaos. The present writer, with a deeper insight, both mathematical and philosophical, displays a consciousness, however dim, of something better. Remarking (p. 65) that the "notions of extension and motion are insufficient, and must always be so, to account for all phenomena;" that there are many, such as the moral and mental acts of living beings, which can only be reduced to rule by the calculations of the theory of chances, he observes that this most extended application of the science of number goes far to justify the ancient apothegm of *Mundum regunt numeri.* He restricts, indeed, the observation still to "secondary causes." But had he followed the extension of the law of number not only forward, but also backward to its primordial and peculiar province in the state called chaos, he had doubtless never theorized upon the objectivity of chance in nature The firm conception of this first of laws *as in itself a bond of order*, while the highest effort of the human mind, perhaps, is the last requisite of complete science.

The "philosophical probability," which is the theme of the next chapter, being made dependent, like the mathematical, on the existence of chance, need not, now that such an existence has been excluded, be discussed. How ill, in fact, it merits notice, is exhibited besides directly in the author's own definition of the idea. "It is," says he, "a subjective and variable probability, which sometimes excludes doubt and begets a certainty *sui generis*, and which at other

times appears no more than a mere vacillating gleam;" and he terms it *philosophical*, "because resulting from the exercise of that superior faculty by which we extricate the order of nature."—P. 98. If this have any definite meaning, the superior faculty alluded to is, on the contrary, simply the mind's *unity*, which makes us fancy, till we find, this order; and the "subjective and variable probability," is merely dawning evidence, which lights the way for the application of conscious method.

Not improperly, then, does the author associate in the same chapter with this probability the treatment of induction and analogy. He also treats them tolerably, judged comparatively with most writers. He commences by remarking well that "the two methods are *much alike*, and are not always to be distinguished from one another." He cites the cloudy and even clumsy definition of both by Kant, and points out easily *several species* of non-included *inductions*. But, besides, in even Kant's idea, we do not, he adds, "see quite clearly what difference there is between attributing to a thing, by induction, what belongs to another thing of the same kind, or concluding, by analogy, that it possesses the quality which has been found in an object of the same genus."—P. 93. After discussing some other opinions, he states his own in the following terms: "Consulting etymology, which is almost always the best of guides, we should in strictness understand by *analogy* a process of the mind which rises, by the observation of relations, to the reason of those relations, for want of being able to descend from the immediate conception of principles to the explanation of the relations which proceed from, and are contained in them; whereas *induction* is more especially the process of the mind which, instead of stopping short on the immediate confines of observation, pursues its onward route, prolongs the line described, yields, so to say, for some time still to the law of motion which was impressed upon it, but not in a blind and necessary manner; for reason tells it why it would be wrong in resisting, and takes the charge of fully justifying what might have been in the beginning no other than a mere instinctive tendency."—P. 95.

Remarking by the way that this *tendence instinctive* is the identical "superior faculty" above paraded, it must be owned that M. Cournot's definitions are not vastly clearer, in either expression or conception, than those of Kant. They are, however, more correct at bottom, as may be indicated in few words. In the first place, he notes a close resemblance between induction and analogy, and alludes to even several sorts of induction. The truth is, that both analogy and all the other methods proper are but progressive modifications of induction; modifications that result conjointly from the complexity

of the subject-matter and the proficiency in positive knowledge of the investigator. In the next place, this distinction is in reality identical with that the author makes between induction and analogy. The latter, he says expressly, proceeds upon *relations*, pursuing backwards their law or reason, but stopping short with the observed facts; whereas induction runs beyond, but whether also upon relation, he eludes saying, and from the obvious motive that he did not know distinctly. A word of explanation will give him significance and even system.

Induction, in its primary form, takes the name of enumeration, as corresponding to the first and simplest of the laws of nature, which is number. It here proceeds upon *single qualities*, whether subjective or objective, and in a line without direction, and consequently without felt limits. This, we see, is just the character of M. Cournot's so-called induction, as well as also (in a singular aspect) of his calculation of chances, which answers literally to the specific term *enumeration;* for this pioneer method is still the same in its application to moral statistics as when first applied to the mathematics, which had doubtless also their epoch of "chance." Analogy, which is the second of the forms of induction, proceeds accordingly upon relation; that is to say, a *double* quality, or the conformity between two qualities of the same object or phenomenon. Resting firmly in its two abutments, and presenting the notion of a *transverse* line, the subject-matter of analogy appears complete within itself; whereas the basis of enumeration, supported only at one of its ends, leaves the mind that yearning for the complementary extremity of the relation which M. Cournot calls "instinctive tendency" and "philosophical probability."

His definitions, then, contain the fragmentary marks of truth, as far as he goes, and only needed the light of principle and arrangement. Having mended his imperfections, let us try to fill up his deficiencies by noticing briefly the remaining stages of induction.

Enumeration and analogy, proceeding equally upon resemblances, in the former among mere qualities, in the latter among relations, must go on of course like parallel lines, without ever meeting or enclosing a system, and could only institute a crowd of isolated and empirical generalities. The system or enclosure which the human mind had been throughout aspiring to, in its endeavour to take in the order or the aggregate of phenomena, became now practicable, through these two preparatory results. The problem was to find a method of combining the disparate pairs, which would by propagation end with weaving the sensible universe into one tissue. We have defined, then, and even denominated, *à priori*, the syllogism.

Pursuing the author's likening of enumeration to a line, we might call analogy a surface, and syllogism a solid; containing thus the three dimensions indispensable to real constructions. No doubt the pedant and the sciolist will smile disdainfully at this comparison; but we beg to say that the exposition is not intended for their intelligence. If our presumption should ever swell so near a level with their own as to inspire the hardihood of undertaking to inform them in anything, we shall take care to be better furnished with famous names and with learned references, than with argument, analysis, and science.

The foregoing forms of induction compose the system of logic proper, the province of which is to trace the harmony of things in space or coexistence. This accomplished, the same three processes are reapplied, in the same order, to the exploration of the different harmony of things in time, succession, and creation. Here they may be named specifically, in accordance with their modified uses, observation, instrumentation, experimentation: the first proceeding, like enumeration, upon individualities, but no longer, like it, passively, spontaneously, superficially, but now actively, inquisitively, introvertedly; the second employing the analysis between the properties or rather relations of certain instruments and the physical objects to be explored; the third, in fine, combining, like the syllogism, its predecessors in an effort to produce the compounds of nature. From the main character of the phenomena of this second order, which are all interior, and enfolded in the complications of creation down the plane of time, the triad of methods is named collectively the analytic system. But these *interior* and *exterior* views of nature would be still dissevered, and in precisely the like predicament as that of analogy and enumeration. And just as these had been combined, we saw, by a third method, into *system*, so a third system is in time requisite to harmonize the two preceding, to compose the statics and the dynamics of the universal organism into the unity of nature and the *solidarity* of science. This, in accord with its destination, is named the synthetic system; and the modifications which it impresses on the three forms of induction are termed deduction, classification, and science.

This exposition could not possibly be otherwise here than abstract; to exemplify, however succinctly, its several steps, would take our entire space. We are happy, therefore, to be able to refer to the work before us for a rich variety of examples to the purpose. Indeed this feature is its main fault, or (if you will) its excellence, as a composition. M. Cournot is tediously partial to arguing by cases and explaining by instances—denoting a mind of rather complete

scientific knowledge and discipline, than of originative power or of ratiocinative energy.

He launches, notwithstanding, into the highest and boldest speculations, as, for example, in the ensuing chapter, into the theory of final causes. His conclusions, too, upon this subject are perhaps as sound as was compatible with his hypothesis, above refuted, of accidental causation. Excluding the notion that the universe was made for man, he restricts the operation of the illusory "design" within the limits of each order or organism of creation, and seems to hold that the diversity of these creations must be the result of a successive superinduction of foreign causes. But it is strange he should not note that, although independent causes might happen to be successively so far conformable to one another, that their effects would offer also a regular series for two or three terms; the improbability of a continuance must have long become an impossibility, (even according to his favourite calculation of chances,) before completing the progressive series already established in the works of nature. This regularity of the effects of course refutes a random causation; which is, moreover, disposed of above by other arguments. We may add, however, a concession of the author himself to the same effect, and which the general lack of comprehensiveness, if not of coherence in his logic, left his profound knowledge of mathematics free to state:—

"If we suppose," says he, "a sporadic mass of material particles, distributed irregularly at all distances from each other, and moving with any velocities whatever, but submitted besides to forces which attract them towards each other, it must happen at the expiration of a sufficient length of time that those particles will be agglomerated into a body of a regular figure, of which the regular movement of rotation and of translation will be a sort of mean between the different movements of the divers particles in the sporadic state. Order will thus rise spontaneously from the bosom of primordial chaos."—P. 106.

But where, then, is the place or origin for your pretended "independent causes?" For what is true of the formation of a single body from the atomic state, can be no less so of all the bodies in the universe, which form, in fact, progressively, comets, satellites, planets, suns; but sporadic particles of a superior complication. Nor is it necessary (as the author must be mathematician enough to know) to compromise the two conceptions, completely positive, of matter and motion, by postulating the metaphysical entity of a force of attraction; for attraction is but motion towards a vortex or a centre.

The author hitherto in his discussion of the probabilities of our knowledge has treated only of the inferences or conclusions from received premises, taking for granted the reality of the premises

themselves in the existence, such as we perceive it, of the external world. But this existence has been contested, and so he now proceeds in turn to apply his tests of probability to that preposterous objection.

A refutation of the subtle sophistry of Berkeley and the German visionaries is quite possibly not yet superfluous, even to philosophic readers, and M. Cournot's long chapter of detailed criticism on the subject may thus be one of the most edifying in the book. He, however, neglects the only argument that could be absolutely peremptory, though it is no other than his own definition of all knowledge. For this consisting (as he says truly) in a "relation between two terms," it follows inevitably that all knowledge, from the lowest sensation to the highest science, implies the existence of both those terms, infers the objective as well as the subjective world; on the other hand, from either term we cannot, in absence of the relation, infer the existence of the other, and may even deny it. Now, this precisely is the condition of that epoch of the human mind, in which the abstract notion of *relation* is in the rudimentary state of attribute, restricted concretely to either abutment under name of "faculties" or of "qualities," imagined both to be inherent, exclusive and occult. Your ontologist, accordingly, who takes his stand on either side, can prove at least to those about him that the other side is but a phantasm, and that one half our world of knowledge contains the whole; while a brother sophist, on the opposite side, does just the contrary no less conclusively. Thus did Fichte, for instance, posted on the subjective term of knowledge, exorcise from out his Ego the material universe, and even the Deity; while Schelling, stationed upon this universe, resolved the Ego into his Absolute. But when the intellect becomes mature enough to recognise that it can know quite nothing of either objective or subjective side save as supporters of a relation, then this speculative thimblerigging is at an end.

Still the notion of relation, though thus conclusive of the external world, may not be forcibly convincing if considered only singly. If its two constituent elements of qualities and faculties could be discovered to present a series among themselves, and so with the others, the demonstration would of course be multiplied progressively at every step. It was probably this application of his everlasting theory of chances that has suggested to M. Cournot the freshest idea in his book. The series just supposed has of late been actually established among the "qualities," the objective end of the relations; and accordingly, the result of this scientific series has been to rout ontology from physical nature to its sole asylum in the mind. Now, the suggestion of M. Cournot would again dislodge it from this last

retreat, by recognising some sort of series among the "faculties." We cite in full his observations upon the subject:—

"Above all, (that is, the arguments the author has adduced,) it is necessary to distinguish that *subordination among our faculties which can alone supply us a control of, and a clew to, seeming contradictions.* For want of this distinction there is no possibility, properly speaking, of philosophical discussion: there is but an endless multiplication of pretended primitive and irreducible 'facts;' but incessant appeals to the criterion of 'common sense,' which is equivalent to the multiplication, in physics, of occult qualities, and is a procedure quite repugnant to theoretical organization."

The latent conformity of this just criticism to the principles above laid down, as those distinctive of the metaphysical philosophy, will be found striking. The primitive facts and common sense are a palpable hit at the Scotch school, and its still more wretched race of French followers for the last half-century. But the panacea to all this trifling, the subordination among the faculties, is not expounded, we shall see, with great precision or profundity:—

"It is a prejudice common among enlightened people that man, being unable to judge but by the aid of his faculties, cannot, therefore, be in a position to criticise those faculties. But if man has several faculties, if they be ordered hierarchically, and not simply associated, the faulty individuality of the *à priori* judgment disappears. Now, the explanations given hitherto, with those which are to follow, will render evident, at least we hope so, the fact of this serial coördination. The senses are but the instruments of the reason: and as man attains a knowledge, through the medium of the senses, of the causes of error inherent in the implements of his own creation, so he may, under certain conditions, attain assurance of the causes of error which might reside in the natural implements at the disposal of his reason."—P. 173.

This, we see, is sufficiently meager and misty. The points to be established were distinctly and successively these: first, the fact of the subordination; second, its order; and third, its operation. The *fact* is proved by nothing which the author had presented hitherto, and but (as will be seen) quite indirectly by any evidence in the sequel. As to the *order*, he scarce attempts to trace its terms, save in the senses, which are, moreover, not the faculties in question. His conception of the *operation* may be observed in the passage cited, where he speaks of reason as the corrector and controller of the subject senses. But, aside from his omission of all the *mental* faculties proper that intervene between the reason and the senses, (which are *physical* organs,) he might be asked for the corrector and controller of reason in turn, which, being supreme of all the faculties, would be left *absolute* at the head of the scale, and could thus be argued by a metaphysician to be as "occult" as any of the rest. *Au reste*, M. Cournot, with his habitual modesty and candour, avows distrust of his resources, in expressing only a *hope* of doing better;

and the mere suggestion of the idea, even as a logical expedient, and more especially as a foundation for the positive science of mind, would leave his work, in this particular, without a rival, or a predecessor, with only one, but a decisive, exception.

In an essay which was published some two or three years since in this city, and which was consequently too outlandish, and has continued too obscure for M. Cournot to have ever seen, or even heard of it—this graduation of the mental faculties had been established systematically, and determined in the double aspect of subordination and of operation. Even application had been made of the result to the purpose aimed at by M. Cournot, as may be seen from a single sentence of the discussion: "While the modes of mind were considered as isolate, to explain one was to explain all, or rather all appeared alike inexplicable, as was shown in fact by Hume, and is, indeed, the nature of all elementary individuality; but link them in *relation*, and let the relation be *progressive*, and the progression be *complication* of a unity, and there will thenceforth be a three-fold necessity for an external and continuous cause."*

The author of this passage (which is proved at large in his opening chapter) had then done more than has been designed, or rather desiderated by M. Cournot. The latter sought merely a mental series in which the terms would be irreducible, (in natural consonance with his mistake about the physical series also,) and of which the efficiency as an argument for the external world would be nearly nugatory, and the existence, as a scientific formula, absurd; for among faculties essentially different a logical series were, of course, impossible, nor could they prove, however combined, beyond their arithmetical amount. But, on the contrary, the sort of series characterized in the last extract, composed, not of pretended faculties, but of positive relations, essentially homogeneous and systematically complicate, in exact harmony with a counter-series established also in the physical world—this mental series, we say, left nothing to be desired, or, perhaps, imagined, in either the cogency of its demonstration or the legitimacy of its principles. Nor was reason, as the supreme term of the scale, left here exposed to the objection adduced above against the loose arrangement of M. Cournot. For studying this and all the faculties, the book referred to has supplied a method which is not merely quite original, but looks extravagant. Representing the mental faculties (or "processes," as he terms them) as not developed in the individual, but in the species, the author argues that the physical history of this collective individual may exhibit, to the contemplation and the criteria of

* Vestiges of Civilization, p. 68.

the philosopher, the world of mind in an *objectivity* no less complete than the world of matter. This would cut off at "one fell swoop" all our subjective "idols of the cave," and lay the basis for a science of ethics and psychology.

M. Cournot, in the ensuing chapter, proceeds to specialize his scale of faculties, under the jumbled heads of Senses, Images, and Ideas. His criticism on the senses is of real value in itself. He shows, for instance, that only two of them—those of hearing and of sight—make any direct contribution to real knowledge; the others serving but as reactives to apprize us barely of the presence of certain bodies, without giving us any notion of them. So far, then, the sophisms against the certitude of human knowledge, from the deception of the senses, would be excluded; and from the nature of the two remaining, which the author further shows to be identical, their reports are of mathematical reliability. "They are," says he, "homogeneous, and procure the same representations of homogeneous knowledges, namely, the representation of space and the knowledge of the relations of magnitude and geometrical figure—the representative efficiency being in each of these two senses attached to the *form*, and, independent of the matter, of the sensation, *ratione formæ et non ratione materiæ*."—P. 229. It would follow, then, that all our knowledge must be at bottom a knowlege of *form;* and, in fact, to form may be resolved all the real phenomena of nature.

Passing now to the outer world, the author discusses, in several chapters, 1. The motion of bodies, of matter and force, and the categories and classification of physical phenomena; 2. Life and the physiological series; 3. The ideas of space and time; 4. Abstractions, entities, mathematical ideas; 5. Moral and æsthetic ideas; 6. Continuity and discontinuity. The order is not objectionable, save the place of time and space, which should precede or form part of the first division. The nomenclature is doubtless metaphysically barbarous; and so is also, more or less, the distribution. But the meaning, duly portioned under three generic heads, presents the Cosmical, the Vital, and the Intellectual kingdoms.

Upon each of these departments, the author's views are quite advanced. But though intelligent and full of instruction, there is nothing absolutely new. Respecting bodies, he well refutes the scholastic distinction revived by Locke, between the "primary and secondary qualities" of matter; and shows that there are only certain qualities more fundamental than the rest, and that the latter may be all, in turn, conceived, in regular gradation, as resulting, only more and more remotely, from the primordial. After an excellent discussion of the fundamental categories, the general law of this grada-

tion, throughout the entire realm of nature, is concluded to "consist in passing from phenomena more general, more simple, more fundamental, more permanent, to phenomena more particular, more complex and more changeable."—P. 265. From the comprehensiveness of this conclusion, and the observed absence of any striking novelty, demanding either praise or blame, we may pass over the succeeding heads. The last, however, or that upon Continuity and Discontinuity, we must stop to commend particularly. It descants admirably on the nature and the functions of the idea of *Number;* which it ranges properly, but inconsistently, with what preceded, at the head of the scale, or the most absolutely fundamental of the scientific *laws* of nature. This disposition, with the whole series of the special categories of the author, we shall meet again with in the second volume—to which we now proceed in order.

The first chapter is on Language; a subject tolerably introduced by the exposition, in the preceding, of the chief difficulty of verbal expression. This consists in the *continuity* of the modifications of phenomena contrasted with the physical *discontinuity* of the words of language. This deep discordance between the objects and the instruments of all expression is to be remedied only by a logical combination of the latter—a combination that begins spontaneously in the grammatical art of syntax, and is scientified in the dialectical synthesis of composition. For composition, in the large and elevated acceptation, is a science; it is more than this, it is *the* logic which Lord Bacon styled the science of sciences; it is a copying of the grand and graduated unity of nature. Hence it is that one of the deepest of the searchers into this nature, and the most eloquent, without exception, of her painters, we mean Buffon, declared, at sixty, though a model of style, that he was only then beginning to conceive the infinite perfectibility of the art. Hence it is that all great thinkers, when imbued thoroughly with the spirit of science, are found so strenuous, as it were, to tesselate into counter unity with that of nature the fragmentary elements of language: they can never put pen to paper till they have fixed the bearings of the special subject; nor proceed, in its discussion, from one division to another, any more than from sentence to sentence, without a transitive connexion. While, on the other hand, the herd of writers, whose stock of knowledge is but "odds and ends," are always ready in beginning and rapid in proceeding; for the monitor within them, the matters to be represented, being all commencements or conclusions or cross connexions, as you may take them, there is no place for hesitation or deliberation in the premises.

The author makes another observation on a point of style, which well exposes a vulgar prejudice on the subject. It is deemed faulty in a writer on philosophy to employ imagery. "But far," says M. Cournot, "from being a fault, it is a fruitful artifice, by aid of which we remedy the natural defects of language, and make it concur indirectly to the presentation of abstract ideas to which it could not be directly adopted. Since it is a fundamental law of the mind that it cannot elevate itself to the conceptions of the intelligible but through the medium of sensible signs; from the moment that language in itself becomes inadequate to this expression, it is absolutely necessary to appeal to other signs. These signs are chosen from among the phenomena of the external world, and also those that pass within ourselves. The former we take particularly from the phenomena of extension and motion, because these are the most simple, the most fundamental—those of which the image has the greatest representative clearness of all the phenomena subjected to the law of continuity—and because the obstacles to the direct expression of our thoughts by language, proceed mainly from the dispersive discontinuity of vocal signs," &c.—Vol. ii, p. 12.

In fact, to remedy these obstacles—affecting chiefly, however, such writers as have new ideas or new distinctions—there are imaginable but three methods. 1. To draw upon the dead languages for a neologistic jargon; 2. To take refuge in analytical abstraction; 3. To breast the difficulty with the common fund of words, by the skilful disposition of dialectical combinations, by the legitimate extension of grammatical analogies, and finally by the employment of terms popularly representative of images themselves descriptive of the new conceptions to be unfolded. The first was the resort, for example, of Bentham and of Kant, and, in a small way, of Sir William Hamilton. The second, which is doubtless preferable, was the choice of M. Comte. But the last was the course adopted by all the masters of the "*grande style*"—by Plato and by Cicero, by Buffon and by Bossuet, by Bacon and by Bolingbroke. Is it not curious, but characteristic, that the shallow dogma thus refuted should be mainly propagated by the metaphysical and minute critics of both North and South Britain, in face of the fact that their acclaimed paragon of all philosophers, this very Bacon, is more full of imagery than not merely all their other philosophers, but even all their poets?

And for our part, we deem this grand style of his a better evidence of his great genius than the mass of fragments, as full of absurdities almost as truths, which are called his philosophy. Future ages, in considering these, would ask with wonder whence the fame

of Bacon, but that these ages will be too intelligent not to discern, in his writings, the giant clothing of the vast conceptions which he could not work into a system. But the inspiration of this cyclopean, and yet concise and continuous strain—whose thronging images are read for argument, and not for ornament or illustration—is that precisely above assigned as the mark and law of scientific genius, the strenuous effort to preserve and picture the varied unity of nature. For if Bacon's doctrine has failed to realize the most immortal of his own precepts, his style at least is constructed truly *ex analogia universi.*

Returning to M. Cournot and his rather meager sketch of language, we hasten on with him to the next chapter, which treats of Logical Definitions. We find here, also, for the most part, nothing but an intelligent enlargement of the fine fragment of Pascal, *Sur l'Esprit geometrique.* The author dwells, however, with some freshness of suggestion, on the prerequisite of "logical etymologies;" by which are meant those fundamental radicles in each idiom which, themselves inexplicable, serve to constitute all definitions in that special tongue. These postulates of definition (so to speak) are also shown to be of great consequence in the construction of a universal language—this being, in fact, the aspect in which M. Cournot takes the subject, and which excuses the apparent vagueness of his survey.

The contents of the following chapter (which is the sixteenth of the work) have much more novelty of view and more fertility of suggestion. The topics treated are entitled: "The Linear Order of Composition, and Logical Construction and the Syllogism." The real import of the former head is a new phase of the assigned obstacle to the sufficiency of oral language, from its vocabular discontinuity. As the title denotes unconsciously, it is the *linear* transformation, succeeding duly to the *numeral* condition. But our space forbids us to enter at large upon this topic.

We are, fortunately, also dispensed from dwelling on the second article, which he calls *Logical Construction and the Syllogism;* for what he means is but a certain fragment of the general system of mental method, even as he lugged into the previous section another portion, named Classification. To show, however, how superior to Mill and others are his separate views, we may cite, for instance, the following remark upon the syllogism. After noting that, in the case wherein the major proposition is but the summary expression of a number of observed particulars, the conclusion can undoubtedly add nothing to our knowledge, and the syllogism is not inference but interpretation, he proceeds to say, as truly: "If, on the contrary, the general truth (*i. e.* the major proposition) be conceived as per-

fectly independent of the particular and secret forms which the general and abstract idea may assume—as being, not the logical *résumé*, but the ground and principle of the particulars—then the syllogism, which expresses the subordination of our judgments, in a manner conformable to the intrinsic relations of things (or according to the order in which facts depend upon each other, and truths emanate from each other) really becomes a means of extending our knowledge, and advancing the knowledge of the properties of particulars, by a suitable application to them of general ideas."—Vol. ii, p. 81.

This is particularly far in advance of British logicians, North or South, who either, like Whateley, extol the syllogism as a universal method, or denounce it, with the Scotch school, as a mere *petitio principii*. Yet M. Cournot would be at a loss, we think, if called on for the rationale of the formation of, and the distinction between, the two descriptions of general premises, or why the latter sort alone extend our knowledge *à priori*. This higher philosophy of the subject has been spontaneously unfolded by the exposition in the foregoing pages. It there appeared that the primary form of induction, named Enumeration, proceeds upon the sort of particulars we call qualities; to these it gives a common name, advancing *pari passu* with observation, and may give the predicative form of a general axiom of the like extent; but this induction controls no further than the enumerated particulars, and for the reason that no particulars (and more especially the class in question, being of all the most exclusive or elementary) infer each other: here, then, is M. Cournot's first description of major premises, and which the syllogism may expound, but not extend. Again, the second of the assigned stages of induction is Analogy, of which we have seen the proper basis is *relation;* but relation contains by essence an independent generality, and will infer, of course, its own two terms, with their other properties, without experience: here is also the other category of the author's major premises, the "general truths, quite independent of particular and concrete forms," and which may serve "to extend our knowledge by their particular application." In fine, the exigencies of both forms stood originally thus: Enumeration collected particulars, without sounding their relations; Analogy supplied relations, without exploring the subject terms: the surplus of the one was thus the deficit of the other, and the double remedy a combination of their resources. The *exploitation* of these resources defines precisely the proper functions, as the combination does the exact form, of the syllogism, as before remarked; and is also well recorded in the etymology of the name, and, we may add, as was required by the general law of

all progression, in which the final term of each triad must be a composition of the two preceding.

So simple, succinct, and systematic is the explanation of this mass of questions, on which whole libraries continue yearly to be written but to worse confound it, when one is led along the path of history and nature by the light of science!

But M. Cournot is not yet done with us on the subject; he still expatiates, in the following chapter, upon "Analysis and Synthesis." His observations will, as usual, be of interest and value when confronted with the explication above advanced. What he says, for instance, of synthesis, will be seen to coincide essentially with the exposition just now developed of the syllogism. In form, both the things are in fact identical, as are, of course, the final members in all three systems of induction—the analytical, as well as the logical and the synthetical. The subject-matter only varies, and progressively—the syllogism being the logical synthesis, a synthesis by *words;* experimentation the analytical synthesis, a synthesis by *things;* and science the synthetical synthesis, or syllogism by *laws.* The same identity of form and diversity of matter prevail in each of the two preliminary series of the three systems, and which the author has confounded crudely in his conception of analysis. But the correction may be now intrusted to serious readers.

Of the closing chapters, the first considers the "Contrast between History and Science," and supplementarily, "The Philosophy of History;" the title of the next is, "The Contrast of Science and Philosophy," and supplementarily, "The Philosophy of the Sciences." It will be seen that this double rubric comprises, more or less confusedly, the leading question of the author, as we signalized it at the outset, to wit, *the difference between philosophy and science.* Let us see, then, if its direct treatment be not inconsistently more scientific than could be augured from the antecedents of the discussion.

This is not the case at least in the alleged contrast between science and history. We have here again a leaven of the original error about "independent causes" and the objective reality of chance. These, according to the author, would be distinctive of the province of history; while the conjoint series and their consequences would compose the field of science. The present, he agrees, involves the *future*, but not the *past;* and from this he concludes the future to belong to theory, the past to history. But this antithesis is a mere subjective sophism. For, aside from accidental causes,—a notion above refuted, and which, moreover, were it founded, must affect the future as well as the past,—what had been history at one "present"

becomes science at another; and his fixed boundary thus floats, a sliding-scale, according to the march of knowledge. And this is the real difference between the subjects. M. Cournot, in transporting it into the order of external nature, feels entitled to criticise Bacon for having placed it in the human faculties, making memory the organ of history, and the reason that of science. But this was, of the two, the lesser error; for, if the faculties be considered, as M. Cournot himself desires they should, as but successive transformations of the same sole faculty of knowing, the Baconian scheme would indicate a mere *degree* of knowledge as the difference between the provinces of history and science.

For the rest, it should be added that this error in the "first concoction," or, (to speak less professionally,) in the system of M. Cournot, has not affected the intelligence of his description of both departments. Of science especially the following outline is richly worthy of transcription: "*Science is knowledge logically organized.* But logical organization or systematization is comprised under two principal heads—first, the division of the subjects and the classification of the objects to which the scientific knowledge relates; second, the logical concatenation of the propositions, which permits the number of the axioms, of the fundamental hypotheses, or of the data of experience, to be reduced to the lowest possible, and authorizes us to extract from their whole contents by deduction, provided only we control the process by confirmative experience. It follows hence that the scientific form will be so much the more perfect, as we shall be able to establish divisions more distinct, classifications better determined, and gradations better demarcated in the succession of relations. Whence it also follows that *to increase knowledge and to perfect science are not the same thing*; for science is forwarded by the conception of a happy idea which better arranges our acquired knowledge, without enlarging their actual mass; whereas a science, in being enriched with new observations and new facts, incompatible with the principles of order and classification before adopted, may lose proportionably the perfectness of its scientific form."—Pp. 190–1.

Here is a hint to your men of "facts," whether statisticians or experimenters, who do not doubt that they alone are the real contributors to science; whereas at best, they are merely, in the very analogy of our subject, but historians, too often chroniclers, of its preliminary phase. It is strange that this succession of the grades of knowledge in all subjects, which M. Cournot has described so well, should not have rid him of his profession. One of the causes, we should conjecture, was that the two subjects of his alleged contrast

are the two extremities of a series of three terms, and that the middle having been omitted, the resulting void presents an opposition. What this middle term is will be disclosed in the ensuing chapter.

Of this, the subject is, the "contrast between Science and Philosophy," which M. Cournot introduces in these terms:—"Science departs from certain primordial notions, common to all men, and combines them to constitute a body of doctrine by means of the sole forces of reason; or it collects observations, experiments, facts by means of which it elevates itself to the discovery of the laws to which are subject certain orders of phenomena: Philosophy disserts upon the origin of our knowledges, upon the principles of certitude, and seeks to penetrate into the reason of the ultimate facts which support the edifice of the positive sciences."—P. 216.

These definitions need little correction to be just enough, empirically. In that of science, the "primary notions" refer to the section of mathematics, and confirm the backwardness betrayed so frequently in the true philosophy of science and mind; for it seems the author is not aware that the pretended axioms of mathematics are real inductions of our *instinctive* experience, and that they differ from the results of our *methodized* experience but in greater obviousness, simplicity, and universality. Such is also the explanation of the feeling of *necessity* which is alleged to characterize them in distinction from the laws called physical; the latter, being less common, appear less uniform in comparison, whereas the former, which are fundamental, do not allow us to descry behind them any higher laws than might, by contrast, in turn taint them with a seeming casualty. The few who penetrate this common barrier by the solvent of analysis find, as the author must have known, these axioms so far from necessary as to seem absurd. His second distinction, in the same definition, restricting science to "*certain* phenomena," (doubtless excluding the mental or moral,) is another phase of the same oversight: an oversight, in fine, which lies in the attribution of the laws of nature, of the gradation of necessity, of knowability, or of casualty which appertains to the imperfect knowledge of the age or of the individual; and on the other hand, arises here, not from a difference of faculties, but from the objective graduation of complication; that is, of difficulty, which progresses down the scale of laws, from the mathematical along to the mental. This illusive tendency to take the objective for the subjective, and reciprocally, and to constitute one's self or epoch the gauge and touchstone of knowledge and certitude, are the distinctions of the metaphysical philosophy. And that this is what the author means, in fact, is shown expressly by his definition, which

describes philosophy as pursuing the origin, the end, and essence of the facts of science.

He has joined, then, an irrelevant issue with the parties whom he censures for confounding this philosophy with science. They never do so when they know anything of science or of philosophy; they, on the contrary, are rather prone to disavow its real services. The philosophy they mean is a positive knowledge of the laws of nature, identical in substance with that possessed by the several sciences, but more extended and systematic than that of any, or of all together. They are, therefore, right in notion, which is all that we contend for; we abandon them to M. Cournot's reclamations about the name: we do not see what can be gained to science by the superfœtation of an appellative so fraught with obloquy and ambiguity as the term philosophy. But, on the other hand, our author should have determined this dispute of words, before inditing a long chapter or his whole treatise beside the question. Had he commenced with the declaration that the philosophy he meant to vindicate was what is commonly called metaphysics, his position would have been clear; nor would the difference which he contends for between this subject and science proper have been then contested, however the value which he gives the former might be denied. This is recently too much the fashion with the mere fragmatists or pedants of science, and has been countenanced by even some of its philosophers: but, in the latter, it is mainly a rhetorical expedient, used to batter down abuses by an opposite excess. Metaphysics, then, or rather, generally, philosophical speculation, deserves and needs the *rehabilitation* of M. Cournot; but not exactly "in manner and form" (as the legal phrase is) as he imagines. The time is come then, when, in fulfilment of our engagement at the outset, we should try to rectify this fundamental aberration of the work, and complete the means of giving it connexion as well as explanation.

As was explained in our sketch of method, the earliest elements of human knowledge consist in feelings and in qualities; that is, *facts* subjective or objective: the record of these isolate facts is the rudimental state of history. By the habitual concurrence or recurrence of some among them, the mind is later led to ask itself the *cause* of the connexion: this inquiry is the germ of philosophy. The cause, of course, conceived as something distinct from the things connected, is sought for ages in one or other of the terms, until these are, by experience or other analysis, resolved in turn into mere aggregates of similar connexions; the mind, expanded by this enlargement, and corrected also of its illusion, then recognises the abstract bond of a *relation;* that is to say, a portion or a result of a general

order: this conception of relation, independently of its terms, is the fundamental form of science. Here we have, in three sentences, a consummate epitome of the career of the human intellect, both past and possible, throughout the universe. The plan needs but extension through the planes of space and time; the succession of the assigned stages remains unaltered and universal.

Thus history, expanding through space, takes the names of geography, cosmography, &c.; extending through time those of natural or of civil history, according as the facts recorded relate to nature or to society; and the "philosophy of (either) history," when the two orders are conceived together. Thus philosophy, traversing space, is called mythology, astrology, &c.; viewed in time, or the successive and causative order of events, it is theology, (of course the dogmatic, not the divine,) metaphysics, &c.; embracing space and time at once, or coëxistence and succession, it takes the name of philosophy proper or positive, that is scientific. Thus science, in fine, unfolding its feeble germ of relation through the plane of statical phenomena, is called the *arts* of numbering, of land-measuring, &c.; when later, ramifying through the dynamical, it takes the forms of the several *methods*, both of the logical and analytic systems; carried conjointly through both the planes, it assumes the systematic harmony characteristic of the various sciences, mathematical, physical, social; and ends, after rejecting the arts and methods as a disused scaffolding, with interfusing all the special forms into one great cosmical conception, which unites the history, the philosophy, and the science of the phenomenal universe.

M. Cournot has still three chapters, of which the subjects are as follows: first, The Coördination of the Sciences; second, Psychology; third, Examination of the Principal Systems of Philosophy. This post-position of psychology, as a sort of scientific outline, betrays again the metaphysical condition of the author's mind. His criticism on the subject is, however, excellent on the whole, and well adapted to unroof its "caves" to the day of positive investigation. To this end he insists again on the subordination of the mental faculties. But all the good things of the chapter, as well as also of the following, will have found their clew and comments in our previous explanations. There remains, then, for a closing word, but what should close the work of M. Cournot, the coördination or classification of the sciences.

Commencing with the essay of Bacon, M. Cournot remarks rightly that the only part of that celebrated scheme, of any lasting value, is the fundamental tripartite division into history, poetry, science.

In fact, it coincides substantially, we see, with the foregoing series. The first and third terms are identical; and our definition of philosophy, as the pursuit of things *imaginary*, corresponds no less exactly to Bacon's poetry, which is its stage of *art*, and which he founds upon the mental faculty of imagination. Nor was the nature of all three terms more meritorious than their number, which is the scientific formula of all progression. Not that Bacon had the least idea of progression in the premises, or perhaps even of the statical principle of his division, as above evolved: its relative accuracy was due mainly to his large sagacity.

Nor should we censure the defect of science when we find D'Alembert, a century after, distorting grossly the same partition, against every notion of science and sense. According to him, the order of knowledges is—history, philosophy, poetry; and that of the corresponding faculties—memory, reason, imagination! What a notion of progression, or even of history, must the man have who makes imagination succeed to reason, and poetry posterior to science! (for science is what the celebrated encyclopædist meant by "philosophy," which was the title of preëminence at that day.) This preposterous interversion well exemplifies how very recently the human mind, in even its leading organs, has put off the swathing bands of infancy. M. Cournot points out others, in the body of the scheme, which offer similar *improvements* upon the errors of the Baconian model. Yet M. Cournot, alas for critics! is not free himself from those very faults; but let us first despatch the remaining subjects of his criticism.

These are the systems of Bentham and of Ampère. Both are justly censured for manner as well as matter. The bifurcate mode of division, which is common to the two, M. Cournot remarks, as a fact, to have failed egregiously in the organic sciences; but the reason (which he does not see) is, that it mutilates the law of progression, which, in these sciences, becomes more paramount in strict proportion to their higher complexity, and makes the triplicate division more indispensable. Besides defects of manner, Bentham's subjects and nomenclature are also deemed by M. Cournot to be often grotesque. And, in truth, Bentham knew nothing of science, and was no hand at even system, his genius being exclusively analytical. Ampère was, on the contrary, by accurate knowledge of most of the sciences, enabled to dissemble better the radical vice of the bifurcation. Moreover the general order of his scheme is consonant to nature and history.

By the by, is it not curious that M. Cournot, himself a Frenchman, should, in circumnavigating the world of knowledge, and criticising

its leading philosophies, with their principal systems of classification, have never mentioned the name of Comte? But the doctrines and distribution of this treatise evince, moreover, a very honest and utter unconsciousness of the existence of the positive system. We do not trace a single theft from, or allusion to, Comte's writings, save the mention of *social physics*, as proposed to substitute the term psychology—a substitution made by Comte in his principal work. We are glad, of course, to find no thefts in the filching fashion of Dr. Whewell, and feel assured that M. Cournot is far above such dissimulations. But, at the same time, we must say with frankness, that few things short of this procedure could be more discreditable in a philosopher, or more denunciative of his incompetency, than to undertake at the present day to make a survey of human knowledges, in complete ignorance, real or affected, of the *Philosophie Positive*.

M. Cournot betrays the consequence in his own attempt at classification, of which the fundamental series is as follows:—RELIGION,—ART,—HISTORY,—PHILOSOPHY,—SCIENCE. In the first place, he improves, indeed, upon D'Alembert, and even Bacon, in not referring the several terms to respective faculties of the mind. But this was, we fear, a virtue due less to theory than to necessity. He was probably unable to determine the subordination, which he desires so much, among the faculties, to suit the requisites of his scheme. What seems confirmative of this conjecture is, that he replaces the triad of faculties by five "forms of development," which he calls *syncrasies* or *temperaments*, and which correspond to the foregoing categories of his series. But the substitution, however forced, is no less a passage from the individual to the broader basis of society or the species, and is thus a real transition toward the cyclopædic point of view, as will be shown when we have pointed out the faults of the partition.

The blunders of M. Cournot, though not so coarse as those he justly censures in D'Alembert or mistakes in Bacon, are much more numerous. He destroys the trifurcate principle by the addition of two terms; he, moreover, interverts the order of the supererogatory members; he finally promotes the latter to the rank of being coequal with the following terms which, in truth, include them as subordinates. For instance, art, so far as it is *knowledge* in distinction from *action*, is so truly history, that this connexion was first the origin and destination of the system of castes, which are hereditary histories of the treasured mysteries of the several trades. The scheme of M. Cournot, then, accumulates the errors of confusion, redundancy and interversion; and all this, in the simple aspect of a logical composition. But considered as a basis for

the classification of human knowledge, it shares, with Bacon and D'Alembert, the still more serious misconception of taking nature, and therefore knowledge, by the wrong extremity of the scale.

The *merits* of the author are well exemplified in the following arrangement of the general sciences, which retains nothing, we see, of the "temperaments" except the number.

1. Mathematical;
2. Physical and Cosmological;
3. Biological, or Natural History;
4. Noological, and the various branches of the Symbolical;
5. Political and Historical.

We speak in praise of the general succession of these stages, not of the distribution or denomination. The author admits himself that he so far tallies with Ampère, as he does also with M. Comte, from whom Ampère, in fact, had copied, and who, however, works a better distribution into six categories. But M. Cournot, in the ramification of each of these in his synoptic table, diverges largely from his predecessors, and with some improvement. The schemes of Bacon and D'Alembert were an indigested hodge-podge, often jumbling sciences, arts, and even absurdities together. Those of Bentham and Ampère, while preserving better the distinction between arts, sciences, and some intermediate term, which they do not settle, yet so run out their everlasting subdivisions upon subdivisions as to be utterly a wilderness—the one scholastic, the other pedantic. M. Cournot has brought all this to very moderate dimensions; though still we think as far in excess of what is requisite or right, as M. Comte is in defect, who speaks of nothing but the sciences.

Perhaps a medium, more or less "golden," might be hit off in the following wise. Corresponding to the three general gradations of knowledge, namely, History, Philosophy, Science, its respective special forms, set in separate compartments, would be embraced by the heading: Arts, Institutions, and Systems. A single stage or two of subdivision is as far as theory should carry each, under pain of frittering away the unity which gives them scientific substance, and bewildering the student in addition. They should also follow in the order stated, it being that of their development, and which is turned topsy-turvy, by the way, in M. Cournot's table. But above all, and in all partitions, the trifurcate principle should be applied to them, as that alone which can render faithful to nature and to history their absolute and interchangeable progression. By interchangeable, we mean the passage, for example, of art into institution, and the procession of such institution at last to science. Thus

politics are, with the priesthood of theocracy, an art; in riper ages, as in our own, they advance into institution; by and by, they will undoubtedly be science. In a word, all sciences have begun with being arts, and all arts will end with being sciences.

To conclude, then, with exemplifying, in point of method and of moderation, the foregoing precepts for the tabulation of human knowledge, we subjoin the following specimen, applied to the principal of the great divisions, and which is normally a combination of the two preceding, we mean that of Science.

	Specific.	Generic.	Type.
SCIENCES.	ARITHMETIC, ALGEBRA, GEOMETRY;	ASTRONOMY;	NATURE.
	MECHANICS, CHEMISTRY, MINERALOGY;	GEOLOGY;	
	BOTANY, BIOLOGY, ETHOLOGY.	SOCIOLOGY.	

There is nothing in this diagram, in point of subject or of nomenclature, that is not familiar to scientific readers. Such will, doubtless, need no comments to discern if its innovations be indeed improvements upon the long line of its predecessors.

ART. VIII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) "*The United States Grinnell Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin*, by E. K. KANE, M. D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 8vo., pp. 532.) If the Grinnell Expedition was unsuccessful in its aims, it has certainly been fortunate in its historian. Dr. Kane has a clear eye, a sound judgment, and an indomitable energy—qualities which fit him admirably for such service as that which he here describes: and to the description itself he brings a facile and accomplished pen. Arctic expeditions have been written of before; but certainly never so well: the book is as full of attraction for the general reader as for the man of science. We hope to present a full review of it hereafter.

This book had just received its last touch from the finishing workmen at Messrs. HARPER'S in December, 1853, when the fire broke out which levelled their grand establishment to the dust. We cannot permit the first occasion offered us to pass without a word upon a loss so disastrous, not merely to the energetic men whose long career of intelligent industry had reared the greatest book-making establishment in the country, if not in the world, but also to the republic of letters and to the general public. Long time must elapse before even the almost limitless enterprise of HARPER & BROTHERS can raise again above the ruins of Franklin Square a fabric so stately, a busi-

ness so vast, and machinery so perfect as could be seen there last December. It *will* be done; of that there can be no doubt: nay, the reconstruction will outvie the original edifice: but even years of labour will not replace the uncounted volumes that stood upon their shelves, or fill up the gap in the supply of public literature made by that destroying fire. The demand for books is greater at this day in America than it has ever been before among men; and if the true history could be written, we think it would be clear, that no small part of this demand is due to the men of this great publishing firm, who have, by their skill and industry, called out the very tastes which they have been foremost in supplying. A glance at the Catalogue of the Messrs. HARPER will show that it contains a list of books in every department of literature in value unequalled for the purposes of general culture (with the exception of the novels—a branch continually lessening in importance) by any catalogue ever issued.

(2.) "*The Old Brewery*" (New-York: Stringer & Townsend, 1854; 16mo., pp. 304) is a modest and simple record of one of the most heroic achievements of modern times. A few Christian women have changed a locality, the very name of which was, but a few years ago, the synonym of vice and crime, into a field of Christian labour and triumph. The book is written by "ladies of the mission," and shows how, and with what success, they have applied the principles of Christianity, in the most orthodox sense, in the work of moral and physical reform. In the language of their preface, "the thrilling incidents recorded in this little book exhibit cases of reformation which no human philosophy can explain or account for. And they are not fictitious stories, but facts, the truth of which hundreds are ready to attest—all going to prove that the gospel is still, as in the beginning, 'the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth.'"

(3.) "*The Lost Prince*, by JOHN H. HANSON," (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co., 1854; 12mo., pp. 479,) is an exhibition of facts tending, in the opinion of the author, to prove the identity of Louis XVII. of France and the Rev. Eleazer Williams, missionary among the Indians of North America. Mr. Hanson needlessly embarrasses his argument with a long preliminary sketch of the French revolution, calculated at once to repel every republican reader. If half the volume were cut away, the remainder would be a better work than the whole. One thing is certain: it has never been *proved* that the child who died in the Temple was the Dauphin: M. Beauchesne's argument fails in the most vital points. Another thing is clear, namely, that Eleazer Williams is no Indian. As to his identity with the Dauphin, our conviction is that it is highly *probable*, though not yet demonstrated.

(4.) "*The Life and Experience of a Converted Infidel*, by JOHN SCARLETT." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1854; 18mo., pp. 274.) This is an autobiography of a minister of the New-Jersey Conference, whose experience has

been so marked as to justify its publication in this form. There is little of the skill of practised authorcraft in the work; but it has the higher merits of simplicity and directness of style, and truthfulness of matter. Mr. Scarlett, in early manhood, fell into the society of the lower class of infidels that infested New-York and its vicinity some twenty-five years ago. He imbibed their opinions and remained under their influence for years. The steps of his conversion are stated with great clearness and simplicity in this volume. His establishment upon the "better foundation" of Christ and his apostles was soon followed by a call to preach; and his first attempt, under bad guidance, is graphically described as follows:—

"While a young convert, I had been enticed by a friend, who believed it to be my duty to preach immediately, to make trial of my preaching talents. The Methodist Protestant Church in Mulberry-street was the place appointed to test my call to the ministry. It had been given out that I would preach on the evening of a Sabbath, and curiosity led many there to hear the sermon. I was advised by the friend to make no preparation, and I obeyed the instructions to the letter. The time for preaching arrived, and my friend and the preacher sat together in the pulpit; but no text had yet come to be preached. I was encouraged not to be alarmed, for that would come whenever I would open my mouth to preach, and surely I did not want to use it till then. After singing and praying, I rose to commence preaching. I opened the Bible, and began to read in order to find the text, which I was informed would *fasten* on my mind whenever I should come to it. It was the last chapter in Mark's Gospel; and as no text seized upon me, I seized upon the sixteenth verse. My preaching state of mind by this time was not the most delightful, but I did the best I could. I began by saying: 'My friends, believing is a thing that ought to be done, and it ought to be done soon, and you must all believe. Now to believe a thing is to —to *believe a thing*. To be damned is not to believe, and to be saved is to be *saved*. I feel uncommonly bad, my friends. I don't know what I am saying myself. I do hope that somebody will come up here and preach, for I believe *I* am not called.' I sat down, but the seat was too high; I wanted to be out of sight of the congregation. One source of relief to cheer my drooping spirits was left me, however, to congratulate myself with. While going home that night, and being concealed by the darkness and the crowd, I heard some apprentice boy say, 'Well, I believe the preacher is a good man, although he does not know much!' This was some comfort."

His next attempt was made under better auspices:—

"One day, under much heaviness and temptation, I received a letter from the Rev. Mr. Cookman, urging me not to smother my convictions of a call to the ministry if I had any. His words were to me ominous, alarming, and timely. To receive such a letter, at such a time, under such circumstances, from such an instructer, on such an important subject, seemed to me providential. Grace and providence, like two wheels, exactly correspond in their union, motions, and designs, working together in accordance with the will of God.

"My past preaching I could not forget, while meditating on Mr. Cookman's letter. A new preacher was sent to us by the conference, and I soon became acquainted with him. I found him kind; but my heart failed in an endeavour to make him acquainted with my trouble about preaching. One day, in peculiar tenderness, he said to me: 'Dear brother, have you not had impressions of your probable duty yet to preach the gospel? Have you not seriously anticipated that you might yet be called to excercise your talents and gifts in this way?' I said something in reply, and with much emotion bid him good morning. At another interview with this minister I had explanations given me on the call to the ministry, temptations and trials connected with it, supporting and qualifying grace promised, and advice and instruction imparted that I desire never to forget. He put things in a proper train, in order to give me a trial at preaching.

I was advised by him to write out my sermon, and submit it to his inspection, if I could feel free to do so. I complied, and was told it was creditable. I was then advised to use it in the pulpit, as it would help me to overcome my embarrassment. I did use it in this way, and preached one other, immediately succeeding the first sermon, with the written copy before me. This was in compliance with the judicious advice of that prudent minister, to whom I shall always feel great indebtedness, as an instrument in the hand of God for introducing me into the field of labour, the consequences of which are of vital importance. In remembrance of his wise counsels, painstaking, and perseverance, my prayer is that he may be continued long a useful and beloved member of the New-Jersey Conference, while the memory of his unworthy brother shall hold in increasing endearment the name of the Rev. Thomas M'Carroll."

We commend this autobiography as worthy of a place among the multitude of sketches of a similar sort which Methodism has produced. It is specially adapted, from its simple narrative, its pleasant vein of anecdote, and its sound moral and doctrinal spirit, to attract and benefit young readers.

(5.) "*A Memoir of Richard Williams*, by JAMES HAMILTON, D. D.," (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 16mo., pp. 270,) is the record of a life devout and self-sacrificing to a rare degree. Mr. Williams was a young English surgeon, who, up to his thirty-first year, "regarded Christianity as for the most part an absurdity." A severe illness brought conviction; conversion soon followed, and he became a member of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, in which he afterward did excellent service as a local preacher and class-leader. In 1850 he united himself with Captain Allen Gardiner in a Mission to Terra del Fuego. This determination was hastily made, and was attended with the sacrifice of all that he held dear: for the love of Christ he gave up a good income, and postponed for a long period the most cherished prospects of his heart. The mission was ill-planned, ill-managed, and ill-fated. Seven men, with only six months' provision, were left in the winter of 1850–51 on the inhospitable coast of Terra del Fuego, with no home on the land, and two small shallops for abode and safety. In six months they were all dead from exposure and famine. The story is a terrible tragedy. While our sober judgment cannot but condemn the planners of the mission for indiscretion, and even for fool-hardiness, yet to Mr. Williams, who offered himself to the service, relying upon the wisdom and judgment of others, we owe the deepest sympathy and the strongest admiration. His faith and love were unexampled. The martyr age of the Church appears to be returning again; and the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church.

(6.) AMONG the many voices which in the nineteenth century have protested out of the midst of Roman Catholicism against the strict Papal system, and the endeavours of the Ultramontane party, perhaps the most prominent place should be assigned to the new work of Professor LEU, entitled "*Warnung von den Neuerungen und Uebertreibungen in der Kathol. Kirche Deutschlands.*" (Luzerne, 1853.) The author is acknowledged among the Catholics as one of the most distinguished scholars of Möhler, and is the only one among them who

does not side at present with the decided Ultramontanists. A canon and professor of theology at Luzerne, Switzerland, he opposed the introduction of the Jesuits, patronized by the Great Council of the canton, and demanded by the majority of the people. He prevailed upon the clergy of the canton, likewise, to unite in his protest. After the Jesuits were banished, Leu became again professor of theology, director of the educational affairs of the canton, and Provost of the Collegiate Church; so that he ranks among the prelates of the Roman Catholic Church. His present work is highly interesting, as the tendencies of the Ultramontane party can of course be better shown by one inside, especially by a prelate, than by an outsider. He treats of the worship of the Virgin Mary with particular reference to the "Mariologie" of Oswald, Professor of Dogmatics at the Seminary of Paderborn, a young writer not without talent, but who by his undisciplined zeal has been led to tread the same path which led the scholastics so far astray. Like them he dares to discuss, quite seriously, and with quotations from all possible sciences, the *sigillum virginitatis*, *vulva reserata et non reserata*, *sanguis menstruus*, &c., in order to prove the now universally adopted doctrine of the *immaculata conceptio*. Certainly in no point is the infallibility of Catholicism more exposed to attacks than in the history of the worship of Mary; even St. Bernard, the greatest *doctor ecclesiæ* in the Mediæval Church, opposed the doctrine of the *conceptio immaculata* as an unauthorized innovation, and no theologian of any repute was found to defend it. So it is very easy for Leu to show that such doctrines are in striking contrast with all tradition; but it is not so easy to remain under such circumstances a Catholic one's self, as he professes to be. For when, a few years ago, the present Pope inquired of all the bishops of the Catholic world their opinion about the *conceptio immaculata*, scarcely any dared to oppose it, and only a few uttered a slight doubt on the feasibility of proclaiming it a dogma. So the Church of the nineteenth century is almost unanimously in favour of what the Church of the thirteenth century just as unanimously rejected. The work contains also a very interesting chapter on Jesuitism. While the bulk of the Catholic party is so strongly prepossessed in favour of the Jesuits, that the admission of any charge against their order is usually looked upon as a sign of bad Catholicism, even at Rome some works are published in which the order, at least as it was at the period of its dissolution by Pope Clement XIV., is strongly censured. Thus the recently-published Life of Clement XIV., by Augustin Theiner, a German priest at Rome of high authority, justifies the suppression of the order by the Pope; and the work of Cretineau Joly, the enthusiastic admirer and historian of the order, was put on the index. Leu gives some other interesting facts concerning this quarrel among the Jesuits at Rome; but in the conclusion he draws he is quite mistaken. He implores the Pope's interference to abate the zeal of the Ultramontane party, especially the bishops of Germany and France, and advises the governments accordingly. Just as well might he advise them to appoint a wolf to guard the sheep against other wolves. Pope, bishops, and Jesuits are at this time more in harmony than they have ever been before, though they may differ about the best way of explaining embarrassing facts of times gone by.

Leu's book is an interesting illustration of the decreasing vigour of the Catholic opposition against Rome. Thirty years ago, almost the whole

Catholic literature of Germany was engaged in a bold struggle against Romanism: even the infallibility of the general councils was denied. But they lost ground year by year. Now the Hermesians are silenced. Hirscher has yielded to the Pope's condemnation of his work; and Leu, whose tone is even more moderate than that of his predecessors, will not succeed better, but will probably submit his firm convictions, the fruit of the studies of an entire life, to the judgment of an Italian priest far inferior in science to German scholars. Meanwhile the strictest Romish sentiments begin more and more exclusively to prevail throughout the Catholic Church. In no period has the Pope had more obedient servants among the priests. We add here, in confirmation of the foregoing statements, two specimens of this new Catholic literature.

The first is "*Tetzel und Luther, von* VALENTINE GRONE, D. D." (Soest., 1853.) The author endeavours to justify Tetzel, the famous seller of indulgences, whom till now even Catholics have not dared to defend. He is of opinion the best measure for the welfare of Germany at that time would have been to burn Luther and his adherents, and to smother the whole Reformation by force. The Protestant periodicals of Germany recommend the perusal of this book to their readers without any commentary; the falsehood of the Romish system cannot be better demonstrated than by such trash.

The other is "*Die Theologie der Vorzeit vertheidigt*, von J. KLEUDGEN, Priester der Gesellschaft Jesu." (Münster, 1853.) The author, who is at the head of the Jesuits, being one of the four assistants of the order, pleads the cause of ancient Catholicism against all innovations, especially against the attempt of Hermes and Hirscher to teach dogmatics and ethics in a form more according to the wants of the present age and science. The book has met universal approval among the German Catholics, and is indeed the ablest apology that can be written for so desperate a cause. Kleudgen belongs to the first class of men which the order of the Jesuits at present commands; the writers of the order, now, are far behind what they were two and three centuries ago.

(7.) Clemens, Dr. Fr. J., "*Die Speculative Theologie A. Günthers und die Kath. Kirchenlehre.*" (Koeln, 1853.)

Balzer, Dr., "*Neue Theologische Briefe an Dr. A. Günther Ein Gericht für seine Ankläger.*" (Breslau, 1853.)

Clemens, Dr., Fr. J., "*Die Abweichung der Güntherschen Speculation von der Kathol. Kirchenlehre.*" (Koeln, 1853.)

Knoodt, Dr. P., "*Günther und Clemens.*" (Wien, 1853.)

From the vast spread of philosophical literature in Germany, and from the great effects produced by it in the literary movements of all Europe, it is natural that Catholics also should be incited to attempts to have their representatives among the philosophers. These attempts, however, have met with anything but success. The only men among the German Catholics who have gained any consideration as philosophical writers have been reproved by their own Church. *Franz von Baader*, the greatest of them, preferred, at the close of his life, the Greek Church to the Roman Catholic. *Hermes*, whose works had

such influence that the great majority of the Catholic scholars, especially the professors of the universities, even many bishops, became adherents to what was called the Hermesian school, could not escape the anathema of Rome. The only surviver of the Catholic philosophers, *Dr. Anton Günther*, although long suspected as to his orthodoxy, has been spared, however, since by him and his friends alone has some life been restored to the rotten Church of Austria. But the struggle about his works has recently been inflamed anew, and it is certain that his speculations, like those of so many other learned and pious spirits, will be suppressed by the authoritative command of St. Peter's. As the subject of this struggle, viz., how far the speculations of Günther are in accordance with the Catholic dogma, is not of great interest to non-Catholic readers, a few words on the authors of the above-named works will be sufficient. *Dr. Clemens* is a layman, professor of philosophy at Bonn, and a leader of the Ultramontane party in Germany; but a man whose ability is not equal to his zeal. He was a member of the Parliament of Frankfort in 1848, and before that time made an attempt, too hard for a greater scholar, to defend the authenticity of the Holy Coat of Treves. He does not attempt to combat the system of Günther by philosophical arguments, but confines himself to showing its incompatibility with the dogmas of the Church. The two defendants are priests: the first, *Dr. Balzer*, Canon and Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Breslau; the other, *Dr. Knoodt*, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bonn. The first was evidently unable to stand the attacks of Clemens, and therefore Professor Knoodt came to his succour. He is a highly-cultivated scholar, and few philosophers have a larger attendance at their lectures than he. Every line of his treatise shows his superiority over his Catholic opponents; but, in spite of his skill, he undertakes an impossible task in endeavoring to show that the endeavours of Günther in adorning the ancient dogmatic Catholicism with modern science *can* be admissible in the Catholic Church. It may be added, that *Dr. Günther* is a priest of Vienna, whose writings, on account of their abstruseness, are accessible to professional philosophers only; but they are popularized by his intimate friend the canon, *Dr. Emanuel Veith*, by far the most distinguished and favourite preacher of Catholic Germany. They have been publishing together for several years a yearly philosophical periodical,—*Lydia, Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, (*3ter Jahrgang*, 1853,)—in which they explain their system.

(8.) "*Liberia: or, Mr. Peyton's Experiments*, by MRS. S. J. HALE," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 304,) is a lively narrative of a Virginia family, who made many efforts to improve the condition and character of their slaves, and finally sent them to Liberia. It is a good Colonization novel.

(9.) BERRIDGE OF EVERTON was one of that noble band of English clergymen who united with John Wesley in his great work of the last reformation in England. Throughout Mr. Wesley's Journal, his faith, his zeal, and his success are mentioned in terms of the highest praise. He was noted for wit

as well as wisdom; and abundant proofs of both are to be found in his "*Christian World Unmasked*," which has just been reprinted (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 18mo., pp. 207) with a brief memoir of Dr. Guthrie. We regret that the American editor has deemed it necessary to expunge "some words and phrases on account of their excessive quaintness, or lack of dignity;" we should greatly prefer the old wine in the old bottles. But, as it is, the book is a stirring appeal, calculated in the highest degree to rouse nominal or backslidden Christians.

(10.) "*The Religions of the World, and their Relations to Christianity*, by F. D. MAURICE, M. A." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1854; 12mo., pp. 262.) This book contains the substance of Mr. Maurice's Boyle Lectures for 1845 and 1846. It treats, in order, of Mohammedanism, Brahminism, Buddhism, and of the Persian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman Mythologies, seeking for what fragments of truth may be found in each, and showing the relations of all to Christianity. It abounds in those broad and general views which are so characteristic of Mr. Maurice; while, at the same time, it is disfigured by the same vague mistiness, both of conception and expression, which mars all his other writings.

(11.) "*The Philosophy of Faith*, by the REV. J. E. COBB." (Louisville, Ky.; sold by E. Stevenson, 1853; 12mo., pp. 424.) This work is divided into three parts, of which the first treats of the nature of faith; the second of its fruits; and the third, of its relations. At the very beginning it is laid down that Christianity is a supernatural system, not only in its extraordinary historical phenomena, but in its principles and their internal influence. On this basis the author's exposition of faith is invulnerable. The book abounds in clear and comprehensive thinking, and is a real and substantial addition to our theology.

(12.) "*Lectures to Young Men*, by W. G. ELLIOTT, jr." (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co., 1854; 12mo., pp. 190.) These lectures (originally addressed to the young men of the author's Church in St. Louis) have already reached a third edition. They treat of Self-Education, Leisure Time, Transgression, the Ways of Wisdom, and of Religion, in an earnest spirit, and with great force of expression. The author belongs to the more advanced and evangelical rank of Unitarian ministers.

(13.) "*God with Men; or, Footprints of Providential Leaders*, by SAMUEL OSGOOD." (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co., 1854; 12mo., pp. 269.) The aim of this book is to give "some idea of the course of the Divine Revelation through the representative characters of both Dispensations;" *e. g.*, Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Paul, &c. It is characterized by a strong sympathy with good men of all classes and creeds, while at the same time it leaves the author's theological position in no uncertainty or doubt. He belongs, like Mr. Elliott,

among the advanced Unitarians: upholding the supernatural character of Christianity; insisting upon personal religion; but denying the divinity of Christ in the sense in which it is held by the orthodox Church.

(14.) "*The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament*, by F. D. MAURICE." (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co.; 12mo., pp. 466.) This volume contains a series of sermons preached in the chapel of Lincoln's Inn, forming a continuation of the "Lectures on the Old Testament," noticed in our pages a year or more ago. Mr. Maurice interprets the Old Testament literally; and finds in it an interpretation of some of the greatest difficulties in history, and in the condition of the world around us. He believes—and sets forth in this book—that God's government of the Jews was not more real and substantive than is his government of England this day; and that the story of the Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament is as directly applicable to the modern world as any Covenanter ever dreamed. There are many rich and valuable truths expressed in the book, and more suggested; but it is a pity that here, as in all his writings, Mr. Maurice's vague and dreamy style should so lessen the impression of his thoughts.

(15.) THERE is no really scientific treatise on Homiletics an the English language. Nor is the want adequately supplied by Dr. Skinner's recent excellent translation,—"*Homiletics; or, the Theory of Preaching*, by A. VINET, D. D." (New-York: Ivison & Phinney: 1854; 12mo., pp. 524.) Like all Vinet's writings, it abounds in acute remarks and original suggestions; and it is abundantly worthy the study of every preacher and student; indeed, it is better than any English book on the subject. But it is still only a semblance of what Vinet would have made such a work, if prepared fully for the press by himself. It is compiled from the manuscript notes of his lectures, pieced out by extracts from the notes of his auditors; and bears evident marks of its fragmentary origin. Nevertheless, as we have said, we commend it to all preachers and students.

ART. IX.—RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

LETTERS ON RECENT EUROPEAN LITERATURE.

LETTER II.

PARIS, January 1, 1854.

COUNT KRASINSKI, the author of "*Panslavism and Germanism*,"—a publication which attracted, a few years ago, no little notice,—appears again, upon his favourite subject, in A *religious history of the Slavic race*: (*Histoire Religieuse des Peuples Slaves*, par le Comte VALERIAN KRASINSKI. *Avec une Introduction, par M. Merle D'Aubigné.* Paris: *J. Cherbuliez.* New-York: *Hector Bossange.*) This subject is of great importance in itself: the spiritual state of the various fragments of this

strangely wretched and scattered race is known as vaguely as their political condition; more imperfect still is American knowledge of the long succession of vicissitudes through which they passed to their present relations to the Christian sects of Europe, and to the faith of Mohammed. And yet the people, to whose actual and historical creeds we attend so little, are as a race (that is, a *nation* proper) the most numerous of Europe—counting now, according to Krasinski, no fewer than eighty million souls.

A book awaking such attention, and supplying the needed information, has, besides, special interest at this moment. The ambitious views of Russia are based entirely on the race in question, and her instrument is their religious condition. This condition may be fortified or modified, the author thinks, so as to form, near the source, the only efficacious barrier against the Muscovite dominion of entire Europe. To urge this project is, indeed, the practical or mundane moral of his book, while, no doubt, his motive is the patriotic one of getting Poland to be made the nucleus. Both these purposes may be appreciated without comment. But there is a moral of a still higher order which may well escape the general reader, seeing the author has not suggested it himself, save in a single instance.

This principle is stated formally in the Introduction by the zealous D'Aubigné, who supervised the publication of the French version. "One of the most important lessons," says he, "which this history may teach us, and which the author himself has signalized, is this: that nations advance in their developments, moral, political, and intellectual, in proportion to the progress which they make in spiritual religion; whereas they retrograde invariably in each of those three respects when the religion of spirit gives place to the religion of form—to the hierarchical, traditional, and ceremonial religion of Rome. The Papacy enervates and abases the nations; the gospel, on the contrary, fortifies and elevates them."

Nothing can be truer as a statement of *fact*, or more opportune and salutary as a *maxim* for our times. But as a principle of philosophy, the doctrine of the editor, as well as of the author, is erroneous and misleading. This doctrine, which is now predominant with politicians as well as theologians, conceives the intellectual progress as a result of the religious. But the converse of the proposition would be nearer the exact truth. It would be truer to say, the intellectual is the cause of the "spiritual" progress; or, stricter still, that both are one and the same essence in successive stages. What the writer terms "*spiritual* religion" is but the mediate or transition form between the sensuous worship of the Romish ritual and the rational religion of moral science. Thus it is that the Protestant religions appear to *cause* the intellectual progress, of which they are but an anterior manifestation. Both phenomena are co-effects, which act reciprocally on each other, but owe their movement to a complex series of external causes. Without attention to these real causes—which the reigning doctrine discards—it is impossible to prove a progress in either religion or intellect. This, of course, is no embarrassment to Roman Catholic theologians, who deny progress entirely. But Protestants should be careful not to leave their premises exposed apparently to contradiction with facts observable upon the surface of the religious history of European nations.

For example, (if, as they assume, the Protestant or "spiritual" religions imply a corresponding ripeness of the public intellect,) how are we to conceive the origin of the Hussites in Bohemia, and of Protestantism generally in the northern states of Europe? Were the Bohemians of the fifteenth century more *intellectual* than the Italians now? Were the Teutonic and Slavonic nations, who remained savage down to the middle ages, more advanced in intellect in the sixteenth century than France or Spain are even at this day, though besides inheritors of the Græco-Roman civilization? The supposition is, in either case, a manifest absurdity; and yet it is involved in the habitual reasonings on this subject. The only step made in explanation of this anomalous class of facts, is to refer them to distinctions of *race*. This might, perhaps, be brought to pass in the declamation of politicians, or the newspaper panegyrists of Anglo-Saxon supereminence. But theologians are the more debarred from it, inasmuch as implying a severalty of human *species*, it really involves them in an impiety which they repudiate of course in principle. To the true solution of these high problems the present history supplies materials, however the author shows the common unconsciousness of any similar applicability.

Before referring to them, let me state the two positions which they go to

establish. These are, 1st. That the Protestant spirit was introduced by refugees from the south; and, 2d. That the northern countries, from the double circumstance of their distance from Rome, and their subsisting semi-barbarism, afforded liberty for its expansion. These two concurrent principles explain, if justified by history, the precedence and peculiarity of the Reformation to the north of Europe, without supposing that its populations, whether Slavonic or Teutonic, had been superior or even equal to the Latin nations in mental progress.

The present history is rich in facts to both effects. With respect to the migration, we find the rise of Huss prepared by large numbers of the Waldenses from the south of France, who for three or four centuries had taken refuge both in Bohemia and Poland. Even Waldo himself, their founder, came to settle in the former country, according to De Thou and other writers. In 1330, the inquisitor of Bohemia reported that collections were made for the Vaudois of Italy, and that the contributors spoke of these heretics as being their brethren and masters. Æneas Sylvius maintained, in terms, that the Hussites were, in very fact, but an offshoot of this imported sect of the Waldenses.

No doubt the Lutheran Reformation, which followed a century after Huss, had been impregnated from like sources, and partly, in turn, by the scattered Hussites. In fine, the utmost *intellectual* evolution of that religious movement—so extreme, indeed, as to have seemed a heresy to the "heretics"—was introduced and organized in Poland by successive teachers from the Latin countries. M. Krasinski tells us that rationalistic Unitarianism had been here prepared, in the first place, by Servetus, a Spanish physician, and after by Pastoris, a Belgian priest; then by Stancari, an Italian, who was Hebrew Professor in the College of Cracow, before it was regularly constituted by Socinus, who was also Italian. This was perfectly in accordance with the scale of *intellectual* forwardness.

The comparative barbarism of the northern states of Europe is attested equally, though quite unconsciously, by several statements of the present narrative. Bohemia, for example, after the discomfiture of the Hussites, became, under Ferdinand II., from having been absolutely Protestant, as absolutely Roman Catholic within the space of fifteen years! A religion of native growth, or in mental harmony with the professors, is never altered, with this abruptness, by an entire people unless semi-barbarous. The same condition gave occasion to the like vicissitudes in even England, where the popular religion was seen to change with the succession of the monarchs. M. Krasinski, indeed, thinks that this could have been equally expected in the most forward of the southern nations—for instance, France. Would not the French, he asks, have become Protestant, had Francis I. but so decided? The shortest answer is, that Francis I. inclined decidedly in this direction, until he saw that the resistance was too general and stern. And this resistance was owing in part to a distinction which I shall presently note.

M. Krasinski supplies other evidences, that the Protestant or "spiritual" religions were not spontaneous emanations of the mental progress of the northern nations. He mentions several instances of the adherence of those populations to the sort of heathenized Christianity which still subsists among the Russians. But so little is he sensible that this can militate against his principle, of a progressive correlation between the grade of intellect and form of religion, that he relates the following fact as, on the contrary, confirmatory. In the middle of the last century, at the commencement of the present, and even so late as 1843, there were discovered, through the south of Russia, some small communities of Christians which corresponded, severally, with the Paterians, the Millenarians, and the Gnostics of the primitive Church. But these, instead of indicating an advance upon Romanism, attest a contrary relapse. Moreover, his so-called Gnostics would have retrograded further still, or, to speak more properly, have never advanced beyond a sort of spiritual heathenism, if they professed, as our historian says, the doctrine of the metempsychosis. He overlooks that the metempsychosis of the primitive Gnostics was essentially different—was a generalized transformation—of that attributed to Pythagoras. I may note you, however, a specimen of the creed of those Russian Gnostics, as delivered to a provincial governor, under Catharine's persecution.

"God is one, but one in the trinity. This holy trinity is an inscrutable being. The Father is light, the Son is life, the Holy Ghost is peace. They are manifested in man—the Father by *memory*, the Son by *reason*, the Holy Ghost by *will*.

The human soul is the image of God; but this image is nothing but memory, reason, and will. The soul existed and had fallen before the creation of the visible world; it is this fall that is recounted in the story of Adam and Eve, which, like most other portions of the Bible, should be taken allegorically. . . . In the beginning the soul's fall was occasioned by the circumstance that it *contemplated itself*, and commenced to love itself alone, thereby abandoning the contemplation and the love of God through *wilful pride*. . . . . The soul is placed in the present life as in a place of purification, in order that, clothed in the flesh and abandoned to its will and reason, it may choose between good and evil, and thus obtain pardon of its primary sin, or incur eternal torment. When a body is prepared for us in this world, our soul descends from above, comes to take possession, and the man is then called into existence. Our body is the house in which the soul is received, and in which we lose all memory and feeling of what we had been before incarnation," &c., &c.—P. 271, *Note.*

This, it will be seen, is not the metempsychosis of Fetichism, no more than it was strictly the conception of the ancient Gnostics. Its intellectual position, as placing purgatory in this life, is less advanced than the Catholic reason, which requires it hidden in the unknown future; whereas the Gnostics were in advance of the ancient orthodox Church—I mean, of course, in philosophical development. The name, also, of the Russian sect, importing *wrestlers of the spirit*, (Doukhoborzi,) suggests a Hindoo grade of religion. Yet low as this was in comparison, it was beyond the Russian peasantry, and so must have been an importation from the south. This, accordingly, our author attests himself historically. And when refugees from Papal persecution reached thus far, and founded sects amid the rudest of the northern nations, what may we not conclude the numbers and the influence of the hunted heretics who must have settled in the intermediate and more forward States? This would also explain the birth-place of such men as Kepler and Copernicus.

It was these heretics, then, and their descendants, by the flesh and by the spirit, that prepared the northern nations for the rise and prevalence of Protestantism. And these populations were the better disposed from another circumstance, above alluded to, quite independent of the proper merits, either moral or mental, of the new religion. With the Slavonic and Teutonic races the Reformation was a *temporal* protest, in vindication of three of the interests which men hold dearest in this life, and which require the least development in the possessors to conceive their value—I mean their independence, their money, and their language. The long struggle between the Papacy and the Germanic empire was an effort, on the part of the former, to reduce to temporal, as well as spiritual vassalage, the various individual states of the confederacy. The levying money for indulgences was the first grievance attacked by Luther, as was the ship-money by Hampden, and the tea-tax by the Americans. The native idioms of the north were also menaced by the Latin language, which were both exclusive in religious matters, and often dominant in civil affairs; and hence the earliest cry of the reformers was for the Bible in their native tongues.

On the other hand, the south of Europe was quite dissimilar in these respects. The people revered the Latin as traditionally the tongue of their ancestors, and manifestly the mother of their actual dialects. In money-matters they were probably so well accustomed to be plundered, at the same time by their native priests and their feudal masters from the north, as to be less sensitive to the procedure. As to the national independence, it was manifestly in no danger in the formidable monarchies of Spain and France. In fact, the latter in particular had early raised an express barrier, not alone to the pretensions, but to the peculations of the Pope, in the famous "Liberties of the Gallican Church."

There is, finally, a third position, on which depends a full solution of this grand historical problem as to the religious division of Europe. The relative freedom of the north, as on the outskirts of the Christian empire, and the asylum which it thus afforded to developed intellect oppressed within, would by themselves explain quite probably the special birth-places of Protestantism, and would do so without compromising its claim to mental superiority, which lay undoubtedly and enormously the other way. But as the spirit of revolt was thus intensest in the south, without a corresponding ratio of the Papal power for its compression, it must also have prevailed in some one or other of the Latin states, and in spite, besides, of their assigned distinctions, from the Teutonic, unless there had been some still

more powerful and precise difference between the sections.

This difference in fact existed, and just coextensively with the phenomenon: the reader will determine whether it was adequate to the effect.

Throughout the *Latin* nations the *aristocracy were foreigners;* they had to lean upon the priests as much for temporal as spiritual safety; they therefore lent themselves to Rome, against the people and the nation. In all the nations of the *north*, (with the sole exception, in part, of England—where, however, the Normans also were of kindred stock,) the aristocracy were *natives:* they therefore sided with the nation against the clergy and the Pope. But in all nations and all revolts, the aristocracy have been the power to lead the people to great or durable achievements. For example, in the case in question, it was the aristocracy who, in Bohemia, avenged so nobly the death of Huss, and beat back Europe from their little territory. They were the party who, in Germany, supported Luther from the first, and maintained a war of generations in vindication of his doctrines; and they did so, because they formed the class to whom these doctrines were most intelligible. Compute, then, not alone the absence from, but also the positive opposition to, all religious reformation by this great agency throughout the south, and you will see the nature and the necessity of the strange difference in question.

I am not aware that this explanation had been hitherto suggested, and have been carried beyond my limits by its supposed novelty and certain importance toward a due understanding of the work before me, and, I think, most others, on the same great subject.

The disquisition will, in fact, allow me to be brief in recommending you another recent publication on the same theme, and in part the same topics. It is called, "*Reformers before the Reformation; or, Gerson, John Huss, and the Council of Constance.* (*Reformateurs avant la Reform du 15th Siècle: Gerson, Jean Huss, et la Concile de Constance; avec des considerations sur l'Eglise Gallicane depuis le grand Schism jusqu' a nos Jours. Par Emile de Bonnechose. Paris: Hector Bossange;* New-York, 134 Pearl-street.) It relates the origin, the character, and the proceedings of this famous Council: its origin in the partition of the infallible Church among two or three "anti-popes;" its character, as first substituting for the despotism of the Papacy the *constitutional* authority of an assembly; its proceedings, in the deposition of the three occupants of the chair of Peter, and in the infamous condemnation of John Huss and Jerome of Prague. There is also a lively narrative of the resulting Bohemian wars. In fine, the rise, the privileges, and the present position of the "Gallican Church" are exhibited with high intelligence and liberality.

M. Bonnechose, without the semblance of a sectarian in any sense, writes in the spirit of the reformer he has made his hero. He seems to hope for the *Protestantisation* of the French people; but he urges it with candour, with moderation, and even with management, and only in the interest of morals, intelligence, and patriotism. I may mention as a fact that is surely creditable to the French government, and gives assurance against excess in the present clerical reaction, that this writer against popery and eulogist of John Huss is librarian to the emperor at Versailles.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh, will immediately publish the last two volumes of the Foreign Theological Library for 1853, namely, Olshausen and Ebrard on the Hebrews, and Gieseler's Ecclesiastical History, Volume IV.; also, the Fourth Volume of Hengstenberg's Christology, translated from the edition of the original just published. The alterations in this edition are so great, as almost to render it a new work; while it is satisfactory to know that the change is one for the better. This volume commences the second series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library. The works at present in contemplation for this series are the following:—

Baumgarten's Apostolic History; or, The Progress of the Development of the Church from Jerusalem to Rome. Translated by the Rev. A. J. W. Morrison, A. M.

Stier on The Words of the Lord Jesus.

Ullman's Reformers before the Reformation; translated by the Rev. Robert Menzies, of Stoddam.

Two or more volumes of Selections from the Studien und Kritiken. Translated by the Rev. Dr. W. L. Alexander.

Keil's Commentary on Kings. Translated by the Rev. Dr. Murphy, of Belfast.

Keil's Commentary on Joshua.

Dorner on The Person of Christ.

There can be little doubt that this New Series will comprise many works of the highest value and interest.

THE first volume of Dr. Dorner's "*Lehre von der Person Christi*," containing the history of the doctrine of Christ's person during the first three centuries of the Christian era, has been long enough before the public to establish its reputation as one of the greatest theological treatises of the age. We have just received the first instalment of volume ii, carrying the history down to the period of the Reformation. The concluding portion is promised in due season.

"*Flores Patrum Latinorum*, ed. D. W. REITHMEIER," (Scaphusiæ, 1853: pp. 372,) is a collection of choice extracts from the Fathers, designed to be read in schools, and to train boys in the Roman Catholic faith. A collection of early Latin and Mediæval hymns is appended to the volume.

WE have received the second and third parts of FRITZSCHE and GRIMM'S "*Kurzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des Alten Testaments*," (Leipzig, 1853,) containing the Exposition of Tobit, Judith, and the First Book of the Maccabees. The whole work will be completed in six parts, and will form, when finished, the most convenient commentary extant on the Apocrypha.

DR. K. R. HAGENBACH'S "*Leitfaden zum Christlichen Religionsunterrichte*" (Leipsig, 1853: 12mo., pp. 254) is one of a class of books common in Germany, but almost unknown here. It is a Manual of Christian knowledge for the use of *schools*—not Sunday schools, but gymnasia and grammar schools.

DR. F. C. BAUR has collected the results of modern ultra-rationalistic criticism on the early history of Christianity into a volume, under the title of "*Das Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*," (Tubingen, 1853: 8vo., pp. 504.) The book, of course, is worthy the attention of all *critical* students of the history of the apostolical age: but there is no other sense in which we can recommend it.

AMONG the new works in theology and Biblical literature announced on the Continent of Europe are the following:—

Biblia veteris Testamenti aethiopici T. I. sive Octateuchus Aethiopicus instruxit Dr. A. Dillmann, Fasc. I. Qui continet Genesin, Exodum, Leviticum cum apparatu critico. (Leipzig: 4to., pp. 118.)

Einhorn, Dr. D., Das Princip des Mosaismus und dessen Verhältniss zum Heidenthum und rabbinischen Judenthum. 1 Thl. (Leipzig: 8vo., pp. 238.)

Hupfeld, Prof. Dr. H., Die Quellen der Genesis und die Art ihrer Zusammensetzung. (Berlin: 8vo., pp. 224.)

Ueltzen, G., Constitutiones apostolicae. Textum graecum recognovit, praefatus est, annotationes criticas et indices subjecit. (Rostock: 8vo., pp. 284.)

Umbreit, Dr. F. W. C., Die Sünde, Beitrag zur Theologie des Alten Testaments. (Hamburg: 8vo., pp. 134.)

SCHENKEL, Dr. Daniel, Evangelische Gengnisse von Christo. Predigten über Obschnitte aus dan Evangelium Johannis. (Heidelberg, 1853: 8vo., pp. 207.)

GRAETZ, Dr. H., Geschichte der Joden, von Untergang des jüdischen Staates bis zunc Abschluss des Talmud. (Berlin, 1853: 8vo., pp. 562.

Reiche, Dr. J. G., Commentarius criticus in N. T. quo loca graviora et difficiliora lectionis dubiae accurate recensentur et explicantur. T. I. Epistolas Pauli ad Romanos et ad Corinthios duas continens. (Gottingen: 4to., pp. 405.)

"*Æschyli Septem ad Thebas, scholarum in usum edidit* FRID. RITSCHELIUS," (Elberfeld, 1853: 8vo., pp. 70.) This is a very neat edition. It contains the text according to Hermann, with a collection of various readings, and the old scholia from the Medicean codex.

"*Plutarch's Vergleichende Lebensbeschreibungen*, Volume I., (Leipsig, 1854: 12mo., pp. 212,) is a new edition of the text of Plutarch's Lives, with a German version in parallel columns. The first volume contains "Themistocles" and "Camillus."

"*Studia in Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos collata, scripsit* GUIL. CHRIST, Dr. Phil., (Berolini, 1853: 8vo., pp. 128,) is a collection of acute observations upon the text of Aristotle's Metaphysics, with proposed emendations. A good index of *locorum emendatorum* is given.

AN attempt at solving the great problem of the origin and limitations of human knowledge is given in "*Allgemeiner Theil der Erkenntnisslehre* von Dr. TH. JACOB." (Berlin, 1853: 8vo., pp. 138.) It is a close, logical treatise, worthy

the attention of all who are engaged in the study of philosophy.

We give together the contents of the principal Reviews, foreign and American:—

Mercersburg Quarterly Review, (Chambersburgh, Pa.,) for January:—I. The Spirit of the Age: II. The Essential Nature of Christianity, and the Fundamental Law of its Action: III. The Dutch Crusade: IV. The true Relation of Chemistry to Physiology: V. The Land of Blessedness.

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburgh, Pa.,) for January:—I. Homiletics: II. Notes on Prophecy: III. The Plan of Jesus: IV. The Unity of the Lutheran Church: V. A Treatise on Biblical Criticism: VI. The New Testament, &c.: VII. The Elements of Individual Spiritual Life and Development, &c.: VIII. Infidelity; its Metamorphosis, &c.: IX. Our Theological Seminary.

Universalist Review, (Boston,) for January:—I. The Bible a Sufficient Revelation from God to Man: II. The Arguments of Analogy: III. The Conflict of Ages: IV. The Kind and Amount of Evidence necessary to establish the Doctrines of Endless Hell Torments: V. Christ the Light of the World and the Life of the World.

Southern Methodist Quarterly Review, for January:—I. The Coleridgean View of the Atonement: II. Zechariah: III. The Ascetical Devotion of Pascal's Late Years: IV. The Evils of Infant Baptism: V. A Critique on Dr. L. Pierce's View of Church Government: VI. A Discourse on the Life and Character of the late Rev. Hezekiah G. Leigh, D. D.: VII. On the Existence and Characteristics of Angels: VIII. Brief Reviews.

North-American Review, (Boston,) for January:—I. Bunsen's Hippolytus and his Age: II. Wayland on Dr. Judson: III. M. Gironiere and the Philippine Islands: IV. J. S. Mill on the Theory of Causation: V. The Life and Death of Louis XVII.: VI. Grote's History of Greece: VII. Memoirs of Francis Horner: VIII. A Frontier Missionary and Loyalist: IX. Early French Poetry: X. Memoirs of Robert Rantoul, Jun.

Brownson's Quarterly Review, (Boston,) for January:—I. Uncle Jack and his Nephew: II. Schools of Philosophy: III. The Case of Martin Kozta: IV. You go too far: V. Six Months in Italy: VI. Literary Notices and Criticisms.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for January:—I. American Baptists—Their Distinctive Principles and Religious Progress: II. Layard's New Discoveries at Nineveh and Babylon: III. Sir William Hamilton's Discussions: IV. Thomas De Quincey: V. The Conflict of Ages: VI. Wayland's Memoir of Judson: VII. Literary Notices: VIII. Literary Intelligence.

Eclectic Review, (London,) for December:—I. Flourens on the Instinct and Intelligence of Animals: II. Bleak-House: III. Sights and Sounds the Mystery of the Day: IV. Burmese Mission; Memoirs of Dr. Judson: V. Shakesperian Criticism: VI. The Life and Martyrdom of Savonarola: VII. Pearson on Infidelity.

London Quarterly Review, for December:—I. Oriental Discovery; its Progress and Results: II. Natural History of Man: III. The British and Foreign Bible Society: IV. Monkish Literature: V. Captivity of Napoleon: VI. The Dukes and Cardinals of Guise: VII. Alford's Greek Testament: VIII. Autobiography: IX. Our Australian Possessions.

Westminster Review, (London,) for December:—I. Constitutional Reform: II. Propertius and his Contemporaries: III. English Religion: its Origin and Present Types: IV. Science at Sea: V. Arnold's Poems: VI. Life and Doctrine of Géoffroy St. Hilaire: VII. England's Foreign Policy.

Christian Remembrancer, (London,) for January:—I. Census of Great Britain, 1851: II. St. Alfonso de Liguori's Theory of Truthfulness: III. The French Pulpit and the Court of Louis XIV.: IV. Bishop Kaye on the Council of Nicæa: V. Alison's Europe from the Fall of Napoleon: VI. Maurice's Theological Essays.

Quarterly Review, (London,) for January:—I. Life and Works of Gray: II. Humboldt's Cosmos—Sidereal Astronomy: III. Missions in Polynesia: IV. M. Guizot: V. Religion of the Chinese Rebels: VI. Castren's Travels among the Lapps: VII. Memoirs of King Joseph: VIII. Turkey and Russia.

Edinburgh Review, for January:—I. Lord John Russell's Memorials of Mr. Fox, and the Rockingham Papers: II. The Blind—their Works and Ways: III. Public Works in the Presidency of Madras: IV. Ecclesiastical Economy: V. Education for the Rich and Poor: VI. Thackeray's Works: VII. The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation: VIII. The Ottoman Empire.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1854.

ART. I.—THE POSITIVE RELIGION: OR, RELIGION OF HUMANITY.

1. *République Occidentale. Ordre et Progrès. Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme, ou Exposition sommaire de la doctrine philosophique et sociale propre à la grande République Occidentale, composée des cinq populations avancées Française, Italienne, Germanique, Britannique, et Espagnole, toujours solidaires depuis Charlemagne. Par Auguste Comte. Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive.*
   Réorganiser sans dieu ni roi, par le Culte Systématique de l'Humanité,
   Nul n'a droit qu'à faire son devoir.
   L'esprit doit toujours être le ministre du cœur, et jamais son esclave.
   Paris: A la libraire Scientifique-Industrielle de L. Mathias, 15 Quai Malaquais, Juillet. 1848. 1 vol., 8vo.
2. *République Occidentale. Ordre et Progrès. Vivre pour autrui. Catéchisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion Universelle, en onze entretiens systématiques entre une Femme et un Prêtre de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, &c.

L'Amour pour principe, L'Ordre pour base, Et le Progrès pour but. Paris. Chez l'Auteur: 10 Rue Monsieur-le-Prince, &c. Octobre, 1852. 1 vol. 12mo.

3. *Système de Politique Positive, ou Traité de Sociologie, Instituant la Religion de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, &c. Paris, vol. 1, Juillet, 1851; vol. 2, Paris, Mai, 1852.

FROM the philosophy of M. Comte we proceed to his religion. We have estimated, to the best of our ability, his speculative merits as the reformer and legislator of the domain of thought; we now proceed to examine his pretensions in the realm of practice, and are required to estimate him in his novel mission of self-authorized prophet and self-constituted hierarch. If, in the prosecution of this inquiry, we refrain from indulging in either the ridicule or the sarcasm which he continually provokes, we trust that our forbearance will not be misconstrued. The temptation to such a procedure is constant and inviting; but in the grave discussion of a vast and ingenious theory, we disdain to use the weapons of guerrilla controversy

which M. Comte almost thrusts into our hands. Our object does not admit of the sportive graces and the fascinating levities of literary recreation: we have undertaken the arduous task of tracing to their fountain-heads the streams of Positive delusion, and of reconducting the waters of truth which are mingled with them, through new channels, to spread verdure and freshness over the very lands which they now cover with miasma and pestilence.

We have taken the trouble to copy *in extenso* the long title-pages of the first two works mentioned in our rubric, because the effect contemplated by M. Comte in his proposed regeneration of a social system, alleged to be effete, is therein exhibited in miniature in his own language, and a faint foreshadowing is thus afforded of the scheme about to be advocated by him. We have not even omitted the mottoes and devices, although their explanation and development must be sought in the body of the treatises; for those constitute the most significant part of the brief programme, and form the phylacteries which he has bound around the brows of his renovated and depurated Humanity. These apophthegms of Positivism furnish a consistent vestibule to the interior of the temple, and prepare us beforehand for that heterogeneous jumble of profound thought, of sagacious morality, and of eccentric hallucination, which encompass us on all sides as soon as we penetrate into the mysteries of the fane. They beckon our fancies onward from the dry precision and phenomenal abstractions of the Positive Philosophy, and invite them to regions smiling beneath a less rarified and artificial atmosphere, where the natural play of human instincts, and the spontaneous ebullitions of human feeling are no longer to be confined in the void of an exhausted receiver. Adhering by the watchword of "Order and Progress," to the spirit and conclusions of his scientific investigation, M. Comte points us by his other countersigns to the mysticism of sentimental reverie, and gives an unchecked rein to the frenzy of the imagination, by proposing to "reorganize without a God, as without a king, the institutions of society, by the sole and systematic worship of Humanity itself." But, in this attempt to regulate the functions of the moral universe, and to circle around the great globe of human action, it is Phaëthon who has abandoned his natural foothold upon earth—not Apollo, who has descended from heaven, to mount the chariot of the sun, and guide the fiery coursers of light around the orbit of the world. M. Comte has assumed a task beyond his powers; but, in arrogating to himself the work of a God, he has strangely divested himself of the more earthly and human attributes of his previous philosophy.

The wide discrepance between his earlier and his later labours—

between the Positive Philosophy and the Positive Politics, with its Introduction and Appendix—is startling in a mind of such logical texture as belongs to M. Comte. With singular steadiness and sobriety he had pursued, in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, an undeviating train of thought through the long succession of the sciences; and had maintained, with scarcely any perceptible faltering, the same harmony of development, the same logical coherence, (or *solidarité*, to borrow the recent and convenient French phrase,) even in the elaborate creation of that new science which he had sketched in such grand and masterly outlines, as the climax of his own labours, and the crown of all human research. But, with human frailty, he relaxes his grasp on the thread which had guided him through the labyrinths of scientific speculation, at the very moment when he proclaims that his system is definitely established, and projects the reorganization of society on the basis of his scheme. This discrepance may, perhaps, be due to the customary incompatibility of the philosopher and the man of practical prudence; or it may be more appropriately detected in the narrowness and insufficiency of his original premises, which compelled him to exclude from all recognition the overruling dominion of Him by whom "princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth;" whose hand planted the foundations, and sustains the fabric of society, no less than it "hung the round globe upon nothing;" and whose wisdom "set his laws upon the great deep, that it should not pass his commandment." This exclusion—a foregone conclusion, by the way, and therefore in dereliction of the fundamental principles of the Positive Philosophy—necessitated also the negation of all those vital and indefinable links by which God has chained his creatures to himself; and it has predetermined the repudiation of all knowledge, and the rejection of all doctrine, which may not be embraced within the limited sphere of strict science. But its own penalty waits upon the sin, and has in the present instance manifestly overtaken it. M. Comte's procedure had left the future development of his system without a support, at the very time when the immense theory, which had been so carefully evolved, was to be transferred from the pliant realms of speculative analysis to the complex and intractable realities of practical construction. The original error thus ripens at length into fruit, and impairs the continuity of even the theoretic exposition, by refusing to yield the requisite aid for the final application of the system.

It is natural that the primitive defect should become glaringly manifest just at this crisis, and not before; for it is always in the process of transferring theory to practice that the deficiencies of the

former reveal themselves even to unreflecting minds. As long as a doctrine is confined to speculation, it is not difficult to conceal from others, as well as from ourselves, the imperfections of the material, and to cover over with deceptive semblances the insecurity and weakness of the foundations; but whenever it is tested by experience, or is transmuted into a scheme for actual employment, the latent errors are instantaneously exposed. In all such cases, the difficulty of previously detecting the fallacy will be proportionate to the greater or less amount of truth with which it may be incorporated. The larger the quantity of truth, the greater will be the probability of the concomitant error escaping notice. We have already acknowledged that the Positive method is correct and available, so far as strict science is concerned; and that it is legitimately applicable to the full extent to which the subject-matter will admit of rigid, scientific coördination; and we have discovered that its radical fallacy consists in the attempt to make science universal, and to deny all other than scientific knowledge. Hence, we have no reason to be surprised that the inherent error of M. Comte's premises should manifest itself openly by a rupture of his logic only when he proceeds beyond the range of pure science to the complex details of practice.

In the commencement of the *Politique Positive*, M. Comte urges the importance of acknowledging the logic of instincts. Rightly and acutely, we think: we did virtually the same thing, before him, and perhaps more correctly, in the first essay of this series: but the Positivist must reconcile the admission of the logic of instinct with the requisitions of a system of rigid phenomenalism. The task is not an easy one: others may conclude with us that it is impossible of achievement. But the very recognition of instinct—especially of instinct capable of subserving the functions of reasoning—appears to us the admission of a fact which cannot be harmonized with any purely phenomenal interpretation. How can this instinct and its processes be discerned? By observation and experiment? Only in a slight degree; for in this case both of these borrow the light of explanation entirely from the premonitions of individual experience. But experience differs from experiment in this important respect, that it is an act of consciousness depending upon no arbitrary and preärranged coördination of circumstances; it is intrinsic, not extrinsic; a modification suffered by the individual, not an observation of general external phenomena. To use the Kantian phrases, so loosely employed by M. Comte,—experience is subjective entirely in its character, experiment mainly objective. Without pressing against Positivism the ridicule and scorn which

are lavished in the first volume of the Philosophy, on the alleged fallacy of the phenomena of consciousness, and the impossibility of the internal observation proposed by the Scotch Psychologists,—we say that this recognition of instincts, which can be originally recognised only by consciousness, is at variance with the spirit of Positivism, or of the Positive Philosophy; because every act of consciousness necessarily implies a reality behind the phenomena perceived, and a real agency or cause antecedent to the perception, and incapable of being included within the sphere of phenomenal explanation. This is the *ignotum aliquid* which precedes all knowledge, and all possibility of knowledge; which is more real than all the shadowy phenomena which it reflects; and which evinces the existence of the agent prior to the manifestation of the act. If we might recur to the significant but seldom understood technicalities of early schools, we would say that the admission of the validity of the logic of instinct necessarily admits the substantiality of the *natura naturans*, as the previous condition, *sine qua non*, of the phenomenalism of the *natura naturata*. It is this inevitable recognition of something which we are assured by consciousness is more than a mere phenomenon, which is, in our estimation, fatal to any scheme of pure phenomenalism. It matters little that the variance may be represented as single, remote, and anterior to the formal evolutions of science: if it exists at all, it annihilates the pretensions of the system. Moreover, it appears single and slight merely because it is here presented only under one aspect, and with reference to the particular inconsistency into which M. Comte has been unavoidably betrayed. But this little discrepance, this unclosed and irremediable chasm between the two hemispheres of knowledge, scientific and practical, presents the entrance-gate for the logical introduction of all that immense but amorphous domain of knowledge which M. Comte has rejected and denied. At the same time, it brands with the mark of sophistry such previous rejection and negation. It divides Positivism, like a house divided against itself, and thus furnishes in the body of the system the irresistible solvent which must disintegrate and destroy the whole elaborate creation.

It would be sufficiently easy to give a more popular and more generally intelligible exposition of this discord between the two parts of Positivism; but we are more anxious to furnish the argument in the form which can be least impugned than in that which can be most cursorily appreciated. For the latter purpose, and for the reader unused to philosophical speculations, the proof of the inconsistency may be condensed into the statement which every one can verify by his own meditations,—that to recognise

instincts or sentiments is to acknowledge facts on the strength of consciousness; that to admit the facts of consciousness, which are individual, is to recognise something more, and something more real than phenomena, which are general; and that to receive anything more than phenomena alone, is at variance with the exclusive limitation of all knowledge to phenomena and the concatenations of phenomena.

The inconsistency which we have been illustrating is inevitable on the part of M. Comte, and springs not less from the strength and perspicacity of his intellect than from the original defect of his premises. Reference to his own repeated expressions will amply show that the consecution of the separate links in his chain of thought is as follows: The social disorder of the day is due to the prevalent intellectual anarchy; the intellectual disorganization is attributable to the undisciplined supremacy of the intellect; the sole dominion to which the intellect can or ought permanently to be subject, is right feeling and well-regulated sentiments; the only means of effecting the orderly governance of the sentiments is by constituting their dependence on, and obedience to, a supreme and superhuman authority—a God, real or imaginary, worshipped under the name of a divinity, or adored under some disguise. But a God, or the equivalent of, or the substitute for, a God, could not be proposed as a phenomenon discovered by observation or experiment. The spontaneous recognition and adoration of deities in all ages of the world might be represented as an historical phenomenon, but not so could the divinity himself who was to be offered as the object of belief and of individual adoration. Aristotle and the schoolmen had confined even the application of the categories and predicables to essences lower in the scale of being than God; M. Comte had declared natural theology to be the beginning of atheism: the mere processes of phenomenal science were inadequate to the discovery or acknowledgment of the Supreme Existence: the only evidence remaining which was available was the testimony of that spiritual nature of man, which formed its inferences under the strong compulsion of the sentiments, and not by those purely intellectual and partially explicable processes of reasoning by which the successive stages of phenomenal science had been constructed. Hence arose the necessity of admitting the validity of instinctive logic—the reasoning of the sentiments.

The magnitude and the essential character of the step taken by M. Comte, in this tardy amplification of the principles of his philosophy, are partially concealed from himself and his readers by the tenor of his expression. He naturally restricts his new postulate to its narrowest enunciation; but, while it has aided him in the

demonstration (!) of the new supreme being, who is henceforward to preside over the fragmentary universe of Positivism, it has necessitated the construction, at the ultimate end of his hierarchal scale, of a seventh science,—Morals, or the science of individual man. On this little interpolated thesis the whole superstructure of Positive morals rests; as indeed all moral science must be planted on an equivalent foundation, and all moral action regulated by its tacit acceptance. The extensive importance of the new position thus becomes manifest: but the position itself, in its most general and correct expression, is only the assertion that there is a principle of faith or belief, distinct from scientific knowledge, which precedes and is essential to the validity of the latter. Thus the error in the original demarcation of the base of the Positive Philosophy, and its subsequent correction, ostensibly *en passant*, by M. Comte, testify to the truth of the positions indicated by us in our article on Philosophy and Faith, in a former number of this Review, and also bear witness to the justice of the principles by which we have hitherto been guided in our estimation of Positivism, and to the strength of the exceptions which we have taken to its philosophy. In this way the recognition of the logic of instinct, however truthful and sagacious in itself, is the entering wedge of dissolution which produces an irretrievable rupture in the body of the system.

Having exhibited the nature and the reason of this inconsistency, we recur to the religion which is sustained by its means, and for the sake of which it was introduced. The ultimate aim of M. Comte's whole labours is the restoration of social harmony, order, and welfare, by the determination of the conditions of social health, and the consentaneous creations of sociological science. But, as the actions of men are dependent upon their opinions and their practice, regulated by their knowledge, it was expedient to criticise the whole circle of the sciences, and to inaugurate an intellectual regeneration, as the instrument to be employed in any ameliorated social organization. As, however, the connexion between knowledge and practice is not immediate, and science does not determine the employment of its facilities, or insure their application to legitimate and just ends, it was necessary that the purified science should be employed in the constitution of the societies, framed in accordance with the sociological theory, under the superintendence of a spiritual regeneration, which alone could insure permanent and healthy action. In these three terms—the spiritual regeneration, the intellectual instauration, and the social renovation—we have the succession and the dependence of the elements that enter into any complete and general reform. These three factors are also represented in the favourite

device of Positivism: "L'Amour pour principe, l'Ordre pour base, et le Progrès pour but."

The spiritual revival is the bond of union by which the other two are ordered and combined; and hence it may naturally be represented as subsequent to the instauration of the sciences, while it is necessarily preliminary to the redress of social grievances. Its position, however, in M. Comte's elaboration is determined by other causes. It appears to have been an afterthought forced upon his notice by the practical requirements of any social reorganization. But, independently of this consideration, moral science is in his arrangement postponed to the end of his hierarchal scale, and was not, indeed, contemplated at all in the original establishment and criticism of that scale. It is worthy of note, that this arrangement necessitates a schism of the science in M. Comte's exposition, and thus reveals a defect in the hierarchy or classification itself; for, although it is thrown back to the extremity of the chain, that portion of it which embraces the religion necessarily precedes the establishment of the definite theory of Sociology. If, however, we conceive the religion of Positivism to be a late concession, as many concurring circumstances compel us to believe, and as M. Comte professes the separation of moral science to be, we might justly assign to the conclusion of the Sociology in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* the appropriate place of both the moral science and the religion, and thus perceive the reasons which determined the order in which the religion is exhibited. Under every view of the case, then, we may readily detect an ample explanation of the episodical introduction of the Positive Religion between the Philosophy and the Politics.

It would be unpardonable, however, to overlook, by any exclusive attention to the intrinsic reasons which prescribed this arrangement, the extrinsic influence to which M. Comte refers its suggestion. This is the interlude of his attachment to Madame Clotilde de Vaux, through whom, he says, "he became the double organ of humanity;" from whom he declares that "the chief inspirations of his sentimental creed and their best expression have both proceeded;" to whom he applies two Italian verses—the one originally addressed by Dante to his sainted Beatrice, the other by Petrarch to his living Laura:

> Quella, che 'mparadisa la mia mente,
> Ogni fasso pensier dal cor m'avulse;

and for whom he claims the honours of sentimental canonization accorded to the poetic flames of Dante and Petrarca. We have no reason to doubt the entire efficacy of this amatory intermezzo in

originating and characterizing the Religion of Humanity: the traces of the origin are sufficiently perpetuated in the lineaments of the creed. But it merely furnished the occasion for the recognition of the preëxistent necessity, and suggested the mode of its solution. We can readily apprehend that the intimacy of affection which linked M. Comte by "an exceptional bond of constant purity" to his "ange méconnue," his "sainte interlocutrice," his "chaste compagne immortelle," recalled his mind from its dreamy wanderings and illuminated his vision so as to enable him to perceive, to feel, to realize the necessity of something more than shadows to interpret the realities and movements of life and action. And, though we may exclaim with Tibullus,

> Heu sero revocatur amor, seroque juventas,
> Cum vetus infecit cana senecta caput,

yet, there need be no hesitation in admitting the influence ascribed by M. Comte to the affectionate instruction derived from his brief association with his "*éminente collègue.*" It fanned into a flame the slumbering embers of passion; it revealed to him the almost unsuspected and ignored empire of sentiment; it disclosed to him the springs of human action at the moment when his whole intricate machinery required a motive power; it unveiled the image of superhuman authority at the crisis when its admission was indispensable. We are thus disposed to combine the objective suggestion with the logical demands of theory, in accounting for the interposition of the Religion of Humanity between the Positive philosophy and practice; and to assign to the former the occasion, to the latter the necessity, of its introduction.

If, however, an accepted religion be an essential element in the constitution of society, it is equally essential for its healthy organization that the religion accepted or proposed be sufficient, reasonable, and comparatively true. The history of former ages of the world prevents us from insisting upon the qualification of absolute truth; for such a requirement would render the provisional efficacy of the heathen creeds wholly inexplicable, and would be inconsistent with the apparent testimony of facts, which seem to indicate that, in a temporal point of view at least, the sincerity of the belief is in general a more important characteristic than the relative truth of the doctrine. But the same history, and also the tenor of the Positive Philosophy, press upon our notice the recognition of the necessity that the later or substituted religion must be more true, more pure, more comprehensive than the creed which it is intended to supplant. If we assent,

as we do without hesitation, to the maxim appropriated by Positivism, "*On ne détruit que ce qu' on remplace,*" we must admit also that, to justify or achieve the destruction, the institution presented to replace the ruin must be more complete and valid than the structure removed. M. Comte confidently flatters himself that he has fulfilled this condition, and boldly proclaims the definite establishment of the Positive Religion by the absorption, expansion, or annihilation of all previous systems of divinity. He conceives it to have been his peculiar mission to resume, complete, perfect, and reconstruct the spiritual authority which was only conceived in outline in the middle ages;* he professes to have eliminated irrevocably the idea of God, in order to establish in its place a definite unity both more complete and more durable;† he also asserts that Positivism has irrevocably eliminated Catholicism, as well as all other theologisms;‡ and, in characterizing the successive complexions of spiritual dogmas, he declares that religion, first spontaneous, next inspired, then revealed, finally becomes demonstrated in Positivism.§ If these pretensions be wholly untenable, we must reject the chimerical construction as a fantastic dream.

A brief examination of the Positive Religion in its separate parts will dissipate altogether the delusion, and show that the whole body of this Humanitarian theology is only a spectral and phenomenal efflux from the Catholic system, which it strenuously condemns, and which it is designed to overthrow. We shall discover that the various parts of this novel fantasy are only grotesque or ingenious caricatures of Catholic or Christian dogmas, like the distorted shadows which are projected from real substances upon incongruous surfaces by the flickering and uncertain lights of artificial luminaries. We shall find that, however the features of the old creed may be deformed by the quaint manipulation of the new idol-monger, they constantly reappear as the ghosts of their former selves. Any efficiency, therefore, which may be supposed to reside in the Religion of Humanity, must appertain in a higher degree to the Christianity which is intended to be cashiered. Every claim, consequently, which is urged in behalf of the modern reverie, is an involuntary testimony in favour of the ancient revelation. In so far as M. Comte repudiates the divine authority and supernatural origin of the Christian dispensation, he plants the foundations of his new structure on inferior and less stable grounds. His scheme is obnoxious, virtually, to all the objections which, justly or unjustly, he alleges against either Chris-

* Syst. de Phil. Pos., vol. ii, p. xxx.

† Disc. sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme, p. 323. Syst. de Phil. Pos., vol. i, p. 329.

‡ Catéchisme Positiviste, Préf., p. xiv. § Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 7.

tianity or Catholicism, the only form of Christianity which he habitually contemplates: it derives from its prototype, but in a very inferior degree, the plausibility and semblance of efficacy which it possesses; and it is liable to all the infirmities which belong to an arbitrary and conjectural theory. It inconsistently challenges for a travesty what it uncompromisingly refuses to the original.

To exhibit the agency of these strictures in a more unclouded light, we shall venture into the labyrinth of the details of the system. Fortunately, the logical appetencies of M. Comte's habitual thought provide us with sufficient clews to guide our footsteps. The Positive Religion is declared to consist, like all others, of three distinct but connected parts: "*le dogme, le régime, et le culte*,"*—or doctrine, discipline, and worship. These divisions are transposed and exhibited in a more logical order in the Catechism,† as doctrine, worship, and discipline. In the larger acceptation of these terms, M. Comte considers them as embracing the whole system of Positivism, the Sociology being regarded as encompassing the circle of sciences, the special domain of intellect; the Sociocracy extending to all action, aggregate and individual; and the Sociolatry regulating all the sentiments of the heart.‡ To estimate them at present on this scale would be to repeat much of our former labours, and to anticipate our proposed future criticism of the Sociology proper. It is obvious, however, that the terms admit of a narrower usage, and may be limited for the occasion to the purely religious aspect of Positivism. In this stricter signification we design to consider them. We shall, accordingly, confine our attention to the direct characteristics of the religion, the nature, and attributes of the new object of adoration, the forms and purposes of the worship, and the functions and duties of the priesthood.

M. Comte naturally enough suspects that the introduction of a religion into a system of professedly phenomenal science, may be calculated to startle his votaries and admirers, and he very prudently addresses himself at the outset of his Catechism to the removal of this stumbling-block from the credulous mind of his catechumen. Indeed, war against gods and against all theologies had been a constant aim of his philosophy; the same hostility is denounced against the same adversaries in the Politics and the Catechism; and he has traced on his banner as his battle-cry, "Organization, without God or king, by the worship of Humanity alone." The war has, however, changed its character: before, it was the aggression of a foreign foe; now it has dwindled into an internecine feud. He is ostensibly contending against every form of theology, but the weapon

* Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. i, p. 402. † Cat. Pos., p. 22. ‡ Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. i, pp. 402, 403.

of offence is now only a spurious theology itself. No wonder he deems it necessary to conjure away, by any and every *hocus-pocus* procedure, this flagrant discrepance, and to reconcile his acolytes to the inconsistency which he unconsciously feels, while he most earnestly disavows it. No wonder that all his admirers and followers, with the exception of the facile catechumen, who, even at the time of her early decease, had not professed herself in the temples of Humanity, and the few congenial, regenerate individuals, who swallow the creed without comprehending it, in their blind devotion to the prophet —no wonder, we say, that, with these exceptions, the religion should have been rejected as a fantasy and an inconsistency by all the disciples of Positivism. We are just as little surprised that M. Comte should devote the first exercise of his self-assumed papal functions to the fulmination of anathemas and excommunications against those who refuse to accept the religion, but claim to be Positivists on the strength of their acceptance of his philosophy.* He is right, and so are they. Indeed, we hardly know which perversity of error is the most to be admired. Positivism cannot be extended to practice without a religion; but *any* religion is at variance with the philosophy. There is an inconsistency in the introduction of any religion, and there are many inconsistencies in the promulgation of such a creed as is proposed; but these fallacies are somewhat retrieved by their absolute necessity. There is a still grosser inconsistency in anticipating practice without any religion, and in adhering to the philosophy for the sake of the support it is supposed to lend to infidelity, when a closer examination might have shown to the pupils, as it has proved to their teacher, that the original base is too narrow and artificial to sustain, without enlargement, any complete fabric of knowledge. On the sharp horns of this dilemma of incongruities, M. Comte and his heretical recusants are ludicrously suspended; and there they must respectively hang until they are ready to drop into the bosom of a more just and more comprehensive philosophy. We have likened Positivism to a house divided against itself; the expression was not designed merely as a passing metaphor, and at length we have arrived at the practical illustration of its reality.

Without stopping to undertake the hopeless and undesirable task of composing this family dissension, we may estimate from it, and the causes which necessarily originated it, the propriety for prefixing to any formal exposition of the creed an attempt to dispel the cloud of difficulties which hangs around the very conception of a religion as a part of Positivism. It is evident, at the first blush,

* Troisième Circulaire Annuelle. 3. Homère 65. (31. Janvier, 1853.)

that even an apparent conciliation between the two can be obtained only by some modification of the customary signification of the term religion, and by some dexterous legerdemain of verbal ingenuity. The pliant proselyte, who, in the *Catéchisme Positiviste*, discharges throughout the dialogues the functions of a Greek chorus, rather than the part of an anxious searcher after truth; and who, like the chameleon, displays only the hues of the leaves it feeds upon, foreshadows in all cases the doubts and difficulties in the mind of the teacher, not those in her own, or suitable to any distinct character. She commences her interrogations by very pertinently inquiring how the universal doctrine, which rejects all supernatural belief, can persist in terming itself a religion. The sacerdotal respondent replies by denying that the word, according to its etymology, has any necessary aptitude for denoting what is ordinarily understood by it,* and thus indirectly intimates that it does not of itself imply any preternatural credence. He then hurries on to declare the functions and conditions of religion, the manner in which the phrase may be trimmed down to an adaptation with Positivism, and the range of Positive Faith. We do not intend to be beguiled, like M. Comte's novice, from the true issue, by entering into a discussion of the consequential and subsidiary positions, with which we in part agree, recognising in them a partial exposition of the truth. We revert to the point which he has ingeniously slurred over—to the nature of religion and the significance of the term. It is remarkable, as a contrast to the view apparently taken by M. Comte, that Lucretius, in his celebrated outburst in denunciation of religion, one of the very earliest passages in which the word occurs, uses it explicitly to express the supposed credulity and superstition appertaining to a belief in supernatural things. Throughout the classics of heathen Rome, the idea of superhuman derivation and usually of superstition is implied by it. Nothing of course is to be learned relative to its primitive meaning by descending to the Christian fathers. The early Greek tongue furnishes no corresponding, and we doubt whether it possesses any equivalent term; for *εὐσέβεια* relates only to worship. Under these circumstances it is certainly a forced and arbitrary procedure to imagine from etymology an original meaning different from that manifested in the earliest use of the phrase. Moreover, we doubt whether the ety-

* As M. Comte's language is indistinct, and invites a great diversity of interpretations, without securing any precision, we quote his own words: "Ce nom, ma chère fille, n'offre, en effet, d'après son étymologie, aucune solidarité avec les opinions quelconques qu'on peut employer pour atteindre le but qu'il désigne." —*Cat. Pos.*, p. 2. This fluitancy of utterance, if we may use the phrase, is itself suspicious.

mology intimated rather than asserted by M. Comte is the correct one: if it were, we should have expected *religatio* to be used instead of *religio*. But, conceding this point, in an inquiry into the meaning of a term in habitual use, about which there has been an almost unanimous agreement of all who employed it for many ages, it is unwarrantable to turn from consentaneous usage to any fancied propriety of a conjectural etymological sense. And, though it may be perfectly true that it is a function of religion to introduce an harmonious synthesis between knowledge and action,* and also to regulate each individual and unite each to his manifold neighbours,† this is but a part of its functions, and by no means excludes the admission of a divine authority. Nay, these purposes may seem to imply the recognition of such supremacy, and, in our estimation, necessitate it. Nor is M. Comte's testimony, consistently interpreted, very far behind this declaration. He says that "either to regulate us or to stimulate us to community of sentiment, to bind men together, religion ought first of all things to subject us to an external power, whose irresistible supremacy can permit no uncertainties."‡ This notable statement supplies a transition to the consideration of the new supreme being of Positivism, to whom we shall pay our attentions, as soon as we have noticed the slightness of the reasoning which satisfies M. Comte in rejecting supernatural belief from the essence of religion, in defiance of all usage and all history, and as soon as we have again impressed upon others the singular celerity with which M. Comte touches and abandons the first difficulty which the Positive Religion presents. He alleges, that hitherto the means have been mistaken for the end in the employment of the term. It has not been so; but the means themselves had a special influence and merit, which he has overlooked. He himself confounds the end with the means, and conceives an accidental end, important though it be, as the sum of the aims of religion. The error naturally springs from the unchristian and irreligious temper of his philosophy, and as necessarily generates the fallacies of his proposed regeneration. The unity which he hopes to effectuate is at best only speculative, but in reality illogical; it apparently complies with the requisitions of a theory, but must be wholly inoperative in regulating the will, or stimulating any sentiments but those which may be set in motion by the imagination. It wants the overruling authority which commands the adhesion of the intellect, and prescribes the obedience of the heart.

To exhibit this defect in its clearest light, we pass to the object of Positive adoration—the new supreme being, who is to be trans-

* Cat. Pos., p. 2. Syst. Pol., vol. ii, p. 8. † Cat. Pos., pp. 2, 7. Syst. Pol., vol. ii, p. 9.
‡ Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 12.

ferred to the throne of the deposed Jehovah. This is Humanity, whose place is curiously asserted to have been hitherto usurped by God.* The first intimation of this new idol (*εἰδωλον*, spectre—M. Comte denies to it the designation of divinity) is found in the *Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme.* The conception and its development are subsequent to 1845, in the summer of which year he gallantly wrote to Madame Clotilde De Vaux, that "when modern social organization should have assumed its true character, it would be to woman alone that the knee of man would bow."† We may fairly attribute to her influence the recognition of the necessity of religion, and consequently the necessity of supplanting the old creed by a novel one; but the seminal principle which was forced by artificial fires to germinate into the substitute for a god, may be perhaps detected in the concluding volume of the Positive Philosophy. "Man, so termed," says M. Comte, "is in reality nothing but a pure abstraction; there is nothing real but Humanity, especially in the world of intellect and morals."‡ Hence, when it was necessary to seek an extrinsic power as the fountain-head of spiritual domination, he invested with supreme attributes the chimerical essence which appeared to be the only reality in his universe of shadows. What has become of the old abhorrence and repudiation of entities, with which Positivism commenced its march?

There is nothing more interesting or instructive in human speculation than to trace the genealogies and affinities of successive dogmas, and thus learn the generations of error. M. Comte borrows largely, though often indirectly and unconsciously, from the schools of German Transcendentalism. He frequently appropriates a special doctrine of Teutonic stock, regardless of its original setting, and ignorant of its descent, and incorporates it with his creed by that marvellous power of assimilation which characterizes any phenomenal system. In the present instance the obligation to his neighbours beyond the Rhine may be sufficiently direct, but the pedigree of the tenet is intricate enough to entitle it to the honours of nobility or notoriety in virtue of the number of quarterings it bears upon its shield.

When Kant and Jacobi, in their divergent rather than dissimilar modes, represented the certainty of knowledge as relative to the individual, and dependent either upon the logical processes of his intellect, or upon some more recondite springs of his nature, all certainty became of course limited to the individual, (as was clearly evinced in the philosophy of Fichte,) and consequently the convictions or

* Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. i, p. 264. † Syst. Pol. Pos. Complément de la Dédicace, vol. i, pp. xxii, xxix. ‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., vol. vi, pp. 692, 694.

demonstrations of one mind could offer no obligatory claim to the assent of another, and were therefore in some measure paralyzed and rendered unsatisfactory. This is a defect in all strictly relative theories of speculation, but a much grosser defect furnishes the parallel in all absolute schemes. It is a defect, too, to be acknowledged rather than removed, and is due not to the error of the doctrine, but to the frailty of the human mind. But the schools of systematic speculation are not content to leave an insoluble difficulty unsolved: amid the mists of the incognizable they will grope for cognizable foundations for certainty; and hence the successors of Kant endeavoured to discover a stable basis for knowledge beyond the fluctuating equilibrium of his theses and antitheses. They would reconcile the antinomies of the human mind. Another step in philosophy was taken to convert the special, isolated, and endogenous certainty of the individual into the semblance or the reality of objective and generic truth. The step thus necessitated was indicated by Fichte, and taken more boldly by Hegel and Schelling. It was to merge the individual in the species, to turn humanity inside out, to give substantial reality to a mass by multiplying and consolidating monads, which were now asserted to be shadows; it was to regard the historical concatenation of the successive generations of humanity as the only complete representation of man; to treat the individual man and the individual mind as only a fragmentary and illusory portion of that one great whole; and to attribute the only certainty and reality of human knowledge and life to the efflux of those qualities from the chimerical and conjectural aggregate. Mr. Stallo, who some years since offered himself to the American people as the expositor of the philosophy of Hegel and Schelling, and invited them to disport themselves in the nebulous labyrinths in which he had lost himself, uses similar phrases to M. Comte: "Man is mankind," says he; and again, "Man is but a tone in the grand universal harmony, a word in the entire language of the Spiritual, the whole revelation of which is mankind."* In the same spirit, Strauss represents religion as nothing more than the varying and mythical expression of the consensus of the instinctive sentiments of humanity. It is natural enough that the Pantheists and Idealists, who had turned the Godhead into a shadow by dissipating his substance and attributes through the universe of thought and matter, should attempt a similar procedure with respect to human intelligence and action. But is it not singular that M. Comte should come from the arid walks of strict science, and fresh from the anatomy and physiology of his biological studies, and

* Philosophy of Nature, pp. 150, 148.

elevate this attenuated, ideal, and purely imaginary Humanity into the sole image worthy of Positive adoration? Yet all errors are confluent in their excesses; and extremes in speculation as well as in action run inevitably, though insensibly, into each other.

But where is the demonstration or the demonstrability of the existence of this head of a religion, which, deriding spontaneous, inspired, or revealed creeds, professes to be itself demonstrated? M. Comte probably anticipates that the habitual recognition of humanity, in its familiar acceptations, will insure its ready admission in its novel import. And it might do so on a cursory view; yet this is all that gives even a passing plausibility to the new imagination. A moment's consideration reveals to us the artifice, and shows that the only evidence adduced or implied by way of demonstration is a mere verbal *tour-de-force*, differing only in mode, but not in spirit, from the apology offered for constructing a religion.

Assuredly M. Comte is unfortunate in his fabrication of creeds, and his manufacture of a God. But he denies the appellation of deity to his incorpuscular humanity, although he designates as a goddess woman, whom he regards as the best type of humanity. We have a very high respect for the tender and delicate veneration with which he contemplates the functions and attributes of woman; but we cannot suffer either his gallantry or our own to wile us from the true issues presented. Whether M. Comte accords or refuses the name of divinity to his new supreme being, we are obliged to consider his Humanity as the God of Positivism and Positivists,—albeit a most false god. A verbal negation, or a verbal quibble, will not destroy a virtual asseveration. The monkeys of Pegu, the elves of the Ashantees and Mandingoes, the cats and dogs of the ancient Egyptians, and the sun, moon, and stars of Sabæans, are as strictly gods, relative to the opinions and mythologies of their respective worshippers, as is the true God with relation to the true religion. If M. Comte's objections to all theologisms apply to all these forms of belief and superstition, they apply also to his own imaginations, which as rigidly constitute a theology; nor can he extricate his *Nouvel Etre Suprême* from the category of the divinities and theologisms, which he professes to have deposed, by any logical chicanery or verbal legerdemain. The Humanity of Positivism must be either a God or nothing—not even a significant term. In the former case it may be an arbitrary imagination; in the latter it is only a wild nightmare, a hallucination conjured up by the dreamy perplexity of distempered thought. In either event, it is as inconsistent with the principles and conclusions of Positivism as it is inefficient to accomplish the purposes desired.

Were we disposed to refute M. Comte by reasoning from the obvious absurdities of his positions, rather than by the employment of the more arduous but more cogent mode of exhibiting their inherent inconsistencies and defects, we might affix the character of false divinity to his Humanity by the simple process of enumerating its alleged attributes. No man in his senses, whether Christian or heathen, pretends to the comprehension of God—whether it be the true God or false gods. "A God understood would be no God at all;"* "for there shall no man see God, and live." The apprehension of God through the partial cognition of the divine attributes, real or supposed, is the only knowledge of divinity which is vouchsafed to men from any other source than revelation.† The Positive religion, then, agrees with all others in confining its interpretation of its supreme being to the exposition of its alleged attributes; and these attributes are nothing but a repetition and travesty of those assigned by Christians and all monotheists to their Supreme Being. Can we, then, be mistaken in asserting that M. Comte's Humanity must be ranged in the category of gods, and that his religion must be regarded as a theology? Doubtless, both the divinity and the creed are false, arbitrary, and fictitious; but they essentially appertain to that very class of conceptions which, throughout the whole Positive elaboration, are declared to be cashiered as effete, and they fall into all those pretended contradictions (real in this case) which they profess to remove.

The manner in which the parallelism between the characteristics of the new supreme being and those of the true God is sustained, is curious and ingenious—but the ingenuity displayed is only of that low order which is skilful in producing parodies. The first attribute established is the unity of the new goddess.‡ This is supposed to result from the capability of reducing the universal order—the general hierarchy of phenomena to the order of human apprehensions.§ In other words, the Positive faith arrives at its true unity, objective and subjective, in necessary accordance with its regular evolution, by condensing the aggregate of real laws around the collective being which immediately regulates human destiny.‖ The unity of the Supreme Being is thus dependent simply on the possible unity of human conception—a singularity not difficult of achievement, if, like Positivism, we commence by ignoring and excluding everything which tends to produce contradiction of thought. At best, this is

* Sir William Hamilton's Discussions, &c., p. 15, note.

† Leibnitz, Diss. de Conform. Fid. cum Ratione.

‡ Cat. Pos., p. 146—cf. Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 68. § Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 56.

‖ Syst. Pol. Pos. vol. ii, pp. 56, 57.

merely a stunted Cartesianism which is returned upon our hands; but if we examine further, we shall find that it is infected with worse characteristics. The identification of the objective with the subjective; or, more correctly, the absorption of the former by the latter, besides the vagueness of its mysticism, is objectionable as constituting a violent transition from the material reality—the external phenomenon, if you please—to the ideal interpretation. It vaults at one bound over the chasm which separates phenomenalism from transcendentalism, and effects the leap, like the flight of the angels of St. Thomas Aquinas, without passing through the intermediate space. Thus Positivism, which was phenomenal sensationalism at the outset of its career, becomes mystical idealism at its close. The apparent unity, which renders M. Comte's thesis plausible, is the general unity of the abstract conception of humanity, in the familiar acceptation of the term, as employed to denote collectively the successions and concurrences of human developments. But the impression produced by the ordinary usage cannot be legitimately extended to its novel and extraordinary applications. It can only originate a play upon words, but never justify a valid inference.

Supposing that this deified Humanity were not the mere hypostasis of an abstraction, the crystallization of a dreamy entity, what unity could be imagined in a supreme being growing by irregular accretions, receiving constant accessions of new members, and incorporating into his essence his select adorers, and even favoured specimens of the brute creation? Nay, further; M. Comte assures us that the superior orders of carnivorous brutes each tend to construct their own supreme being, and are prevented only by the aggressions and supremacy of man.* Where, then, is the intrinsic unity? It can exist only in the arbitrary determination of the idea, not in the essence of the supposed being.

To this shadowy phantasm—this Fetich of the introspective imagination—we are required to pay the tribute of homage, prayer, and gratitude, because this *Nouvel Etre Suprême* is supremely beneficent, and furnishes all our blessings by its sagacious providence. That the world, at any period, owes its condition, good or evil, mainly to the influences of all preceding civilization and corruption, we are ready to admit as cordially as M. Comte is anxious to assert it. But it would be impossible to establish the beneficent intention, which constitutes the essence of beneficence, except in some exceptional individuals, or in a few rare ages. As to the providence of humanity, it is preposterously at variance with the lessons of history. A scanty band of philosophers, scattered through the suc-

* Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 60.

cessions of time, have endeavoured, usually with vain efforts, to anticipate and order the future; but scarcely a single generation of men has ever been able to foresee or consciously predetermine the events or condition of a future time. They have been fully occupied with ministering to their own imminent needs. True, the instincts of humanity and its actions are not confined simply to the present: they range into the future, primarily from selfish anxieties for themselves, secondly, from the desire of benefitting their immediate posterity. But, if the distinction did not seem too finely drawn for vulgar application, we might assign the mainspring of this tendency to the fact, that there is no apprehensible present in which to work, and for which to labour. While we write, the present is already vanished into the past; it is with our yesterdays, and has joined the years beyond the flood. No; the beneficence and providence which M. Comte ascribes to humanity lie entirely beyond its circle: they are no part of its properties or essence; they are only its accidents, and borrowed from an extrinsic source; they appertain to the nature of Him who constituted human instincts, human sentiments, and human powers; who regulates human events; who breaks athwart human schemes and designs, educes good out of evil, and shapes his own ends out of our rough-hewn plans. The semblance of truth in M. Comte's attribution of beneficence and providence to humanity, and which give plausibility to the delusive parallelism, is the obvious result of a higher power, and an unconscious testimony to the existence of a real and divine Ruler of the universe.

This new supreme being is declared to be immeasurable and eternal;* but its immensity is certainly limited by terrestrial space, and even on earth by the division which parts the great waters from the dry land; and its eternity is derived from neither infinite nor undefinable duration, but merely from its undefined continuance. It is declared to be the origin of all power and all knowledge, not as the fountain-head of movement and intelligence, but simply as being the aggregate and receptacle of past action and discovery. Nevertheless, its omnipotence is confessedly limited by the immutable and extrinsic laws of nature, and its omniscience is confined to the narrow range of phenomena, and their colligation into theories. We do not think that M. Comte ventures to assign perfection to his dream. This is one inconsistency which he has, we believe, escaped; for what perfection could be ascribed to a being who becomes "sufficiently formed"† only after the lapse of ages, and by the incorporation of successive generations of his servitors? But perfectibility is his great characteristic; yet even this is only a finite process, not

* Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 59. † Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 82.

indefinitely continuous: for, if we understand the Positive theory aright, the inauguration and subsequent realization of Positivism constitute the last possible steps of human advancement; and consequently the idealized Humanity admits only of amelioration in its retrograde parts, and extension and enlargement in time and space by the incorporation, digestion, and assimilation of animals and men. This new Dragon of Wantley does not, however, gorge down women: they are exempted from this fate, or denied this blessing; and for the reason that their identity is totally lost in the existence of men. Their principal mythological function is to afford the best and purest representation of the great Essence,* and on the festal days of Humanity to provide from their number a symbol to typify it to the crowd. We know the debates occasioned by the Mohammedan exclusion of women from paradise; and jocose irreverence has considered that the intimation, "There was silence in heaven for the space of half-an-hour," is entirely irreconcilable with their admission into the place of beatitude; but M. Comte prevents by anticipation any such knotty discussions in the Positive Church, by declaring them incapable of assimilation, and assigning them an intermediate position between Humanity and men.† Henceforward, they are to be regarded as a little more than man,—a little less than nothing.

In the whole of the parallelism between Humanity and God—and it is pursued through all the changes of attributes—there is a constant recurrence of such amusing fancies, and a constant repetition of artificial contrasts and shadowy comparisons. We cannot trust ourselves to the temptations which a minute examination of the various details would present. The inducements to laughter and ridicule are too inviting; and in inflicting condign and merited castigation on a wild fantasy which disgusts and irritates much more than it amuses, we might be unconsciously guilty of desecrating a subject which we would mention only with the highest veneration, but which is worked into the tenor of M. Comte's exposition with revolting indecorum.

In the same spirit in which the lineaments of the supreme being have been borrowed from the attributes of God, the other doctrines of Christianity are parodied and reproduced. The fundamental principle of Positive morals—*vivre pour autrui*—or the conversion of egotism into altruism,‡ is just a more abstract enunciation of the Christian prescription, to love one's neighbour as one's self. It is true that M. Comte examines and estimates the respective

* Cat. Pos., p. 207. Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 63. † Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 63.
‡ Cat. Pos., p. 149.

merits of the two maxims, and of course gives the verdict in his own favour. But we are under no obligation to agree with him; and we cannot but regard the Positive tenet as a mutilation and extravagant distortion of the Christian precept. We make no observation at present on the excellence and the elevation of the aim thus proposed by his philosophy: its consideration in this respect belongs to the estimation of his scheme of social regeneration. We note it now simply to indicate its consanguinity and virtual identity with the commandment of that Christianity which Positivism was designed to overthrow.

The Christian doctrines of the immortality of the soul, the sanctification of the righteous, and the reprobation of the wicked, reappear in quaint guise in this novel religion. When this mortal life is ended, the unending spiritual existence commences for each individual: after playing his part for a while as a being, he becomes after death an organ of Humanity, and transforms his objective existence into a subjective*—*illusion.* If he has faithfully discharged his duties, and devoutly ministered to the service of Humanity, he has the ineffable satisfaction of entering as a component mist into the cloud of Humanity; if he has neglected the religious exactions of the creed, he is formally denied this incorporation, and is rejected forever. The more peculiar canonization of the saints, and the more flagrant condemnation of the chief of sinners, we reserve for later notice.

When we look to the admission of religion into the Positive scheme, after all the anti-theological declamations of the author, and contemplate the character of its doctrine, and the attributes of the supreme being which has been imagined, we cannot but regard it as an involuntary but strong testimony on the part of a bitter adversary to the necessity of the true religion, and to the existence of the true God. We do not think that we do any violence to the nature of the evidence thus furnished, when we conceive it to be a confirmation of the faith of the Christian, and a valid refutation of all the sneers of the infidel. Nor do we think that we push the advantage thus yielded too far, when we claim it as an effectual abnegation of the exclusive pretensions of the Positive Philosophy, and as the virtual dissolution of the whole scheme.

Returning from the notice of details to the estimation of the relation borne by the Religion of Humanity to present or past mythologies, we are struck with the singular conjunction of heterogeneous extremes which takes place through its instrumentality. The Humanity to be adored is borrowed, as we have shown, from Hegel and

* Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 61.

Schelling. The appropriation has probably been facilitated by the theory propounded by Leroux in his treatise *De l'Humanité;* or the idea may have been caught up from the shattered fragments of German metaphysics which float through the atmosphere of recent French speculation. The mystical investment of this transfigured Humanity in the robes of the Christianity which has been cashiered as mythical, has been possibly aided by the work of Strauss, which, if we mistake not, was translated into French, shortly before the publication of the novel doctrine, by M. Comte's then eminent friend and colleague, M. Littré. But, through whatever channel derived, it is obvious that the outline and the features of the Positive Supreme Being and the details of the dogmatic theology of Positivism, are plundered from Christianity. A third element is, however, added to the Christianity and infidel idealism thus united together; and for this addition we must recur to the earliest ages of heathen superstition, and the first dawn of pagan philosophy. The former age is represented by the return to the worship of animals, in a grosser, because more conscious and less concrete form, than it was practised by the Fetichists and ancient Egyptians; the second age is renewed by the inversion of the early Greek doctrine of *anima mundi*—the Humanity of M. Comte being only the converse of that fancy, entertained in consequence of that introversion of the human mind which was before explained. Thus, here again all extremes meet and embrace each other—and yet, we are assured that this chaotic, amorphous, and heterogeneous chimera supplies the sole unity which is consonant with the nature of the human mind, the appetencies of the human heart, or the scientific interpretation of external phenomena. We will not trust ourselves to characterize such a crude enormity in the terms which it provokes.

We pass from the doctrine, which has been only briefly examined, to a still more cursory notice of the worship, and the spiritual organization. On the latter we shall not dwell, because it interlaces itself too intricately with the scheme of social reconstruction; and with the former we will not tarry, because it is purely a freak of the imagination,—a symbolical and semi-poetical extravaganza. Some notice, however, of both we are obliged to take.

The first aim of the Positive worship is the development of subjective life, with a due recognition, however, of its necessary subordination to the objective and phenomenal world.* That is to say, the rigid rule of science having been constituted, the first act of faith is its transmutation into sentimental mysticism. In the simplest and most ordinary application of this principle, to the suitable revivi-

* Cat. Pos., pp. 154, 159.

fication of the cherished dead, their "cerebral evocation" is to be aided by the determination of the place, the seat or altitude, and the dress, peculiar to each.* The interesting catechumen naturally enough detects here the absence of any necessity for "the great institution of prayer," and seeks to be enlightened on the subject. She is assured in reply that this could not have been omitted, as it constitutes the principal condition of any worship whatsoever, and that Positivism satisfies the want much better than Catholicism, and purifies the institution at the same time that it develops it.† The Positivist prays, we are told, for the sake of airing his best affections, and may entreat noble advances, which are thus almost assured. The worship of Positivism thus becomes a species of ambiguous Pietism, addressed to an ideal object, and practised merely for the sake of giving an imaginary exercise to the sentiments. We might have considered this as a plausible recommendation of the study of novels and romances, but it is a curious exposition of the efficacy of prayer. It displays, however, the tendency of Pietism to degenerate into a mere selfish reverie, and its aptitude for conjunction with any creed. It easily merges into an intellectual opiate, and like the Oriental bang, is indulged in, not for the sake of any permanent results, but in order to generate the imaginary satisfactions of inebriate hallucination. It lights up the phantasmagoria of sentimental dreams; but its influence can extend no further than to produce indolence and apathy in waking thoughts and actions. Can we be mistaken, then, in attributing an eminently mystical character to the Religion of Humanity? But, observe that even this Pietistic aspect is derived from certain sectaries of the Catholic Church; and, indeed, M. Comte manifests in multifarious modes, and often by explicit declarations, his partiality for the mystical effusions of the Catholic sentimentalists.

By the felicitous combination of signs and images our thoughts and sentiments are directed with fervour toward the special objects of adoration, and these will be gradually multiplied by the habitual practice of the worship, so as to eventuate in a closer communion with "the final evocation"—the Supreme Being of Humanity.‡

Thus the worship divides itself into two parts, private and public; the former preceding the latter in accordance with the general law of the Positive Hierarchy, and being subordinate to it, inasmuch as the more general succeeds but transcends the more special, throughout the whole distribution of Positivism.

The private worship is divided into personal and domestic; the one being characterized by the worship of guardian angels, the other

* Cat. Pos., pp. 160, 165. † Cat. Pos., p. 170. ‡ Cat. Pos., p. 172.

by the institution of nine social sacraments.* In both cases, we are again reminded that the whole organization of the Religion of Humanity is a caricature and attenuation of the doctrines of the Roman Church. It is from that source that these guardian angels descend, though in their selection, functions, and attributes, there is an evident retrospection to the *Lares* and *Penates* of the elder Romans. These pocket-gods are to be the best personifications that each may be individually able to assign to Humanity. They are to be in general the mother, wife, and daughter, though a substitution for each of the three is allowed where circumstances require it. Thus the principal angel is alone common to both sexes: each of which must borrow from the other two complementary (or complimentary) angels.† So far as this fantasy reveals the instructive veneration for family relations, and so far as it only disguises the affectionate respect which is due to woman, we have no word of dissent to offer. Nay, rather, in a time like the present, when the graces and duties of home are habitually depreciated and too frequently disregarded, when the voluntary homage to be paid to woman is disgustingly replaced by clamours for woman's rights, we are happy to recognise, through the haze and the delusion of M. Comte's religious creed, a just and delicate estimation of woman's mission, and the reverential courtesies with which she should be surrounded. Here we approve: we endorse most cheerfully the testimony of the English lady, quoted with well-placed pride by M. Comte.‡ But with this our approbation must end. When he sublimates respect into religious adoration, and refines the metaphors of rhetorical gallantry into articles of theological faith, we can no longer assent; we can only smile at the folly, the fallacy, and the thin illusion which we are obliged to condemn.

A censure of the same sort, though less relieved by approval, is invited by his institution of the nine social sacraments. These, too, are borrowed from Romanism, though he has deemed even the pontifical number insufficient for his extended purposes. He endeavours to atone by their quantity for their deterioration in quality. The nine social sacraments are presentation, initiation, admission, destination, marriage, maturity, retirement, transformation, and incorporation.§ The first, or presentation, corresponds to Christian baptism. The new-born child is solemnly presented to the priest, who receives from the parents their engagement to train him up suitably to the service of the goddess Humanity. Godfathers and godmothers are confessedly borrowed from Catholicism; and from the same source,

* Cat. Pos., p. 183. † Cat. Pos., pp. 183–7. ‡ Syst. Pol. Pos., Préf., vol. i, p. 21.
§ Cat. Pos., p. 193.

though without the same acknowledgment, is taken the practice of imposing a saint's name on the new member of the Church.

Initiation is the substitute for confirmation, and is accompanied with religious instruction. It is ordinarily to take place at the age of fourteen, but may be postponed or refused, when the religious instruction or conduct of the child has not prepared him sufficiently for the rite.

Admission is an interpolation. It takes place at twenty-one, and is the sanctification of the festal ceremony which has been long observed by the noble and wealthy of Europe on the heir's attainment of his majority.

Destination is avowedly an extension of the Catholic sacrament of Holy Orders, and is to be applied to the selection of a trade, an occupation, or a profession.

Marriage is sufficiently intelligible to dispense with any explanation. But we may observe that M. Comte has elevated a contingent expediency, suggested by the crowded populations of Europe, into a religious prescription, when he assigns the ages from twenty-eight to thirty-five as the proper matrimonial age of the man, and after twenty-one as that appropriate to the woman.

Maturity is the repetition or reduplication of the sacrament of presentation, and is designed as the counterpart of the Eucharist.

Retirement is a novel institution, intended to characterize the withdrawal of the man in declining life, at the age of sixty-three, from active occupations; on which occasion he nominates his successor, thus in part reviving the castes of the East, in part the usages of the mediæval guilds.

Transformation corresponds to extreme unction, or the funeral service of Protestant societies.

Incorporation takes place seven years after death, and is an enlargement of the Roman Catholic canonization of saints, extending it to all good citizens. In another point of view, it may be regarded as the transference to earth and man of the final judgment to be pronounced, according to the Christian faith, by God upon the fate of all at the general resurrection.

But this general incorporation—this sacrament after death—admits a more special and honourable form, in regard to the principal benefactors of humanity. They are solemnly deified, and succeed to the niches occupied by the mediæval and other saints; while those by whom society has been injured are as formally stigmatized with perpetual opprobrium. The germs of this institution were manifested in the Course of Positive Philosophy, but they have sprung up in the Positivist Catechism into an umbrageous scheme,

like the growth of the grain of mustard-seed. With true Papal authority, and of his own mere motion as Grand Priest of Humanity,* M. Comte has, after several revisions, satisfied himself in the assignment of saints gathered from all ages, countries, and races, to every month of the year, and to every day. Not content with this, he has to most days ascribed two saints, leaving the other secondary positions open for his friends, followers, and the *élite* of future times. He has not, indeed, appropriated any space to himself; but we may expect that the respectful veneration of his acolytes will transfer, after or before his death, the honours of the Thirteenth Month from Bichat to the Founder of Positivism. At the end of the year, he has added an All-Saints'-day; and in Bissextile years a day for the solemn reprobation of Julian and Bonaparte, though this is to continue only through half the first generation, and to be appropriated afterward to abstract worship.

We have run into the details of the public worship; but we have neither the patience nor the inclination to travel through the various mummeries of Positive rites. We only note that the era from which years are reckoned is the institution of the first French Revolution; that the divisions of the year, the number of the months, the number of days in each month, and the names of the days are all changed. The conciliation of the lunar and solar year, by giving thirteen months to the year and twenty-eight days to the month, is only apparent; for the days intercalated at the expiration of the year produce an immediate derangement. The elaborate and artificial idealization of the months, their new designations after the demigods of Positivism, and the conversion of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, &c., into Humanidi, Maridi, Patridi, Filidi, Fratridi, Domidi, Matridi, are *niaiseries* on a par with the Nivose, Ventose, and Pluviose of the Revolutionary Year.

Thus, it would appear, that the whole scheme of the Religion of Humanity—doctrine and worship—constitutes not a demonstrated, but a fabricated and factitious religion. The phenomenalism, too, to which the Philosophy limited Positivism, returns, when it can be only injurious, to the creed which is to regulate Positive practice. There is not even the merit of original conception to redeem the transparent jugglery of the new artifice. It is borrowed in all its parts, principally, and in its broader outlines from Catholicism, but with occasional assistance from the most divergent sources—Fetichism, Transcendentalism, Paganism, and Jacobinism.

We ought to have mentioned, *en passant*, as another link binding the Religion of Humanity to Catholicism, that the symbolical repre-

* Syst. Pol. Pos., Préf., vol. i, p. 19.

sentation of Humanity is evidently the resuscitation of the Virgin Mary.

The Roman Catholic Church is the only form of Christianity recognised by M. Comte as still possessing the semblance of efficacy and validity; but it, with all other forms of Christianity, is continually declared by him to be *effete*. Yet the whole framework and complexion of the Positive Religion is only a *capriccio* rung on the same tune. If, then, Christianity is virtually extinct in all its phases, the Religion of Humanity, which is only the spectral image of one of them, must be still more inefficient. Yet, strange to say, this inconsistency is not suspected by M. Comte; or, rather, he fancies that thus is established that definite spiritual authority which the middle ages made an admirable but vain effort to construct. And, indeed, it is solely from these artificial analogies with Christianity and Catholicism that the new creed derives its feeble pretensions to plausibility. It addresses itself to intellectual and spiritual associations already entertained, and by the appearance of harmony with them it achieves what little acceptability it may possess. But it offers only the shadow in place of the reality: if men will not be governed by the supreme authority of God, or be obedient to the real or supposed revelation of his will, what moral coercion can give any influence to the adoration of Humanity—the vague, dreamy, intangible, inapprehensible generalization of the abstraction of self? Drowning men, it is said, will catch at straws. M. Comte's temper and philosophy were both impassively atheistical—we cut through the quibble by which he would repel the designation;—but the necessities of practice imperatively demanded a supreme ruler of the universe, and he has set up this figment of moonshine between him and the abyss into which he is sinking. Through the golden mists of sentimental reverie, through the haze of intricate and artificial delusion, the Positive votaries, if they do not worship the effluence of self, in its Humanitarian expansion, can only concentrate their adoration on the person and memory of the founder of Positivism—the constructer of their theory, the prophet of their creed, the creator of their god. If we may judge from the indications afforded, such a result would scarcely be unsatisfactory to M. Comte, and it would at any rate have the merit of communicating reality to what is now only an imaginary film. That great traveller, Gulliver, in the course of his wonderful peregrinations, found certain sages who were busily engaged in bottling sunshine, which was afterward set free to ripen cucumbers. M. Comte devoted himself for some years in like manner to the incarceration and preservation of moonshine, which is now offered as an elixir of life for the preven-

tion and alleviation of all social maladies, and for the cultivation of all sentimental virtues. We cannot express more definitely our estimation of the Religion of Humanity. The cloud is so vapory, so attenuated, so gilded with colours reflected by the opposing sun, that it defies distinct apprehension.

It is a very different case, however, when we leave the creed and turn to the organization of its ministry. Here all is precise, systematic, cognizable. Any dream or delusion may be available to priestcraft; any fantasy furnish the excuse for a rigid hierocratic domination. The ministers of Brahma and Buddha, the Magians of Persia, the Bonzes of China, and the sacerdotal caste in Egypt had no advantage over M. Comte in their creed, except in the sincerity of its believers. But, if Positivism can be swallowed as a religious doctrine, and can supply any food whatever for the appetencies of faith to cling to, it may in like manner sustain the new hierocracy, which is very minutely and elaborately organized in advance.

We should do no injustice to the priesthood of Positivism, if we were to say that Brahminism afforded the only adequate type of its hierocracy; we should certainly pay it the compliment desired by M. Comte if we termed it a revolutionized and dereligionized Papacy. It differs from the first in having a Dalai Lama, or supreme head, now represented by M. Comte himself, and in not acknowledging the distinction of castes: it differs from the second in not admitting the election of its Popes, or requiring the celibacy of the clergy; for it leaves the nomination of a successor in the hands of the Pontiff. It returns toward Brahminism by suggesting and facilitating the introduction of an equivalent for castes; and it agrees with the Papacy in almost all respects, though anticipating a still more extensive and universal domination.

The sacerdotal order of Positivism reveals the conception of an absolute hierarchy, transcending in the elements of its authority all the hierocracies of the East, and appropriating the designs of the Hildebrands and the Gregories only to extend them. By the union of intellectual and spiritual knowledge, and the appropriation of intellectual and spiritual instruction, the dream of the Mediæval Papacy is amplified into more than double its wildest volume. All power, or the motive-springs of all power, are concentrated in the Church; the execution and the determination of the details of execution are all that is left of the populations and their rulers: and this terrific embodiment of all valid authority is rendered still more dangerous by the autocratic monarchy to which the whole organization throughout the world is subordinated. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the only mode of renovating society—of regenerating the sentiments,

of removing the anarchy of the intellect—which M. Comte can discover, is the revival of a spiritual despotism more crushing, more exclusive, and more arbitrary, than anything the world has yet seen. The father of Positivism pretends that his system is founded upon the lessons of all past experience,—upon the conclusions of all history; but he has certainly read history in a very retrograde manner, when his studies conduct him to the imagination of an hierocratic throne for himself, where he may sit in more splendid and despotic isolation than even the Dalai Lama of Thibet can pretend to do, though he professes to be a god.

We have not entered into the details of the sacerdotal organization, and do not discuss the propriety of uniting the secular and spiritual education in the same hands, or the ministry of science with that of religion, because these are questions of deep importance and wide range, irrespective of Positivism, and ought not to be examined in connexion with such a passing dream as the Religion of Humanity. They connect themselves, moreover, so closely with the general theory of society, that if we examine them at all in connexion with Positivism, we must postpone the inquiry until we consider the Sociological scheme.

It will readily be observed from the slight sketch which we have given, that the Positive priesthood is only an expanded and thinly disguised resuscitation of the Roman hierarchy. We conceive ourselves, therefore, to be fully sustained in the criticism with which we commenced this notice—that the only originality to which the Religion of Humanity could pretend, was of that kind which was ingenious in the invention of parodies. This whole episode—its god, its doctrine, its rites, and its ministry—can be regarded in no other light than as an unseemly mockery and desecration of Christianity. To us this scheme which dethrones God to elevate an altar to Humanity, which rejects Christ to inaugurate the mission of M. Comte, and which wildly arrays the shadow of Christianity against the substance, is more repulsive and revolting than either the outrageous blasphemy of Voltaire, or the transcendental mythicism of Strauss. Fortunately, it can lay no claim to either the wit of the former, or the deceptive profundity of the latter: it can neither beguile the fancy nor seduce the reason. Every one, who reflects for a moment, must see through the transparent gauze by which the delusion is barely veiled, and must estimate the tawdry puppet at its intrinsic worthlessness.

The Positive Philosophy was unquestionably a sagacious, ingenious, and profound theory, though it embraced only a partial view of the truth. The Positive Sociology is as indubitably a bold

and penetrating attempt to discover and apply the laws of social organization. But the link by which the necessary connexion between speculation and practice is sought to be established, is equally frail and fanciful, and is spun out of nothing but cobwebs. It is wholly inefficient to aid the transition, for the sake of which it is introduced; it would be almost unnecessary to add, that it is utterly futile to inaugurate the spiritual authority which practice is acknowledged to require. Throughout it is vain and transitory as a passing dream of the night; and if it imposes upon the credulity of any one, it can only be in consequence of a predetermination to be deceived.

It may seem strange and inconsistent that a philosopher of great learning, and of vast compass of speculation, should have so far fallen from his high estate as to promulgate seriously such a flimsy device as this Religion of Humanity. We shall dispute neither the strangeness nor the inconsistency; but we may add that such ludicrous fallacies are necessarily incident to all forms of infidelity, when these are pushed to their extreme developments. It is much more important to note the barrenness and baldness of this illusion as an infallible assurance that the tide of rational scepticism has at length fairly begun to ebb. The Positive Philosophy alone was dangerous to the interests of Christianity: the Positive Religion removes the film which had beclouded the eyes of credulous infidels, and either remits them to the worship of the shattered idols which they had abandoned, or compels them to return with humility to the genuine revelation which they had scorned.

The whole influence of the Positive Religion, with sensible minds, will be expended in convincing them of its own inefficiency, and the consequent inefficacy of Positivism as an all-embracing scheme; and in confirming their faith in their God and their Redeemer. It has only unveiled to the eyes of the multitude the abyss which was previously divined solely by those accustomed to philosophical speculations; and its sole demonstration has been the exhibition to all of its inability to fill, to bridge, or to pass it. Its signal failure is the doom of Positivism; and heralds the coming day when the rejection of Christianity, and the indulgence of Rationalism in religion, will be universally recognised as the attributes of a mind weak, vain, presumptuous, illogical, and incapable of sustained reflection. Such a day is approaching; we pray for its early advent: and when at length its morning sunlight streams unclouded over us, we may avow with pleasure that the darkest hour, which announced the proximity of another morn, was closed, when all that M. Comte could propose as the substitute, the antagonism, or the antitype for Christianity, was the poor and impotent device of a Religion of Humanity.

ART. II.—OUR RELATION TO PUBLIC OPINION.

"A MAN'S foes shall be they of his own household." Strange and startling words! Members of the same household enemies to one another! A family,—where the infancy of all has been nourished at the same fountains of life, with a common blood coursing in their veins,—torn by discord, rent by strife, and burning with bitter feuds! The domestic sanctuary a prey to jealousy, hate, revenge, and all uncharitableness! Whither, then, shall we direct our regards for mutual love and good-will? Who shall bear the name of friend, or feel the generous glow of kindling affection? A man's foes in his own household, beneath the domestic roof, lurking within the family enclosure! What a picture of horrors for the imagination to contemplate! What a human hell to prefigure and antedate the raging fires of perdition!

And yet this is no fancy-piece. Recall the age in which these words were uttered by the Saviour, and the ages following it in immediate succession. Multitudes were betrayed to the torturing and murderous power of the public authorities, both of Judaism and heathenism, by their nearest and dearest relations. Brother informed against sister. Sisters revealed the hiding-places of their Christian brothers. Children exulted in their successful treachery toward the authors of their being. The husband ruthlessly betrayed to destruction the wife of his youth and the companion of his age. And (can human hearts believe it?) mothers thirsted, like evening wolves, for the blood of those very pieces of themselves, the children whom they had carried in their womb, nursed at their breasts, watched over in their infancy, guided in their youth, and trained up to manly strength and vigour.

Ah, but those stern ages are over! Yes; but human nature is not over. The words of our motto afford a striking example of that breadth and comprehensiveness of import, which belong to the moral propositions of the Bible, in a degree to which no mere human composition even approaches, and which so eminently adapt the Holy Scriptures to the instruction of all ages of time, and to all the classes and conditions of men. They announce a universal fact of humanity. They reveal a principle which as truly belongs to the moral elements of our nature in this age, as in that of a Herod or a Nero. Its developments, indeed, are different; but its essence and its destructive energy are the same. It no longer informs

against a child on account of his religious faith. It does not construct engines of torture, to wrench from the heart of a father his dearest hope. It does not kindle fires to consume one's own flesh and blood, as a sacrifice to the demon of superstition. But it does that which, if less violent, is perhaps even more dangerous. It disguises its poison in honey. It comes in the drapery of a good angel. Its weapons of attack are a specious, but damnable philosophic dogma, a witty innuendo, a social glass, a ticket to the theatre, a cunning device of thrift, a lax creed of morals, a profane jest, an unchaste picture, a sparkling but licentious poem, an impure romance, a well-framed double meaning, delicate to the ear, but redolent of lewdness to the heart, a mere negation of goodness and piety, and a long train of similar unsuspected but soul-destroying influences. There is scarcely a family in which some of these agencies are not busy at their work of death. There is not a school, not a neighbourhood, not a city, not a community of any sort, where their venom is not seen and felt.

In such a state of things, with what a melancholy emphasis may we apply the words of our Saviour to our own times and circumstances: "A man's foes shall be they of his own household." This is the source of the greatest part of the wickedness which infests the world; it results from nothing so much as from the evil sentiments and evil example of associates. There is no fountain of moral dangers so prolific, none so much to be dreaded, none to be so carefully shunned, as blind conformity to the opinions and practices of others.

The declaration of our Saviour, cited above, with these reflections upon it, suggests the general subject of our relation to public opinion. Our subjection to this potent influence, the danger thence arising, the duty of independent thought and action, the proper source and standard of our moral judgments, and the necessity of a rightly-educated public opinion and conscience, are topics which touch our interest in its vital parts, and are ever seasonable, ever appropriate, ever important.

It is an old proverb,—embodying, like most of these sententious formularies, the result of ages of observation,—that a man may be known by the company he keeps: the instruction of which is, that we ought to be discriminating in our choice of associates; for what *they* are, they will make *us* to be. An intelligent observer of men will draw from the manners of the child the manners of the parents. Without ever having seen them, he will tell you what are the ordinary tones of their voice and expression of their features,—whether gentle and smiling, or stern, querulous, and forbidding,—with almost

as much certainty as if he were among their intimate friends. What imparts that charming sweetness of voice and demeanour to the children of Friends, but the mild and subdued manners of the Society of Friends? The very beasts of high northern latitudes, naturalists tell us, are almost all white, from conversing with the perpetual snows of their frozen climates. So have we seen a young man enter the navy of our country, full of horror at the awful profaneness of the service, and in less than two years of association with the scenes and manners of a man-of-war, we have listened to as chilling oaths and imprecations from him as ever fell upon our ear from human lips.

The power of this principle of assimilation from social contact is strikingly and painfully displayed in our places of education. Here, scarcely a day passes in which some wickedness, some low principle, some act of more than doubtful morality, is brought to light, for which the ever ready excuse is, that all the scholars say or do the same thing. Pupils, of every grade, are the veriest slaves of each other's opinions, the veriest imitators of each other's conduct, the veriest echoes of each other's principles. So also are the throngs of young men who crowd our great cities, as clerks and apprentices, and, indeed, most young persons in every position and pursuit of life. But why extend our proofs and illustrations under this head? Who does not know and confess that an alliance with bad men makes bad men? that the companionship of the wise begets wisdom? that the life of the pure reproduces itself in its associates? and that the society of the learned refines the taste, exalts the understanding, and enlarges the knowledge of those who enjoy it?

Argument is not the thing that is wanted here—it is feeling. It is a deep and constraining conviction of the danger. The peril is known; it is confessed; it cannot, indeed, be denied. But it is not realized; it is not felt. Would that it were given us to portray the danger in such vivid colours as would touch the heart, and persuade the young to escape from the impending ruin. "Forewarned, forearmed," is an apothegm pregnant of salutary meaning in reference to this as to other dangers.

We once knew a young man, of high intellectual and moral promise. He had a solid understanding, a quick, moral perception, and such advantages of education as our best academies afford. Both his parents were consistent Christians, and he was the child of many prayers, of many counsels, and of many hopes. At the age of fifteen, fresh from the pure scenes of a Christian home in the country, with the dew of maternal prayers and counsels on his heart, he went to learn the business of a merchant in one of our great

cities. He entered a large and respectable mercantile establishment. He was full of good principles and good resolutions. The right and the just were words which had with him a meaning and a power; but he soon found that such principles, and a conduct conformable to them, were at a discount among his new associates. A leer of contempt from one, a curl of the lip from another, a profane sneer from a third, and a loose morality in all, were a sore trial to his virtue. He withstood the battery manfully for a time, but the thousand appliances of a seductive and treacherous dissipation were at length used with but too fatal a success. A breach was thus made upon his principles—an entrance effected into the citadel of his moral character. His descent soon became rapid; his wicked companions now became his idols, to whose low and evil opinions he bowed down, in as real a worship as ever the followers of Moloch or of Baal paid to those cruel divinities. To gain the good opinion of persons such as these, or to avoid their ridicule, he overcame his best affections; he hardened his conscience, he broke the hearts of his dearest earthly friends, he grieved the Spirit of God, calling him to a better mind; and within the space of three brief years, at the sunny, hopeful, opening age of eighteen, he sunk to the dishonour of a drunkard's grave, and to the deeper, darker shame and terror of a drunkard's eternity. Such, and so dreadful is the danger of a departure from the counsels of parental wisdom and love, of a weak surrender and abandonment of principle, of a facile compliance with the opinions and practices of the thoughtless and profane.

The only safeguard against such perils lies in forming our opinion upon conviction, and in acting with a fixed, supreme regard to principle. We are exhorted by an apostle to be "rooted and grounded" in moral goodness. There is no "short and easy method" of reaching such a result. It is a high and heroic achievement, a work of self-discipline and of "patient continuance in well-doing." But it is an achievement worth the cost. How is it to be accomplished? Read the lives of men who have become eminent in goodness, and the means will become clear as the midday sun. It is a remarkable feature in the history of all such men, that they have early entered into the depths of their own soul, and have deliberately framed series of resolutions, more or less extended, thus mapping out, as it were, beforehand, the voyage of life. They have been like the architect, the merchant, and the voyager, who carefully count the cost of their respective undertakings, and laboriously gather all the needful lights, that they may form their opinions intelligently, and lay their plans with prudence.

President Edwards framed seventy resolutions, all of them before he was twenty years old, as the great landmarks and guides of his life. How far the energy of these early resolves diffused itself over his subsequent career—how far these purposes of holy living contributed to the exalted piety for which he was conspicuous, the intellectual grasp and vigour which distinguish his writings, and the renown in which his name and memory are held by the whole Church, the judgment-day will alone reveal. Go ye and do likewise; reflect, deliberate, seek light from above, and settle, intelligently and firmly, the principles on which your future life shall be regulated. Do right, because it is right; shun wrong, because it is wrong; act justly, though the heavens fall; and then rest in the assurance that you will not lose your reward. You will have it in self-respect, you will have it in peace of conscience, you will have it in the honour of men, you will have it in the approbation and favour of Heaven.

But the only true source and standard of right opinions is to be found in the Holy Scriptures. Human nature is, after all, of itself, essentially weak. And nothing shows its weakness more than this perpetual craving after some guide and support out of itself,—this living upon the judgment of others rather than our own. Such, undoubtedly, is the weakness of our nature, that it does absolutely need some external direction and assistance. Idolatry had its source in this deep consciousness of our being. All writers agree in tracing its original to the deification of dead men, who had been eminent in life for strength of will and vigour of action. The reverence felt toward these men, the habit of leaning upon them, and a certain indefinable hope of some subtle transfusion of their qualities to the worshippers, led to the erection of temples, and the payment of divine honours to their memory. But there is as real an idolatry now, as when the Greeks and the Romans bowed down to the thirty thousand divinites of their mythology. Its object, too, is substantially the same,—men, either truly eminent, or fancied to be so. The Moloch of our faith is public opinion, popular judgments, the thoughts and whisperings of our neighbours. The "mind of the street" must be sounded, the opinion of the town must be taken, before we can venture upon a new coat or a new dress. The idolatry remains; the form only is changed.

Human nature must, then, have something out of itself to lean upon. This is settled in universal experience, and confirmed by the voice of all history. The question is, Upon what shall it lean? The choice lies between two objects,—God and his word, or men and their opinions. Reader, we hold up these two several objects

to your observation. Regard them; study them; ponder their qualities, excellencies, assistances. Strength and weakness, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, life and death, are here set before you. Make your choice; make it deliberately, thoughtfully, with prayer,—and the result cannot be doubtful. The "law and the testimony"—the truth and power of the living God—must carry it over those veriest nothings,—popular caprice, popular applause, and popular censure.

Finally; we ask the reader to contemplate the importance of a rightly-educated public opinion and conscience, together with the means of securing so invaluable a blessing. Since men are such echoes of each other in their moral opinions and practices, and since they are likely ever to remain more or less subject to this potent influence, it becomes a point of transcendent moment to enlighten their judgments, to elevate their principles, and to purge their manners; and this reformation must begin where the evil to be overcome has its source,—in the family and the school. Greater attention must be given to the reality of things; less to their shows and semblances. The young must be trained to attend more to the substance of objects than to those fair appearances which lure but to cheat. They must imbibe with the milk of infancy, and continue to mingle with the food of childhood and youth, the noble sentiment, that

> "Worth makes the man, the want of it the fellow;"

that a good head is of more value than its covering; that a good heart is better than a graceful carriage; and that a life without a stain, a character above reproach, though the shell be roughly clad, and the manners lack a courtly polish, is a possession above the price of rubies. Men's moral judgments are out of joint; they are framed upon *simulacrum*, as Carlyle would phrase it,—upon mere semblance and seeming.

These reflections point to a reform in our methods of education. More of a religious element must be infused into them. There is a morbid dread of religion in our schools, to call it by no worse a name, which is of baleful influence and augury. Men are scared by the spectre of sectarianism. "Don't mention a God or a future world to our children, or you'll make them Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Churchmen, or something else as bad." This cry is as senseless as it is impious. Is there not much common ground among Christians of differing creeds? Is not the common ground the broadest and most important? Do not all Christians receive the essential doctrines of revelation,—the divine

origin and authority of the Holy Scriptures, the being and perfections of God, his moral government of the world, the fall and redemption of man, his accountability, the obligation of a pure morality, and the doctrine of a future judgment and endless retribution? But if religious instruction in schools necessarily involve denominational or sectarian teaching, then we say, without hesitation, let such instruction be given. The narrowest, blindest, and most intolerant bigotry of sectarianism is better than infidelity, whether it come in the bold and open form of old English deism, or in the more insidious and captivating guise of modern transcendentalism. It is better, also, than that utter indifference and insensibility to religious truth, so common in our day, which are but one remove from infidelity itself. Education without religion is education without its essence. To give men knowledge, and leave them immorality, would be but an equivocal boon. Rather, we might say, it would be to put into their hands an instrument of mischief, and supply stimulants to the use of it. It would be offering, not bread, but poison, to the eager appetite of the rising generation. Access to the tree of knowledge was once purchased by exclusion from the tree of life. Be it our endeavour—surely not an impracticable one—to commingle, in loving embrace, the foliage, flowers, and fruits of these twin sisters of paradise. The true dignity of man consists in a severe morality, in self-control, in humility and moderation, and in the voluntary performance of all his duties to God and his neighbour. Religious education is, consequently, the first want of a people. "The end of learning," says the great Milton, "is to repair the ruin of our first parents, by requiring to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, and to imitate him."

But what a mass of false perceptions, false judgments, and false principles, in morals, is exhibited in almost all our schools! It would be a curious research, as Dr. Arnold suggests, to gather up the several points in a character which boys respect and admire, in order to show what a crooked rule they walk by. In the true scale of excellence the order is,—first, moral perfection; secondly, force of understanding; and, thirdly, physical strength and dexterity. At school this order is reversed. The most active and expert player is the best fellow; the cleverest scholar comes next in the scale; while the best boy, with nothing but goodness to recommend him, rises but little above contempt. The habitual breach of duty, even, is countenanced and upheld. Everywhere else but in schools, it is but a natural feeling that it is disgraceful to do our business ill; that it is contemptible either to have no employment, or, having one, to neglect it. Not so in these scholastic communities. Here the

contrary often happens; idleness is a glory, industry a reproach. We have heard of a college student who, from an affectation of genius, would ask what the exercise of the hour was in the recitation-room, after having spent the day in idleness, and toiled at his lesson much of the preceding night, under his bed, with the light behind the covers, lest it should be known that he sat up at night! Such a man, one would think, must despise himself for the rest of his natural life. But the most fearful laxity in the code of school morals is the estimation in which falsehood is held. Lying is far from being considered as hateful a vice as the Holy Ghost teaches us to regard it: but little disgrace is attached to it. It is fearful to contemplate the amount of direct falsehood, of unfair concealment, of deceitful representation, and the long train of similar wickedness practised without compunction or shame, often with exultation even, by school-children.

Nothing but the simple, plain, earnest teaching of the word of God can change this sad state of things to a better. That divine word is quick and powerful. Its influence upon the understanding is as healthful and invigorating as it is upon the heart; its quickening energy as great upon the intellectual as upon the moral perceptions. It is the great and controlling agency to be employed in the production of a better public opinion, a sounder public conscience, a higher standard of public morals, a purer and healthier action of the public heart. In the accomplishment of so desirable and excellent a result, religious education, based upon the Bible, is the one thing needful. Other measures may change and subside, as the national mind changes and subsides beneath them; but this is a measure which creates the national mind, and which insures, by its firm and broad substructions, the solidity, harmony, and durability of the whole social structure. It is the bond of our union, the charter of our liberties, the ward and keeper of our constitution; the palladium of our happiness, our safety, and our right. It seems to us that there is urgent need of a reform in this matter. We want a stronger infusion of godliness into the sources of public sentiment; a greater use of direct, plain, and earnest Bible teaching, both in the family and in the school. Here, Christian brethren, is a great work; a work to which every Christian man and every Christian woman must put their shoulder and their heart. Say not that you are too obscure and insignificant for the labour. God works by small as well as by great instrumentalities. Gideon and his three hundred, armed with their pitchers and their lamps, and bearing a divine commission, shall discomfit and put to flight the swarming hosts of Midian. God

magnifies his own power by the feebleness of the means as accompanied with the splendour of the result. He accepts a prayer or a sigh, and pours the treasures of his goodness on a nation in return when royal gifts are wanting.

Art. III.—ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

1. *The Grammar of English Grammars, with an Introduction Historical and Critical; the whole methodically arranged and amply illustrated; with Forms of Correcting and of Parsing, Improprieties for Correction, Examples for Parsing, Questions for Examination, Exercises for Writing, Observations for the Advanced Students, Decisions and Proofs for the Settlement of Disputed Points, Occasional Strictures and Defences, an Exhibition of the several Methods of Analysis, and a Key to the Oral Exercises: to which are added Four Appendixes, pertaining separately to the Four Parts of Grammar.* By Goold Brown, formerly Principal, &c., Author, &c. New-York: S. S. & W. Wood, 1851. 8vo., pp. 1028.
2. *The English Language.* By Robert Gordon Latham, M.D., F.R.S., &c. Third Edition, revised and greatly enlarged. London: Taylor, Walton, & Maberly, 1850. 8vo., pp. 609.

We have selected the two works whose title-pages stand at the head of this article, not for the purpose of formally reviewing them in particular, nor because we intend wholly to condemn or wholly to approve either of them. We present them rather as fair specimens of the two modes of treating the English language now in vogue. Mr. Brown is a thorough-going practical grammarian of the orthodox school. The most rigid empiricist will find no new-fangled terms or notions here to offend him. The author is a teacher of grammar himself; and his book is a complete repository of grammatical items. The old fable of Apollo and the critic tells us that the cunning god rewarded a diligent collector of all the faults and errors in a certain work of fame by presenting him with a bag of chaff, from which he had directed him to cull out all the wheat. We hope Mr. Brown will receive some more substantial compensation for the immense labour he has been at in this work. He has certainly gathered instances enough of false grammar (so called) to make his fellow-grammarians of every age and clime, from whose works he has collected them, stand aghast at the sight of their own heresies. We have more than a suspicion, however, that if his own book were served in the same way, a pretty handsome sum of the like coin might be paid back to him. What a great pity it is that teachers cannot follow their own rules; but so it seems

to be, even in grammar: out of some *five hundred* authors, whose various grammatical works are enumerated in the "condensed catalogue" prefixed to this volume, none appear to have escaped the keen scent of this hunter, but all have furnished their quota of "errors" to garnish the pages of "The Grammar of English Grammars." Verily, common mortals had better at once give up all idea of "speaking and writing the English language correctly," seeing that the very professors of the "art" have so universally failed.

The work of Dr. Latham is of an altogether different stamp. He treats the language etymologically, tracing each form to its source in the Anglo-Saxon dialects, and thence deducing its grammatical power and construction. This is certainly, so far as it goes, a rational mode of procedure. But etymology in this sense is not grammar; and it does not follow because a word was a certain part of speech, or had a certain grammatical character in a particular language, that it must be the same in a kindred or derivative one. Ours is the *English* language; and its grammar must neither be confounded with that of the Germanic dialects on the one hand, nor the Romaic on the other. Still the etymological plan of treatment is proper as a basis, and when rightly carried out and applied, we may hope to see something like a correct system of grammar spring from it.

Thus far of the particular works before us. We shall now proceed to examine grammatical principles in the light of these works, and only refer to them incidentally in the discussion.

In the first place, then, What is English grammar itself? The following is the definition furnished us in the books: "English grammar is the art of reading, writing, and speaking the English language correctly."—*Gram. of Gram.*, p. 131. Now we undertake to say it is no such thing, in any one of these particulars. Let us analyze the definition. As to what the English language is, we are all agreed. How do we learn to "speak" this language? Evidently by imitation, in our infancy. English grammar, then, so far as this part of the definition goes, is the instinctive imitation of articulate sounds as signs of ideas. But is this a just statement of the science?—is this any part of what we understand by the system of grammar? Who ever dreams of this in defining the subject? Behold the little grammarian in petticoats, receiving from the unpretending mother, or perhaps from the illiterate nurse, lessons in this sublime science, whose very fundamentals puzzle the most erudite brains! But, possibly, the word "correctly" may have been overlooked in our criticism: let us add that to the definition. It will

then amount to this,—that the child has to be retaught at school what he has incorrectly learned in the nursery. Or perhaps the infantile prattle, or fond nurse's "baby talk," is to be dropped for the more dignified style of books. And how is this translation effected? Is it by calling to mind the dry rules of Murray or Brown? Not at all. It is still the same imitative process. The boy uses the same phrases as those around him, just as he borrows their accent, without ever thinking of grammar. There may be some inaccuracies in his language, (and who, even of the most cultivated, is without some faulty habits in this respect?) but in the main he uses proper forms of speech. At all events, if he ever learns to speak correctly, he does so by imitation, or from his reading, and not artistically, nor from his grammar. And then, as he ascends, in maturer years, to the higher range of declamation, or perhaps becomes a public orator, how does he improve his "art of speaking correctly?" He may perhaps occasionally recur to his grammatical rules to correct some of the grosser faults that have become habitual with him,—or, rather, that are conventional in colloquial life; but in all the nicer points where grammar, as above defined, is needed, if anywhere, he simply consults the general practice of others, and conforms to *usage*. In short, he passes from his imitative "grammar" to imitative "rhetoric," and is equally unconscious of "art" in both. Moreover, "speaking correctly" just as much includes propriety of tone, manner, and emphasis, as it does articulation: here, then, the sweeping definition brings in elocution and half-a-dozen kindred sciences under grammar.

Again; the definition is not a whit more correct in regard to "reading and writing correctly." Penmanship is certainly no part of grammar; but it is included in the definition. Aside from this inaccuracy, the definition fails for precisely the same reason that it fails as to "speaking." Writing necessarily follows reading in acquisition, but precedes it in practice: the forms, powers, and application of letters must be learned, before they can be intelligently employed, and written before they can be read. But neither reading nor writing contains any new element of grammar: they are merely modes of speech; the words, ideas, language are the same,—the outward symbol alone is changed. If, therefore, grammar has not been acquired or practised, as such, up to this point, it cannot be developed in these operations. The grammar pertains to the language itself, and not to the mode of representation. Our conclusion is now reached,—that grammar does not consist in correctly reading, writing, or speaking, whether considered separately or taken together.

But it will probably be said that the process delineated above is only the practical application of grammar; and that the knowledge which the child thus silently imbibes, or gradually and insensibly acquires, when reduced to form and exhibited in systematic rules, is what constitutes proper scholastic grammar. This we admit; and precisely for this reason do we object to the definition. Its terms limit it to this very *practical* affair. It is called an "ART." Now art in its very nature respects practice; it grows out of it, and cannot subsist without it. An *art* is any profession, employment, or operation that requires *skill* in its performance. This skill is the result of habit, which depends upon practice. Invention may improve an art by rendering skill more available; but experience alone can really increase the skill. In this view, therefore, grammar can be called an art only by confining it to the above practical routine. Now we do not suppose any one will think of calling that *grammar*, as intended to be covered by the definition. If it be, we might as well discard our text-books, for we know their whole contents before they even reach us,—they are unavailing for any purpose. Here lies the radical error of the definition; it mistakes the sphere and office of grammar,—which is not to enable persons practically to use their mother tongue aright, but to exhibit and classify the principles which unconsciously guide them in that use. In one word, grammar is not an *art* at all.

What, then, is English grammar? We answer, simply, Grammar is *the science of language;* and English grammar, of course, is the science of the *English* language,—just as arithmetic is the science of numbers, and not the mere process of computing them; and astronomy the science of the heavenly bodies, rather than the ability to calculate eclipses. A *science* is a systematic view of any branch of knowledge; and herein grammar differs from the general familiarity with the facts and details of language, acquired in infancy or from observation: the one is *knowledge* simply,—undigested, practical, and unconscious,—till called into use; the other is developed under definite and harmonious laws, theoretically and intelligently comprehended: the one takes cognizance of the *phenomena* merely; the other treats of the *principles* of which these are the index.

This distinction we conceive to be of fundamental importance, and we therefore dwell particularly upon it. Having stumbled at the very threshold of their work, grammarians have been lame through the whole of it. They have incorrectly defined the subject of which they propose to treat, because they have actually misapprehended it; and hence they have proceeded to discuss it in a manner quite aside from its real nature, and the wants of their readers. True

and proper grammar they have wholly ignored. They have exhibited an infinity of abstract propositions, arbitrary rules, dogmatic exceptions, and stale examples; but the genius and spirit of the language they have never inquired about: they present to the student a dry skeleton, with the absurd expectation that he will thence picture to himself the living form clothed with grace. They have mistaken their office: it is *not* to teach us our native language, nor how to use it,—that we know already, without their aid; it is to show us *why* we use it thus, and *how* it came to be what it is. If we were foreigners, attempting to learn English, there would be more propriety in their proposal; but even then we should probably find an easier way of acquiring it, namely, by association with those who speak it. We can only account for the formal farce they palm off in lieu of the life-like drama, by attributing their mode of procedure to a fashion derived from the course usually pursued in teaching the dead languages. These have generally been set forth in didactic treatises, detailing the forms and powers of the words, and adding practical rules and examples to direct the tyro in their use and combination, very much after the manner of a guide-book for a traveller in a region that he has never before explored. All this is well enough in such a case: indeed, we are inclined to think, notwithstanding the Ollendorfianism so prevalent of late in these studies, that for persons of mature judgment, who can grasp these generalizations, and memorize the details, it is the better method, because more direct, expeditious, and thorough—the rules serving to associate the facts together; but for younger minds the imitative plan is rapidly superseding the other,—and in the most approved text-books of this kind, the artificial system is only retained at all, because of the impossibility, from the nature of the case, of fully providing the means for the natural process, and also for the purposes of the higher culture of which we have spoken. But to attempt to transplant this dry, enunciatory system into one's vernacular is the most preposterous and useless thing in the world. It is only rehashing, in a very unpalatable form, a savoury and wholesome dish on which the scholar has fed from infancy; nay, it is extracting from the mental growth the aliment that has been digested and assimilated, and bottling it up in a mummied state.

It will, doubtless, be claimed by grammarians that, although youth may be orally acquainted with the language, and may in general be sufficiently correct in the use of it for practical purposes, they still need to study it, in order to get a just idea of its relations to other languages, and to be able to compare its elements with each other; in other words, to obtain a full, analytical, logical, and systematic view

of it. This is quite true; but we have shown that the prevalent mode of teaching grammar does not set out with this object in view, and we shall in the issue still more fully prove that it entirely fails to accomplish it. It is in order to this very end that we demand a more scientific exposition of the principles of the language; and that these shall be treated in the same manner as any other science with whose outward phenomena we are in daily contact. A history of the facts of natural philosophy, for instance, showing that a stone thrown into the air will return again to the earth, that water will only run down hill, that the sun revolves around the earth every day, and the like, would be considered a very inapt and frivolous work to put into the hands of youth: they must be furnished with a treatise expounding the *laws* under which and by virtue of which these things take place, and apparent anomalies and contradictions must be cleared up: in short, that instinctive demand of youth, as to the "why" and the "wherefore" of things, must be satisfied. From the neglect of this vital point, grammar has become a mere collection of dry technicalities, by which the student is enabled, indeed, to talk very flippantly of nouns, adjectives, and verbs, and quote, parrot-like, a rigmarole of rules, paradigms, and observations, without ever once gaining an inkling of the *rationale* of the language he is mechanically dissecting. The whole affair is a system of *nomenclature*, merely, by which certain words are recognised as those labelled by the names of the several "parts of speech," and marshalled unmeaningly, to and fro, across the automatical chess-board of grammar. Now names are well enough, and we do not object to a nomenclature, provided it is natural, simple, and philosophically correct; but we insist that it shall have some significance, and that those who use it shall understand that significance. Especially do we demand that terms be not put nor mistaken for ideas; and that the student be not amused with a mere flourish of dialectics, when he ought to be grappling with the realities of philology.

It may be objected that grammar, such as we have pictured it, would be too abstruse and difficult a study for youth. To this we simply reply, If it is too difficult for childhood, let it be reserved for maturer years. Do not waste the precious time of early instruction in lumbering the mind with trash, when there are other studies that might properly occupy it. We admit that language, thus considered, is a somewhat recondite study; but do not on that account, we beg, resort to the quackery of "knowledge made easy," so as to miss the real knowledge itself. The science of language, we conceive, is a sort of "mixed" *metaphysics*, holding a middle position between pure philosophy on the one hand, and practical phenomena on the

other. The *word* is a physical fact, the *thought* is the mental counterpart; and it is the province of grammar to trace the connexion between them, and to follow each in its windings and changes. No wonder, then, that the study should be somewhat intricate, and require some acumen. Its difficulty lies in its nature,—and, by prematurely demanding it of minds unprepared or unable to fathom it, grammarians have been compelled to substitute, in fact, a very inferior and empty form of knowledge in its place, in order to make it at all practicable. And yet, how have they succeeded? Have they, after all, made grammar a pleasing or profitable study for youth? We can all speak feelingly on this subject from personal experience. Is it not the most stupid and uninteresting study of our recollection? We have ourselves, in our childish days, thrown down our book in utter despair of ever obtaining a rational comprehension or full mastery of its interminable categories of gender, number, and case, of mood, tense, and person, with their anomalous irregularities, its arbitrary, prolix "rules" and definitions, with their crossing and recrossing exceptions, observations, and remarks,—all to be "got by heart." And yet we were no more unsuccessful than others in our efforts: indeed, we became at last quite adepts in grammatical sword-play, so much so that we were allowed to remain in our seat as a sort of *corps du reserve*, while the class were reciting, and only called upon in cases of special difficulty;—which important item we may be allowed to state without the imputation of vanity, when we add, that nevertheless, up to our riper years, we remained, according to our present light, in utter ignorance of the most essential principles of true grammar. Ye shades of youthful hours, murdered piecemeal by torment over the pages of Murray and his fellow-tyrants, how do ye cry out from a thousand graves against the unnatural outrage! Truly, any system of instruction that has one grain of common sense in it, however difficult it might be, could not be more tedious to the young scholar than the contents of our ordinary grammars. On the contrary, we are persuaded that the method we propose would not be half so difficult, if presented in a clear and simple manner. The student would be delighted and cheered on, from step to step, by the *new* ideas acquired, instead of being bored and discouraged with old facts classified under unintelligible formulæ and unmeaning distinctions. Starting with what the child already knows and admits, he would readily be led on to the investigation of its history and reasons; and when these were acquired he would find himself truly master of his native language.

But to proceed with our examination in detail. True to their notion of teaching the neophyte the particulars of the language,

our grammarians next present him with a catalogue of the letters of the alphabet, and enumerate the powers and sounds of each,—all which information he has long since obtained from the spelling-book. The various styles of letters are duly set forth, as if the tyro were about serving an apprenticeship as a printer. Not a word is said about the origin of these letters; for aught the student discovers, they may have dropped from the clouds, or have been used in precisely the same form by Adam in penning the literature of Eden. The only real piece of news given in the chapter, is that certain letters are *called* vowels, and the rest consonants: why they are so, the reader is left as much in the dark as ever. He is only told that the respective names signify that the latter cannot be pronounced without the former,—a statement which phonography would in a moment convince him is entirely false. Then succeeds the division of syllables, by which the letters are sorted out into parcels that nobody recognises in speaking or writing, and are useful only to the compositor, when he has to break a word at the end of a line. In *spelling* only, that most notable exercise, in which the scholar has usually graduated before he is allowed to enter the university of grammar, is this specially important; and here, to the infinite vexation of the catechumen, it is pertinaciously insisted on, even to the repetition, at each successive syllable, of all the preceding ones, until the *sesquipedalian* polysyllable assumes the formidable prolixity of the story of "the house that Jack built." And yet, after this process has been repeated daily, for half-a-dozen years or more, upon all the words of the language, when the scholar comes to "write correctly" these same words in his weekly theme, he will make the most notorious blunders in some of the most common of them. Why is this? Evidently because we never spell in speaking, and he has not been accustomed to spell in writing: by a false system his *ear* has been trained, but not his *eye*. If he had been required to write the words propounded for spelling, instead of enunciating them in syllables, he would have become familiar with them in their correct form. Hence it happens that not one in a hundred, even of those who have spent their youthful years in constant attendance at school, is able in after-life to pen a letter without committing some unsightly errors of this class. So much for "orthography."

We cannot stop to notice particularly the thousand and one inconsistencies and absurdities current under this head; but there is one method of "murdering the queen's English," so outrageous, and becoming so fashionable, especially in this country, that we are constrained to comment upon it. We mean the system of spelling proposed by Noah Webster, whom many, particularly the New-

Englanders, deem the only "standard" author on this subject. In lighting upon this name Mr. Brown has evidently pounced upon a favourable quarry; and he indulges his taste for criticism with all the gusto of a vulture on a defenceless carcass. We cannot do better justice to both, nor to the public, than to quote from the Introduction to the Grammar of English Grammars, pp. 118, 119:—

"13. The history of *Dr. Webster*, as a grammarian, is singular. He is remarkable for his changeableness, yet [he is] always positive; for his inconsistency, yet very learned; for his zeal 'to correct popular errors,' yet often himself erroneous; for his fertility in resources, yet sometimes meager; for his success as an author, yet never satisfied; for his boldness of innovation, yet fond of appealing to antiquity. His grammars are the least judicious, and at present the least popular, of his works. They consist of four or five different treatises, which for their mutual credit should never be compared: it is impossible to place any firm reliance upon the authority of a man who contradicts himself so much. Those who imagine that the last opinions of so learned a man must needs be right, will do well to wait, and see what will be his last: they cannot otherwise know to what his instructions will finally lead. Experience has already taught him the folly of many of his pretended improvements, and it is probable his last opinions of English grammar will be most conformable to that just authority with which he has ever been tampering. I do not say that he has not exhibited ingenuity as well as learning, or that he is always wrong when he contradicts a majority of English grammarians; but I may venture to say, he was wrong when he undertook to disturb the common scheme of the parts of speech, as well as when he resolved to spell all words exactly as they are pronounced.

"14. It is not commonly known with how rash a hand this celebrated author has sometimes touched the most settled usages of our language. In 1790, which was seven years after the appearance of his first grammar, he published an octavo volume of more than four hundred pages, consisting of Essays, moral, historical, political, and literary, which might have done him credit, had he not spoiled his book by a grammatical whim about the reformation of orthography. Not perceiving that English literature, multiplied as it had been within two or three centuries, had acquired a stability in some degree corresponding to its growth, he foolishly imagined it was still as susceptible of change and improvement as in the days of its infancy. Let the reader pardon the length of this digression, if, for the sake of any future schemer who may chance to adopt a similar conceit, I cite from the preface of this volume a specimen of the author's practice and reasoning. The ingenious attorney had the good sense quickly to abandon this project, and content himself with less glaring innovations; else he had never stood as he now does, in the estimation of the public. But there is the more need to record the example, because in one of the southern states the experiment has recently been tried again. A still abler member of the same profession has renewed it but lately; and it is said there are yet remaining some converts to this notion of improvement. I copy literally, leaving all my readers and his to guess for themselves why he spelled "*writers*" with a *w* and "*riting*" without.

"15. 'During the course of ten or twelv yeers, I hav been laboring to correct popular errors, and to assist my yung brethren in the road to truth and virtue; my publications for theze purposes hav been numerous; much time haz been spent, which I do not regret, and much censure incurred, which my hart tells me I do not dezerv.' * * * 'The reeder wil obzerv that the *orthography* of the volum iz not uniform. The reezon iz, that many of the essays hav been published before, in the common orthography, and it would hav been a laborious task to copy the whole, for the sake of changing the

spelling. In the essays ritten within the last yeer, a considerable change of spelling iz introduced by way of experiment. This liberty waz taken by the writers before the age of Queen Elizabeth, and to this we are indebted for the preference of modern spelling over that of Gower and Chaucer. The man who admits that the change of *housbonde*, *mynde*, *ygone*, *moneth*, into *husband*, *mind*, *gone*, *month*, iz an improovment, must acknowledge also the riting of *helth*, *breth*, *rong*, *tung*, *munth*, to be an improovment. There iz no alternativ. Every possible reezon that could ever be offered for altering the spelling of wurds, stil exists in ful force; and if a gradual reform should not be made in our language, it wil proov that we are less under the influence of reezon than our ancestors.'—*Noah Webster's Essays, Pref.*, p. xi."*

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* To this scorching, but just criticism, we may add that contained in the minority report of the Hon. James W. Beekman, the able chairman of the Committee on Literature, presented July 7th, 1851, to the Senate of the State of New-York, on the question of introducing Webster's quarto Dictionary into the common schools. We have room only for a few extracts:—

"'Webster,' says an able critic, 'began his career as a lexicographer by spelling words as they are pronounced—*aker*, *soe*, *iland*, *steddy*, *wimmen*, *lether*, *imagin*;' he ended by making a dictionary, valuable for its definitions, scientific terms, old and obsolete words, and generally for its etymologies—although these were sometimes fanciful, and sometimes adapted to a specific purpose.'

"No American writers of eminence spell by its rules. Neither Irving, nor Bancroft, nor Bryant, nor Hawthorne recognises its authority. The cheap publications of the Harpers have done more to create provincialisms—a literary evil from which America has hitherto escaped—than any one who has not given attention to the subject would believe. Should the State of New-York add its *imprimatur*, we may have, ere long, expurgated editions of the 'Wars of Granada,' or of 'Twice-told Tales,' of the 'Pilgrim's Progress,' or the 'Vicar of Wakefield,' done into American prose—the spelling curtailed in the Bloomer style, to the most utilitarian and bandy-legged proportions, and a 'crebrous claudication,' to use Websterian English, jingling in every line.

"'Webster's career,' says Edward S. Gould, in a letter to the chairman of your committee, 'was a mistake, because based on false assumptions. He *assumed* that the language needed reformation, and that he was able to reform it; the latter blunder being far the greater of the two. He began forty years or more ago on the extreme of his own theory, and his first false step was to mistake the duties of a lexicographer, whose province is to *record*, not to *legislate;* to say what the language is, and not what it should be. Webster assumed the right to make and alter in conformity to his own views; and assuming that superfluous letters were an orthographical evil, and that conformity between the spelling and the pronunciation of words was an orthographical desideratum, he almost went to the extent of our contemporaneous phonographers. Finding, however, on experiment, that this would not do, that the storm of criticism he had provoked was more than he or his book could bear, he began to modify to suit the critics. He published, in a course of years, five different Dictionaries, all in retreat from his original ground, and stopped modifying only when he stopped breathing; and his literary heir, and successor, and son-in-law, Goodrich, thinks it strange that everybody is not satisfied with these concessions on the part of Webster!—as if a shopkeeper were to demand five dollars for an article worth one dollar, and then, after chaffering, and finally and gradually falling to two dollars and fifty cents, cite the fact of his taking off half of this first price to prove the two dollars and fifty cents must be cheap.

"'The present difficulty with Webster's Dictionary is, its *total want of a principle*. To spell words as they are pronounced, and strike out all superfluous letters, although radicalism and folly, is still a principle of action; but to abandon that, and vacillate capriciously between that and the previously recognised system, is mere quackery and irresolute nonsense, and its tendency, when at all countenanced, is what we see—a confusion in orthography, such as was not previously known since the *establishing* of the language by Johnson.

"'Webster's rules are both arbitrary and capricious. He changes, for example, *theatre* into *theater*, because, he says, words ending in *re*, adopted from the French, must be transposed into *er;* yet in the derivative he transfers the *er*, that is, the termination, back again to make "*theatrical*." Here the derivative does not control the primitive. Again, he changes *defence* into *defense*, because the derivative *defensive* requires the *s*. There the derivative does control the primitive.

"'He changes *distil* into *distill*, "because the derivative *distiller*, &c., requires the

The editor of the last edition of Webster's Dictionary has wisely expunged nearly all the remaining Websterisms from it, so that it is now a tolerably correct representation of the English language, in respect to orthography: another pruning would probably erase the last relics of his officiousness, and leave his disciples to return to their proper language as used by the rest of the world. We are not writing a review of that work; we have introduced it only as bearing upon orthography. We will therefore dismiss it, merely remarking that language is a conventional thing, yet it has its laws; a mere outward analogy ought not to control it: history and literature have made it what it is, and no single smatterer nor set of smatterers have a right to meddle with it. Whatever is good in Webster's alterations, will be found not to have been original with him; and the rest is mere quackery. Good usage is the only standard in such questions; and the man of taste will eschew all provincialisms and schoolisms. The language is what literature has made it; and any one who does not conform to this, does not write English. It is not a question of fancy, but of fact. Where good usage itself varies, philological analogy ought to decide,—but conceit never. Such new-fangled forms as *hight*, *center*, *fullness*, &c., are as much a blemish in modern printing as the old-fashioned ones,—*publick*, *booke*, *itt*, &c., would be; or even the imaginary ones of phonotypy, —*sifur*, *hevun*, *ar*, &c.

The second division of English grammar, we are informed, is "Etymology." And here we certainly may expect to find something said about the historical derivation of the language, and the primitive forms of its words. But no, not a bit of this; such is not the province of the etymologist, it appears. "Etymology treats of the different parts of speech, *with* their classes and modifications," by which last term is meant the "inflections or changes in the terminations, forms or

double *l*." Here again the derivative controls the primitive; but he does *not* change the forget into forgett, although the derivative *forgetting*, &c., requires the double *t*; so that there, still again, the derivative does not control the primitive.

"'He strikes the *u* from *mould*, because it is superfluous; he strikes the *u* from *honour*, *favour*, &c., because it is superfluous; but he does not strike the *o* from *serious*, *courage*, &c., where it is as superfluous. He strikes out *l* from *traveller*, &c., because it is superfluous; yet he spells *excellent*, *vacillate*, &c., with two *l*'s. He spells *profit* with one *f*, yet, with the inconsistency that marks all his career, he does not strike the second *f* from *proffer*. It is true he is right in this last forbearance, but he is, as everywhere else, inconsistent.

"'The sum of the matter is, that Webster was a vain, weak, plodding Yankee, ambitious to be an American Johnson, without one substantial qualification for the undertaking; and the American public have ignored his pretensions. One publisher of note has adopted his orthography, because he publishes his dictionary, and one newspaper editor of note has done the same thing; but beyond these two establishments, neither of which can claim any authority as umpires in a literary question, Webster's orthography is as unpopular as it is abominable; and I hardly know how our legislature could do a greater wrong to popular education than by inflicting Webster's radicalism on the rising generation.'"

senses of *some* kinds of words."—*Grammar of Grammars*, p. 213. Truly, these "modifications" are very comprehensive, and yet very indefinite. And then, what is to be said about these "parts of speech," besides their classification and modifications? Nothing, that we can perceive, except their names and significations; and what these are we shall see presently. The whole series of definitions is confused, partial, and bungling, and has no inherent meaning; their purport remains to be made out from what follows, and, when discovered, has only the force of a terminology that revolves within itself. For instance, the "parts of speech" are defined to be "the several kinds or principal classes into which words are divided *by grammarians*;" as if there were no natural basis for such a division. Let us see whether there be or not.

The "parts of speech," then, "in English are *ten*" [in number], &c., enumerated as usual. These certainly may be considered as "the several kinds" of words, although we shall endeavour to show that they are not all *distinct* kinds; but they as certainly are not "the principal classes" into which words are divisible. There is a division more general than this,—a proper grammatical one, of which they are susceptible,—namely, into declinable and indeclinable; or, (in English,) more properly, into *principal* (comprising the noun [or personal pronoun] and the verb) and *accessory*, (consisting of the adjective class, [including the article, adjective pronouns, and the participle,] and all the particles,) [that is, the remaining parts of speech.] We will take them up in succession.

"An article is the word—'the,' 'an,' or 'a'—which we put before nouns to limit their signification."—*Gram. of Gram.*, p. 218. Now, waving all minute criticism upon the phraseology here, which strikes us as exceedingly awkward, we find this definition, or rather description, radically defective and erroneous in several respects. In the first place, it does not distinguish an article from an adjective, which (as well as many other parts of speech) is often "put before nouns to limit their signification." In the next place, an article does not "limit the *signification*" of nouns at all, it only limits their *extension:* the noun *man* in the two phrases, "*A* man," "*The* man," does not signify a different object, for they may be identical; it means in both cases a class,—but the article *a* shows that any individual, indifferently, of that class is referred to, while the article *the* indicates a particular individual. In the third place, the definition seems to state that we always put an article before a noun when we wish to limit its signification; which is so far from being true, that we not infrequently prefix one in order to enlarge the meaning: such is the effect with all proper names; as "Hercules," an indi-

vidual, "*a* Hercules," any very strong man. Many nouns, again, are not used without an article, at least in the singular number; as, *world, sky,* (*skies* is less significant than *the sky,*) &c. Finally; "the word *the, an* or *a,*" is sometimes not an article at all, as in the curious phrases: "*The* sooner *the* better," "*The* while," "*The* more *the* merrier," "*The* deuce you do," "Many *a* man," "*A* great many," "Twice *a* year," "Alack *a* day," "*A* fishing," "*An* hungered," "*An't* please your honour," &c. It is probable that grammarians only intend the latter part of the above definition to serve as a description of the use of the article, and they should therefore place it as a subsequent remark by itself. What precedes must be the definition proper; it amounts simply to this,—that "an article is one of the three words, *the, an,* or *a,*" which would at least have been intelligible. We doubt the propriety of making the articles a distinct part of speech, since their etymology and use both show that they are essentially adjectives, of the kinds usually termed numeral and pronominal; but if the current nomenclature be retained as the most convenient, let it be correctly stated, that it may be properly understood.

The definite article is said to consist of the word *the,* and the indefinite of the word *an* or *a.* The terms are incorrect and inappropriate. For instance, in the phrase, "*The* man who does so deserves to be hung," is the individual more "definitely signified," or less so, than in the phrase, "*A* man who does so deserves to be hung?" or is either expression more definite than to say, "Men who do so deserve to be hung?" The difference, if any, is too slight to hang a fundamental classification upon. Again, we are told that *the* is definite, because "it denotes some particular thing or things." Is a particular lion meant in the proposition, "*The* lion is *a* noble beast?" No, it is said, but a particular kind of animal is meant. We reply, the same is true in the proposition, "*A* lion is a noble beast;" and yet we are told that *a* or *an* is indefinite, because "it denotes one thing of a kind, but *not* any particular one." Such sentences are of constant occurrence, and sorely try the common sense of the grammarian who is seeking consistency in the application of his theory. We do not deny that there is a sense, or rather degree, in which *the* is usually definite, and *a* indefinite; but it is too vague and variable to be of any value as a ground of logical distinction. The so-called article *an* (apocopated into *a*) is evidently derived from the same root as *one,* and in all the cognate dialects of the Indo-Germanic group the article and the numeral are identical. In the modern European languages only is the indefinite article expressed, being understood in the ancient tongues before nouns not otherwise indicated to be taken definitely. The article *the* is

etymologically related to a large family of demonstratives, which most clearly appears in the pronouns *this* and *that*. Thus the corresponding Greek word τό is always used as a demonstrative pronoun by Homer; and the German *das* stands for the neuter form of both words. (See also the Anglo-Saxon forms, uses, and affinities of both articles, in Dr. Latham's treatise, p. 249. In Sophocles' *Greek Verbs*, p. 9, the same element is evolved from the Greek, but the application is carried so far as to become in many cases fanciful.) This simple clew to the derivation of the articles casts a flood of light upon their varied and intricate uses in our language, and is the only key to their grammatical classification and elucidation. We would pursue the explanation had we space; but, as we have not set out to write a grammar, we must forbear. Even Mr. Brown is constrained to acknowledge, "that *an* or *a* is nearly equivalent in meaning to the numeral adjective *one*, but [is] less emphatic; and that *the* is nearly equivalent in meaning to the pronominal adjective *that* or *those*, but [is likewise] less emphatic."—P. 219. It is quite characteristic that, after having been brought so near the true theory of these words, he should yet stoutly insist upon their entire distinctness as parts of speech, and even disdain to give the reader the slightest idea of their etymological connexion.

Next in order comes the Noun, for which we have the following definition: "A noun is the name of any person, place, or thing, that can be known or mentioned."—*G. Brown*, p. 230. It will not do, forsooth, to call a noun "a name" merely,—which is all that the word means or amounts to in the end,—because that is too indefinite, and other parts of speech may designate various qualities, states, acts, or relations, as well; hence is added, "of any person, place, or thing." But it is still found defective, because qualities, acts, and relations are neither "persons, places, nor things," objectively considered; and there are certain words, such as *nobody*, *nothing*, and the like, that elude the grasp of the definition; hence another addition, "that can be known." And as people are apt to discuss many matters about which they *know* very little, a final clause is added, to include these also, namely, "or mentioned." And now, after having undergone as many emendations as Dr. Franklin's famous hatter's sign, the definition is found to answer the purpose—with those who fail to perceive that it presupposes the very information which it sets out to give: "the name of any . . . . . thing that can be . . . . . mentioned," is simply the name of anything that *has* a name; and, therefore, this whole appendage to the "name" is quite nugatory. In our humble judgment, *a noun is any word that may stand as the subject of a proposition*, (or, if you please, of a *verb*;) and by

this sign, we apprehend, the student after all learns in practice to distinguish it from other kinds of words. This, we believe, is the only true *grammatical definition* of a noun that can be given, because it begins at the foundation of the sentence, and pursues the natural method of logical analysis. A noun and a verb—the subject and the predicate—are all that are essential to constitute a proposition, the embodiment of a communicated thought; all the other words represent subordinate ideas, and are, therefore, ranged about these in dependent and collateral relations. Viewed in this light, syntax and etymology (that is, what are usually so called) are inseparable; the definitions and forms of words at once indicate their connexion, just as the shape of natural bodies shows their design and place in the system of creation.

With regard to the classification of nouns into proper and common, we will here only remark, that in strictness it is only "proper names" and the abstract nouns that come under the usual grammatical definition of a noun; since other "common nouns" designate some *class* of objects, and not "any person, place, or thing," individually considered. The modifications of number and gender we shall also pass over without comment, the English language being so simple and logical in these respects, that no "art" of grammarians has been able to twist it into very serious anomalies. As to person and case, however, we are unable to acquiesce in the usual treatment of nouns. That pronouns have these modifications in full we admit; but we cannot see why they should, on that account, be attributed to nouns likewise. For instance, a noun cannot be used in the first person without a pronoun preceding it, to indicate the speaker. This, on the common theory, involves two inconsistencies: first, if "the first person denotes the speaker" in the noun itself, the pronoun cannot be necessary likewise for the same purpose; and again, if "a pronoun is a word used *instead* of a noun," they ought certainly not both be used together. The truth is, that because the noun has no first person of itself, the pronoun, which represents that person, is prefixed to express it; while, at the same time, the addition of the noun, as in all other cases of *apposition*, serves to render the pronoun more explicit and emphatic. All this is proved by the fact, that the noun may be entirely dispensed with, but the pronoun cannot. In the alleged second person of nouns, this is even more strikingly true, except that, as the imperative mood usually dispenses with the subject-pronoun, this, as well as the noun to which it refers, may disappear in a direct address. If "the second person" be a modification of nouns at all, it is rather a *case* (called the vocative in kindred language) than anything else; but even this is

unnecessary, as in English this is more properly a mode of construction in the sentence, like the nominative absolute, or an interjection. Nouns, therefore, are always of the third person, and this, of necessity, since, from their nature, they are the object *spoken of*.

Cases, in English grammar, are defined as "modifications that distinguish the relations of nouns or pronouns to other words."—*G. Brown*, p. 247. They are enumerated as three—the nominative, possessive, and objective. Now, wherein consists the "modification that distinguishes" the first and the last of these from each other, in nouns, we have vainly endeavoured to discern. That they are placed differently in the sentence is true, and the same might be said of adjectives and many other words; but the words in both relations are the same, and the distinction is a needless one. We claim that no "modification" should be admitted as a *case*, unless it shows itself, *as a general rule*, by a corresponding change of form. The word "case" itself signifies this, and its use in all other languages is limited to some regular mode of inflection. If the nominative and objective, although precisely of the same form in all nouns, are held to be distinct cases, because they are differently related in the sentence, then, on precisely the same grounds, we ought to adopt all the Latin and Greek cases; nay, since we are not limited by any change of termination, as in those languages, the Engligh cases must be made a dozen or more, so as to include all the various constructions of syntax. The objective case, as such, belongs only to the personal pronouns; and even with these, a closer examination shows that it is quite as often a *dative* case; as in the phrases, "Give *me* the book," "Point *them* the way," &c. The same is true of nouns; as, "Give *John* the butter." It is of no avail to attempt to resolve these constructions by supplying the preposition *to;* that makes altogether another sentence of them, and one that is not so good English; yet it leaves the pronoun or noun a real *dative* still. Etymology also shows that these dative forms, of the pronouns at least, are original and proper, coming directly as such from the Saxon; indeed, it seems to show that our so-called objective forms are no objectives at all, being in all cases supplanted by the true datives. (See Latham, p. 237.)

The *possessive*, however, is a true case, indicated by a change of termination, and regularly running through the declension of the cognate dialects. The apostrophe does not show a contraction for *his*, as commonly supposed, but simply stands for an elided *e;* as *man's*, originally *manes* or *mannes*, *book's* for *bookes* in words ending with *e*, it is inserted for the sake of uniformity; as *time's* for *times*, to distinguish it from the plural. In the pronouns, on

the contrary, this case disappears, the so-called possessives *his, my*, &c., being clearly adjectives, and the intensives *mine, ours*, &c., standing for the noun and adjective at once.

Before leaving the noun, we must briefly advert to a peculiar property of the English language, which appears particularly idiomatic in the use of this part of speech: we mean what Dr. Latham calls the *convertibility* of its words,—that is, their power of being freely employed as various parts of speech without any change of form or accent. In other languages, even of the Germanic stock, this is usually done by means of derivatives, which differ from the primitive by certain terminations, combinations, or prefixes: and this is also systematically the case with the English; as *good, goodly, goodliness*, &c. But, besides this, we have a large liberty of directly employing nouns, especially as adjectives, verbs, &c., and *vice versa*; as "*Whitewashing*," "A *fancy* sketch," "The *lo-heres* and the *lo-theres*," "The *blue-stocking* class," "The *me* and the *not-me*," "A *good-for-nothing* fellow," "An *if* and an *O*," "*Down* with him!" "To *better* his condition," "The *ups* and *downs* of life," &c. These conversions are more frequent in colloquial life than in books. They are even extended to words domesticated from foreign languages; as, "A loud *Amen*," "An *omnibus* line," "They *encored* him," "All of the *millionaire* grade," &c. It is from overlooking this convertibility of words in the English language, by virtue of which many parts of speech become actually changed into others, without any outward alteration, that grammarians have invented a thousand nice distinctions and ingenious constructions by ellipsis and what not, altogether foreign to the simple structure of the language, and occasioning infinite perplexity to the student.

The next "part of speech" in order is the Adjective, for which Mr. Brown (p. 257) gives us the following definition: "An adjective is a word added to a noun or pronoun, and generally expresses quality." The expression "*added to*" is altogether vague: it implies that the adjective follows the noun, whereas it usually precedes it; it implies at least that the two words are closely adjoining, whereas in many cases they are widely separated by intervening correlative terms; it also implies that the adjective is always of secondary importance, whereas it frequently contains the chief idea, the noun being really the *addition*; as, "The *good* man is happy." Again, the expression is not discriminative: a *noun* is "added to" another when it is connected in apposition or by a conjunction; *adverbs* are frequently "added to" nouns by way of qualification; and *participles* are almost always so. Finally, the expression is practically fallacious: adjectives are oftentimes "added to" verbs, as

in predicates; *e. g.*, "The man is *good*." They may regularly stand in place of the nouns they qualify, as, "The *good* are happy;" and they not infrequently stand alone and absolutely, as "*Good!*" In short, this expression is no definition at all, but a mere translation of the word "adjective," and a very defective one too. The *adjected* clause, "and usually expresses quality," is a mere appendage that ought to have followed as a remark; for it is too uncertain to be of any other value. But even this definition is not consistently adhered to by the grammarians who propound it: various words, which are adjectives to all intents and purposes, are called attribute-nouns, pronouns, participles, parts of verbs, and almost everything but by their correct names. But upon these and other details, such as the Hibernicism of the "three degrees of comparison," (of which the first contains no comparison at all, and the last is beyond comparison,) we have not space for further comments.

The Pronoun next engages our attention. It is defined to be a "word used instead of a noun."—*G. Brown*, p. 282. Indefinite and wrong again: indefinite, because many other words may be used "instead" of nouns (as above shown) without becoming pronouns; wrong, because the noun itself can but seldom be used for the pronoun which is supposed to stand "instead" of it. This last objection is true in the case of all the so-called adjective pronouns, (to say nothing of the contradiction involved in the very name,) such as *who, which, this, all, any, none*, &c., and is equally applicable to the so-called possessive case of all the personal pronouns, and even the other cases of those of the first and second persons; for who would understand the sentence, "The boy loves *the boy's* book," to be equivalent to the sentence, "The boy loves *his* book?" or what noun could be substituted in the sentence, "*I* love?" We have left, therefore, as the only true pronouns, according to the above definition, those of the third person in the nominative and objective cases. A correct definition should include all the personal pronouns, (of these two cases,) and exclude all the rest as being mere pronominal adjectives. A pronoun is a word that stands as the sign of the first or second person, *or* represents a noun in the third.

The Verb follows next in order. This, we are informed, (G. Brown, p. 316,) "is a word that signifies *to be, to act*, or *to be acted upon*." Here the same tautological mode of defining "in a circle" is observable, as in the case of the noun: a verb is employed, as such and by way of example, in the very gist of the definition itself. It would not do to say broadly, with many, that "a verb is a word that signifies *action, being*, or *passion*," but it is a word that puts these ideas *in the form of a verb*,—that is, with the word *to* prefixed.

But is this correct after all? Does "*I love*" signify either "to be, to act, or to be acted upon?" The student will find it difficult to tell which of these it means, and the scholar will see that it means none of them; it merely expresses a certain *state* of mind in the speaker. It is impossible to define a verb in this manner without enumerating every species, with all its modifications of form. We conceive a verb to be, simply, *any word that may stand as the predicate to a noun.*

Passing over the classification of verbs in their different grammatical kinds, we will consider their *voices*, *moods*, and *tenses*. Now, with regard to all these, we lay down the broad principle that there is no proper "conjugation" except in the *simple* forms; the compound forms of verbs are only apparent, because periphrastic modes of conjugation. We might treat any circumlocutory phrase that may stand for an adjective, or any particular modification of a noun, as these parts of speech, with as much reason as to parse these assemblages of words as single grammatical terms. Hence the confusion of three present tenses active, for instance, as "*I love*," "*I do love*," "*I am loving;*" as if these were any more identical than a dozen other combinations,—*e. g.*, "*I continue to love*," "*I am in the habit of loving*," &c. We would reject all these auxiliary forms, as being separate modes of speech, and resolve them into their natural grammatical elements. As we held in regard to nouns, so we hold in respect to verbs: there are no grammatical "accidents" to be recognised, which do not show themselves by a systematic change of form in the single word itself. The English verb, therefore, has no proper passive voice, except the present participle, (*e. g.*, *loved*, which must not be confounded with the same form in the *active* voice, as "I have *loved;*") and it supplies the rest by employing the verb *to be* in connexion with this. So of the compound tenses of the active voice, the perfect, pluperfect, and the futures, as also the entire potential mood. There is, we protest, no more reason for inserting these formulæ in the paradigm of the verb itself, than a score of other moods and tenses that are equally in use. "I *do* love" means simply, "I *do* the thing called loving;" "I *have* loved" means "I *have* done [that is, I *possess* in completion] the thing called loving;" "I *will* love" means "I *will* do the thing called loving;" "I *might* love" means "I *might* do the thing called loving." In all cases these auxiliaries are to be parsed as simple verbs, and the appended force of the primary verb is either a participle attributed to the subject, or an infinitive depending upon the auxiliary. Many, we are aware, who have been accustomed to view our verb in the light of the prolix and extensive paradigms of the Latin and Greek

languages, will be startled, and perhaps demur, at the meager remnant to which the English verb will thus be reduced; but we contend that it is in accordance with the simple grammatical structure of our language, and sustained by the analogy of all the cognate dialects. In this respect it greatly resembles the Hebrew, where a few simple forms are made, by a variety of combinations, to answer the purpose of all the moods and tenses,—the "conjugations" of that language having the force of derivative verbs. The following is a synopsis of all the true forms of the verb *love*, for instance:—

	ACTIVE.			PASSIVE.
Mood.	Tense.	Number and Person.		Sole Form.
Indicative.	*Present.*	*Singular.* 1.	love.	*Present* . . loved.
		Singular. 2.	lovest.	
		Singular. 3.	loves.	
		Plural (throughout)	love.	
	Preterite.	2 *Singular*	lovedst.	
		The rest	loved.	
Imperative.	*Present.*	2 *Singular* / *Plural.*	love.	
Subjunctive.	*Present* (throughout)		love.	*Participle.*
	Preterite "		loved.	
Infinitive.	*Present*		love.	
Participles.	*Present*		loving.	
	Preterite		loved.	

Even this list might be greatly reduced: the subjunctive mood is being fast supplanted by the indicative, of which again the second person singular has nearly given place to the second person plural, and in that common form is identical with the imperative; so that for practical purposes, in regular verbs, there may be said to exist but four forms,—*love, loves, loving, loved*,—which constitute the entire variety in use. How much simpler and more intelligible to the student would such a paradigm be than the interminable one invented by ordinary grammarians, and required to be repeated by rote, as if it were a magic spell. So much for the distinction in the forms of the different "modifications;" let us see if their meaning be any more clearly and accurately distinguished.

"Moods are different forms of the verb, each of which expresses the being, action, or passion, in some *particular* manner."—*G. Brown*, p. 322. Yet "the infinitive mood .... expresses the being, action, or passion in an *unlimited* manner."—*Ibid.* And it is added, "without person or number;" by which is more properly meant, without any distinguishing *sign* of person or number. "The indicative mood .... simply indicates or declares a thing," (*ibid.*;) that is, in *no* "particular manner." Yet this mood, like all the rest, often asks a question, without *declaring* anything; unless we use a refine-

ment, and say it declares something *interrogatively*. "The potential mood"—a sheer interloper—" . . . . expresses the power, liberty, possibility, or necessity," &c.; and why not, also, the propriety, determination, hazard, authority, &c. ?—*e. g.*, "I *dare* go," "He SHALL do it," "I WILL go," "You *ought* not do so," &c., &c. "The subjunctive mood . . . . represents the being, action, or passion as conditional, doubtful, or contingent."—*Ibid.*. So does *the interrogative mood;* and so might any other mood, provided it had the word *if* prefixed. "The imperative mood is that form of the verb which is used in commanding, exhorting, entreating, or permitting."—*Ibid.* *Ergo*, the following "forms of verbs," examples respectively of each of the above "uses," are instances of the imperative mood: "Thou *shalt* not steal;" "I *charge* you do it;" "I *pray* you let me see it;" "You *may* go." And why not, as well as, "*Let* us go?"

"Tenses . . . . distinguish time."—*G. Brown*, p. 326. Since by common consent there are but three essential distinctions of time, *past*, *present*, and *future*, we should naturally expect a like classification of tenses. Not so with grammarians. They do not even recognise these as *primary* distinctions on this subject, nor arrange the more complicated forms as *secondary*, but give us "six tenses" at once. "The present tense is that which expresses what now exists or is taking place," (*ibid.:*) as, "I *sail* for Europe to-morrow, and *am going* to visit Rome;" "As soon as he *gets* there, he *is* to let me know;" "When wine *is* in, wit *is* out;" "Men often *mistake;*" "You *take* the right-hand road, and it *brings* you there;" "The curtain *rises*, the play *begins;*" "Brutus *gives* Cæsar the last fatal stab." *Quere*—in the present imperative, subjunctive, and infinitive, is there anything represented as "now existing or taking place," beyond the mere command, supposition, or abstract idea? Again, "the *imperfect* tense is that which expresses what took place or was occurring in time FULLY past," (*ibid.:*) *e. g.*, we presume, "I *saw* him but this instant;" "God *made* the country, man *made* the town;" "*Were* I young, [or old,] I *should* feel as you do;" "They that weep, as though they *wept* not." This tense, however, is more accurately defined than the others: it would have been more correct to say that it denotes time past *simply*. The English language has no proper future tense; hence it regularly uses a circumlocution, and sometimes borrows the present tense in cases of vivid representation, as above,—just as does also the preterite tense occasionally, called "the historic present." This naturally results from the fact that time present is *passing*, and consists of but a moment, when past and future meet. "The *perfect* tense," on the contrary, it seems, is *less* perfect than the *im*perfect, for it only "expresses what

has taken place within some period of time *not* yet fully past," (*ibid.*;) *e. g.*, doubtless, "I *have* often *met* him." But we need not dwell upon this and the other compound tenses; they clearly express the complex idea resulting from the addition of the tense of the auxiliary to that of the proper verb, and it is only by thus analyzing them that they can be rightly explained. This appears still more strikingly in the so-called potential mood, where there is an utter confounding of time in the various tenses as exhibited in the grammars. For instance, where is the "time fully past," or, indeed, any time past, in the sentence, "I *would* go if I *could?*" These auxiliaries are defective verbs, in which the tense as here exhibited is a sort of *conditional future*, and must be carefully distinguished from the proper preterite of *will* and *can*, in the sentences, "He WOULD go, although I warned him;" "I *could* not stir, for I was bound;" "Then, in his frenzied moments, how he *would* rave!" Similar discrimination must be exercised with regard to *shall* and *should*, *may* and *might*. We now pass on to a brief consideration of the particles.

"An Adverb is a word added to a verb, a participle, an adjective, or another adverb, and generally expresses time, place, degree, or manner."—*G. Brown*, p. 401. We here notice the same ambiguity and vagueness in the expression "added to," that we animadverted upon in the definition of the adjective. An adverb is often rather "added to" a noun, than to its verb; *e. g.*, "*When quite* a lad, I used to do so." At other times adverbs are not "added to" any other word, but stand quite alone; *e. g.*, "*Yes*," "*No*," "*Moreover*," &c. Now, to our mind, the facility with which the other particles become adverbs, and the reverse, or all become mutually interchangeable, shows that the adverb ought to be regarded as the radical part of speech, of which the others are only modifications. For instance, prepositions: "Get *up*," "*Off* shore;" conjunctions: "*Yet* higher," "*Hence* you see," "*Till* noon," "You have seen him, *then?*" "*So* that," "If I could *but* catch him;" interjections: "*Indeed!*" "*Ah* me!" "*O* the bliss!" "*Alas* for him!" "*Well!*" Etymology, and a comparison with other languages, confirm this position. The *comparison* of adverbs is a pure figment of the grammarians: the apparent comparatives and superlatives may all be more naturally resolved into the corresponding forms of the primitive adjectives, used adverbially; and this view is strengthened by the fact, that where they are not formed by merely prefixing the adverbs *more* or *most*, *less*, *least*, *very*, &c., to the simple adverb, they do not take the adverbial termination at all; *e. g.*, "He acted *wiser*," or, "*more wisely*," not "*wiserly*," or "*wiselier*." The only instances

of a proper comparison are, *sooner, soonest, oftener, oftenest, rather,* and some forms in the old poets; these are formed by analogy, or, perhaps, from adjectives now obsolete, but they are too isolated to constitute a basis for a general principle.

"A Conjunction is a word used to connect words or sentences in construction, and to show the dependence [of one] of the terms so connected [upon the other]."—*G. Brown,* p. 409. The same purpose, we might add, is served by all *relatives,* and by many adverbs; indeed, almost any part of speech or combination of words may be employed as a conjunction, or the natural sequence of thought may supply its place. The definition is too broad, and might include all connectives, whether particles or copulæ. As to "the dependence of the terms," their mere juxtaposition shows the *fact* of the dependence, and their arrangement in the sentence usually shows the *mode* of it. The natural significance of conjunctions themselves is wholly ignored; the student is left to imagine that they add no *idea* to the sentence. There is not the slightest allusion to their inherent sense, except in the *non*-sensical classification into copulative and *dis*junctive *con*junctions.

"A Preposition is a word used to express some relation of different things or thoughts to each other, and is generally placed before a noun or a pronoun."—*G. Brown,* p. 416. So, we might say, is a conjunction also "used to express some relation of different .... thoughts to each other," and many other words might be put in the same category: "*some* relation of thoughts," is a very wide phrase. The etymology and original use of the prepositions show that they were primarily intended to express a *local* "relation" of motion, direction, or position, and that this passed over by an insensibly figurative application to a secondary *causal* sense of agency, possession, &c. *From, by, to, in, through,* &c., have continued in both senses; while others, as *of,* (originally *off,*) *for,* (literally, *in front,* as representing,) &c., are used only in the latter. When they express a *logical* relation, that is, between complex ideas, this class of words become conjunctions; when they express a *subjective* relation, that is, between a subject and a predicate, they become adverbs; it is only when they express a *collateral* relation, that is, of a subject or predicate to some additional object, that they are proper prepositions: *e. g.,* "Men used manuscripts *before* the art of printing was discovered," (where "before" is transferred from *place* to *time;*) "He lived *before* me," "He rode *before* me," "He went *before.*"

In all this discussion, our space and design have limited us to a notice only of general principles, and a few cases for the purpose

of illustrating them; these we wish to be taken as samples only of the defects of modern grammars, and the modes by which they might be avoided. Our criticisms have mostly been expended upon the *definitions*, because these are the most prominent and fundamental points. We have selected those of G. Brown as being, on the whole, perhaps, the best of any that proceed upon the common plan. We may be spared the examination of those of other grammarians, when we find this consummate critic himself remarking of them, "A majority of all the definitions and rules contained in the great multitude of English grammars which I have examined are, in some respect or other, erroneous."—P. 101. Certainly, with these warnings before his eyes, we might have expected him to avoid these errors, even if this had to be done by abandoning the whole system with which they are incorrigibly bound up. Well may he repeat the exclamation of Scaliger, "Nothing is more unhappy than the grammatical definer!"—*Ibid.*

Had we room, we should continue our criticisms through Syntax also, where we should find the ordinary system of grammar equally defective and inconsistent; but we must dismiss this branch of grammar with the single remark—which is alike applicable, indeed, to every department—that all grammatical statements, and especially the general propositions, should set forth the essential principle involved, and all the details and apparent departures should be explained into conformity with it. The maxim is inadmissible here, that "exceptions strengthen the general rule:" a single well-founded exception wholly vitiates the rule, because it proves it false. Grammar has its fixed and certain laws, as much as chemistry or any other science; and if a rule does not hold good in a given instance included under it, it either shows that the rule is wholly untrue, as having no real law for its basis, or that it is so incorrectly stated as to cover an example that properly comes under some other law which the rule infringes upon: in either case the correct principle is missed. There may be apparent exceptions, irregularities, and anomalies, but it must be shown that they are apparent only. This mere assorting of words and forms into parcels, as may suit arbitrary "rules" and "definitions," and then packing away the nonconforming cases into a list of "exceptions and observations," ought never to be accepted or taught as a substitute for grammar. We had also intended to dissect the process of "parsing," as prescribed "in the books,"—"formules" and extended specimens of which are given, even to satiety, in Mr. Brown's ponderous treatise. The true method of parsing, that which begins by analyzing the sentence into its logical elements, and treating the subordinate clauses

and words in accordance with their relations to these and to each other, he passes over with a very slighting notice. We feel too much disgust, however, at the recollection of the operation in our own case, and too little patience at the observation of the practice in others, to be able to speak calmly of the routine usually regarded as the meritorious exercise of parsing. It is the veriest mass of trash that ever disgraced the school-room; we can only compare it to the stereotyped stupidity of the Chinese disciple, as he frames his theme by ringing changes upon the dicta of Confucius, and fancies this is learning.

But we rejoice to perceive that a better day is dawning upon English grammar. The disputes and mutual criticisms found in the popular treatises on this subject have conspired with their palpable errors and inconsistencies, to undermine the confidence of many teachers in the system itself, which is so uncertain and assailable; and the community are becoming very generally dissatisfied with all grammatical text-books that proceed upon the old plan. Other works, pursuing the natural and only true method, that of etymological analysis, are beginning to be written and studied. They are but initiatory, it is true, and they approach the subject cautiously. It is evident that the real grammar of the English language has been hitherto unwritten, and modesty becomes those who enter the field. We do not know of any one treatise that fairly meets the requirements of the case; but we could mention several, written by authors on both sides the Atlantic, that are clearly approximations, or rather introductions, to the needed work. As far as they go, they are correct in plan and principle. When the details shall have been well defined and settled by these and further labours in the same line, a proper foundation will be laid, on which we may hope ere long to see arise a well-developed and symmetrical system of the SCIENCE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. When such a work does appear, the present treatises will speedily and forever be consigned to oblivion.

Art. IV.—JACQUELINE PASCAL.

Jacqueline Pascal: or, a Glimpse of Convent Life at Port-Royal. From the French of M. Victor Cousin, M. Prosper Faugère, M. Vinet, and other sources. Translated by H. N. With an Introduction by W. R. Williams, D. D. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1854.

"When the heavenly choir were returning home, after having sung on earth the advent of the Lord Jesus, one of them, the Angel Peace, entreated to remain on earth, and coöperate with the gospel. But there was no resting-place for her in any habitable region, since everywhere, every foot of land worth possessing was the object either of violence or jealousy; and she needed some quiet place whither to retire at seasons and refresh her wearied spirit. So there was allotted her a small place in the desert; and her presence made it blossom as the rose." So runs the apologue; and those who are acquainted with the history and character of the institution in which Jacqueline Pascal closed her earthly days will be at no loss to apply it.

In a former number we gave a general view of Port-Royal, but the present publication allows us to enter its doors, and gives us a clearer insight into the routine of its daily life. It is a compilation of two works by M. Cousin and M. Faugère upon the Pascal family, is introduced by the Rev. Dr. Williams, and closed by an essay from the late M. Vinet.

Struck by the beauty and intelligence of three young children who surrounded their father in his audience-chamber, Cardinal Richelieu remarked that he would make something of them. The haughty favourite could never have divined that all these children would live to seek higher honours than he could bestow, and to count as dross the patronage for which others sighed.

Etienne Pascal, a learned and excellent man, was descended from an ancient family in Auvergne. His domestic affections were strong, and his interest in the moral and mental culture of his children unremitting. Clermont, their birth-place, is a city in the then province of Auvergne, which now comprises the departments of Puy de Dome and Cantel. It may be a question with the physiologist how far the native region of the Pascals had an influence in producing the strongly-marked characteristics for which each of the family was distinguished. It is a mountainous country, proverbial, we are told, "for the obstinacy of its inhabitants." The Puy de Dome, under

whose shadow he was born, is the mountain on which the experiment recommended by Pascal for determining the weight of the air, and its influence on the height of the mercury in the barometer, was carried into effect.

In the year 1628, Etienne Pascal lost his wife, and two years after he removed from Clermont to Paris for the education of his children. The elder daughter, Gilberte, afterward Madame Perier, was a most superior and exemplary woman, whose tender care for her young brother and sister did all that was possible to supply a mother's loss. It is to Gilberte's sketches of her distinguished brother, and her sister Jacqueline, that we are principally indebted for our familiar acquaintance with them. Jacqueline, however, was the sister closer allied in heart and mind to Blaise, and the one who exercised the greater influence over him. From her infancy she was distinguished for extraordinary personal attractions, precocious genius, and great sweetness of temper. She was six years old when the family removed to Paris, and Gilberte dwells with lively fondness upon her pretty manner and winning ways at that period of her life. When she was seven years old her father requested Gilberte to teach her to read. She found it a difficult task, until the interest of the child was awakened by one of those fortuitous circumstances that sometimes decide the bent of a character. Jacqueline hearing her sister read some poetry, attracted by the melody of the rhythm, told her that she would try to learn if she would teach her out of a verse-book. The request was complied with, and from that time rapid progress was made. "If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, Antony would have kept the world," remarked the sententious Blaise. Had Jacqueline found a less accommodating teacher, her rare talents might never have been elicited. From this time poetry became her passion; and she began to compose "not bad verses," says her cautious sister. We find Jacqueline soon after engaged with three little friends in the composition of a play which was performed before a large audience, and exceedingly admired. The report of her genius reached the court-circle, and the attendance of the child was requested at the royal palace of St. Germain's. There she found that remarkable character, Louise d'Orleans, better known in history as La Grande Mademoiselle, a woman who blended a superabundance of folly and vanity with so much good sense and bravery that her father pronounced her the worthy representative of her grandfather Henry the Great. While waiting the summons of Anne of Austria, Mademoiselle requested Jacqueline to make some verses upon herself and Madame Hautefort. The child complied, and wrote two appropriate epigrams. We may imagine

Madame Hautefort the more inspiring subject for her muse. She was a young lady of engaging manners, and so correct in her deportment as to have gained, in that corrupt court, the sobriquet of Sainte Hautefort. The queen treated Jacqueline with great consideration, and gave her frequent invitations to the palace, where she sometimes had the honour of attending her majesty when she dined in private. When she was thirteen years old a volume of her poems was published, with a dedication to the queen. A celebrated poet of the day, after some strictures upon the book, adds,—

> "But genius lifts thee common rules above,
> Fair child of song."

Even at that period we find her impressed with the conviction that her gift of song was a sacred talent intrusted to her by God, "for which she claimed no merit, but ascribed all the glory to him."

At this time the elder Pascal became obnoxious to Cardinal Richelieu for the fearlessness with which he remonstrated with him for his illegal seizure of private property to carry on the war with Spain. He was probably not the less earnest for being himself a sufferer. Threatened by the arrogant favourite with the Bastile, Pascal concealed himself for three months. But upon hearing that Jacqueline was dangerously ill with small-pox, he returned to the house to remain with her at every hazard. She recovered, but with the loss of her beauty, on which she wrote some verses full of piety and good sense. In them she thanks God that her life had not "faded like an April morn," and blesses him for the scars upon her face, because she views them as the impress of his hand. As we read her little poem, we wonder at the union of so much taste and sensibility with the childish feeling that led her still to take pleasure in "her trinkets and her dolls." Soon after Jacqueline's recovery, a play was to be performed for the entertainment of the cardinal. It was composed by Madame Scuderi, a fashionable writer of the day, whose poems and interminable romances abound with unnatural and exaggerated sentiments. Gilberte reluctantly consented that her sister should take part in the exhibition, at the urgent entreaty of the Duchess d'Auguillon, and then only in hope that the attractions of the child might soften the cardinal's heart toward her father. Nor was she disappointed. The marvellous little girl acted her part admirably. The father was not only forgiven, but soon after presented with a profitable and honourable office in Rouen, which he filled with his usual uprightness and integrity. As an evidence of his probity, it is related that he discharged his secretary, who was also a relative, for receiving a louis-d'or as a bribe. He

found the records of his office in great confusion, but, with the assistance of his son, he soon succeeded in placing them in a satisfactory condition. It was to expedite this business that Blaise invented his celebrated calculating machine.

The Pascals probably found Rouen a pleasant dwelling-place. The "city of a hundred towers" has given birth to some of the most illustrious names in France; and Pierre Corneille at that time resided there, and was a frequent guest at the hearth and board of the Pascals. He is not said to have been a great conversationalist, but the genial qualities of the family, united to so much genius and cultivation, must have drawn from the poet many an immortal thought. He took a lively interest in the opening talents of Jacqueline, and persuaded her to become a competitor for a yearly prize, offered by the city for the best poem on the Conception of the Virgin. It was adjudged to her, but, whether from modesty or indifference we cannot tell, she was absent when it was to be presented. Corneille, however, received it for her, with an impromptu speech of thanks in Jacqueline's name. Afterward it was carried to her with drum and trumpet.

Gilberte thus speaks of Jacqueline at this period of her life:—

"Though she was then fifteen, she was as frolicsome as a little child, and still found much amusement in her dolls. We used to scold her for this; but had great difficulty to get her to give up her childish plays, which she much preferred to the distinguished society of the town, although she received general admiration."—P. 44.

We cannot think of the authoress of a poem that excited the whole city of Rouen, and in which the greatest dramatist of France took a lively interest, staying at home to play with dolls, without reiterating the assertion of Joanna Baillie, that

> "A simple heart with subtle spirit join'd,
> Makes such a union as
> May pass for curious and unnatural."

Jacqueline was fifteen when her sister Gilberte married M. Perier, a man in every respect worthy to become a member of the Pascal family. At this period of her life, notwithstanding her full conviction of the importance of true religion, she exhibited a degree of alienation from it, and even expressed contempt for some of its observances. It is certainly no matter of surprise that the discerning mind of Jacqueline saw the folly of Papal forms, and became disgusted with them.

The time had now arrived when, through a chain of God's providences, this remarkable family were brought to feel their accountability to him for the lofty powers with which he had enriched them.

St. Cyran, the imprisoned director of Port-Royal, had his captivity in the Bastile at one time shared by a priest named Guillebert. Few persons ever came in contact with this man of God without imbibing something of his heavenly spirit. Hard and haughty hearts melted before the cross which he exhibited to their view; the ambitious became lowly, the careless devout. Guillebert was not an exception. When released from his confinement he poured forth strains of fervid eloquence that attracted crowds of listeners to his church in the little village of Rouville. Members of parliament, with other distinguished persons, came from Rouen, and took lodgings on Saturday night that they might listen to his voice on the ensuing day.

Among his converts were two noblemen, "brothers, belonging to the numerous family of Bailleul." They had made the study of anatomy and medicine the amusement of their leisure hours, when they learned, through the preaching of Guillebert, that they were bound to use their acquired knowledge for the benefit of their fellow-creatures.

They attended the elder Pascal for a dislocated limb; and while attending upon his body they also ministered to his soul. Madame Perier writes:—

"The edifying discourse and exemplary lives of their visitors made my father, brother, and sister wish to read the books which had aided them in obtaining so great a degree of holiness; and this was their first acquaintance with the works of Jansenius, M. de St. Cyran, Arnold, and others, that were of great service to them."

We do not think the translator of this work is correct in her statement that Blaise was the first to "rest his whole hope of salvation on the merits of his Redeemer;" for two years afterward, Jacqueline, in allusion to her brother's conversion, writes to her sister:—

"We entreat you never to forget this; nor let a day pass without reviewing God's dealings with us. He has not only made us kindred in Christ, but children of one father in a twofold sense, since, as you know, our father's conversion preceded ours. Ought we not to be astonished at God's mercy in thus doubly allying us, both in emblem and reality? For, as we have often remarked when with you, corporeal things are but the types of spiritual, and God employs visible things to represent those which are invisible. The view of the relation between the things of nature and those of grace takes in a wide range of profitable thoughts, and demands our frequent and serious attention." —P. 101.

Blaise Pascal was twenty-three years old at this time. The world had considered him a model of purity, for no outward sin had sullied the beauty of his daily life. Yet not until now did he find

Christ as the Redeemer of his soul, and attain that saving faith which made his ensuing life so radiantly beautiful in Christian magnanimity and gentle resignation to the will of God. The twin-sister of his soul soon became a partaker in "his new-found joy," and from that time they were united by a threefold cord. It was a beautiful union; and surely God did not intend that, as was too soon the case, it should be violently torn asunder. In the same year M. and Madame Perier visited Rouen, and "became the subjects of a similar change" to that which the rest of their family had known. The whole Pascal family then placed themselves under the ministry of M. Guillebert. The strictest of our Methodist fathers required of their converts no more simplicity in externals than he. Madame Perier's daughter tells us how cheerfully her mother complied with the requisitions of her spiritual director to lay aside her ornaments and the trimmings on her dresses. She informs us, also, that she never put those decorations upon her children which she herself could not conscientiously wear; for she stripped them of the ribbons, laces, and silver-embroidered dresses in which, when left for a short time under her care, it had pleased their grandmother to array them. From that time the young Periers wore only gray camlet; and their mother incurred considerable expense in taking them to Paris rather than leave them with their grandmother, lest associating with children of worldly views should mar the simplicity of their character. No half-way measures did the Pascals use; no compromise with duty was ever made.

At this period of her life Gilberte must have been in the full bloom and richness of that beauty which her daughter speaks of; and we can imagine her dignified and unostentatious appearance in the dress of sober-coloured material which her conscience prompted her to wear. Several years after this, when Madame Perier lay dangerously ill, Jacqueline writes of her in words that recall to mind one of the most beautiful of Milton's sonnets. She says:—

"Let her hope to go in with Him to that blessed marriage, since she neither suffered her lamp to become extinct by quitting the ways of God from the time of her entrance on them, nor has she bought oil of those who sell, by listening to the flatteries of false guides, but has faithfully preserved the true oil of grace shed abroad in her heart by God's Holy Spirit."—P. 152.

After much devout and earnest preparation, Jacqueline Pascal, for the first time, partook of the communion in 1646. "We may believe that she then really received the influences of the Holy Ghost," writes her sister, "since her character from thenceforward was completely changed."

From this period every communication from the family accords

in piety of tone. Blaise is breathing out some of those fervent supplications which have come down to us, and Jacqueline is calling upon her sister to pray for her with her whole heart, as well as offer up thanksgivings on their brother's account. He, prostrated by illness, only asks for perfect and unqualified submission to the will of God. These petitions were fully answered. With serene patience he endured his distressing maladies; and when, owing to an obstruction in his throat, he was obliged to swallow nauseous medicines drop by drop, he never uttered a complaint. "Make me to glorify Thee in my sufferings, knowing that without them I cannot attain unto glory, and that thou, O my Saviour! didst choose to be made perfect thereby. The marks of thine agony once revealed thee to thy waiting disciples, and thou dost still set on thy followers the seal of tribulation," were some of the utterances of his heart.

Soon after, Pascal, accompanied by Jacqueline, went to consult the physicians in Paris. Her letters from that city show us with what interest she entered into her brother's scientific pursuits. They speak of Descartes, Hobert, and Roberval, the savans of the age, and give details of their various conversations. This visit decided the destiny of Jacqueline's life. She then became acquainted with M. Singlin, the pious director of Port-Royal, and after a conversation with him, in which she expressed the breathings of her soul after perfect consecration to God, she came to the conclusion that it was at that retreat she might, to use her own words, "become wisely pious."

Never had the piety of this institution shone with a brighter lustre than at this period of its existence. Long-continued persecutions, from a power that demanded the sacrifice of truth and conscience, had done much to emancipate them from a slavish obedience to its authority, and to ingraft upon them what Vinet calls "an unconscious Protestantism." The spirit of the whole body was evinced in the simple reply of Gertrude de Valois to the Superior, who threatened to deprive her of the sacraments, and to have her body cast upon a dunghill, because she would not sign propositions which she knew to be false: "I do not think your lordship will be able to discover any place to cast my body, where my Saviour cannot find and raise it up at the last day." The institution in which such a sentiment was openly expressed, might well be denominated the "hotbed of heresy" by the infuriated Jesuits.

We, as Protestants, cannot fail to discern grievous errors in the creed of Port-Royal, and are compelled to allow that even there invocations to the saints were professedly practised. But in the latter part of its existence we hear little of a belief that always,

indeed, seemed to sit very loosely upon them. The appeal in their extremity is to God, through the Saviour, and the saints in the calendar are seldom named. Error there met with an antagonistic influence in the Scriptural knowledge that was so fully diffused, for the Bible was constantly read, and the nuns were exhorted to commit portions of it to memory. The Constitutions say,—

"Let them try to fill the treasury of their minds with God's word, which is more desirable than gold or precious stones: so will the languishing flame of devotion in their souls be quickened by contact with that divine truth, for the word of the Lord is full of fire."—P. 90.

From the nuns and recluses we find letter after letter, such as the stanchest Protestant might write; and we must ever feel, with Vinet, that the piety of Port-Royal was "spiritual, actual, and sincere. It had no toleration for sublime fantasies; the virtues it practised were useful and salutary; it aimed at justice and charity in its relations with mankind; and its morality is no exact, ingenious mechanism, but a living, pliant reality."

Such was the monastery which Jacqueline desired to enter. But her father could not endure separation from her, and peremptorily refused his consent. So far from rebelling against this decision, Jacqueline's friends at Port-Royal insisted upon her obedience to it, and the correspondence which passed between them at the time shows their noble and magnanimous characters in bold relief. Although not permitted to take the veil, Jacqueline after this had no connexion with the world, except through "the golden link of charity." She consulted the directors of Port-Royal upon every point of conscience, upon every act of her life. We mourn over the austerities to which she doomed herself, and over the false views of Christian duty that led to her seclusion from the family by whom she was so dearly loved. Yet we are glad to hear that she nursed them tenderly in illness, and if she would not contribute to their amusement, that she still made it her happiness to extend to them every kindness; that she busied herself in works of mercy to the sick and suffering, and that her separation from the world neither soured her temper, nor made her manners austere.

A letter, from which we have before quoted, written by Jacqueline about this time, seems to bear the assay-mark of her brother, and shows us how perfectly her mind was the reflection of his own. One sentence appears particularly characteristic of the author of Les Pensees:—

"We ought to consider ourselves as criminals in a prison hung around with pictures of our Liberator, and the necessary instruction for obtaining our freedom. Yet it must be owned that these holy hieroglyphics cannot be de-

ciphered without a supernatural light; for the very things which speak of God, and manifest his glory to those who know and love him, serve to hide him from those who know him not."—P. 101.

At the suggestion of an ecclesiastic who frequently visited her, Jacqueline translated a Latin hymn, which is given us in an English dress. It is remarkably fine; and we cannot enough regret the decision of M. Singlin, who, when consulted by Jacqueline upon the propriety of continuing her translations, replied that the lot of woman was humility and silence, and even assured her that she should "hate her genius." Surely the pious father forgot that every creature of God is sanctified by the word of God and prayer. Our feelings rebel against the sentence that hushed the golden harp that sent forth such sweet and solemn music, and forbade the consecrated use of the talents which God had bestowed. Yet, in our age of active exertion and extensive charity, may we not learn a lesson from the deep humility and entire self-negation of the Port-Royalists? They were accustomed never to speak of themselves, their exertions, or religious attainments. They did not desire credit, nor seek distinction even for eminence in piety. They let their light shine before men not by sounding professions and assumptions of religious superiority, but by the purity of their daily life, and the sweetness of a heavenly temper. While they aimed at a continual remembrance of God, in looking to him, and referring everything to his will, they carefully shunned whatever might have a tendency "to foster self-complacency," a desire of distinction, or a love of applause.

The spirit they inculcated is admirably expressed in the following language of The Mère Angelique:—

"Nothing is more easy than to deceive ourselves as to the grounds and intents of the heart in those actions which, when once performed, constitute a choice for life. The motive was perhaps pure which first inspired it, and because the same outward course remains, we are too apt to flatter ourselves that the same internal devotion, zeal, and singleness of heart, still continue; whereas, too often, the habit by which a course of life is continued, is wholly different from the choice by which it is established. And if the human heart be so corrupt that even an apostle found it necessary to seek constant aid from above, and that the inner man should be renewed day by day, do not let us flatter ourselves with vainly trusting to a dead and formal adhesion to those works we once adopted from spiritual and living faith. . . . Examine your hearts: there is an indolent retirement from the world which originates in a misanthropic absorption in our own concerns; there is a melancholy retirement which is grounded on disappointed self-love; and there is a philosophic retirement which has its basis in pride and contempt of others. Far different from all these antichristian dispositions is a genuine religious retirement. The Christian's seclusion is founded on a deep experience of the corruption and deceitfulness of his own heart; nor is it deserving of that holy name unless, while he comes out from among worldly men to wait upon God in silence, and to renew his strength, either in solitude or by the example of his saints, he also

assiduously and diligently labours by his industry and talents, as well as by his prayers, to serve to the very utmost, even that secular society which conscience has led him to quit as associates."—*Memoirs of Port-Royal*, vol. i, p. 195.

In the autumn of 1651 the elder Pascal was seized with his last illness, and Gilberte relates how assiduously Jacqueline attended her father day and night, and how, when her presence was not needed in his room, her time was spent in incessant prayer on his behalf, in words that recall the tender lines of Crabbe:—

> "Still long she nursed him; tender thoughts meantime
> Were interchanged, and hopes and views sublime.
> With him she pray'd, to him the Bible read,
> Soothed the faint heart, and held the aching head.
> She came with smiles the hour of pain to cheer;
> Apart she sigh'd, alone she shed the tear—
> Then, as if breaking from a cloud, she gave
> Fresh light, and gilt the prospect of the grave."

Etienne Pascal died in September. We give the following extract from a letter written by his son upon that occasion:—

"Let us, then, view death in Jesus Christ, and not without him. Without Christ, death is naturally an object of detestation and dread. In Christ all is changed, and death becomes lovely, holy, the object of the believer's desire and joy. In Christ all things are pleasant, and work together for our good. Death is no exception, for Christ suffered and died that he might sanctify death and sorrow. As God and man he experienced the two extremes of majesty and meanness, and, in so doing, sanctified everything save sin, and became an example to us in every condition."—P. 125.

And now, deprived of the father whom he had so loved and reverenced, and separated by distance from his elder sister, Blaise turned to Jacqueline for consolation and support. But her determination to leave the world upon her father's death had been fully formed, and the Pascal spirit was ever unyielding and inflexible. His anguish was extreme when informed by Gilberte of Jacqueline's purpose. He shut himself up in his room, and refused to look upon the face from which he was soon to be forever exiled. The account that Madame Perier gives of these circumstances is very touching; the more so from the almost Scriptural simplicity of manner in which they are related. When the morning arrived which was to separate Jacqueline from her friends, as sternly as if the hand of death had beckoned her, her sister writes:—

"She rose, dressed, and went away, doing this, as she did everything else, with inconceivable calmness and evenness of spirit. We did not say good-bye, for fear of being overcome, and I turned aside from her path when I saw that she was ready to depart."—P. 129.

Thus, by sacrificing the tender affections of the heart, Jacqueline Pascal persuaded herself that she was doing God service. What a

monstrous perversion of duty to leave a world that she was so qualified to improve and enjoy, and a brother whose happiness was so dependent upon her, under the idea of making herself more holy and acceptable to God! Still hoping to throw an impediment in the way of her sister's becoming a nun, Pascal made some difficulty in regard to the dowry which the monastery usually received upon the reception of a novice. This touched the proud spirit of Jacqueline to the utmost. She had yet to learn the heavenly meekness which, united to so much genius and strength of character, made Angelique Arnauld so preëminently lovely: "My grief became so violent that I wonder how I ever lived through it," she passionately exclaims. In vain M. Angelique advised her to leave her relatives to manage her fortune, and to think only of her approaching profession. She was so unhappy at the idea of entering the convent as a pensioner instead of a benefactor, that she begged to be admitted as one of the lay-sisters. These are nuns who perform the menial offices of the convent, and are in reality its servants. Jacqueline's request was refused, and her brother, finding resistance unavailing, acted with his accustomed generosity, and settled a handsome dowry upon the institution.

In May, 1642, the convent-gate closed upon Jacqueline Pascal forever. No mention of the ceremony has been found among the records of Port-Royal. Their principle was to avoid ostentation and display upon these occasions, as well as upon every other. Even the imposing ceremonial of removing the hair of a novice was not practised there, lest she might regret the sacrifice in after-life; but a little was merely cut off at the ends.

Three years after Jacqueline's profession, her brother joined the recluses at Port-Royal. There they met only at church, and their intercourse was merely by letter. The tenor of Pascal's life at Port-Royal is fully known. In his retirement he forged those keen and polished shafts which caused the Jesuit order to reel and bite the dust with wrath and agony. And there he collected and arranged materials for a noble temple, of which a few precious stones, carved and chiselled with exquisite precision, have been preserved. Soon after Jacqueline's entrance into the convent she was appointed Sub-Prioress, and Mistress of the Novices, an honourable but laborious situation. She attended to the religious and general education of "the Sisters of the White Veil," particularly explaining to them "the solemn nature of their obligations, and their need of continued prayer and effort if they desired to grow in grace, striving to imbue them with a delight in solemn communion with God, and a true submission to his holy will."—P. 87.

Port-Royal had long before Jacqueline's entrance been noted for the admirable education bestowed in its schools:—

"The truths of Christianity were there solidly and luminously taught—the minds of the pupils were thoroughly cultivated; and where they perceived the germ of peculiar talents, the education they received under the sisters of the Arnaulds and the Pascals was far different from that which any other public system of education ever elsewhere afforded to ladies."—*Memoirs of Port-Royal*, vol. i, p. 206.

The Arabs say that a tree becomes fruitful by looking upon another: so we may imagine what enduring effects continued intercourse and communion with the Port-Royalists would have upon the youthful mind. The words of such instructers must indeed have "kindled as they fell;" and it is no wonder that their pupils were everywhere distinguished for the purity of their lives as well as for the superiority of their acquirements. Jacqueline's letters to her relatives at this period are written in a cheerful tone, and breathe the most undying love; a love, she tells them, resembling "a fire closely packed together, which diffuses the more heat because it does not waste its strength over a large surface." We should wonder that she makes no allusion to the persecutions of that period, if we were not aware that the Port-Royalists made it a matter of conscience to preserve a profound silence respecting their injuries; and were exhorted never unnecessarily to speak of their own concerns, and then in as brief a manner as possible. "This barrier," says Vinet, "is never threatened either by the dearest interests or the most profound emotions."

We find Jacqueline Pascal the obedient nun and the passive recipient of the opinions of her Church, until forced into collision with it by what she considered an "imperilment of the truth." Then, standing face to face against a power which demanded the surrender of the human will, and aimed "to smelt soul-ore into one solid mass," all the nobleness and intrepidity of her character was fully evinced. The much-talked-of formulary drawn up by the council, sanctioned and enforced by the clergy, and submitted to by some who had hitherto been pillars for the truth, was condemned both by Jacqueline and her brother: he, in Paris, and she, at Port-Royal, unknown to each other, lifted up their voices against it. He afterward yielded; but no excuses for expediency, no fallacious reasoning moved her; and, to use her own idea, she turned from truth itself "when painted in the colours of falsehood."

"What are we afraid of? Banishment for the nuns, the seizure of property, prison, death, if you will; but are not these things our glory, and ought we not therein rather to rejoice? Let us either give up the gospel, or let us carry out its principles, and esteem ourselves happy in suffering for the truth's sake.

But we may perhaps be cast out from the Church! True; and yet who does not know that none can be truly detached from the Church except by his own will? The spirit of Jesus Christ is the tie that binds his members to himself, and to one another."—P. 215.

She elsewhere writes:—

"I know very well that the defence of truth is not woman's business; though in a melancholy sense it may be affirmed, that when bishops seem to have the cowardice of women, women ought to have the boldness of bishops. And if we are not to be defenders of the truth, we can at least die for it, and suffer everything rather than abandon it."—P. 219.

M. Arnauld, worn out with the persecutions that had broken up their schools, scattered their nuns, and imprisoned their directors, thought that a compromise, which would give them a little repose after the storms of so many years, would be allowable; but Jacqueline continued firm, and wrote him one of the most noble and fearless letters that was ever dictated by the heart of woman. She and the Prioress of Port-Royal, Deschamps, at length stood alone in their opposition. But after a letter from Arnauld, in which he endeavoured to overcome their objections, their signatures were at length extorted, but not without a protest, "in order to clear their consciences in some degree." How ineffectual these concessions were, the utter domolition of Port-Royal attests. It scarcely delayed its doom, and the life of Jacqueline became the costly sacrifice.

"She died of grief because, under the guidance of her brother, with the great Arnauld, and the distinguished members of Port-Royal, she had consented to a transaction esteemed proper by them all, but in which the exquisite delicacy of her moral sense detected a slight evasion. How much mingled strength and weakness in such a death! yet it was not the Christian, but the woman, who sank overwhelmed by the weight of her own courage."—P. 248.

She passed from the sorrows and anxieties of earth to the peace and serenity of heaven, on her birthday, 4th of October, 1661, aged thirty-six years. M. Angelique was gathered to her Father's house two months before. Of Jacqueline, M. Singlin from his place of concealment thus writes: "When God takes them in so holy and happy a frame of mind as was hers, I have reason to praise him, and therefore to rejoice. My only sorrow is because I know there is a void in your house which it is impossible to fill;" and Angelique St. Jean, at that time the very soul of Port-Royal herself, exclaims: "Alas! I had hoped great things in all our present and future trials, for her whom God has taken away lest we should lean on her too much."

Her brother followed her on the succeeding August; and thus, as Vinet beautifully remarks, were shattered "two precious vases, by the mighty workings of truth, genius, and feeling within them. The covering was too frail to resist the internal pressure."

And now Gilberte is left, the last of her father's family, with radiant memories of the dead, and Christian hopes for the living. These hopes were fulfilled; for in after years her daughter writes:—

"Such was the life of all the members of my family. I am left alone. They all died in immovable love for the truth. I may say, as did Simon Maccabeus, the last of all his brothers: 'All my relatives and brethren have died in God's service, and the love of his truth; I am left alone, and God forbid that I should ever think of renouncing either.'"

Happy Margaret! thus standing upon the verge of heaven thyself, with all thy loved ones beckoning thee from thence. The bitterness of death is gone, and the sorrows by which thy heart was riven have made for thee a channel of consolation and of joy.

In reading the work before us we have been struck with the strong resemblance between the Pascal and the Wesley family. Both possessed the same concentration of purpose, the same simplicity of motive, the same love for the truth, and the same indomitable will. John Wesley, rejecting the living of Epworth against the arguments and entreaties of his father and brothers, stands side by side with Jacqueline Pascal, turning away from the prayers of a brother who loved her as his own soul, when she felt that her vocation was for a monastic life. Both of them refused to succumb to spiritual despotism, when its mandates warred with the voice of God within their souls; and, like Susanna Wesley, Jacqueline, at every risk, would have refused to respond to the prayer that involved the recognition of the title of one whom she did not consider to have a legal right to his position as king.

Jacqueline Pascal was taken from the evil to come. The full fury of the storm that hung over the convent burst upon it immediately after her death. The nuns were placed in such rigorous captivity that in several instances it resulted in loss of life. The recluses were threatened with the Bastile, and hunted from place to place. M. Singlin died of the hardships he endured.

And now the valley of Port-Royal is desolate; the site of its noble buildings is scarcely discernible. The fiat, "Raze it, raze it, even to the foundations thereof," was remorselessly executed. Lovely wild-flowers wave over prostrate arches, and cover the desecrated graves of its saints, as if nature would veil the ruin which man has made. No sound save the sighing of the wind and the note of the lonely bird is heard; for even the soft music of the little stream is hushed by the profuse vegetation that crowds its channel.

But is the mission of Port-Royal ended? Can this noble band of confessors and martyrs have suffered and died in vain? We cannot so believe. The leaf falls from the tree to fertilize the soil; the

dew rises to heaven, and returns in showers "to cover the broad fields with golden grain."

> "What seeds of life that day were sown
> The heavenly watchers know alone:"

and as seeds that for hundreds of years encased in darkness have afterward distended, and sprouted, and brought forth blossoms, so we trust that the love, the devotion, the unshrinking faith of the Port-Royalists may yet yield a noble harvest to the Christian Church. Reuchlin, a German Protestant, has written a History of Port-Royal; and St. Beuve, "one of the most distinguished of the living critics of France," is now occupied with a similar task. We have no doubt that the writings and examples of these eminent saints, when thus made familiar to us, will kindle a brighter flame of devotion, and "impart a leaven of new life throughout the entire commonwealth of Christianity."

The founder of our Church, with his large Christian heart, delighted to dwell upon the piety of Gregory Lopez and De Renti. He loved the image of Christ wherever manifested. And we in his spirit may rejoice to know that, in the one song that has no discordant note, many will unite with us who have not called themselves by our name, nor worshipped after our manner; but who "are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone."

Art. V.—BISHOP ASBURY.

Journals of the Rev. Francis Asbury, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. 3 vols., 12mo., pp. 524, 492, 502. New-York: Carlton & Phillips. 1854.

We congratulate the friends of the Methodist Episcopal Church upon the appearance of these volumes. It is a singular fact, that although Francis Asbury is the most distinguished man that the Methodist Episcopal Church has ever produced, and the most important ecclesiastical personage that our country has ever seen; and although more than thirty-seven years have passed away since his decease, a full memoir of his life yet remains to be written. Numerous and urgent calls have been made for it; and several attempts have been made to meet them; but with singular want of success. The reasons of this are two: First, adequate materials for such a memoir were not to be had, until very recently; secondly, a fair

estimate of the character of the man, and of the relative position that he was entitled to hold in the ecclesiastical history of the country—until the recent extraordinary and unlooked-for developments of his wonderful labours—could not be made. He was one of those few men whom his own generation could not appreciate. The men of his time did not know who was among them. The goodly proportions of his lofty and apostolic character were more than they could comprehend. It has remained for the men of another generation, who are now the eye-witnesses of some of the results of his wisdom and toils, to do him justice. Those memoirs will, probably, appear in due time; and, until then, we commend our readers to the perusal of the interesting volumes before us.

One volume of these Journals was published during the author's lifetime,—first in numbers,—although not under his own inspection; and also the first number of the second, with the intention of publishing the whole volume—a purpose not then carried into effect. The remainder were not published till 1821, five years after his death, when the whole were issued by Messrs. Bangs & Mason, then agents of the Book Concern of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in three volumes, octavo. Though much pains were taken with the edition, and it was probably made as perfect as circumstances then admitted, yet it was full of errors and inaccuracies, and was far from giving entire satisfaction to the numerous friends of the distinguished author. This first edition was never extensively circulated, and has long since been out of print. Something better was much needed.

This desideratum is at length supplied in the volumes named at the head of this article. In these we have an elegant and accurate edition of the Journals, upon which no pains seems to have been spared, and which cannot but be read with pleasure and satisfaction by the friends of our Church, and indeed by all persons who feel interested in that much-neglected branch of study—the ecclesiastical history of our country. The writer lived during the most important and eventful period of our history,—namely, from the commencement of our troubles with the mother country to the close of our last war with Great Britain. It was during this period that all the leading denominations of the country became fully organized in their present form, and the ecclesiastical as well as the political interests of the country were placed upon a firm and solid foundation, from which has arisen the great prosperity of later times. This department has hitherto been almost wholly ignored by most writers on American history, because they were ignorant of it, and incapable of appreciating its value and importance; but this will not always be. And it is also to be further noted, that the author

of these Journals travelled more extensively, and conversed with a larger number of persons of all classes, from Washington—with whom he was personally acquainted—down to the humblest dweller in the log-cabins of our extensive frontier, than any other man of his time. He usually passed through nearly the entire extent of our country, from north to south, besides crossing the mountains to the borders of western civilization, almost every year, especially after 1798, when he held the first conference in the then District of Maine.

Mr. Asbury's Journals extend from the meeting of the conference held in Bristol, England, August 7, 1771—so famous in the Calvinistic controversy of the times, and at which he received his appointment from Mr. Wesley as missionary for America—to December 7, 1815, within a few months of his death, a period of upward of forty-four years. They also contain notices of his early life, previous to that event, interspersed throughout the volumes; and also an account of his concluding labours, and of his death, which cannot but draw tears "even from eyes unused to weep." This edition, unlike the former, also contains that most valuable appendage to all large works,—a closely-printed index of twenty-six pages; which must have cost no small amount of patient labour, and will save much to the reader.

To whet the appetite of our readers for a thorough perusal of these journals, we subjoin the following sketch of the life and character of their venerable and apostolic author:—

Francis Asbury was born in the parish of Handsworth, about four miles from Birmingham, in the county of Staffordshire, England, August 20th, 1745. His parents, Joseph and Elizabeth Asbury, were in humble circumstances, and of steady and consistent piety. They were Methodists, and their house was long a home for the preachers, and a place of meeting for the members of the society.

Joseph and Elizabeth Asbury had but two children,—Francis and Sarah. The latter died in her infancy, which affliction seems to have been the means of leading Mrs. Asbury to repentance, and to seek those consolations of divine grace of which she so much stood in need at this time. Thus was a great good brought out of a seeming evil; for the death of that infant made the spiritual life of thousands in distant regions of the earth, the most of whom were then unborn.

Francis was now the sole care of his parents; and, according to their humble ability, they were not wanting to him, but brought him up "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." His pious mother, however, seems to have been the most prominent in this work.

Young Asbury was the subject of serious impressions when but a child at school, when—on account of his religious turn of mind, of

the piety of his parents, who were accustomed to invite devout people to their house, and of the fact that he wore a white smock frock, which bore some resemblance to a clergyman's surplice—he was called "the *parson*." He was converted to God when thirteen years of age, and the grace he then received he ever after retained. The Rev. Alexander Mather, a distinguished name in the annals of Methodism, (afterward one of the first presidents of the British Conference,) was then stationed on the Staffordshire Circuit, which embraced the place of young Asbury's residence, and thus had a hand in the formation of the character of one who was to tower far above him in ecclesiastical dignity and extensive usefulness.

At this time also young Asbury was accustomed to meet in class at Wednesbury, to meet in band at Bromwich-heath, and attend church at West-Bromwich, near the seat of the Earl of Dartmouth, so celebrated as the munificent patron of Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H., whose name it bears, and who, as a British statesman, also figures somewhat largely in our colonial history. Here he heard such men as Ryland, Stillingfleet, Talbot, Bagnall, Mansfield, Hawes, and Venn, under whose able ministry he seems to have profited. The Rev. Henry Venn stands prominent among the Calvinistic party in the Church of England, in the great revival of the last century, and was the author of the once popular treatise called "The Complete Duty of Man." Venn lived long after the humble gardener's son, who used to listen to his evangelical teachings in the West-Bromwich Church, had risen to the episcopal dignity and to eminent usefulness in the new world. He died in 1797, aged seventy-three. The Rev. Wm. Ryland, also of Sutton Co-fields, attracted by the early piety and promising talents of young Asbury, gave him advice, and lent him books; and thus also assisted in the formation of a character which was to shed its sweet and mellow light upon unborn millions in the distant regions of the Western hemisphere.

When Mr. Asbury was a child, his parents removed to a village called Barre, about a mile and a quarter from the place of his birth. In this vicinity he was sent to a school kept by one Arthur Taylor, of whom he speaks not in the highest or most affectionate terms. Like most of the lower class of English schoolmasters of that time, Taylor beat his pupils much, but taught them little. His severities, said Asbury, "drove me to prayer; and it seemed to me that God was very near to me." When Dr. Fisk visited this place, in 1836, after the lapse of eighty years, a school was still kept in the same room.

About the time of his conversion, young Asbury was apprenticed

to one John Griffin, a chape filer. A "chape" is the catch of a buckle. Rather a small business, one would suppose, for such a man; but as small as it was he made but poor progress in it, for it is said that he was but an indifferent mechanic. The fact is, he was called to another work, upon which his mind was solely intent, even at this early period. Even from the time of his conversion he was accustomed to hold meetings for reading and prayer among his companions, until they assumed such an aspect of importance as to call down the persecutions of the wicked in opposition to them, upon which those at whose houses they were held refused to accommodate them longer. He then withdrew them to his father's house, where he was sure of both sympathy and protection; and here, under his pious and juvenile exhortations, some were converted, and found peace with God.

After having thus exercised his youthful gifts in this private way for some time, when about sixteen he became a local preacher, and, to the amazement of many, appeared in a more public manner. As calls were now numerous, and as his master was very indulgent to him in his work, he now went far and near, visiting various places, not only in his native county of Staffordshire, but also the neighbouring counties of Derbyshire, Warwickshire, and Worcestershire, where are now large and flourishing societies.

Of Mr. Griffin—who seems to have possessed sufficient piety and good sense to appreciate his promising character, and who most evidently sympathized with his youthful evangelical labours, and in whose house he was treated rather as a son, and an equal, than as a servant—he speaks in terms of great respect and affection. Whether this good man ever lived to witness the elevation to which his early protégé finally arrived, we have now no means of knowing.

At the Conference held in London, August 18, 1767, when he was just twenty-two years of age, one year after the formation of the first class in New-York, by Philip Embury, and one year before the erection of the old John-street Church, in that city, —destined to be one of the scenes of his early labours in the new world,—he joined the itinerant connexion, under Mr. Wesley, and was appointed, with James Glassbrook assistant, to the Bedfordshire Circuit, the scene of the gospel labours of John Bunyan, and of the sorrows of the pious Lady Russell, a century before; and since distinguished for the large number of its pious and devoted Methodists.

In 1768 he was appointed alone, and, of course, in charge of the Colchester Circuit, which shows the confidence Mr. Wesley reposed in him, even at this early age. Where he was stationed in 1769 and

1770 we have no means of knowing; but there is presumptive evidence that in the first of these years he was in Northamptonshire, and in the second of them in Hampshire, in the south of England.

It will be remembered that it was at the Conference held in London, in 1770, at which he was probably present, that the famous minutes on justification were adopted, which gave rise to the great Calvinistic controversy, so famous in the history of Methodism, and called forth the inimitable Checks to Antinomianism, by the saintly Fletcher, by which the doctrinal character of Methodism has been so materially affected on both sides of the Atlantic. We have thought it most providential and opportune that these minutes should be published, and this controversy should commence, just at this time, in order to give the right direction to a mind which was to mould the character of the largest and most influential Protestant Church in the new world, and, through them, their brethren also of all other denominations.

At the Conference held in Bristol, August 7, 1771, also rendered memorable by the proceedings of the Rev. Walter Shirley, and some of his friends, in opposition to the minutes of the preceding year, he received an appointment as a *Missionary to America.* Mr. Richard Wright, a young man who had travelled but a year, and concerning whom we have but little information, was appointed to accompany him. They sailed from a port near Bristol, September 2, and arrived in Philadelphia on the 27th of the following month. We presume that their accommodations were not quite equal to those afforded by the splendid packets and palace-like steamships of the present day; for during this long voyage of upward of seven weeks, their friends, by whom we presume their outfit was furnished, having forgotten their beds, Asbury's was composed of two blankets spread upon the bare boards. Time, however, did not pass unimproved. They preached to the crew, on deck, every Sabbath, in addition to which Mr. Asbury employed himself in some pious reflections suitable to his circumstances, in the study of the Scriptures, and in reading some of the works of Norris, Bunyan, Edwards, and Mr. Wesley, and also the Life of De Renti. Time, with him, was a most precious commodity, to be most diligently used for the good of man, and for the glory of God.

Upon their arrival in Philadelphia, they found Mr. Pilmoor engaged in his appropriate work, while his colleague, Mr. Boardman, was similarly engaged in New-York. These two gentlemen were the first regular missionaries to America, and had now been in the country two years. In the evening they attended at St. George's Church, where Mr. Pilmoor preached. "The people," says Mr.

Asbury, "looked on us with pleasure, hardly knowing how to show their love sufficiently, bidding us welcome with fervent affection, and receiving us as the angels of God."

He tarried in Philadelphia but a few days. On the 9th of November he set out for New-York; and, stopping to preach in various places in New-Jersey and Staten Island, on his way, he was five days in reaching that city; where, said he, "I found Richard Boardman in peace, but weak in body."

At this time New-York was mostly confined to the lower end of Manhattan Island, below the Park, and contained about twenty-five thousand inhabitants, with seventeen places of worship,—of which the Episcopalians had three, the Dutch Reformed three, the Lutherans two, the Germans (the German Reformed, we presume) one, the Presbyterians two, and the Seceders, the Baptists, the Moravians, the French Protestants, the Methodists, and the Jews, each one.

Soon after his arrival in New-York he says, "My brethren seem unwilling to leave the cities; but I think that I shall show them the way." And show them the way he did. Up to this time nothing important had been done out of the cities, except what Mr. Robert Strawbridge had done, single-handed, in Maryland. But when Mr. Asbury was stationed in New-York, he was accustomed to visit the adjacent country in Westchester County, and on Long and Staten Islands, preaching almost every day, even in the depth of winter, and when debilitated by disease; and when subsequently stationed in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Norfolk, previous to the war, his usual practice was the same. From those places the word of the Lord, in his mouth, "sounded out into all the region round about."

This peculiar policy, which guided his administration in this country for nearly half a century, has shaped the entire character and condition of Methodism in the United States and in Canada to this day. In Great Britain, the labours of the Methodists were the most needed in the large towns and cities, the population of which has relatively increased the most rapidly during the last century. To those places, therefore, their labours have been mostly confined, and there lie their numbers and their strength. But in this country the very opposite was the case. Here, the country population was then the most destitute, and was also destined, relatively, to increase to an extent that was impossible in the old world. Here, therefore, our richest harvests were to be reaped. With that keenness and comprehension of vision, possessed only by great minds, these facts seem to have been seen by Francis Asbury; and to the country, therefore, he turned his attention, as the most

inviting and promising field,—and kept it turned to the country to the last year of his long and useful life. Subsequent results have shown that he was not mistaken in this matter. Hence our numerical strength, unlike that of our British brethren, lies in the country; and although by far the most mumerous Church in the nation, our numerical superiority does not appear in any of the cities of the Union with the exception of Baltimore, and perhaps of Cincinnati. What, indeed, would be the rural population of the United States, especially out of New-England, without the powerful presence and working of Methodism!

About the first of April, 1772, Mr. Asbury left New-York, in which he had spent the winter, for Philadelphia; and we are introduced to an attempt to plant Methodism in the capital of the Puritans, and which now claims a passing notice. Meeting with Messrs. Boardman and Wright in Philadelphia, the former proposed a plan of future operations, which was, that he should go to Boston, Mr. Pilmoor to Virginia, Mr. Wright to New-York, and that Mr. Asbury should remain in Philadelphia for three months. This proposal most fully agreeing with his notions of the aggressive nature of Methodism, and with his earnest desire for an enlargement of the work, he says, "With this I was well pleased."

The ship in which C. Wesley took his passage for home, from Charleston, S. C., in 1736, was compelled by the ill-conduct of the captain, and by stress of weather, to put into Boston, where she remained a month in the fall of that year. Mr. Wesley was treated with great kindness by certain friends whom he found in this town, and preached several times in the two Episcopal churches then in Boston, both of which—King's Chapel, Tremont-street, and Christ's Church, Salem-street—are yet standing. He also received invitations to preach in the country; but was compelled to decline on account of illness. And now, after the lapse of thirty-six years, behold one of his co-labourers from the old world appears in the metropolis of New-England as the herald of a free salvation, and as the representative of the rising sect then "everywhere spoken against."

At the time of Mr. Boardman's visit Boston contained about seventeen thousand souls, with about ten Congregationalist churches, three Episcopal,—the two above-mentioned, and also Trinity, in Summer-street, built in 1737,—two Baptist, both of which stood in Salem-street, a Friends' meeting-house, which stood on the west side of Congress-street, and a Sandemanian chapel, which was located in an alley, somewhere near the centre of what is now called Hanover-street.

The pious and accomplished Thomas Prince, the junior pastor of the Old South Church, had been gathered to his fathers in peace. His colleague, the venerable and apostolical Sewell, had also died but three years before, after having attained to his fourscore years. Nearly the whole of that generation, of which he was one of the last representatives, which had received Mr. Whitefield so enthusiastically, in his first visit, in 1740, had passed away, and another, which knew but little of their doctrine or spirit, had taken their places. So powerful had been the reaction of "the great awakening" of thirty years before, and so rapid and thorough had been the spread of the Unitarian leaven in that town, that even the Rev. Mr. Condy, the pastor of the First Baptist Church, in the beginning of the latter half of the last century, was suspected of being tainted with it. It is to be presumed that there was not a clergyman in Boston, at this time, who could fully understand the doctrines preached by Mr. Boardman, or sympathize with him in his evangelical labours, except the pious and able Dr. S. Stillman, who had been settled as the pastor of the First Baptist Church as successor of Mr. Condy, in 1764. "The candlestick" in that place yet shed forth no dim or uncertain light.

Besides all this, the minds of the people of Boston were exceedingly engrossed with politics, which, in consequence of the attempts to enforce the Writs of Assistance and the Stamp Act, and other obnoxious measures of the home government, were now rapidly assuming a more serious aspect. The British troops were already quartered in the town. The massacre of citizens in State-street, two years before, and the unpopular acts of the royal governors, Bernard and Hutchinson, had influenced the Bostonians to the highest pitch of excitement, so that they were probably but poorly prepared to listen to that evangelical message which the humble Methodist itinerant came to bring them.

That under the above circumstances Mr. Boardman should meet with any success at all, in this mission to the children of the pilgrims, is almost wonderful; but, as is characteristic of the history of the zealous and indefatigable Methodist itinerant, he *did* meet with success. Obtaining the use of a place of worship, he preached the doctrines of free grace to those who came to hear. Some believed "the glad tidings," were happily converted to God, and, in accordance with the invariable usages of Methodism, were formed into a society. What were the names of the original members of this first Methodist society in New-England, and who were its "leaders and stewards," has never been transmitted to us. But however now unknown on earth, we trust that the names of some, at least, were duly recorded in the

"book of life," and will be read to the assembled and elect Church in the great day.

But this infant society, around whose short but mysterious history so much interest seems to linger, was doomed to extinction. Such was the distance of Boston from Philadelphia, which was then the centre of operations,—such was the great scarcity of preachers at this period, and the numerous and pressing calls in other directions,—and such, especially, were the increasing political excitements of that period, consequent upon the passage of the Boston Port Bill, by which the town was shut up, and which was presently succeeded by the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill, the siege of the town by the American troops under Washington, the departure of two thousand of the inhabitants with the British troops, in March, 1776, and the subsequent long and protracted war, by which the preachers were prevented from performing any regular labours east of the Hudson,—that the little society, failing to receive the attention necessary to its existence and prosperity, was scattered abroad.

Thus ended the first attempt to establish Wesleyanism in the capital of New-England; and two other attempts were to be subsequently made before success was to be finally realized,—namely, by the Rev. Mr. Black, of Halifax, N. S., in 1784; and by Jesse Lee, in 1790–1.

On the 10th of October of this year Mr. Asbury received a letter from Mr. Wesley, appointing him General Assistant, that is, superintendent of the whole work in America; and requiring a strict attention to discipline, which had been much neglected, in consequence of which the work had suffered. He immediately took his station in Baltimore, and, while performing the ordinary duties of a circuit preacher, attended also the quarterly-meetings of the circuits in that vicinity, and superintended their concerns for the next half-year.

In June, 1778, Messrs. Thomas Rankin, G. Shadford, and T. Yerbury arrived from England, with Captain Webb, at whose earnest solicitations they had come, and who accompanied them on the voyage. Mr. Rankin was a Scotchman by birth, and being the oldest travelling preacher among his colleagues, having joined the itinerant connexion in 1762, he was appointed superintendent of the whole work, and was charged with more ample disciplinary powers than had been committed to any of his predecessors. Mr. Asbury seems to have yielded him his authority with great satisfaction, glad to be rid of the oppressive responsibility attached to so important an office.

On the 14th of July in this year the first Conference was held in the

city of Philadelphia. But seven years had elapsed since the formation of the first class in the city of New-York, and four years since the first regular missionaries—Messrs. Boardman and Pilmoor—had arrived in America. Thus far the business of the connexion had been transacted at the quarterly-meetings, and in the private conferences of the preachers. The whole connexion now embraced six circuits, extending from New-York to Petersburg, Va.; ten preachers, of whom but two were native Americans; and eleven hundred and sixty members of society,—of which New-York and Philadelphia had each one hundred and eighty, New-Jersey two hundred, Maryland five hundred, and Virginia one hundred. The session of this Conference occupied but two days, and its minutes fill but a single page.

By this Conference Mr. Asbury was appointed in charge of Baltimore, with three other preachers; it being, even then, the largest circuit in the connexion. Such was the increase of the work, that two meeting-houses were erected in Baltimore during this conference year,—the first at Fell's Point and the other in the town; and the prominent and influential position which Baltimore Methodism then assumed it has ever since retained.

Presently the sound of war was heard in the land, and men began to make preparations for the coming contest. The Revolution was a season of trial, although not of depression, to the Methodists as well as to others. Messrs. Boardman, Pilmoor, and Wright had returned to England in 1774. Mr. James Dempster, who was a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, and who arrived in the fall of the same year, in company with Mr. Rodda, and in 1775 was stationed in New-York, soon after left the connexion and joined the Presbyterians; and, upon the breaking out of the war, Messrs. Rankin, Shadford, and Rodda, being royalists, were compelled to return home. Mr. Asbury, of all the English preachers, alone remained. He thought it would be an eternal disgrace to forsake in this time of trial the thousands of poor sheep in the wilderness, who had placed themselves under the care of the Methodists; and fully sympathizing with the cause of the struggling colonies, he resolved to remain and share the sufferings and the fate of the infant connexion, and of the country.

But this resolution cost him much. After Mr. Rankin left, the superintendency of the societies again devolved upon him; and, owing to the severe troubles of this stormy and eventful period, he often found it difficult to perform his duties. Like many religious people of those times he was, from conscientious scruples, a non-juror, as were all the other Methodist preachers, and also many of the

clergy of the Episcopal Church, who yet chose to remain in the country. As their character and motives were not understood, they were exposed to much suffering and persecution. The Rev. F. Garrettson and Joseph Hartley were imprisoned on the Eastern Shore of Maryland; Mr. Chew, also one of the preachers, being brought before the sheriff of one of the counties of the same state, and required to take the oath of allegiance, replied that scruples of conscience would not permit him to do so. The sheriff then informed him that he was bound by oath to execute the laws, and if he persisted in his refusal, no alternative was left but to commit him to prison. To this the prisoner answered very mildly, that he by no means wished to be the cause of perjury, and was therefore perfectly resigned to bear the penalty. "You are a strange man," said the sheriff; "I cannot bear to punish you, and therefore my own house shall be your prison." He accordingly formally committed him to his own house, and kept him there three months. In the course of this time this gentleman and his wife were both converted to God, and joined the Methodist society.

On the 20th of June, 1776, Mr. Asbury, notwithstanding his extreme prudence, was arrested near Baltimore, and fined five pounds; and in March, 1778, he retired to the house of his friend, Thomas White, a judge of one of the courts of Delaware, where he remained comparatively secluded for ten months. Although his movements were now circumscribed, yet he was by no means idle, and remarks that it was "a season of the most active, the most useful, and the most suffering part of his life." Indeed, it was two years before he presumed to fully leave his retreat, and to travel extensively in the performance of his duties as superintendent; when the authorities becoming convinced that there was no treason in the Methodist preachers, but that their scruples were of a religious, not of a political nature, and that they were merely intent upon preaching the gospel of peace as humble evangelists, they were permitted to exercise their functions unmolested.

Mr. Asbury now left his confinement, and made tours through Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, attending the conferences, of which there were now two, visiting the societies, confirming the souls of the disciples, and directing and encouraging the preachers in their arduous work; being sometimes in the vicinity of the belligerent armies, and a painful witness of the sufferings and sorrows of our then afflicted country.

He seems, finally, to have clearly foreseen the result of that fearful struggle; a result which experienced and sagacious statesmen on the other side of the Atlantic, as well as many sensible men on this,

could not foresee, and for which the best patriots in the land had abundant reason to fear. In one place, speaking of the rumour that a reinforcement of troops had arrived from England to prosecute the war, he says: "But what *can* they do, except they send an army of one hundred thousand men?" Mr. Asbury, being well acquainted with both the people and the country, well knew that their subjugation was utterly impossible but by a perfectly overwhelming force.

The Church of England in this country, although she had enjoyed the advantages of an establishment in five of the states, was nearly ruined by this war. All the other denominations, except perhaps the Baptists, seem to have made no gain in numbers, while they evidently lost largely in other respects, as we have never heard of a revival among them all, of any importance, during the whole of this period; yet the Methodists, holding themselves aloof from both belligerent parties, and confining themselves wholly to their appropriate work, flourished as much during these times as in any period of their history. Although the preachers were sometimes unable to keep their circuits, on account of the marching and counter-marching of hostile armies, yet, promptly returning to their work as soon as obstructions were out of the way, they enlarged their borders on all sides, except the north, where they were prevented from passing the Hudson by the British, who held possession of New-York up to the close of the war. The results of their humble and pious labours during this period were, that from ten circuits, nineteen preachers, and three thousand one hundred and forty-eight members in society, in 1775,—at the close of the war, in 1783, they had thirty-nine circuits, eighty three preachers, and thirteen thousand seven hundred and forty members; and, instead of being exhausted after such severe labours and fearful struggles, they felt fresh and spirited, and ready to enter new fields, "white to the harvest," that were inviting them on every hand.

But this was not all. While we were thus engaged in a bloody, expensive, and protracted war—while the soil was invaded by a powerful enemy, whose arms were now almost everywhere victorious—while the currency of the country was in a state of utter prostration and ruin—while the inhabitants of the land were still divided by violent intestine commotions, which added the horrors of a civil war to the other evils under which we were suffering—while our Church was yet in its infancy, its members amounting to a few thousands, and those generally poor, and divided by a controversy respecting an important practical question in ecclesiastical polity, the administration of the sacraments by lay preachers — while we were yet without a regular Church organization, and while it

was not yet certainly known how the struggles of the nation and the trials of our connexion would finally issue,—yet, in this gloomy hour of one of the most gloomy periods of our national and connexional history, Francis Asbury had the boldness to project a literary institution for the education of our rising youth, which finally came out a college. John Dickins, afterward our first book-agent, drew up the plan, and Messrs. Long and Bastion, who resided on Fish River, North Carolina, were the first subscribers.

The building of this proposed institution was not commenced till 1785, when it was located in Abingdon, Md. It was of brick, one hundred and eight feet long by forty wide, and three stories high; and occupied the summit and centre of a lot of six acres, commanding a beautiful panoramic view of the Chesapeake Bay and of the surrounding country. It was opened on the eighth, ninth, and tenth days of December, 1787, Mr. Asbury preaching each day,—the dedication sermon on the Sabbath, from 2 Kings iv, 40: "O thou man of God, there is death in the pot!" On the 4th of December, 1795, after this infant college—which was called Cokesbury, from the names of the two bishops, Coke and Asbury—had cost the Church about £10,000, it took fire from some unknown cause, and with its library was burned to the ground.

Dr. Coke being in the country at the time, suitable buildings were immediately purchased in Baltimore, being the best in the city, and a similar school was opened with all expedition, to which two hundred students at once repaired. But in a year, to a day, from the burning of the former, this school also took fire, on the Sabbath, while the people were assembled for worship, and was consumed, together with the church and parsonage, with which it was connected These two severe losses completely discouraged Bishop Asbury, and he felt compelled to mournfully exclaim, "I feel convinced that our call is not to build colleges!" He was right; it was not at that time. Our call was then to another work, namely, the conversion of souls, and the organization of spiritual Churches. Hence, no further attempts of this kind were made till the founding of Augusta College, Ky., and of the Wilbraham School, Mass., thirty years after; since which many similar institutions have gone into operation among us, and now prosper.

This brief history will suffice to refute the slanderous supposition that the early Methodists were inimical to learning. We thus see that it was not so. They merely esteemed something else, namely, godliness, as of more importance; and, therefore, like the apostles before them, without despising letters, gave more attention to the formation of Christian Churches than to the establishment of insti-

tutions of learning; and in the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed we now most fully approve of their course.

But to return from this digression. It may be asked, How were men raised up to carry forward this great work, during the stormy and troublous period of our Revolution? We answer, that we hardly know. All of the most prominent and influential of them, except Mr. Asbury, were raised upon the spot, and in the mode in which the great majority of Methodist preachers have been called to their work, and fitted for it. And yet such men as J. Dickins, F. Garrettson, John Tunnell, Caleb Pedicord, and William Gill, who were among them, for ministerial talents would have honoured the Church of God in any age and in any nation. Dr. Coke, himself educated at Oxford, a ripe and elegant scholar, and a minister of the Establishment, and who had perhaps seen the most of ministerial life, on both sides of the Atlantic, of any man living, pronounced them the ablest ministers that he had seen in Europe or America; and their works show that this testimony was true.

We have now arrived at a most important event, both in the life of Mr. Asbury and in the history of American Methodism—the organization of the Church. Up to this time, the Methodists had considered themselves as members of the Church of England, the preachers as mere laymen, and the societies as without a regular and complete Church organization. But the war had made great changes. As it separated the colonies politically from Great Britain, so it separated them ecclesiastically. The connexion between the Church of England at home and the Church of England in the United States was forever dissolved, and the authority of the bishop of London, who was their diocesan, was no longer recognised; and the patronage of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, which had supported all the Episcopal Churches in the country, as missions, except those in the towns of Boston and Newport, in the cities of New-York and Philadelphia, and those of the establishments of the South, was wholly withdrawn. A large proportion of the clergy were royalists, and were compelled to quit the country. Those who remained could not conscientiously take the oath of allegiance to the new authorities; and some of them, as they would not submit to the imposed restriction of omitting the accustomed prayers for the king and the royal family, ceased to officiate.

The establishments of Maryland and Virginia were both prostrated by the war; and mournful and deplorable, indeed, are the pictures which a writer of their own, Dr. Hawkes, draws in his histories of the Protestant Episcopal Churches in those states. In

Pennsylvania, at one time during the war, there was but one clergyman, the Rev. Dr. W. White, rector of Christ's Church and St. Peter's, Philadelphia, who continued in the exercise of his functions. At the time of the ordination of Bishop Provost of New-York, in 1787, there were but six or seven clergymen in the whole of that diocese, while the oldest Episcopal Church in New-England, King's Chapel of Boston, had fallen into the Arian heresy; and numerous others, in various parts of the country, had become wholly extinct. And, further, the episcopate had not been obtained by the Episcopal Churches in the United States at that time; and as the other denominations had successfully resisted the appointment of a bishop, and the establishment of episcopacy in the colonies, it was questionable whether such an ecclesiastical officer would be tolerated in the country at all. Great and serious difficulties attended the organization of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States; and it was not until July, 1788, that it was finally effected. It was not till the generation of revolutionary times had almost wholly passed away, and the present generation had come upon the stage of action, that she began fully to recover from her dreadful and long-continued prostration.

In these pressing exigencies the Methodists were left to take care of themselves, and of the great and growing work which God had committed to their trust; and they did so, showing themselves most fully competent to the task. They applied to their spiritual father, Mr. Wesley, for assistance; for although the authority of the bishop of London had wholly ceased in America, that of Mr. Wesley had not, but was as fully and as cordially recognised by the thousands of his children in the new world as ever. As Mr. Wesley and all his people here were Episcopalians, what they wanted, of course, was an episcopacy; but an episcopacy adapted to the peculiar nature of their plan,—namely, an itinerant episcopacy. Indeed, Mr. Wesley was in the full exercise of all the episcopal powers at home, and so was Mr. Asbury in this country, except in the matters of ordination and the administration of the sacraments; and that, too, to an extent not possessed by any of our bishops at the present time. No violent changes were to be made by the substitution of Congregationalism, or Presbyterianism, or a clerical aristocracy, in which none of them believed, for a plan that already existed; but what was wanted was simply a regular and complete form to be given to a system which was already in the full tide of successful experiment, and which had the entire confidence and affections of both preachers and people.

Accordingly, on the 2d of September, 1784, Mr. Wesley ordained Thomas Coke, late of Jesus College, Oxford, Doctor of the Civil

Law and Presbyter of the Church of England, who had been, in connexion with him for several years, superintendent of the societies in America; and R. Whatcoat, who had formerly been a circuit colleague with the Rev. A. Clarke, and who was afterward elected bishop, in 1800, and Thomas Vasey, as presbyters,—with instructions to also ordain Mr. Asbury to the episcopate. He also abridged the Book of Common Prayer, with forms of ordination for three orders of ministers, for the use of the American societies; and dismissed his envoys to their transatlantic work with his apostolical benediction.

Dr. Coke and his colleagues sailed from Bristol on the 18th of September, and arrived in New-York on the 3d of November; and on the 15th of the same month met Mr. Asbury, for the first time, at a quarterly meeting, at Barrett's Chapel, Delaware, where the doctor communicated to him and to the preachers present the design of his coming; and, upon consultation, it was resolved to call a special General Conference, to meet in Baltimore at Christmas.

Sixty, out of the eighty-three preachers then in the connexion, accordingly met on Christmas eve in Baltimore, and proceeded to their work. Although appointed to the office by Mr. Wesley, who was the acknowledged father of the connexion, yet Mr. Asbury would not accept of the superintendency unless elected by the suffrages of his brethren, which was accordingly done by a unanimous vote; upon which Dr. Coke, with the elders present, proceeded to ordain him by imposition of hands, in which they were assisted by the Rev. Mr. Otterbein, a German minister of Baltimore, and a particular friend of Mr. Asbury. The Book of Common Prayer was also adopted, with twenty-five articles of religion; and also a Book of Discipline, consisting of thirty-five sections, and which constitutes the basis of our present constitution. Thirteen preachers were elected to elders' orders; and thus was the work of organization for the present completed.

In 1785 Methodism was introduced into South Carolina by Mr. Asbury in person, accompanied by Henry Willis and Jesse Lee. In 1786 it was introduced into Kentucky, by James Haw and Benjamin Ogden; and two years after, Mr. Asbury crossed the mountains, to superintend the progress of the work, and to acquaint himself with the wants of the country. In 1788 it was introduced into the country north of the city of New-York, and east of the Hudson, as far as Lake Champlain, under the leadership of the apostolic Garrettson, who had already been the pioneer of the work amid the snows of Nova Scotia; and in 1789 it was successfully introduced into New-England, by the zealous and indefatigable Lee. Such

a rapid extension of the work of God, by men who were without state patronage and without connexional funds, and who were called to contend with the privations arising from the deep poverty of themselves and of the country at that period, as also the opposition arising from the ignorance and prejudices of the people, we think that the world has never seen since the apostolic age, except it be at the Reformation.

In 1791 Bishop Asbury visited New-England; for the first time, and held a Conference at Lynn, Mass., in a church which had just been erected, and which we believe is yet standing, although now used for another purpose. This place was made the centre of operations in New-England for many years; and from thence sounded out the word of the Lord from the ocean to the lines of Canada, and from the St. Croix to the Green Mountains. Bishop Asbury was highly pleased with the appearance of New-England, and with the prospects of the cause in the land of the pilgrims; and was accustomed to visit it in his episcopal tours, every year afterward, to the close of his life, with the exception of 1797, when he was prevented by ill health, and appointed the apostle of New-England Methodism, the Rev. Jesse Lee, to take his place in the conferences.

In 1792 there arose a great schism in the Methodist Episcopal Church. It was led by the Rev. James O'Kelly, a popular and influential preacher in the south, and is hence called the O'Kelly schism. It was occasioned by the refusal of the General Conference of that year, upon motion of Mr. O'Kelly, to grant an appeal from the bishop to the Conference, in the case of the appointments. However safely such a rule as this might work where all the preachers were amply provided for, as in the British Conference, yet in this country, and especially as our Church was then situated, it would have prostrated the power of the episcopacy, and must have proved perfectly ruinous to the connexion, as it finally did to the schismatics who adopted it. It was said that there were also two secret causes for this move of Mr. O'Kelly's,—namely, the Arian heresy and disappointed ambition.

Although but two travelling preachers withdrew at this time, yet in the course of three years the Church lost upward of ten thousand of her members, being about a sixth of the whole number. This was one of the gloomiest periods in the entire history of the Methodist Episcopal Church. But, during the whole of it, the hearts of Asbury and his zealous colleagues seem never to have faltered; but they quietly pursued their way, and waited for better days.

The seceders formed themselves into a Church; and hoping to secure a measure of popularity which might otherwise be denied them on their own positive merits, they called themselves "Repub-

lican Methodists." But it was of no use; like most others of the same conduct and of the same character, they came to naught in a few years,—and but little more was heard of them.

But adhesion to principle is always best in the end; and so it proved in this case. These fearful wastes in the Church were soon destined to be repaired. In 1797, under the labours of D. Dunham and of H. C. Wooster, a revival of great power and extent broke out in Upper Canada. In 1799 it also appeared in still greater power in Kentucky,—at which time both camp-meetings and the Cumberland Presbyterians had their origin. From thence it spread into the Middle States, and then north and south, and soon became common throughout the whole nation. These were the palmiest days of Methodism. The revival continued without interruption to the last year of our last war with Great Britain, 1814, when it seemed to have been brought to a close by the political troubles of the times. During this flourishing period the Church increased from fifty-six thousand six hundred and sixty four to two hundred and fourteen thousand three hundred and seven members, and the number of preachers from two hundred and ninety-three to six hundred and seventy-eight.

Seven years before he died Bishop Asbury was permitted to witness an event which must have given him the greatest satisfaction, in view of the future prospects of Methodism. This was the formation of the delegated General Conference at Baltimore, in 1808, at which the constitution of the Church was finally perfected by the adoption of the six restrictive rules.

Since 1796 a General Conference had been held every four years, to which all the preachers in full connexion were eligible; but as the Church had now greatly extended, and as the number of the preachers had also greatly increased, it was impossible for but very few to attend from the extremes of the work, which gave those conferences in the vicinity of the place in which the General Conference was held, by being able to send a greater number of members, a vastly preponderant influence in the councils of the Church, and which, by right, did not belong to them. This was a serious evil, and one which threatened serious consequences; and at first it was hardly known how it could be disposed of. But it was finally done by the formation of a General Conference to be composed of delegates from the several Annual Conferences. This, as it was perfectly equitable, gave entire satisfaction to all parties.

In 1800 the episcopacy had been strengthened by the election of Rev. R. Whatcoat as the colleague of Mr. Asbury, with equal episcopal powers. He having died in 1806, the Rev. W. M'Kendree, a very distinguished preacher of the Western Conference, and who

had been a prominent actor in the late great revival in that country, was elected to fill his place at this Conference. Both of these appointments were exceedingly agreeable to the feelings and to the wishes of Bishop Asbury; and with both of these colleagues he lived and laboured on terms of great intimacy and friendship.

Bishop Asbury was never married. He gives in his Journal the following defence of his bachelorship. Under date of January 26th, 1804, he says:—

"If I should die in celibacy, which I think quite probable, I give the following reasons for what can scarcely be called my choice. I was called in my fourteenth year, and began my public exercises between sixteen and seventeen. At twenty-one I travelled, and at twenty-six I came to America. Thus far I had reasons enough for a single life. It was my intention to return to Europe at thirty years of age; but the war continued, and it was ten years before we had a settled and lasting peace. This was no time to marry, or to be given in marriage. At thirty-nine I was ordained superintendent bishop in America. Among the duties imposed on me by my office was that of travelling extensively; and I could hardly find a woman with grace enough to enable her to live but one week, out of the fifty-two, with her husband. Besides, what right has any man to take the advantage of the affections of a woman, make her his wife, and by a voluntary absence subvert the whole order and economy of the marriage state, by separating those whom neither God, nature, nor the requirements of civil society permit long to be *put asunder?* It is neither just nor generous. I may add to this, that I had but little money, and with this little I administered to the necessities of a beloved mother till I was fifty-seven. If I have done wrong, I hope that God and the sex will forgive me. It is now my duty to bestow the pittance I have to spare upon the widows and fatherless children and poor married men."

We now approach the period of Bishop Asbury's death. He had lived to see his adopted country pass through two wars; to see its political independence secured, a general government successfully organized, the reputation of our people fully established for bravery, patriotism, energy of character, superior intelligence and love of social order, and occupying an honourable and prominent position among the nations of the earth. To this result, so far as moral powers are concerned, we think his own herculean and extensive labours and powerful influence had contributed above that of any other man. He had also lived to see the Church pass safely through two schisms by which she had been perilled; and increased from four regular travelling preachers and a few hundreds of members, to more than six hundred and sixty ministers, and upward of two hundred thousand members; and from being confined to three or four points in some of the Atlantic states, now established in every state in the confederacy, and also in the British provinces of the North. His constitution had never been strong, and from his first arrival in this country he had often suffered from painful and distressing attacks of disease; but he had continued to travel and

preach, and to preside in the conferences, even when he was sometimes unable to dismount from his horse without assistance—the indomitable spirit within constantly rising superior to the frailties of its earthly tenement without.

But the weary wheels of life were, at last, to stand still. The last entry in his Journal was made December 7th, 1815, while travelling in South Carolina, to which he had come from a tour in the Western Conference. His health now began sensibly to fail, until he became more like a walking skeleton than a living man. He continued to journey, however, till he reached Richmond, Va., where he preached his last sermon on Rom. ix, 28, on Sunday, March 24th. He was carried from the coach into the church, and set upon a table in the pulpit, from which he delivered his message, of nearly an hour in length, being unable either to walk or stand. From thence he journeyed to the house of his friend, Mr. George Arnold, in Spottsylvania, Virginia, hoping to be able to attend the General Conference to be holden in Baltimore, May 2d. But he was unable to go further. This truly apostolic bishop had presided in his last Conference, and had read out his last list of appointments. Consumption had finally marked him for its victim. Being now perfectly conscious of his approaching dissolution, and informing his friends that he was about to die, they asked him if he had anything to communicate; to which he replied, "That as he had fully expressed his mind in relation to the Church in his addresses to the bishop and to the General Conference, he had nothing more to add." His work was now fully done. The next day his speech failed, and on being asked by his travelling companion, the Rev. John Wesley Bond, "if he felt the Lord Jesus to be precious, exerting all his remaining strength, in token of complete victory, he raised both his hands." A few moments after, as he sat in his chair, with his head reclined on the hand of Mr. Bond, without a struggle, and in great composure, he breathed his last on the Sabbath, the 31st of March, 1816—a fitting day for the toil-worn veteran to enter into his rest. He was seventy years of age, fifty-four of which he had spent in the work of the Christian ministry—forty-five of them in the United States, and thirty of them as senior bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. "The memory of the just is blessed."

Having said thus much respecting the life of this venerable man, it only remains to make a few remarks respecting his character.

1. His Piety. This was steady, solid, and consistent, and without the least taint of austerity or fanaticism. He possessed a mighty

faith, a lively hope, an ardent love, and a flaming and quenchless zeal; a patience that was never tired, a long-suffering that was never exhausted; an upright intention, great sincerity of disposition, and an untiring devotion to the interests of depraved and afflicted humanity, and to the cause of his Divine Master. On this point there is no mistake. Like all good men he had numerous enemies, who were ever watchful and vigilant, and who were not wanting in the closest attention to all his movements; and whatever they may have thought or said of that peculiar ecclesiastical polity of which for so long a time he was the head and the most prominent living representative, yet no one ever succeeded in fixing a stain upon his moral or religious character.

2. His Intellect. In him perception, memory, and understanding were so admirably combined as to produce the qualities of good sense and of soundness of judgment in great perfection. Of the imagination there was a deficiency, and a consequent want of refined and accurate taste; but we are inclined to the opinion that this was rather owing to his neglect of that important faculty, so conspicuous in the two Wesleys, than to the want of the faculty itself. Life, to him, was such a severe matter-of-fact affair, that he could not stop to cultivate mere taste. Like all truly great men, he possessed great strength of will, which knew not how to yield, but to the calls of duty and the demands of principle. This was one source of his great power over other men. He was conversant with the Holy Scriptures in their original languages, and was well and extensively read in works of science, biography, history, and theology, especially the latter, which was his *forte*, as it should be of every gospel minister. His notices of books, in his Journals, especially previous to 1784, are numerous; and how he found time while performing the duties of a circuit preacher, and afterward of a superintendent, engaged in long and frequent rides over the worst roads in the nation, often with no other accommodations than those afforded by the log-cabin of the squatter and frontier settler, to read so much, it is somewhat difficult, as in the case of Mr. Wesley, to tell. But he did it. Like Baxter, he could say, when asked where he was educated, "As for my faults, they are a shame to no university, for I am of none;" and, like Baxter, he possessed a well-stored mind, and could everywhere point to the proofs of his apostleship in the Lord.

3. His Character as a Preacher. His sermons were sound, instructive, and edifying, abounding in matter and in evangelical sentiment; but they were not brilliant. Indeed, his mode of life did not admit of his forming those habits of composition necessary to a finished and first-class pulpit orator. Yet his sermons were not

destitute of power. It is mentioned as an extraordinary fact of one of the greatest preachers of modern times, Massillon, the Bishop of Meaux, that, in the delivery of his sermon on the Reprobates, his hearers unconsciously half rose from their seats to shake off the horror of thinking that they might possibly be of that number. But Asbury has done even more than this. He has raised his hearers quite off their seats, absorbed with the importance of his theme; an instance of which occurred while he was preaching in Winchester, N. H., in 1810.

4. His Gift of Government. In this he is without a compeer in this country. No man can even pretend to compare with him for a moment. The most of even eminent ministers in the United States have been confined to single congregations. Others have only presided over small and inconsiderable dioceses, containing so few churches as to admit of their being rectors of single parishes at the same time. The labours and influence of none, with but very few exceptions, and these mostly among the Methodists, have extended beyond three or four states. But here is a man who was the pastor of a flock which fed upon a thousand hills,—from the snows of the Canadas, "where summer hurries through the skies," to the sunny South, where roll the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi,—all of whom he held together against a thousand opposing forces, and attached to his person and office, and paternally governing them by moral power alone. Such a spectacle the world has never before seen, not even in the person of Wesley, and probably will not again for many years to come.

5. His Laboriousness. We have seen, in part, what he was as a student, a labourer in the local ranks, while employed also as an humble artisan, as a preacher in charge of a single circuit, as a general assistant of the societies in America, under Mr. Wesley, and afterward as superintendent of the Methodist Episcopal Church. But let us contemplate him a little more attentively for a few moments. At one time we see him holding a Conference between the waters of the Kennebeck and the Androscoggin, and directing the labours and encouraging the hearts of the small band of hardy itinerants in that distant field. We then see him taking his rapid flight through New-England, preaching as he goes, and anon he is preaching to crowded congregations in the city of New-York, composed partly of the children and grandchildren of those to whom he had there ministered, in colonial times, forty years before. Again, we see him ministering to devout and enthusiastic multitudes in Baltimore, and stopping for a few days to refresh himself in the society of a select circle of opulent and refined

and pious friends in that hospitable city and its environs. Then we behold him crossing the fords of the broad Potomac, perhaps for the fiftieth time, and hastening down through the piny woods and cotton fields of the distant South to the waters of the Savannah. Presently we behold him scaling the heights of the Blue Ridge and the summits of the Alleghanies, sometimes in company with parties of armed emigrants, sleeping in the woods at night, and descending into the valley of the great West, where the waters flow toward the setting sun, and which is now the fertile and happy home of prosperous millions. Next we discern him, and before the year has rolled its round, beyond the waters of the Niagara and of Lake Ontario, and, in view of the beauty of the country and the fertility of its soil, exclaiming, "Surely this is the land which the Lord hath blessed!" In these extensive tours all the duties of his responsible and important office, great and small, are alike to him, and are equally attended to. At one time we behold him presiding over the deliberations of a Conference, and appointing a hundred men to their several fields of labour; and then preaching to a few poor people gathered in a schoolhouse of an Atlantic state, or in the humble log-cabin of a western settler on the banks of the Ohio; stopping to pray with a poor family far away from churches and the public means of grace, with whom he has taken a frugal repast of "hog and hominy;" and then arresting his course, as he goes to feed thousands, to point some poor African, whom he meets in his journeying in the far South, to "the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." During all this time he also keeps a journal, in which he records the events of the passing moments, and also conducts an important and extensive correspondence. Truly, like the great apostle to the Gentiles, he was "in labours more abundant."

6. Finally, taking him all in all, we have no hesitation in saying that Francis Asbury was the most distinguished and important ecclesiastical character that this country ever saw. Of Washington and his compatriots it might be said, that some of them, in some things, were his superiors. General Greene possessed superior military talents, Wayne possessed a more impetuous courage, Hamilton possessed more brilliant parts, and Lafayette possessed a more ardent and disinterested attachment to the cause of human liberty; but no one of them possessed that peculiar and fortunate combination of all these powers which gave Washington an acknowledged superiority to them all, and pointed him out as the man born to command. So of Francis Asbury. This country has seen men superior to him in many points. Cotton Mather and Thomas Prince were his superiors in learning; Edwards and Dwight were more eminent

theologians, and Gilbert Tennant and President Davies were better pulpit orators; but take him all in all, there is no one of them, nor any one else whom this country has produced, who possessed that peculiar combination of gifts, and endowment of rare qualities, which give this humble Methodist preacher that position among American divines which Saul occupied among his brethren. What Washington is politically in this country, Francis Asbury is ecclesiastically—without a compeer. To God be all the glory. Amen!

Art. VI.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION.

It has long been the fashion to decry the logic of Aristotle, because, its legitimate use not being understood in the mediæval schools, it served to divert the minds of men from the study of nature, and set them whirling about in dialectic circles to educe the principles of science and the laws of the universe; and Bacon and Des Cartes have been lauded to the skies, because they taught that Nature reveals her laws only in the passing phenomena of matter and mind, as presented to the senses and the consciousness, which must be carefully analyzed and then generalized by the process of induction. A comparison has been made between the organon of Aristotle and the organon of Bacon,—or, to speak more precisely, between the method of deduction and of induction,—altogether to the disparagement of the former, until at length it has come to pass that it is no longer regarded by many as of vital importance to scientific investigation, while induction is considered as not merely an indispensable auxiliary to the discovery of new truths and principles, but as the only fundamental process of inference—the only process by which, from facts perceived by the intelligence, you can advance to the determination of the laws and principles which are the objects of science.

It is remarkable that, notwithstanding the exaltation of induction, since Bacon directed the attention of philosophers to it, no thorough attempts were made to expound its philosophy, and to institute its canons until very recently. Dr. Whewell, Mr. John Stuart Mill, Dr. Henry Tappan, and M. Comte have supplied the desideratum by works profoundly investigating the whole subject of logic, and particularly induction. We have, therefore, the means by which we may sit in judgment upon the question, and render an enlightened verdict.

The particular aspect of the question, which it is the design of

this paper to examine, is clearly presented in the following remarks in Cousin's critique of the philosophy of Locke. Cousin wonders, as well he may, that a leader in the sensual and Baconian school of philosophy should so far be warped from his appropriate sphere of thought, as to lose sight altogether of induction as one of the legitimate modes of knowledge, while, at the same time, casting contempt upon the syllogism as the proper type of the reasoning process!

"Thus intuition and demonstration are the different modes of knowledge, according to Locke. But are there no others? Have we not knowledge which we acquire neither by intuition nor demonstration? How do we acquire a knowledge of the laws of external nature? Take which you please, gravitation for instance. Certainly there is no simple intuition and immediate evidence here, for experiments multiplied and combined are necessary to give the slightest law; and even this will not suffice, since the slightest surpasses the number, whatever it be, of experiments from which it is drawn. There is need, therefore, of an intervention of some other operation of mind besides intuition. Is it demonstration? Impossible, for demonstration is the perception of the relation between two ideas by means of a third; but it is upon the condition that the latter should be more general than the two others, in order to embrace and connect them. To demonstrate is, in the last analysis, to deduce the particular from the general. Now, what is the more general physical law from which gravitation can be deduced? We have not deduced the knowledge of gravitation from any other knowledge anterior to it, and which involves it in the germ. How, then, have we acquired this knowledge, which we certainly have? and, in general, how do we acquire the knowledge of physical laws? A phenomenon having been presented a number of times, with a particular character and in particular circumstances, we have judged that if this same phenomenon should occur in similar circumstances, it would have the same character; that is to say, we have generalized the particular character of this phenomenon. Instead of descending from the general to the particular, we have ascended from the particular to the general. This general character is what we call a law: this law we have not deduced from a more general law or character; we have derived it from particular experiments, in order to transfer it beyond them. It is not simple resumption, nor a logical deduction; it is what we call induction. It is to induction that we owe all conquests over nature, all our discoveries of the laws of the world."

This clear and eloquent exposition of the order of thought in the two processes of deduction and induction, as it has commonly been apprehended, enables us to present, without danger of being misunderstood, the problem which we wish to solve, viz., that there is no fundamental difference between induction and deduction; but in both cases the mind proceeds from the more general to the less general, or from the general to the particular; and that the opposite process of proceeding from the particular to the general is utterly impossible. All inference, I maintain, is of one kind—it is deductive. You may take as many particulars as you can gather together, and they will be perfectly barren of any consequence, unless you can attach them to a general principle. You may sum them up, and call it generalization; but you can never infer a universal law, you can

make no scientific generalization by means of them, unless you can put them upon some broader general principle than that which you wish to educe from them. Take the instance of scientific induction referred to by Cousin, that of the law of gravitation, and analyze it thoroughly, and you will see that it is at bottom deduction. A philosopher observes a material substance—a body—say, an apple, fall to the ground; he observes another body, a leaf, in like manner disengaging itself from the tree and following the apple; he casts a stone into the air, it takes the same direction; he casts a feather upon the winds, and, though for a time it is resisted by the currents of air, yet, when these obstacles cease, it directly in like manner falls to the earth. From these particulars, he observes that it is the material substance in these different bodies that exhibits the phenomenon of falling to the earth, and not any particular quality of the apple, or the leaf, or the stone, or the feather—and this is his analysis. Thereupon he proceeds to infer that all bodies—all material substances—in all parts of the globe will behave in like manner; in other words, he infers the law of terrestrial gravity. This is his induction. He seems, indeed, merely to proceed from the particular to the general; but how? by what authority? on what ground? To answer this question is to solve the problem of inference.

Dr. Whewell, who has elaborated this point, says that the conclusion is not a mere summing up of these particulars, and of all known particulars of the same nature; it is something more—a conception, which, while it expresses these particulars, transcends them—it reaches all possible cases of the same kind. But how do we get this conception? He says we leap to it: "Induction mounts the ladder by a leap, which is out of the reach of method." But, then, it can turn round and verify itself by descending the ladder, step by step, by the deductive process. But how do we make the leap? By a sort of philosophical "sagacity—a scientific instinct," which is the rare gift of some superior minds. But this explains nothing.

Now, if this inference of the general law from observed particulars be a legitimate procedure, and it cannot admit of any solution, then it must be regarded as ultimate, and we may call it induction, and mark it as the opposite of deduction. But it happens that we can analyze the process in this instance and in all instances of induction, and this analysis will show that the subtle movement of the reasoning faculty from the particulars to the general is upon the broad basis of a universal and intuitive principle, and thus the whole process could easily be put into the form of a syllogism, with the principle for its major premiss, and these observed particulars for its minor premiss.

Happily the desired analysis of this process is furnished to our hand by Mr. Mill, who not only goes with Cousin in maintaining that induction is one fundamental mode of investigation, but advances far beyond him, contending with great ability that inference is always fundamentally from particulars to generals, and that deduction is only an intermediary process, which may be resorted to for convenience, but is of no avail for original discovery.

And here I can scarcely refrain from remarking how happily opposite systems conspire to advance the light of truth! By their conflict they bring to view the vital points of inquiry, and clear the ground for those who would approach to determine the merits of the case. If Mr. Mill has taken the wrong side of this question, yet it will ever be to his praise, that his thorough comprehension of the subject, and his precise and candid statements have placed the controversy in the clearest light; and if logicians differ, it will not be because the point in dispute is misapprehended, but because their different systems of philosophy drive them to opposite conclusions.

Hear what he says:—

"We must first observe that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what induction is, an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe, viz., that there are such things as parallel cases, that what happens once will happen again, and not only again but always."—Vol. i, p. 370.

It is evident that Mr. Mill has thoroughly elaborated the opinion; for he has profoundly criticised the statement of it as made by Reid and Stewart, viz., that it is an intuitive conviction that the future will be as the present. He remarks:—

"Time, in its modification of past, present, or future, has nothing to do either with the belief itself or the grounds of it. We believe that fire will burn to-morrow, because it burned to-day and yesterday; but we believe on precisely the same grounds that it burned before we were born, and that it burns at this very day in Cochin China. It is not from the past to the future, as past and future, that we infer, but from the known to the unknown, from facts observed to facts unobserved, from what we have perceived or have been directly conscious of, to what has not come within our experience. In this last predicament is the whole region of the future, but also the vastly greater portion of the present and the past."

Thus far his criticism is just; but in what follows he denies that this principle is intuitive, and herein lies the whole error of his system. His empiricism forbids him to acknowledge that any universal principles, even the first principles of mathematics, are intuitive. He says:—

"Whatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition that the course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle or general axiom of induction. It would yet be a great error to consider this large generalization as any explanation of the inductive process. On the contrary, I hold

it to be an instance of induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious kind. Far from being the first induction we make, it is one of the last, or, at all events, one of those which are latest in attaining strict philosophical accuracy. As a general maxim, indeed, it has scarcely entered the minds of any but philosophers, nor even by them, as we shall have many opportunities of remarking, have its extent and limits been always justly conceived. It is this principle, though so far from being our earliest induction, which must be considered as our warrant for all others in this sense, that unless it were true, all other inductions would be fallacious."

Thus this ingenious reasoner disclaims what he at first seemed to affirm. He disclaims making this principle any explanation of the process of induction as being founded upon it, or proceeding through it; but he now regards it as only the *sine qua non* of correct induction, so that no induction could be valid were its truth not admitted! And why? Because he thinks this principle is itself an induction, and this not the earliest in science. But if so, how could the earliest inductions have been made if their truth depends wholly upon this as their "fundamental principle?" And if itself be an induction, how could it be made at all? It then must have been founded upon itself, or else here is one induction, and that the greatest of all which is not formed on this principle. Good reason in these paralogisms to modify his statement! But take his qualified statement, that this late induction is the warrant of all other inductions, then it follows that all scientific inductions up to the time when this was formed, were without any warrant; and that warrant itself is without any warrant, except it be warranted by itself; and if this be impossible, then itself and all other inductions warranted by it are without authority!

But if we read on, we shall find that what he calls "warrant in a certain sense" is what all who believe in deductive reasoning, will call proof:—

"Archbishop Whately has well remarked that every induction is a syllogism, with the major premiss suppressed; or (as I prefer to express it) that every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism by supplying a major premiss. If this be actually done, the principle which we are now considering, that of the uniformity of the course of nature, will appear as the ultimate major premiss of all inductions, and will, therefore, stand to all inductions in the relation in which, as has been shown at so much length, the major premiss always stands to the conclusion, *not contributing at all to prove it*, but being a necessary condition of its being proved, since no conclusion is proved in which there cannot be found a true major premiss."

But why will not Mr. Mill allow that a true major premiss of a true syllogism proves its conclusion? Because the major premiss contains the conclusion, and itself was formed by the addition of particulars, or induction from particulars of which that very conclusion was one. Passing this for the present, it is enough for our purpose

that he admits that the principle of the uniform course of nature is the foundation of every induction in the very sense in which the major premiss of a valid argument is the proof of its conclusion.

The question now is, Where did we get that fundamental principle? It is absurd to consider it an induction, as we have seen, on Mr. Mill's own principles; it must then be a deduction or an intuition. It cannot be a deduction; for, as Mr. Mill has clearly seen, that would suppose a principle beyond it, more general, from which it was derived. It is an intuition, and is given by the reason in its primitive unfoldings, and on the very first occasion of the recurrence of any cause whose effect we have experienced, or of any cause similar to that primary cause. We see its manifestations in the very first rational actions of the child. Let the child put his finger upon a coal of fire, and he learns by experience that it causes pain. Can you get him voluntarily to touch it a second time? He sees another similar coal beside it; can you get him to touch that? He will no sooner touch the second than the first. Why not, seeing that he has no experience, but that the first coal was once the cause of pain? He knows by experience nothing about its power to burn a second time, and nothing at all about the power of the second coal to burn. The only explanation is, that his reason obliges him to conclude as he does; and this law of the reason, this principle of mental order, when rendered into language, is the belief that like causes produce like effects. It is the province of the philosopher to look at this necessary movement of the reason, and to abstract from it the axiom involved in it, and to lay it as the basis of all formal disquisitions upon the laws of nature. But the child is guided, nay, he is governed by it in all his future inductions. It transpires in the reason immediately after that great first principle of causality, that every event has a cause, which is as early as our first consciousness of sensation, and which is the occasion of our primitive ideas of the external world, and of God, the cause of causes, and lays the foundation of all science.

Nor is the principle of uniform causation involved in the human reason alone; it belongs as much to the instinct of animals of every grade—the fish, the bird, the insect, seems infallibly guided by it. It pervades the whole animated world, and without it, it would rush on instant destruction. Indeed, the instinct of animals goes beyond this, and reveals the causative character of many objects before any experience can take place of their power to bless or to harm. It is not so with man; he must test everything himself, or be taught by those who have tested. A babe will as soon put his hand into a flame as snatch at a bouquet of flowers; he will chew the deadly herb

as fearlessly as the lamb will pluck the tender grass. This fact has been noticed by Mr. Hume, with an eagerness which characterizes his devotion to empiricism. He then takes occasion to wonder, with an air of delighted scepticism, how it is, after learning thus the particular character of causes, we can infer they will continue to produce the same effects.

"All our reasoning on matters of fact seems to be founded on cause and effect. By means of this relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country or in France, he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact, as a letter received from him, or a knowledge of his former resolution. A man finding a watch, or any other machine on a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning facts are of the same nature. . . . . If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence which assures of matters of fact, we must inquire how we came at the knowledge of cause and effect. I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this is *not in any instance attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience*, when we find any particular objects are conjoined with each other. Let any object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities, if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed at the very first entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him."

All this we see no reason to dispute; but when he advances to the conclusion that it is by repeated or customary experiences that we discover the uniformity of causation, we find him as blind to the real working of the human reason as he would be blind to the operation of animal instincts, if he should affirm that all animals, like man, discover all noxious food and other hurtful causes by experience. But let Mr. Hume speak for himself upon this point:—

"As to past experience it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only and that precise period of time which fell under its experience; but why this experience should extend to future times and to other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar, this is the main question on which I insist. The bread which I formerly eat nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities has induced secret powers. But does it follow that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems to be no wise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged, that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a certain step taken, a process of thought, or inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and, I foresee, that other objects, which are in appearance similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that one proposition may justly be inferred from the other. I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning."

Eureka! good Mr. Hume, we have found out that reasoning, that connecting principle which you despaired of finding. It lay just before your eyes when you penned the observation that one proposition is always inferred from the other. Do you not see that you here struck upon a law of the reason by which it is necessitated to operate thus, and that this law evolves the axiom, like causes produce like effects? or, as it is generally stated, the course of nature is uniform. What men always think and must think is a primary and essential truth, an ultimate principle of reason.

But Mr. Hume has objected to this origin of the principle.

"Were it the offspring of the reason, an intuition, it would be as perfect at first, and from one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing is so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of experiments in any kind that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now, where is that process of reasoning which from one instance draws a conclusion so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances, that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of instruction as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning."

It would be easy to turn off this question with a joke, especially as the example of the eggs is so egregiously puerile; but it is due to the candour of Mr. Hume to treat it seriously, nay to admit that the question is one of great importance, and leads to the true science of induction. It is not true that bodies having the same or similar qualities produce different effects,—the eggs that have a different taste are different in some particulars, and this is usually sufficiently manifest in eggs; and if your eyes fail to see it, a microscope will abundantly reveal it. Just here, opens to our view the appropriate sphere of induction as far as it may be properly distinguished from deduction: its office is to analyze phenomena—to mark the different qualities of objects, and to ascertain their precise effects; but when you have certainly determined what qualities in any case produce what effects, one single instance of causation is sufficient for the widest generalization. Show me the property of the magnet which attracts iron, and I hesitate not to predict, that whenever and wherever that quality appears, in like circumstances it will be followed with the same effect. But if I have not been careful in my observations, and mistaken some other property for the real one, then most certainly I shall make a false prediction, and the event will expose the error. It is not in the reason, which assures me intuitively that like causes produce like effects, but in my observation.

Science is under no greater obligation to any writer of the present

age than to Mr. John Stuart Mill, for the profound and elaborate exposition of the grounds and process of induction which he has given to the world. "There is no event," he remarks, "happening in the universe, which is not connected by an invariable sequence with some one or more of the phenomena which preceded it."—"If we knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space, and their properties, or, in other words, the laws [or modes] of their agency, we could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe; at least, unless some new volition of a power capable of controlling the universe should supervene. And if any particular state of the universe should ever recur a second time, (which, however, all experience combines to assure us will never happen,) all subsequent states would return too, and history would, like a circulating decimal of many figures, periodically repeat itself.

> Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
> Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quæ vehat Argo
> Delectos heroas: erunt quoque altera bella,
> Atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles."

Such undoubtedly is the order of the universe, with the single exception of the free-will of moral agents. But Mr. Mill makes no such exception; for he holds that human volitions are so far controlled by motives, that a man's actions as inevitably result from his character as any effect follows a cause,—and if we thoroughly knew his character we could certainly predict how he would act in any supposable case. But this we repudiate, for this reason, among many which cannot now be mentioned, that the same view must apply to the divine mind; and then it would follow that the universe, like a circulating decimal, actually has been, and will be produced and destroyed, again and again, forever. For God is the same in character; and if, when nothing was but he, his power produced the present universe, it was but the type of a past and a coming eternity. Plato's reminiscences are resurrections; and not only the ideas that now are have been before, but we ourselves, the world's millions, and all their various histories, have been before as now, and will be as they now are, again and again, forevermore. But, aside from free agents, the idea of Mr. Mill is as true as it is sublime; and it illuminates and explains the problem of induction. The law of causation binds together the universe, and its only difficulty is to discover that chain amid the shifting, and veering, and multitudinous phenomena that move about it and upon it; but if you can strike that chain at one point it will vibrate throughout its whole direction. "The order of nature, as perceived at first glance, presents at every instant a chaos, followed by another chaos. We must decompose each

chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, and in the chaotic consequent a multitude of distinct consequents." What then? We have to determine which particular antecedent is followed by which consequent, and which consequent is produced by which antecedent; then, by the simplest ratiocination, whose major premiss is the principle of causality, furnished by the reason, we generalize the fact, or, in other words, infer a law of nature. To make the requisite analysis we need to observe and experiment; and we require no aid but the simple rules of arithmetic, except in those cases where the effects of various causes are mixed together, as the curvilinear motion of the rocket, which is the result of various causes. Here we require the aid of the higher mathematics to determine the proportion in which the causes mingle in producing the effect. But all mathematics is deductive. Hence, nowhere in induction, throughout its whole circuit, can you find any new principle of inference. Inference, therefore, is always one and the same; it is a passage of the thought from the more general to the less general, or to the particular; and never *vice versa*, from the particular or from particulars, however numerous, to the general. I repeat, you may sum them up, and call them by a general name; but that is no inference, no induction, no proper generalization.

Thus, it is demonstrated, that the process by which we discover the laws of nature is fundamentally a deductive process; and that we are as much indebted to the reason for the major premiss, as we are indebted to experience for the minor premiss.

It is owing to a misapprehension of the intuitive developments of the reason, that some modern philosophers have rejected the syllogism as a type of ratiocination. They suppose its major premiss is a general truth obtained by a summation of particulars; and, consequently, to deduce one of these particulars from the general, is to reason in a circle. But great as the mystery of the reason may appear, we hold it to be the source of general principles, and it gives them to us as by revelation. So struck was Cousin with this function of reason, that he seemed well-nigh beside himself, and almost ready to bow down and worship it as a portion of divinity; and Plato, at the dawn of philosophy, declared, "It is the gift of the gods to man, which, as I conceive, they sent down by some Prometheus in a blaze of light." But it is no enthusiasm to say, that the reason is the brightest aspect of the image of God in man. Were the human mind destitute of this power of intuition, it would be impossible to vindicate the logic of Aristotle. This he clearly saw and stated in his exposition of the process of deduction. Indemonstrable truths, he affirms, make the basis of all reasoning; for if your premises be

demonstrated, then they must have been demonstrated by something beyond them, and if they were demonstrable though not demonstrated, it only extends the chain indefinitely back. Hence there must be indemonstrable truths at the foundation of every reasoning process, or it is without foundation. And these indemonstrable truths are particular intuitions of sense, of consciousness, and of the reason,—and, also, the general intuitions or principles of the reason. Thus sense gives us direct knowledge of the qualities of bodies, consciousness of the phenomena of mind, and reason ideas of substance, space, time, cause—right and wrong—and the principles of causality, mathematical principles, &c. The principle of contradiction—namely, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time—Aristotle considered the first of these indemonstrable principles, which lay at the foundation of demonstration.

The error of the schoolmen, which plunged them into the vortex of abstract speculation, was in the supposition that all truth lay wrapped up in *a priori* principles, and could be educed by ratiocination: they failed to perceive that they yielded no consequences of scientific value, but as they were attached to facts. Bacon reclaimed science from folly by turning her eye upon the actual phenomena of nature. But it is an illusion as great as that of the scholastics, to suppose that facts can of themselves give science; for they are as inconsequential without the principles of intuition as these are barren without them,—they lie scattered about like pebbles on the shore, until they are bound together by some *a priori* principle or general truth: then we see in them the path of the mighty laws that clasp and encircle the universe. A falling apple sheds a ray of light through immensity, and a drop of rain marking the clay pours its illuminations down the chasms of a past eternity.

And is not here the answer to Mr. Mill's earnest inquiry: "Why is a single instance in some cases sufficient for a complete induction; while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception, known or presumed, go so little way toward establishing a universal proposition?" The difference in the cases is that the former stands in the relation of cause and effect, and the latter does not. "Whoever," he adds, "can answer this question knows more than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the problem of induction." Let him add the true theory of the origin of primary axioms to his own incomparable analysis of induction, and he may demand the palm. Take away the *a priori* principles from induction, and you cover with clouds the whole process, and the long array of the sciences dependent upon it; restore these ideas,

and the movement is attended with certainty, as far as certainty can belong to human knowledge.

I say as far as certainty belongs to human knowledge; because, after all, it must be confessed that absolute knowledge is not for man. In its very depths, what is our knowledge but faith? When we talk of certainty, what do we mean? Certainty for an individual is but his necessary belief; human certainty is the necessary and universal belief of the race. In heaven itself, certainty is absolute only in the Throne of Light; the knowledge of the loftiest archangel nearest that Throne is but a cloudless belief, forced upon his understanding by its own subjective laws. God only knows, and knows he knows,—God only is light.

This leads us to remark that the problem of induction being only a question of causation, it matters not what theory any one adopts in respect to second causes, if he admits that no event is without a cause, and like causes produce like effects. To us there is no more difficulty in supposing that God has put a causative power in nature distinct from his own, than that he has constituted nature, matter, and mind distinct from his own essence. If matter exists with its various elements distinct from the divine nature, though not independent of it, why may we not suppose that God has endued it with a motive property as well as other properties? Secondary causes are the general belief of mankind as well as secondary natures. Still, you may take either hypothesis,—you may think it was the electric fluid which struck the oak when it fell blasted and blazing with lightning, or you may regard it as the stroke of the divine thought or volition, and think that all other events are, in like manner, the extemporaneous movements of the all-pervading mind of Deity. Yet if your reason obliges you to believe that they proceed upon the principles of causality, then induction is the same, and the certainty of its results is the same. Proceeding upon *a priori* and empirical data conjointly, the process is not to be doubted—until the faculties of observation and reason are doubted; and when they are doubted the mind is ruined, and the light of knowledge is set forever.

Art. VII.—MISCELLANIES.

I.

Address of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, to the British Conference.

"Reverend and Dear Brethren,—It has caused us deep regret that we have received no communication from your venerable body in reply to our letter transmitted through Dr. Dixon, who, four years since, so ably and acceptably performed the duty of a representative from your Conference to ours. But, as we cannot believe that your failure to write to us arose from any diminution of fraternal regard on your part, and must attribute it only to accident, we cannot allow the opportunity afforded by our assembly in General Conference to pass without renewing to you our assurances of Christian affection and brotherly sympathy. We rejoice to believe, and we account it one of the distinguishing marks of the divine favour, that Methodists throughout the world are one in heart and feeling; and we wish especially to cherish and preserve the most intimate relations with your body, and with the Wesleyan Methodists of the British empire whom you represent. We greet you, then, again, in the name of our common Lord, as brethren beloved.

"The want of a letter from you has been, to some extent, supplied by the visit of the Rev. Anson Green, Delegate from the Canada Conference to the Wesleyan Methodist Church, whose ample and lucid statements of the affairs of the Connexion in Canada have been received by our body with lively satisfaction. Mr. Green also gave us some informal statements with regard to your Conference and Church, and assured us that your affection for us remains unabated.

"It is with unfeigned gratitude to the great Head of the Church that we have to report to you continued growth and prosperity within our borders. The last four years of our history have been signally marked with the divine favour. The 'Lord hath been our stay; he hath brought us forth also into a large place.' His 'wonderful works which he hath done unto us cannot be reckoned up in order: if we could declare and speak of them, they are more than can be numbered.' There are, however, a few points of special interest to which we can briefly and thankfully advert. You will rejoice to learn that the peace of our Church has been unbroken for the last four years, and that the labours of our ministry have been abundantly honoured with the divine blessing. The increase in our membership during the period named has been ninety thousand two hundred and forty-six; and that increase has been progressive, as follows: in the first year, about seven thousand; in the second year, about twenty-three thousand; in the third year, twenty-seven thousand; and in the fourth year, about thirty-two thousand. We are happy to say, also, that we believe that, throughout the Church, there has been a growth in spiritual life and Christian zeal; and, especially in many quarters, there has been awakened a new interest in the doctrine and practice of Christian holiness.

"Our enterprises of Christian benevolence have also been more amply and generously sustained by our people, during the last four years, than ever before.

There has been a progressive advance in our missionary contributions, far more than proportionate to the growth of our numbers: the amount raised in 1848–9 being about eighty-seven thousand dollars; in 1849–50, about one hundred and five thousand dollars; in 1850–51, about one hundred and thirty-three thousand dollars; and in 1851–2, about one hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars. And our Committee has anticipated a further growth of missionary zeal among our people, by appropriating two hundred thousand dollars for the outlays of the next year.

"In the Sunday-school department we have a similarly gratifying prosperity to record. We have now enrolled ninety-three thousand five hundred and sixty-one officers and teachers of Sunday schools; four hundred and seventy-three thousand three hundred and eleven scholars; and one million two hundred and sixty thousand five hundred and fifty-eight volumes in the Sunday-school libraries. In the circulation of religious books and periodicals there has also been a marked improvement; and, with our large means for preparing and circulating a wholesome literature throughout our country, we hope for still greater results in the future.

"Our home-work is extending with unparalleled rapidity over this continent. On our western or Pacific coast a vast empire has been opened to our labours, and we have endeavoured, as far as our means would allow, to enter into it and cultivate it. Two Conferences have been formed,—the Oregon Conference and the California Conference; and we have already within the bounds of those Conferences nearly sixty ministers in active service. We have, also, just directed the establishment of a Book Room, and of a weekly religious journal, in San Francisco.

"We take great pleasure in calling your attention to the success which has attended our work among the German population of our country. We have now nearly one hundred and fifty ministers and ten thousand members among them, many of whom are converts from Romanism. Some of the ministers converted here have been sent back to their father-land as missionaries; and we have great encouragement in the present state and prospects of our work there.

"Within the last year our senior bishop, the Rev. Elijah Hedding, D. D., has been removed by death. He closed a long life of devoted and acceptable service to the Church by a happy and triumphant death. His name is held among us as a synonyme for all that is pure in virtue, lofty in intellect, and complete in Christian character and life. At the present session of our Conference our Episcopal Board has been strengthened by the election of four brethren, high in the esteem and confidence of the Church,—the Rev. Drs. Levi Scott and Matthew Simpson, and Rev. O. C. Baker and E. R. Ames.

"We have heard informally, with great regret, of the agitations that have existed in your body for some years past, and sympathize fully with you. We rejoice in the confident belief that Methodism in England is so strongly rooted in the affections of the people, and, what is more, so surely protected by Divine Providence, that it will only flourish the more after these storms are over. We have no doubt that in this, as in all things, you 'commit your ways unto the Lord, and trust also in him;' and, therefore, we are assured that 'He will bring forth your righteousness as the light, and your judgment as the noonday.'

"May the Lord who 'loveth judgment' uphold you in your integrity, and set you before his face forever!

"We are, dear brethren, in behalf of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church,—

"(*Signed,*) "BEVERLY WAUGH,
"THOMAS A. MORRIS,
"EDMUND S. JANES,
"LEVI SCOTT,
"*Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*

"JOSEPH M. TRIMBLE,
"*Secretary of the Conference.*

"BOSTON, *May 29th*, 1852."

Reply of the British Conference, 1853.

"REVEREND AND VERY DEAR BRETHREN,—Your Address, dated May 29th, 1852, has been received by us at this our Annual Assembly with the most grateful satisfaction. We regard it as a special testimony of that unfeigned brotherly love which you maintain toward us, and which you have not suffered distance of place, interrupted intercourse, or any other occasion, to destroy or abate. Permit us to assure you, in return, of our sincere and undiminished affection for you, and of our joy in all that relates to your prosperity. May 'the LORD God of your fathers' and ours continue to protect and guide you in all your ways; and, large as are the members already gathered around you by the agency of his grace, may he 'make you a thousand times so many more as ye are, and bless you, as he hath promised you!'

"The declaration of your ready love is heightened by the consideration that, at the time when it was penned, you were not in the possession of any letter from us in reply to your acceptable address by the Rev. Dr. Dixon, and that you could scarcely fail to construe our apparent silence into some measure, at least, of blameworthy forgetfulness and indifference. Yet it was not so. The Address which you conveyed by our honoured representative was duly placed in our hands, and read in our Conference. It was heard with feelings of the truest esteem and attachment. An answer to it was prepared, and, as far as we can ascertain, regularly despatched. You may find a copy of that answer, following your own Address, in our printed Minutes for the year 1849. By what means it failed to reach its proper destination, we are, at this time, unable to discover. Will you please to accept this as an explanation of what could not but awaken your surprise? Our desire is to cultivate intimate Christian relations with our beloved brethren in the Western hemisphere, as well as in all other parts; and to your own sentiment we heartily respond,—that 'Methodists throughout the world are one.'

"We have listened to the intelligence which you communicate concerning the state of the work of God among you, with fervent emotions of gratitude to Him from whom all our good proceeds. The untroubled peace which 'the Lord of peace himself' has given you for so long a space of time, the abundant success which you have enjoyed, and which severally appears in the increase of your numbers, accompanied with so observable a growth in spiritual life and blessing; in the enlarged liberality of your people, as displayed especially in their contributions to the support of your great missionary agencies; in the multiplied instru-

mentalities of your Sunday school and other kindred or accompanying institutions; in the extension of your labours to populous lands, not until lately visited with heavenly light; and in the fruit of souls which you have gathered among the German population interspersed through the United States;—these, and all other things of a like kind to which your Address refers, cheer our spirits, and raise our hopes. During the time that such recitals were laid before us, many felt, and some expressed, the peculiar fitness and significancy of Solomon's language, 'As cold waters to a thirsty soul, so is good news from a far country.' Our prayers are offered that He who has so graciously visited you, may guard and maintain his own cause, and may so plentifully pour out his Holy Spirit on the widely-spread regions in which you dwell, that 'the wilderness and the solitary place may be glad,' that 'the desert may rejoice, and blossom as the rose;' that it may 'blossom abundantly, and rejoice even with joy and singing;' that 'the wilderness,' in a word, may be 'a fruitful field,' and that the 'field,' already made 'fruitful' by the LORD'S bounty and blessing, may, amid the richer effusions of heavenly grace, be 'counted for a forest.'

"For several years we have been exercised by manifold trials and adversities, and have had to mourn over the removal of many from us who, we once hoped, would have been 'our rejoicing in the day of the Lord Jesus.' But we trust that, in these painful and unexpected circumstances, we have endeavoured to 'submit ourselves unto God;' to repose all our trust in his power and love; to fall back, with entire unreserve, on the principles of our fathers; to seek for a more copious baptism of the Spirit of Christ; to prosecute our proper work in charity and peace,—and to wait. We are humbly resolved, in dependence upon God, to preserve inviolate the system of doctrine and discipline which has been confided to us, 'by honour and dishonour, by evil report and good report, as deceivers and yet true;' and we are looking for days of more abundant good. Signs of hope have not been withheld from us, even in our most discouraging circumstances; and these signs are now multiplied. Never did we, as a body of Christian ministers, enjoy a larger measure of mutual harmony and love. We feel that we are one. Tokens of reviving appear in many parts of the work in our own country; and the intelligence which has been communicated to us during our present sittings of the prosperity of religion in France, which now has its own separate Conference, and in other lands abroad, has greatly cheered us. The missionary province of our labours has always presented to us scenes of peace and growing fruitfulness; and it now, more than ever, invites the hopes and efforts of our evangelical zeal. To all this we would gratefully add that the spirit of a more than ordinary liberality has descended on our people; and that improved facilities are likely soon to be supplied for the removal of pecuniary difficulties, and the further extension of our labours.

"It is our earnest purpose, as we are assured that it is also yours, to keep in view the great design of Methodism amid all our plans and movements, not to entangle ourselves with the parties and affairs of this life, but to please Him who hath called us to be soldiers in his army, and to war a good warfare for him; to promote experimental and practical Christianity in the earth; and, in pursuance of this object, to use 'the weapons of our warfare' which 'are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds:' this is our great concern. Let us still agree to follow the steps of our honoured predecessors, to imbibe a larger portion of their spirit, and to rejoice in the prerogative that we are permitted to 'enter into their labours.' The time of active exertion hastens

to a close. 'Our fathers, where are they?' Many dear and honoured men among us, like your own excellent Bishop Hedding, have passed to their rest; but they have bequeathed to us an example worthy of all imitation. May we follow them, as they also followed Christ; and may our 'end,' like theirs, be 'peace!'

"Our Conference of this year, now swiftly drawing to a conclusion, has been one of great unanimity and peace; and its public religious services have been marked by more than usual manifestations of truth and grace. We shall soon proceed to our several spheres of labour, in the cheerful expectation that 'the LORD will be with us;' and we trust that the coming year will be a year of blessing. 'Return, O LORD, how long? Make us glad according to the days wherein thou hast afflicted us, and the years wherein we have seen evil. Let thy work appear unto thy servants, and thy glory unto their children.'

"With our affectionate wishes and prayers for your continual and abounding prosperity, we are, reverend and very dear brethren, yours, in the bonds of Christian peace and love,

"JOHN LOMAS, *President*,
"JOHN FARRAR, *Secretary*.

"BRADFORD, *August* 10*th*, 1853."

II.

HORACE BINNEY WALLACE.

TO THE EDITOR.

January, 1854.

DEAR SIR,—Last night the January number of the Methodist Quarterly Review reached me, and I have just read this morning with melancholy interest the fragment of the late Mr. Wallace's letter to you. It is certainly a remarkable production, and merits the commendation which you have bestowed upon it. The whole tenor of the epistle gives me a very high opinion of both the character and the intellect of the writer, and enables me to sympathize cordially with the eulogies and regrets expressed by M. Comte on the occasion of his early death. The letter exhibits a masterly appreciation of the Positive Philosophy, its merits, its limits, and its defects; but it also affords abundant evidence that the estimate of that philosophy, which is briefly indicated, was derived, less from the exact mode in which it was propounded by its author, than from the manner of its reception by Mr. Wallace, as modified, restricted, and purified by the transmuting and assimilating powers of his own mind. His remarks appear sometimes more appropriate to Positivism as it was literally interpreted and accepted by himself than as it was specifically designed by M. Comte. This is a venial error into which quick, penetrating, and generous minds are frequently and unconsciously betrayed. Thoughts, which are suggested to themselves in the course of their reading, are ascribed to the authors whose views have awakened them. The spontaneous reflection is supposed to be an independent and external picture on the glass which merely returns the impression to the source whence it had pro-

ceeded. Had the life of Mr. Wallace been prolonged, and had it ever been my good fortune to meet him, he might have been surprised with the extent of the consonance between his general views and mine; though we might, perhaps, have still continued to differ slightly in our interpretation of the Positive Philosophy. This gratification has been denied me; and the pleasure and instruction, which it might have afforded, have been revealed to me, when the knowledge can only excite vain regrets. In justice, however, to the memory of Mr. Wallace, no less than to myself, it is important to remember that his letter seems to have been written with only my first paper on Comte before him—without the assistance or elucidations which the subsequent parts of the criticism might have rendered, and without reference to the article on Philosophy and Faith, (Meth. Quar. Rev., April, 1851,) which furnishes the key-note to my whole procedure, and lays down the fundamental positions on which such philosophy as I may possess is established. That article was not designed simply as an independent essay. It was written as a part of the criticism of Comte, and intended to be an introduction to it; nor do I think that the validity of my strictures on Positivism can be justly appreciated, except by the previous acceptance of that essay as a criterion. In that first article, too, are contained, I believe, the germs of a sound and partially new philosophy, calculated to sustain Christianity instead of being antagonistic to it, as nearly all other metaphysical methods have proved to be in their ultimate development.

The time has passed for any comparison of my views with Mr. Wallace's for any other purpose than to elicit a just appreciation of Positivism from the contrast. This may still be done, and may still be important, as the system is now rising into more prominent note, and assuming a more popular aspect by its introduction to the English-reading public through the medium of the two abridged translations of Miss Harriet Martineau and Mr. Lewes.

Mr. Wallace's favourable estimate of my criticism is gratifying to me, as bearing testimony to the importance and general accuracy of my views, by indicating the agreement with them, in the main, of an intelligent man, who had long made the subject his special study. That agreement, in nearly all essential particulars, is much more intimate than he was able to suspect; for he has not always understood me rightly, and his conclusions were necessarily defective, as he had only a part of my critique before him to comment on. So far as there was any misunderstanding of what was immediately submitted to his consideration, I must take the blame of the misinterpretation to myself; for there must have been some obscurity or insufficiency in my expression to mislead a man of his evident candour and perspicacity.

He is, however, perfectly correct in supposing that I had originally underestimated the importance of M. Comte's great law of the Hierarchy of the Sciences. I appreciated and admired it as a luminous and profound guide to the classification of the sciences themselves; I recognised its great value as an exemplification of the successive stages of scientific development; I apprehended, as fully as himself, the service which it was calculated to render in determining and explaining the characteristic changes and expansions of the ascending sciences, which he has so vigorously pointed out; but I did not at first discern its intimate relation to the Positive method, or its necessity as an essential part of the system. I have since discovered and rectified my error. It is, perhaps, going too far to term this law "the key-stone of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*," for it is a corollary from the first law of Positivism—the law of the three states—a consequence which M. Comte apparently does not perceive. But it is unques-

tionably one of the grand laws of the system, and is the intermediate principle —the *axioma medium*—through which the phenomenalism of the fundamental law is communicated and applied to all the successions and details of the sciences.

The perusal of the first volume of the *Système de Politique Positive* convinced me that I had attributed too little importance to the Law of the Hierarchy, when I regarded it chiefly as a mere method of classification. In a connected, condensed, and thorough examination of the whole scheme of Positivism, which I wrote in outline a year ago, though it has not yet been published, I corrected the imperfection of my former view, reduced the law of classification to its natural dependence on the first law, exhibited its importance, its mode of development, its partial truth, and its defects, and introduced what I deemed to be its rectification, in a more detailed and consistent arrangement of the ethical sciences. So much of that essay as relates directly to the *Hiérarchie des Sciences* I would gladly append to this letter; but the extract would be too long, and its validity and significance would be only imperfectly recognised, if this solitary member were rudely torn, as it necessarily would be, from the organic body of which it forms a part. I can only give here the table of the sciences as it results from the rigid development of M. Comte's law of classification, which necessitates their arrangement, with or without any solution of continuity, in two series.

A. Cosmology.

I. Mathematics. Propædeutic to Physical Science.

II. Astronomy.

III. Natural Philosophy—a vague and undistributed body of science, including Barology, Thermology, Optics, Acoustics, Electrology, and possibly some other branches.

IV. Chemistry.

V. Biology—or the operation of the general laws of nature in an individual organism, as modified by life. This science, as explaining the phenomena of spontaneous action, forms the transition to the sciences which treat of intelligent and voluntary action, and is intermediate between Cosmology and Anthropology.

B. Anthropology.

I. Logic. Propædeutic to the Ethical Sciences—embracing Metaphysics as an Introduction or Appendix.

II. Deontology, or Ethonomy.

III. Political Philosophy—including Universal Jurisprudence, the Theory of Government, Political Economy, Statistics, &c.

IV. The Science of History—*Dynamique Sociale*—which must logically precede the philosophy of social organization, as the facts must be collected and observed before inductions can be made, or generalizations established.

V. Sociology proper—which applies all of the above sciences to the interpretation of social action and the regulation of societies, as integral organisms, without regard to specific forms of government.

There is something arbitrary and artificial, I admit, in the arrangement of the second series of sciences, but M. Comte acknowledges this to be an incident of all such classifications; and the table is exhibited not as absolutely true or satisfactory to myself, for, like Positivism, it excludes the descriptive sciences, but as the result arrived at by the rigid application of M. Comte's second law. It will be observed, too, that Theology is omitted—but of theology there can be no

strict science, as it rests upon revelation and divine prescription, not upon human demonstration, and lays its foundations upon faith, not upon observation, experiment, or reasoning. In passing from the Cosmological to the Anthropological series, there is a break in the application of M. Comte's law on this arrangement. But invert the second series and the continuity is maintained in the same manner as it is preserved by M. Comte; but then his law must be applied in an inverse sense, which he is not conscious of having done himself. Of course, each series requires for its perfect apprehension a thorough acquaintance with the other: either may take precedence in the order of their study, but not indifferently; the times and concomitant condition of the intellectual world, and the relative state of the Ethical and Physical sciences, must determine which should have the priority; and, in the case of individuals, some influence in the decision of the question must be accorded to the purpose and design of their studies. In Aristotle's day the study of Physics might appropriately take the precedence of the study of Ethics for the improvement and extension of the latter; in Bacon's day, it was exactly the reverse; in our time we may recur to the order of Aristotle; and some centuries hence Anthropology may be the proper preparation for the amelioration of Cosmological science again. This epoch is, perhaps, closer to us than I have supposed. But neither Cosmology nor Anthropology can, as an entire system, be permanently entitled to priority of consideration.

I have suffered this digression to lead me too far from Mr. Wallace's letter. With the explanations which were given above, I fully assent to his interpretation of the significances and differences of the separate sciences, as manifested by the application of the law of classification. But he entirely misunderstood my recognition of a species of knowledge, lying beyond the range of science, and unattainable by scientific processes. Had he ever known the article on Philosophy and Faith, before referred to, he could scarcely have fallen into this misconception. I never dreamed of excepting the philosophy of society from the jurisdiction of science. The attempt to bring the former within the domain of the latter I regarded as the loftiest of M. Comte's achievements. Like Mr. Wallace, I had been engaged myself in a similar endeavour for years before I had seen or heard of M. Comte's labours; and there is a singular coincidence between some of his positions, and even expressions, and many passages written by me before I had any acquaintance with his works. Like Mr. Wallace, too, I had taken for my companions and advisers, Burke, Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Vico; but I had added to their number Plato, notwithstanding all his socialistic vagaries, Franciscus Balduinus, Bacon, Filangieri, and Aristotle, whom I valued above them all. In all that I have written relative to M. Comte, I have most cordially approved of his extension of science, under the form of the historical method, to the theory of society; and I have spoken of this as his crowning triumph. I even went so far beyond what Mr. Wallace supposed to be my limit, that I expressed the belief that a positive treatment might be, in great measure, applied legitimately to Metaphysics. The knowledge beyond science, to which I referred, consisted of all those impulsive and instinctive convictions which determine our affections, and frequently our actions—a knowledge which loses itself in faith, and forms the basis of all religious belief. For I differ equally with Mr. Wallace and M. Comte in regard to the possibility of demonstrating religion. A demonstrable religion is, to my apprehension, a palpable absurdity, and a contradiction in terms. A real, valid, and efficacious religious conviction must repose on faith, not demonstration. To attempt to found it upon the latter is to imitate the

impious daring of the builders of Babel, and can result only in a worse confusion. The conviction, implanted by faith, may be deepened, extended, and intensified by confirmatory or corroborative evidence: it cannot be established on human proof, nor does it admit of demonstrative reasoning, except from premises previously received from faith alone. Where was the use of revelation, if Christianity could be proved conclusively by human reasoning? Belief would have then been an inevitable necessity, like the assent to a mathematical truth: it would have been a purely intellectual exercise, and no trial of the heart of man.

Besides religion and morals—things which I consider inseparable in practice, and only dissociable in theory by the barbarous mutilation of both—I recognised as beyond the reach of science the principles of all knowledge and action; and in this position I am fully sustained by Aristotle, who is still the greatest mind and the highest authority on such subjects produced in all the ages of humanity. I also recognised as beyond the present range of science all that nebulous, floating mass of general and instinctive belief in relation to matters of practice, in which points of truth glimmer like the isolated stars in the Milky Way revealed by the telescope, and out of which, in the process of time, and by further study and discovery, new increments are added to science. I did not attempt to define the limits of this unscientific knowledge, for it was negatively defined by including all that science could not or did not embrace. I was reluctant to commit the folly of attempting to define the undefinable and the indefinite. "That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting cannot be numbered." But the distinction between science, actual or possible, and that knowledge which does not admit of scientific arrangement, seems clear enough to my mind, and was sufficiently exemplified in the article on Philosophy and Faith to acquit me of the guilt of such a gross blunder as Mr. Wallace has, from misapprehension, attributed to me. It is true, that in the Ethical branches of science I would assign a much ampler scope to deduction than in Physics; but this predominance of synthesis over analysis in these departments is prescribed by Aristotle, commended by Bacon, and has met with the approbation of M. Comte in his later work.

If I did any injustice to the first law of Positivism, the error was scarcely of the sort supposed by Mr. Wallace I admitted that the procedure of the mind in philosophizing might be distinguished into the three modes designated as theological, metaphysical, and positive. I objected to the employment of these terms, and also to the erection of this succession into a universal, complete, and all-comprehending law. The objection to the term theological has been approved by Mr. Wallace, who is entirely right in considering it a mistake on my part to suppose that it was employed by M. Comte as synonymous with religious. The distinction between the two, in his employment of them, arbitrary and illegitimate as that employment is in both cases, is sufficiently illustrated in the *Système de Politique Positive* and in the *Catéchisme Positiviste*—works published subsequently to the composition of my criticism, which, however, prove only the more conclusively the ingenious impropriety with which the term theological is applied to the first mental state. I must think that Mr. Wallace suffered himself to be misled by his own more correct views of philosophy, when he fancied that the three states were not intended by M. Comte to be reciprocally exclusive of each other in the scheme of Positivism; and that the Positive mode was not designed to absorb the other forms, as the rod of Aaron swallowed the serpents of the Egyptian magicians. Mr. Wallace saw truly, as I saw, that in point of fact the three modes might be coëxistent, not in the same subject, but in the same mind,

and might all possess equal truth within their respective orbits, without either of the others ever becoming entirely absorbed by the Positive method. This perception of his own he has too hastily transferred to the Positive Philosophy, as one of its characteristics. But M. Comte had said, "De là, trois sortes de philosophies, ou de systèmes généraux de conceptions sur l'ensemble des phénomènes, qui s'excluent mutuellement."—*Phil. Pos.*, vol. i, p. 3. And this declaration is reaffirmed on every possible occasion, and under the greatest variety of expression. This I do regard as the assertion that the theological and metaphysical methods of philosophy are transitional, and are destitute of truth—except that partial and evanescent truth (δόξα, not ἀλήθεια) which may serve a provisional purpose until science has conquered their domain. Now, I believe that much of our knowledge must always be founded upon faith, not on science or demonstration; that part of it always must be established by deduction from the first principles received by faith, and must hence be metaphysical; and that, therefore, science, which arrives at its premises by induction, can never exclude the other modes entirely, or itself occupy the whole sphere of knowledge. In this position Mr. Wallace might not have agreed with me, as he entertained the hope of Christianity being rendered demonstrable; but it approximates very closely to an agreement with him, so far as his immediate objection is concerned.

That M. Comte understood his first law in a different sense from that in which it was interpreted by Mr. Wallace, is evinced by his exclusion and repudiation of logic and metaphysics, no less than by his own express testimony. But Mr. Wallace declares himself unable to follow my meaning when I spoke of M. Comte's entire negation of *logic* and metaphysics. The difficulty must have proceeded solely from his having construed *logic* in its loose, popular acceptation, as equivalent to reasoning, while I used it in its strict sense for the science of reasoning. Assign the former meaning to the word, and his censure is perfectly just; assign the latter, and it is altogether inappropriate inasmuch as M. Comte does deny most explicitly that logic is a science, or separable from the concrete acts of reasoning. (Phil. Pos., vol. i, pp. 38–40.) It is excluded from his table of the sciences, and is declared to be capable of appreciation only in its concrete forms, which are foreign to logic, properly so termed; and, moreover, mathematical science is assumed to be the model of reasoning, to the exclusion of the guidance of logic. But my views on this subject were developed in the second part of my criticism on M. Comte's Philosophy, (Meth. Quar. Rev., April, 1852, pp. 180–3,) which, apparently, had not been seen by Mr. Wallace when he wrote his letter; and which might have led, if seen, to a considerable modification of his strictures. Is it not possible that he might have seen it after his letter was written, and, in consequence of the correction of his former views which it suggested, that he might have retained that letter unfinished in his portfolio? It must be said, however, that M. Comte is not altogether consistent himself in his remarks upon logic, using the term too vaguely, and receiving it in one sense, while rejecting it in another, without rigidly distinguishing between its two significances. Moreover, he has given much greater credit to logic in his second system than in his first. It is possible that this uncertainty and indecision may have caused me to take a too partial view of his doctrine on this topic, and to press my objections further than was either necessary or appropriate.

With the points already elucidated, my denial that Bacon was the apostle of Positivism is connected. Bacon received theology, metaphysics, and the Aristotelian logic; he acknowledged the truth of Christianity, and believed in revelation; he

admitted the existence of unscientific knowledge beyond the sphere of intellectual demonstration, or even of complete interpretation. All these positions I have established in the course of my writing in your Review; and, as each of these tenets is inconsistent with Positivism, as proposed by M. Comte, I refused to consider Bacon as the founder of the system, although it was elaborated by a development of one-half, though only half of his doctrine.

Bacon was no more a Positivist than Mr. Wallace himself. Mr. Wallace deemed himself to be one, and naturally enough considered Bacon so. But, in the Baconian Philosophy there are many essential parts which are incompatible with M. Comte's scheme, and which are consequently rejected by him; and Mr. Wallace accepted Positivism only by adding to it a belief in Christianity, and denying that it is necessarily an atheistic or infidel system. But M. Comte continually repeats that science and theology, Positivism and Christianity, are absolutely incompatible. And he is entirely right: a system of pure and exclusive phenomenalism necessitates the repudiation of revelation, and cannot be logically combined with Christianity. In this respect the logic of M. Comte is more correct and unerring than that of Mr. Wallace. It is true that a philosophy approximating to M. Comte's, and agreeing with it within a certain limited range, may be conceived, which shall not be inconsistent with Christianity; but this would not be the Positivism of M. Comte, but a new, distinct, and more enlarged philosophy, such as I have been endeavouring to indicate. If Mr. Wallace's reception and interpretation of Positivism were logically correct, I should myself be a Positivist; if, as I think, they are invalid, he agreed with me, or I with him, in the acceptance of a different philosophy, which incorporates the greater part of the Positive Philosophy, and is, in reality, a modernized and Christianized Aristotelianism, accordant in the main with the scheme of Sir William Hamilton.

These are all the topics of dissent indicated in Mr. Wallace's letter. The observations made upon them show in reality a more intimate accordance between our opinions than he supposed, and dispel almost entirely the apparent differences. Some discrepances might have still remained, but they would probably have been unimportant, for the whole tenor of his remarks points toward the goal which I have been striving to reach. I need not say that I cordially endorse his comments on M. Comte's hieratic pretensions and new religion; but he appears to me to have underrated the *Système de Politique Positive* as a whole—very likely in consequence of never having had the opportunity of studying more than the first volume, which is filled with the rodomontade of the Religion of Humanity. But it affords me sincere satisfaction to perceive the intrinsic similarity which existed between his views, aims, and doctrines, and mine; and to bear testimony, now that he is beyond the reach of praise or blame, of flattery or censure, to the justice, sagacity, profundity, and comprehensiveness of his criticisms, though they sometimes proceeded upon an imperfect or erroneous apprehension of my real opinions. I do trust that all the fragments of his writings will be gathered up and published. I would rather feed upon the broken bread from such a table than upon the stalled oxen of such pompous and imbecile philosophers as Whewell, Morell, and the juvenile Eclectics, French, English, or American.

I subscribe myself,

Yours very sincerely,

G. F. H.

Art. VIII.—LETTERS ON RECENT FRENCH LITERATURE.

LETTER III.

Paris, 1854.

A hydrographic engineer of the French Marine, M. Gaussin, was sent, some time ago, to make a physical survey of some of the Polynesian Islands. During his sojourn of four years he was led, by philosophic curiosity, to turn his intercourse with the natives to the account of studying their infant idioms. The result was an essay, which he prepared, in 1852, in competition for the Volney prize of Linguistic, and which obtained besides the "crown" prize of twelve hundred francs, with a special commendation of the Academic committee. (*Du Dialecte de Tahiti, de celui des Iles Marquises, et en général de la Langue Polynésienne:* ouvrage qui a remporté en 1852 la prise de linguistique fondé par Volney. Par L. Gaussin, Ingénieur Hydrographe de la Marine. Paris: Firmin Didot. New-York: Hector Bossange.) He now submits it to the judgment of the public. The signal merits of the work as a faithful record of the subject, and the early stage of language which this subject represents, deserve alike that I should sketch you a brief analysis. My notice will proceed:—

1st. On the description of the Parts of Speech, or of the modes which correspond to these divisions of European languages;

2d. On the forms which appear peculiar to the Polynesian;

3d. On the reflections and the system of the author.

1. *Noun.*—As with us, the Polynesian nouns are proper or common, save that the latter correspond alike to our substantives, our adjectives, our verbs, and even sometimes our adverbs. The *adjective*, which thus appears to have no special form, is supplied by the addition of one noun to another; and this procedure, by *qualification*, results progressively in the production of composition at the same time in the words and the ideas, from the simple notions and the single syllables of the original condition. The distinctions of gender, too, are obtained in a similar manner, by the addition of the names for man and for woman; just as in English *she* and *he* are applied to some animals for the same purpose. They are founded in Polynesian upon sex alone, according to the author, although he mentions a third form employed to designate the human species; and this is probably but one of the branches of an anterior division of objects, (corresponding to the American Indian,) into animate and inanimate. The variations of intensity, commonly known as the degrees of comparison, exist but in a rudimentary state. The notion of number is obtained by the same procedure as comparison, and all the other modifications, by the addition of another noun; but in Polynesian the noun which qualifies the singular is a noun of multitude, and the result not a plural, but a collective designation. The cause is, that the conception of plurality is abstract, while collectivity is concrete and visible to sense.

Pronoun.—There are personal, possessive, and interrogative pronouns; but no relative, because a logical connective. The personal are placed by the author in the class of nouns proper, because, like these, they refer to

objects, not to relations, as with us. These pronouns have three numbers—the singular, dual, plural; or rather the latter is a *trial*, that is, denotes no more than three objects. Here, we see, is a refinement upon that classic dual form which is still accounted a perfection, because encountered in the Greek. The truth is that both belong to the age of infantile imbecility, when the savage cannot number, and so not name, beyond two or three. And the proof of this is patent in the Polynesian dialects, where the dual and *trial* forms still betray their composition from the corresponding numerals subjoined to the radical pronouns.

Article.—The Polynesian has two articles, the definite and the indefinite; but unmodified, as in the English, by gender, number, &c. M. Gaussin interjects them in a rather miscellaneous category, to which he gives the title of "Substantive Enunciations"—defined as "serving to place the noun in a condition of predication." To this he also refers the pronouns demonstrative and possessive, certain adjectives of number, &c.; while even the pronouns personal differ only in the kindred property of "rendering the predication concrete." The meaning of this jumble of our syntactic subdivisions, and which the author does not clearly see through, will be suggested in the sequel.

Verb.—The verb and its appendages he similarly groups together under the general designation of "Verbal Enunciations." In fact, the verb in Polynesian does not differ from the noun in form. It is even sometimes predicated or "enunciated" by the articles; but usually by a set of particles appropriate to the purpose. By these, which are still employed in the condition of separation, are expressed the so-called accidents of number, tense, and mood; that is to say, so far as yet developed, namely,—of the tenses, the future and the past; of the moods, the optative and the imperative—the indicative mood and the present time being still confounded with the radical form. Among these particles of predication the author also ranks preëminently the representative of the auxiliary verb to be. But this is likewise without mood or tense, and a mere exponent of the verbal function; not unlike the particle *to*, which marks in English the infinitive mood. In short, the auxiliaries in Polynesian are but the articles of the verb, as the articles are the auxiliaries of the noun.

Preposition.—The prepositions are but few in number, the relations they denote still fewer, and the objects which they govern corporeal. The relations are: of origin, of dependence, and of destination; that is, the beginning, the middle or continuation, and the end. So that the savage proceeds by instinct, in his expressions of the work of nature, on the same principles which the analysis of the philosopher prescribes to art. And the reason is, that all true art is but a reproduction of the course of nature. These three relations have in Polynesian a distinct set of signs, accordingly as conceived actively or passively. For example, in our active and passive forms of the verb transitive, there is *dependence* alike of the object and of the agent upon the action. The dependence of the agent we express, in the passive, by a preposition; while, in the active, we make the object depend directly on the verb. But the Polynesian interposes, in this case too, a preposition; only varied to denote a different conception of the dependence. Thus, (to take

the author's instance,) instead of saying, "I love my husband," a wife will say, in Polynesian, "I love *to* my husband." And the reason, as well as necessity of this, is plain. The verbs here have not only neither an active nor a passive form, but are as yet not even distinguished from the nouns. The active tendencies of the relation *toward* the object and *from* the agent must therefore be differenced and denoted by prepositions. And the same is true, for similar reasons, of the passive point of view.

This distinction between the notions of motion and rest, or, as the author scientifically calls them, the dynamical and the statical, pervades, he tells us, the whole idiom and the ideas of the Polynesians. But this is, in fact, the principle of the primordial division of gender into animate and inanimate, which I suspected him of overlooking. And the suspicion is too well confirmed by the quite imperfect recognition of it which he manifests in his description of these prepositions.

Adverb.—The adverbs in Polynesian are of place, time, and *direction;* or, in the enviable French expression, *orientation.* To these few relations are they confined, in fact, with all savage and simple peoples. But in the present case, it is observable, according to the author, that the adverbs are of the nature of the pronouns and proper names; that they designate concrete notions, and not relations. I however feel persuaded that there is here a double error—an error, on the one hand, respecting the small extension of the idea of relation which can be possible to such a people; an error, on the other hand, respecting the real import of what we style their proper or concrete names. The latter is evinced, in fact, by the author's own argument to prove the adverbs to be connatural with proper names: it is, he says, that they are, like them, found accompanied by articles, or what he names enunciative particles; for the proper names in Polynesian are so determined, as well as the common. But this is because they really are descriptive rather than denotative—designate less an object than a *relation.* Hence, in fact, the need of limiting them, to denote an individual. The prefixation, then, of such particles to adverbs also infers, undoubtedly, analogy between the two classes of vocables: but the analogy consists, on the contrary, in both alike implying relations; not, as the author assumes and argues, individuals or concrete notions. And this conclusion, drawn moreover from an evident prepossession as to the functions of the proper names in European languages, appears to be confirmed and was perhaps caused by an illusion of observation, which indeed mystifies the matter throughout the work. He interprets the notions abstract and concrete of the Polynesians in the ordinary philosophical acceptation. But in such a sense the savage has no abstract names whatever; even those accounted most so, in their infant idioms—the general terms—are but repetitions of individual applications. The truth, however, is, that though the concrete objects are alone in view, these terms signify effectually their analogical relation. And so the Polynesian adverbs, while meant to name a place or epoch, refer essentially to the *relation* between those objects and the speaker. The oversight of this unconscious involution of the relation in one or another of its individual and material terms, is the second error above imputed to the author.

Conjunction.—The conjunctions are extremely few, and derived, the author says, from three sources. The most simple are supplied by the prepositions; as the function of the preposition is in fact to connect words, while that of the conjunction is to connect sentences, the passage from the former to the latter is entirely normal, like that, for instance, of the adverbs of place into those of time. The second expedient is a periphrasis, which might be called a conjunctional phrase; in like manner as there are also prepositional and adverbial phrases. The third supply is from the particles of "verbal enunciation," of all of which the virtual import is the verb *to be;* and this in fact is so well conjunctive as to have got the technical name of "copula." These several sources of the conjunctions are therefore probably well assigned; although the author's explanations are here, as elsewhere, insufficient.

Interjection.—There are, it seems, in Polynesian, but two or three interjections. But is not this in contradiction with a certain linguistic theory which pretends the interjection to be the earliest of the parts of speech, and that, moreover, from which proceeded all the others in succession? for, if so, it should be found in a proportional abundance in the comparatively infant idiom of the Polynesians. The conflict, says M. Gaussin, is but apparent. "In the beginning, there was no distinction between the words responding to our sentiments and those recalling the images of the external world. At this stage of the development of languages, there was neither article nor particle of any sort: the words were thrown together, so to say, one after the others. Subsequently, to enunciate the modifications of time and place, to give expression to the relations between ideas, each distinct language had recourse to means particular to itself, but proceeding, doubtless, from already existing materials. These modifications, these relations, being also applicable to ideas derived from the two sources, (subjective and objective,) the division was not still established among the corresponding terms. This is nearly the condition of grammatical development in which we find the language of the Polynesians at this moment. In other words, it offers but few or no interjections, precisely *because most of the words are modelled on this part of speech, and that, enunciated separately, they may often be regarded as in reality no other than interjections.*"—Pp. 226, 227.

The conflict then is turned to a confirmation of the theory. This results sufficiently from the author's explanation, in spite of the habitual inexactness of his analysis. I hasten, therefore, to my second head of comment on the book, and which regarded certain forms which he makes peculiar to the Polynesian.

2. Among these are the two classes named of "prefixes" and of "suffixes," of which the treatment follows after the regular forms, in distinct chapters. But they are both of the same nature as another category called "determinatives," which is placed, however, at the other end of the scale. The same is true of the "enunciatives," whether "substantive" or "verbal," in which descriptions are jumbled the article, the pronoun, and the verb. In fine, a form, interposed between the preposition and the adverb, under the title of "possessive adjectives," is also kindred to this large family. In addition to this wild dispersion of things we presently shall find congeneric, among the forms thus alleged peculiar to the Polynesians,

there is, moreover, an omission of our old acquaintance, the adjective. Its presence is, however, indicated incidentally by the author, who says repeatedly that nouns substantive, and even others of the parts of speech, may be made adjectives by *post-position* to other nouns. These various disorders of arrangement and defects of discrimination appear the result of a system which only serves to confuse the writer.

3. This system—if a simple series of generalities can be so called—is the *Positivist* theory of language. The three terms of M. Comte, namely, sentiments, images, signs, are expanded by our author into the following five gradations: "1st. Sensations or concrete images—that is to say, applying to something real and determinate; 2d. Sensations or rude [*brutes*] images, but independent of the being or the object; 3d. Immediate metaphors of sensations or of images—called immediate, to distinguish them from metaphors by comparison; 4th. Simple signs of ideas; 5th. Logical signs of thought or grammatical forms."—Pp. 58, 59. This, it is quite clear, is no improvement on the master, in either philosophy, explicitness, or perspicuity. On the contrary, it only throws the subject into chaos. Who understands, for instance, its distinction between "sensations or concrete images" and "sensations or rude images?" What, moreover, are themselves these rude, or should I call them *brute*, images? for I must own I find the epithet untranslatably nonsensical. What mean even the *concrete* images, since all images of course are concrete? Are any images whatever quite convertible with sensations? And suppose so, are there no sensations besides images? Further, metaphors—immediate or otherwise—are not vocables, but only an extension of their application. But why go on to canvass what is obviously an utter hodge-podge of redundancy, deficiency, and confusion? With such a table of the elements of language before his mind, how should the author not have exhibited the imperfection of analysis which I have found myself constrained to notice so repeatedly in his work?

I should add, however, in justice to the learned body who "crowned" this essay, that the theory was not inserted at the time of their examination. The author seems, indeed, to have known his men, if not his theory, better. He prudently confined himself to observations and examples; or, if he now and then appealed to principles, they were the principles of French grammar. By this economy his composition displayed an air, in part factitious, of sobriety, practicality, and research, which well adapted it to obtain favour with the judges of the academy; for, be it wisdom or be it weakness, it is notorious that these gentlemen have an aversion to speculation that is, in my opinion, not unnatural. A legislature of the intellect can judge impartially of new facts, because these imply but industry or opportunity; but a new theory is sure to bristle every man of them into hostility, for it pretends to a philosophical, if not a mental superiority above, not merely each in particular, but even the aggregate corporation. No novel theory should, therefore, venture to brave this double *amour propre*, unless, indeed, it were completely irresistible. It was probably this calculation that advised the author of the work in question, in first submitting it to the academy, not to present the foregoing system; and he did wisely, his speculations being, we see, not perfectly overwhelming. It was only in giving the essay to the public

that they were inserted, and acknowledged to take their origin (I have shown how mongrelly) from M. Comte, whose proper system is, besides, a theory less of linguistic than of psychology.

To vindicate these strictures I will briefly sketch a substitute, which, at the same time, may prove the value, in relation at least to statistics, of the work before us.

Every theory of general grammar should be based distinctively upon *words* —the psychical substrate of the ideas belonging properly to other sciences. But words must be of different kinds, according to the requisites of discourse. These requisites can be, in number as well as order, but the following:— 1st. To *designate* the objects or the notions to be communicated; 2d. To *distinguish* them from interlocutors; 3d. To *reconnect* them, in the linear series of succession which is organically indispensable in discourse, so as to recompose the specific conception of the speaker in the general comprehension of the hearer. There must be, then, three general descriptions of vocables, to wit,—denominatives, determinatives, and conjunctives.

Again, the things to bé denominated are, in turn, of three species; and so are, consequently, the determinatives and conjunctives. There are sensations of things within the speaker, perceptions of things without him; in fine, conceptions of relation between both those elements of all knowledge. There must, then, be subjective names, objective names, attributive or relational names; or, as the grammars call them, interjections, nouns substantive, and nouns adjective. A corresponding subdivision of the determinatives yields, respectively, the pronoun, the article, and the participle—the former having a subjective, the second an objective, and the third a relational import. In fine, the series of conjunctives presents an equally strict conformity with the preposition, the conjunction, and the adverb—the first connecting subjects, (the *subjective* terms of the proposition;) the next connecting copulas, that is, the substantive or *objective* terms; the last connecting predicates, or the *relational* terms. Here is, then, a positive and quite spontaneous confirmation of our deductions *a priori* from the necessities of discourse. This new arrangement of the parts of speech exhibits further the internal evidence of certain harmonies made immemorially the rules of syntax, but never explained, and of which the principal will be found indicated by the lines in the following diagram:—

Denominatives:	Interjection	— Substantive	— Adjective;	
	|	|	|	
Determinatives:	Pronoun	— Article	— Participle;	} Verb.
	|	|	|	
Conjunctives:	Preposition	— Conjunction	— Adverb.	

The theory is that these several members of the philological series arise progressively, in this double order, at the same time vertical and horizontal, and are also formed from the interjections by the simple process of reduplication. A full analysis of this procedure would test the truth of the foregoing scheme, and would present the proper occasion of bringing psychology to aid philology, as every lower and anterior science is the fittest *evidence* of the succeeding. But such a task, however succinct the performance, would need a volume, and would, moreover, involve additional development of the

diagram. I can at present but note some changes in the distribution of certain vocables, made still more necessary by this change in the common arrangement of the parts of speech, and which will help us to an explanation of the grammatical phenomena which M. Gaussin deems the most anomalous in the Polynesian idiom.

He finds the adverbs of place, time, and direction in abundance, while the conjunction is represented but by two modified prepositions. But this would be in contradiction to the arrangement in the scheme, which presupposes quite the contrary proportion of development. It would, moreover, not well consort with what the author himself states, generally, that the dialects of the Polynesians are found at present in the stage of determinatives, having scarcely advanced to the synthetic series; that is, being, as he describes it, "without *syntax*." But both the conflicts will be removed by the restoration of the "adverbs" in question to their proper place and denomination between the pronouns and the articles; a place, besides, assigned them clearly by their etymology in all languages, and the suspicion of the more sagacious of our grammarians of the classic tongues. The transposition will leave the Polynesian language with no adverbs proper; and our author says it has none, unless the vocables above new-named. The anterior term, too, of the conjunction is scarcely emerging; and the preposition, we have seen, appears in but a few of the simplest applications: all conditions in exact conformity to the progression of the assigned series, as well as also to the social stage of this infant people.

The second order, named of determinatives, is, on the other hand, developed largely, although not yet to the full extent of evolving the article or the verb *to be*. The latter are, in fact, the ultimate generalities of the series. They are both supplied in Polynesian by the "enunciative particles," and sometimes by the same particles alike. This indifference would intimate a kinship between the classes, in accordance with their juxtaposition in the diagram. And, in truth, the verb *to be* is but the article of the participle, as the article is but the similar auxiliary of the substantive—that is to say, a word determinative of its positive existence. For both the participle and the noun are mere abstractions without those prefixes; as is equally the interjection even, I may add, without the pronoun. From the accretion of the various vocables of affixation or determination around the nouns of the primary series, expressive, all of them, of modes of *quality*—namely, subjective objective, relational—resulted the well-known forms called composition and inflection, to be themselves resolved in turn into the syntax proper of the final series.

This slight example will serve to show what a variety of novel views may be laid open by a curious scrutiny of the foregoing schemes, and by then applying it to the seeming anomalies of the Polynesian idiom. Most of these—as M. Gaussin represents them to our wonder—would, I engage, become quite natural to the reader. He would see, for instance, why the pronoun, in Polynesian, refers to subjective, and never to either objective or abstract nouns, (p. 125;) why the article, both definite and indefinite, the numeral nouns, the demonstrative, possessive, and partitive pronouns might be classed in one category, which he, too, entitles "determinatives," (p. 149;) why all varieties of this description involve the idea of the article, (p. 162;) why all

the particles he terms "enunciative" have the import of the verb to be, (p. 203;) why, originally, they were names of a superior *generality*,—which, through this quality, became auxiliaries as well for conjugating as determining,—(p. 219,) &c., &c. By the same procedure, the studious reader might reach spontaneously the rationale, as little known, perhaps, of certain rules of our European syntax. That, for instance, which says the adverb is employed to modify the verb and adjective is well elucidated by the third column of the diagram. So is also the definition that expounds the adverb as "without a regimen and self-significant"—in sole exception (save the interjection) to the parts of speech—explained as strikingly by the *free* position of both these singular exceptions at the opposite extremities of the grammatical series.

In conclusion, M. Gaussin's book is full of interest in point of subject, and seems of general reliability for observation as well as statement. The style has all the French clearness; is so clear, indeed, as to dissemble the undercurrent of confusion both in idea and in arrangement. Nor is the work at all a dry one, considering the theme and the scientific prudery of the author. Without principles of his own, or a general system from any source, he, however, filches in the common axioms of general grammar with such adroitness, as seems to freshen from time to time his statistic details with new reflection. Though useful rather than agreeable, and sound rather than profound, the work is one of the most interesting and instructive on primitive language.

The author speaks with favour, and even acknowledges some obligations to a recent treatise on the same idioms by an American, Horatio Hales. He also mentions a translation of the Testament into Polynesian, of which the honour of the execution is awarded to the Methodist Church.

I HAVE to call your attention to a new treatise on SOCIAL SCIENCE, (*Qu'est ce que la Science Social?* Par COLINS. 2 vols. Paris: Hector Bossange, 25 Quai Voltaire. New-York: 138 Pearl-street.) M. Colins (or "Colins" barely, as he styles himself majestically) is a general officer in retirement for now some twenty years at Paris. All this time and all this leisure, with the opportunities of the locality, superadded to the preparation of a French military education, he has converted to the meditation of the social problems of our epoch. He may be still remembered in America, to which he made a flying visit, in connexion with a project which shows his enterprise, if not invention. He proposed to take off Napoleon from St. Helena in a balloon! but the emperor's brother, then residing at Philadelphia, declined the offer, on the ground that the illustrious prisoner did not desire a covert escape; and M. Colins came off with thanks for his chivalrous project and his pains and perhaps also the decoration, which it seems he bears, of the Legion of Honour. But the remoteness of this date implies, you see, a length of years sufficient to chasten down the speculative ardours of youth, which moreover usually commence, only in men of genius, with balloons; and this experience is attested positively by a reference in the present work to certain papers on a reform of the public administration, which M. Colins had the courage to propose to the government in the year 1810. Another sign, and perhaps still more certain, of intellectual superiority is, that while always an adherent

of the republican school of politics, he has attached himself to none whatever of its various factions in this city. The natural consequence is, that he has been left to live and labour in obscurity, with but a few select followers, including a Belgian ex-Prime Minister. The last I specify as a third and final indication of his merits; for when the conceit of a prime minister allows him to put himself to school in politics, it is assuredly no small compliment to the teacher.

Well, all these promising antecedents, which had been detailed to me by the bearer of the book, would have possibly failed to predispose me to read at all the book of M. Colins; for to the current run of speculations on the subject of politics I have taken a nausea; and then the title—"What is Social Science?"—seemed here to savour of the quack or pamphlet. It should be known, therefore, that the author has disclaimed its ownership, referring it to a suggestion of Girardin, of the *Presse* newspaper—to whom, in fact, it bears an unmistakably filial likeness. But the balance against these prejudices was determined by two circumstances. One is, that the bearer, as alluded to, of the books was no other than His Excellency Major William Tell Poussin, late Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington; and the other, that the work was not presented me for public notice; but, as a letter which accompanied it from the author expressed it flatteringly, to request my private opinion as a fellow philosopher on such subjects. Here, you see, was quite enough to touch a vanity less susceptible to intellectual and European deference than that of Jonathan; and so, of course, I could do no otherwise that set forthwith to peruse the book. But the perusal of a single page would have been sufficient of itself to recommend the work to patient examination. For the present I shall say, however, but few words of its general tenor, as the scheme is waiting a third volume for its completion; and this is to present the theory, which, if at all according to advertisement, will richly merit that I should lay it before your readers in a separate article.

His theory, in fact, is promised to carry social renovation to the length of bending that Ulysses's bow of the reformers of the day—I mean the radical extirpation of pauperism; and not alone of the material, but the "moral pauperism" also, as the author justly designates the popular ignorance. For all this his panacea is *science*—social science; which he rightly understands, however, as involving all other sciences. In the systematic proclamation of this really sovereign and sole remedy, M. Colins is indubitably in advance of M. Comte, who, on the contrary, has turned to preaching a sort of vulgar mysticism. But in the article of *proof* their relative positions may be inverted; and as the one has started principles which he abandons in their consequences, so the other may repeat these consequences without furnishing the antecedents. But of this we can be fairer judges on the appearance of the final volume. Meanwhile, however, I may add (though not, of course, to justify this dubitation, but, on the contrary, to stimulate American interest in the work) that M. Colins undertakes to "demonstrate" the immortality of the soul; not the subjective or humanitarian immortality of M. Comte, but the good old objective immortality of theology. This would even seem a mainspring in his system of "social science." Of this system we have, moreover,

toward the end of the second volume, a certain specimen, which has, I own, not impressed me favourably. It is entitled and introduced by the author himself in the following wise:—

"As a supplement to our knowledge respecting the actual state of society; as a scale of comparison with the different Utopias which we have criticised already, and will criticise again; and as a transition to the society of the future, we proceed to exhibit:

1st. *The general theory of Taxation.*
2d. *The general theory of the organization of Property.*
3d. *The general theory of Associations, whether national or municipal.*"

These expositions have each much interest, much originality, and some truth; but the exact quantum of the latter element I do not undertake to scan at present, in advance of the integral examination of the system.

The volumes before me leave no doubt, however, of the author's merits as a critic. Indeed, I greatly suspect that criticism, not construction, is his forte. He lingers in it through the entire first, and the greater portion of the second, volume. In this survey, most of the publicists of the day of all diversities—from the French Emperor and the Archbishop of Paris, on the one hand, down through the defunct *Doctrinarians* to the extreme left of the *reddest* Socialists—are corrected or confuted with a masterly facility. For this alone the work would be of value in America. And the manner is not less excellent than the matter. The brevity without obscurity, and the sarcasm without gall, have made me laugh as much as Sancho's apothegms in ripping open his master's visions.

Art. IX.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) We had looked with some interest for the account of Bishop Ives's conversion, expecting to find in it *some* plausible reasons—some form at least of logic—in justification of his course of conduct. But "*The Trials of a Mind in its progress to Catholicism*, by L. Silliman Ives, LL. D.," (New-York: Sadlier; 1854; 12mo., pp. 233,) is the weakest possible rehash of old views—of theories and arguments refuted over and over again. It can have no force whatever except against High Church Episcopalians; and even against them, though Bishop Ives *might* have made an invincible argument, he has not talent enough to do it. How a man so clearly narrow and feeble in intellect could ever have been elected a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the nineteenth century, is a problem for Episcopalians to solve.

(2.) "*Is it Possible to make the Best of Both Worlds?* by T. Binney." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1854; 18mo., pp. 287.) This is a "Lecture to Young Men," expanded into a volume full of practical wisdom. Its aim is to show that the present life may be made happy, beautiful, joyous, and fruitful; and at the same time that the best interests of the future life may

be only the more abundantly secured thereby. Not that one can serve both God and mammon; but that the very same principles which must be employed in order to gain the other world, lie at the root of all substantial success in this.

(3.) "*Discourses and Sayings of our Lord Jesus Christ: a Series of Expositions*, by JOHN BROWN, LL.D." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 2 vols., 8vo.; 1854.) These valuable Expositions have already reached a second edition in this country. Of Dr. Brown's characteristic merits and defects as an expositor we have before spoken; and the present work is about of the same stamp with those that have preceded it. The Expositions are true old-fashioned Scottish *lectures*, embracing exegesis, comment, interpretation, exhortation, and historical illustration; and allowing the author to say anything he pleases if it be only *about* his theme. Dr. Brown uses large licence, and makes very large books. They are crowded, too, with matter: most of it excellent, much irrelevant. If these volumes were reduced to half their bulk they would be increased in value.

(4.) "*A History of Greece*, by WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1854; 12mo., pp. 658.) This is a school history of Greece, prepared by a man more highly qualified for the task than any other. It is founded mainly upon Grote, as, indeed, any such book prepared in these days must be. Its great merits, when compared with other school histories, lie in the fact that it views the republics of Greece from a republican standpoint, and that it treats, amply enough for practical purposes, of the history of literature and art—topics which are almost entirely omitted in the ordinary school books. The present edition has had the careful revision of Professor G. W. Greene, who has adapted it for use in American schools, by adding Heeren's geographical summary, and a series of synchronitic tables in an appendix.

(5.) "*The Parish Side*" (New-York: Mason Brothers; 12mo., pp. 258) is a book suggested by "Shady Side" and "Sunny Side," and is an attempt to portray, "in a few sketches, some of the excitements, labours, and trials, experienced on the Parish Side." In point of skill in conception and execution it cannot compare with its predecessors: its main value consists in the light it sheds, incidentally, upon the more private features of village life in New-England. It is in many cases inaccurate, and provincial in language.

(6.) "*Baptism: a Treatise on the Nature, Perpetuity, &c., of the initiatory Ordinance of the Christian Church*, by THOMAS O. SUMMERS." (Richmond: J. Early; 1853; 12mo., pp. 252.) This volume differs from ordinary books on the subject, in treating at some length of the "Administration of Baptism," and of the "Use of Baptism,"—points rarely noticed, or if at all, very inadequately discussed, in the current treatises. It differs from them also, and

very happily, in the clearness of its arrangement, in the aptness with which the joints of the discussion fit each other, and in the discrimination with which important points are brought out strongly, while minor ones are comparatively thrown into abeyance. The first chapter treats of the nature of Baptism, showing that it is at once a federal rite of purification, and also the rite of initiation into the Christian Church,—"necessary to salvation, as no one can be saved who neglects a known duty; but not so necessary but that a man may be saved without it, if nothing but invincible ignorance or insuperable obstacles occasion the neglect." Chapter ii shows that baptism is of perpetual obligation in the Church; and chapter iii, that the Scriptures require it to be conferred upon infants as well as upon believing adults. This chapter is elaborated with great care, and is forcible and convincing, not only in its direct proofs, but also in its replies to Anabaptist objections. Dr. Summers takes the ground, clearly and strongly, that *children are members of the Christian Church*. The fourth chapter gives a rapid historical sketch of the various views that have prevailed with regard to the validity of lay baptism, &c., from the earliest period to the present time. Chapter fifth treats of the "Mode of Baptism" at length, and with great ability. The sixth and last chapter, on the "Use of Baptism," is one of the most valuable in the book. Dr. Summers holds that baptism is not regeneration, nor its necessary condition or instrument; but that it subserves the threefold purpose of signifying to us the mercy and grace of God—of ratifying our title to covenant blessings, and pledging our discharge of the corresponding obligations—and of ministering to our sanctification. He rejects the Calvinistic theory, that only the children of believing parents are to be baptized; and shows, at the same time, that it is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of Calvinism as such. In an appendix Dr. Summers reviews Howell's "Evils of Infant Baptism," with keen discrimination and with some severity. We cordially commend this little volume as one of the best summaries of Christian doctrine on the subject of baptism that has come under our notice.

(7.) "*John Howard and the Prison World of Europe*, by HEPWORTH DIXON." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1854; 18mo., pp. 401.) Mr. Dixon has succeeded better in this work than in his Life of William Penn. It is a little strange that the preparation of a popular life of the great philanthropist should have been left for Mr. Dixon; indeed, though every one has talked of John Howard, few knew anything authentic about him. The author has used all diligence in collecting the materials for this volume, and has worked them up into a narrative generally clear and attractive: presenting Howard's character and actions with great fairness and fulness before the reader. There is one striking deficiency, however: Mr. Dixon has not enough of the Christian element in his own mind to appreciate fully its influence on Howard. In this respect he is like Southey writing the life of Wesley. The defect is to some extent supplied in an introduction to the American edition, by the Rev. R. W. Dickinson, D. D., in which the Christianity of Howard is shown to have been the root of his philanthropic zeal, and the support which kept him up during labours and perils so enormous.

(8.) CARTER'S *Fireside Series* is intended to include interesting and unexceptionable stories, narratives, and descriptions for the young. The last issue that has reached us is a very pretty volume, including the "*Woodcutter of Lebanon*," (pp. 152,) and "*The Exiles of Lucerna*," (pp. 243; R. Carter & Brothers, New-York.)

(9.) "*Successful Men of Modern Times.*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 18mo., pp. 207.) The word "successful" is used in this book in its worldly sense, but in the *best* worldly sense. Its examples include tradesmen, artisans, inventors, artists, scholars, statesmen, &c., and the means by which each triumph was achieved are recorded for the instruction and encouragement of youth.

(10.) "*The Eternal Day*, by the REV. H. BONAR," (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 249,) is composed apparently of lectures, such as Mr. Bonar has been in the habit of publishing, at intervals, for some years past. This volume contains an anticipation and description of the occupations and joys of the future life, expressed in florid and by no means concise language.

(11.) WE have before mentioned with commendation Dr. Lardner's "Handbooks of Natural Philosophy," and have now to name the "*Third Course, including Meteorology and Astronomy.*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1854; 12mo., pp. 768.) Books on these subjects soon become obsolete, from the rapid succession of new discoveries; the present volume brings the facts up to the latest dates. As popular treatises, these books are unrivalled for clearness, fulness, and method; and the copious index, applying to the whole three volumes, gives to the series the character of a compendious cyclopædia of Astronomy and Physics.

(12.) "*History of the French Protestant Refugees*, by C. WEISS, Professor of History, &c., translated by H. W. Herbert." (New-York: Stringer & Townsend; 1854; 2 vols., 12mo.) The design of this work is purely historical, not polemical; and it is therefore of the greater value from the force with which it *incidentally* bears upon the Romish system of propagating Christianity by persecution. The first book takes up the history of the Protestants in France from the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes by Henry IV., and carries it on to the time of the revocation of that edict by Louis XIV. The most illustrious names in French history, and the purest families of its old aristocracy, figure in its pages as refo[illegible]rs: alas, that so many of them were afterward seduced from their allegiance by the attractions of a court from which Protestantism effectually excluded them! The remaining books follow the fortunes of the three hundred thousand noble exiles—warriors, statesmen, scholars, artisans, and merchants—who abandoned the land of their birth and their love, sooner than abandon their God. The different emigrations are treated in order,—first, those to Prussia, then that to England, America, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. The work is executed in a most thorough and

scholarly manner; all the sources of information, public archives, &c., in England, Switzerland, and Holland having been personally examined by Professor Weiss, who has had greater opportunities for the task than have ever before been offered. We cannot speak of the merits of the translation, not having the original book before us; but it is generally fluent and easy. There is a copious appendix on the Huguenots in America, which adds greatly to the value of this edition: making it, in fact, a much more complete book than the translation by another hand recently published in England. The original "Edict of Nantes" and its "Revocation," with many other state-papers connected with the history, are also subjoined. On the whole, the work is one of the richest contributions to the history of Protestantism that has appeared of late years.

(13.) "*Remarkable Examples of Moral Recovery*, edited by ABEL STEVENS." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 18mo., pp. 190.) This little book contains a series of narratives—all facts from real life—designed to show the power of the grace of God in reclaiming even vile offenders, under the most unpromising circumstances. There is one very remarkable account of recovery from intemperance that is worth the price of the book.

(14.) "*The Church and the Ministry*, by WILLIAM S. GRAYSON." (Louisville: Morton & Griswold; 8vo., pp. 102.) Mr. Grayson has a mind of rare acuteness; and if his style were equal to his power of thought, his writings would make a decided impression upon the theology of the times. As it is, we fear that his crude mode of setting forth his thoughts will restrict his books to a very narrow circle of readers. But it is our duty to say that this book is no mere repetition of old commonplaces; it is a fresh, earnest, and vigorous inquiry into the forms of Christianity, with particular reference to the constitution of the Christian ministry, and the doctrine of the apostolical succession. His positions are, 1. That the Scriptures are the constitution of the Church of Christ; 2. That whenever Christian people organize themselves according to this constitution, they are the Church of Christ. He holds that episcopacy is taught in the Scriptures as a cardinal element of Church organization; and therefore he is an Episcopalian. But he does not hold to the apostolical succession; and therefore he is a *Methodist* Episcopalian—not a follower of the Church of Rome or the Church of England. The pamphlet deserves a wider circulation than it is likely to receive.

(15.) "*The Constitutional Text-Book*" (New-York: C. S. Francis & Co.; 1854; 12mo., pp. 503) might with much more propriety have been styled "Selections from the writings of Daniel Webster, with an Appendix, containing the Constitution of the United States;" for, out of the whole book, four hundred and thirty-six pages are occupied with passages from Webster's speeches, many of which are, in our judgment, anything but just and adequate expositions of the constitution.

(16.) "*Dr. Grant and the Mountain Nestorians*, by the REV. THOMAS LAURIE." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 1853; 12mo., pp. 417.) The topics of this book make it interesting in spite of unskilful handling. Dr. Grant was a man of much character, and admirably fitted for a work requiring not only piety, but sagacity, firmness, and courage. The book gives a fair sketch of his life and labours, with a good deal of information about the Nestorians. In the hands of an artist, it would have proved one of the most attractive books of the time: even as it is, it is a most valuable one.

(17.) IN our number for April, 1853, we noticed with commendation "*Pastoral Theology; or, the Theory of the Evangelical Ministry*, by A. VINET," translated by D. Skinner. We are glad to see that a second edition of the work has been already called for. (New-York: Ivison & Phinney; 12mo., pp. 387.)

(18.) "*The Words of Jesus*" (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 131) is a series of practical religious lessons founded on sayings of our Lord, and intended to form daily readings for a month. They are very full of comfort and instruction.

(19.) ONE of the last labours of the venerable WILLIAM JAY, of Bath, was the preparation for the press of a course of "*Lectures on Female Scripture Characters*," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1854; 12mo., pp. 351:) indeed, while the last sheet was passing through the press, the man of God was summoned to his rest. He died December 27, 1853, aged eighty-four. The lectures here given were delivered nearly fifty years ago, while the author was in the opening prime of his powers; and they have the freshness, ease of style, and spiritual life which characterize all his practical writings.

(20.) "*Vara; or, the Child of Adoption*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 316) is a sort of religious novel. The heroine is a missionary's daughter who comes back from the East to get an education under the charge and patronage of an every-day American family, in which she meets with much kindness and many mishaps. By-and-by she blooms out into a lovely girl, and finds, too, an uncle who had defrauded her out of a large fortune. Very pious, very accomplished, very beautiful, she is all that a model heroine ought to be; and finally marries a fine cousin, a young preacher, and goes off with him into [redacted]sionary life. The story is well told, and some very effective points are made. On the whole we doubt the utility of this class of books.

(21.) M. GUIZOT has furnished another instalment of his "History of the English Revolution," which is translated under the title of the "*History of Oliver Cromwell and the English Commonwealth, from the Execution of Charles I. to the Death of Cromwell.*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1854;

2 vols. 12mo.) It is marked by all the well-known merits of M. Guizot's style—clearness of arrangement, aptness of expression, and moderation of feeling. At the same time it is not a full and true history of Cromwell: wide and comprehensive as M. Guizot's historical knowledge is, and careful as he has been in the use of his materials, he is not competent to write that history. He applies, throughout, the maxims and the methods of the school of politicians of which he has long been the brightest ornament, to the acts of a man and the events of a time in which that school would have found itself entirely out of place. The book, nevertheless, is a valuable contribution toward the history of one of the greatest men—if not the greatest man—that England has produced; and, at the same time, is full of interest from the strong undertone of severe criticism upon Louis Napoleon's usurpation that pervades it throughout.

(22.) "*Purple Tints of Paris*, by BAYLE ST. JOHN." (New-York: Riker, Thorne, & Co.; 1854; 12mo., pp. 446.) This volume contains a great deal of pleasant writing about the ways of men in Paris, by one well acquainted with that city of cities. Though much of the work treats of comparatively little things, it contains some discussions of the gravest topics; and the author shows that he has *thought* as well as observed. He comes to the conclusion that the chief explanation of the calamitous vicissitudes of the social history of the French is to be found in their general disregard, both practical and theoretical, of the sacredness of marriage.

(23.) "*The Life and Labours of St. Augustine*" (New-York: J. C. Riker; 1854; 12mo., pp. 150) is a translation, admirably made by the Rev. T. C. Porter, of a sketch of Augustine by Dr. Schaff, originally published in the "Kirchen-freund." It is not offered as a complete monograph—the doctrinal part of the subject being hardly touched upon—but is designed rather for the general reader than for the scholar. It is clearly conceived and vigorously expressed.

(24.) "*The Two Records*, by HUGH MILLER," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 1854; 12mo., pp. 46,) is a lecture explaining and reconciling the two histories of Creation—the Mosaic and the Geological. After giving a clear statement of the schemes of Chalmers and Pye Smith, and showing their inadequacy in the present state of geological science, Mr. Miller states his own,—namely, that, "if taking the Mosaic days as equivalent to lengthened periods, we hold that, in giving their brief history, the inspired writer seized on both those salient points that, like the two great lights of the day and night, would have arrested most powerfully during those periods a human eye, we shall find the harmony of the two records complete." The lecture is marked by Hugh Miller's well-known admirable powers of conception and description.

(25.) "*Russia as it is*, by COUNT A. DE GUROWSKI," (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 12mo., pp. 312,) certainly gives a clearer account of the internal

condition of Russia, and of the organization and operation of the government, than we have seen elsewhere. The author is a scholar, has been a man of action, and has had a wide experience in political life, subterranean and other. But his mind is full of the dream of Panslavism, and all his facts are drawn up in array to prove that this dream is a reality. The book is written more in the tone and spirit of the old Pagan idea of the State and of races, than of Christian civilization. Count Gurowski believes that Czarism has reached its zenith in the person of Nicholas, and that, from this point of culmination, it must begin to decline. He paints the *present* character of Nicholas in very dark colours, and considers that his personal tendencies, and even the enormity of his power, are signs of the approaching and hastening decay. He finds grounds for his theory in the state of the nobility, the army, the clergy, the *bourgeoisie*, the peasantry,—in short, in every class of Russian society. It appears to be his opinion that Russia will conquer in the present war; and that, with the possession of Constantinople, the destinies of the nation, of Czarism, and of Europe, will enter upon a new phase. The work is, we repeat, written to serve the interest of a special theory; but, if the reader will keep that fact in view, and make suitable deductions on account of it, he will find here a large amount of valuable and well-digested information.

(26.) "*A Plea for Infant Baptism*, by the REV. MOSES HILL, A. M.," (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 18mo., pp. 143,) is a brief, clear, and forcible treatise. The plan of the argument is,—first, to show that the Abrahamic covenant is continued into the gospel dispensation; and, secondly, that infants are therefore entitled to baptism as members of the Church. We are glad to see books of this class multiplied; and hope that the time is not far distant when both the theory and practice of our Church with regard to children will be greatly amended.

(27.) MESSRS. CARTER & BROTHERS have issued a new and neat edition of "*Emblems, Divine and Moral*, by FRANCIS QUARLES." (1854; 12mo., pp. 323.) No one who knows the keen wit, the evangelic piety, and the poetic genius of quaint old Quarles, would be without a copy of his famous book, even at great cost: and it is here offered in a form at once pretty and cheap.

(28.) IN Bohn's Illustrated Library (New-York: Bangs, Brother & Co., 13 Park Row) we have a new edition of "*Dante, translated into English Verse*, by J. C. WRIGHT, M. A.," (12mo., pp. 460,) with an introduction, notes, and Flaxman's illustrations, engraved on steel. For general reading this is, perhaps, the most convenient edition of Dante now extant in English.—In the Standard Library we receive "*The Carafas of Maddaloni*," an interesting account of the vicissitudes of a noble Neapolitan family, "combined with the history of Naples during the period of its subjection to Spain; including many details of the Masaniello rebellion, which have not before been brought into notice."—The Antiquarian Library furnishes us, for the first time, with an

English version of the "*Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy*, by ORDERICUS VITALIS;" (2 vols., 12mo.) Ordericus was a monk of the twelfth century, born in England, but educated in Normandy. His history is a medley of facts, traditions, adventures, and letters, brought together almost without plan or order; and yet, according to M. Guizot, "no book contains so much and such valuable information on the history of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, on the political state, both civil and religious, of society in the west of Europe, and on the manners of the times, whether feudal monastic, or popular." The translation is made from the Paris edition commenced in 1838.

(29.) "*An Historical Text-Book and Atlas of Biblical Geography*, by LYMAN COLEMAN." (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co.; large 8vo., pp. 319.) As a manual on the subjects indicated by its title, this work is far beyond anything heretofore published in English. It contains eight maps of the Bible lands, showing their condition, political divisions, &c., at the different periods of their history. The maps are founded on Kiepert's,—the best extant,—with such modifications as later travels and researches make necessary. The text consists of two Parts,—the first, treating of the Old Testament; the second, of the New,—and, under each, the history and geography are treated *together*, as they should always be studied. To read history without geography is to put out one of your eyes.

A rapid glance at the work in all its parts, has sufficed to show us its remarkable adaptation for use in instruction. There are points in which we think the author has erred in his conclusions, but they are of minor interest; and it is more important for us to press the value of his book upon teachers than to criticise it minutely. One would think that in a Christian land the history and geography of the Bible would form a main branch of study for youth; yet "what school or academy, even when proposing a course of study peculiarly select and religious—what college or theological seminary even—includes in its plan of study the geography and history of the Bible?" The pretence that text-books are wanting can avail no longer; here is one in every way adapted to the object. Nay, even any "Bible or Sunday-school class might study this book with sufficient thoroughness, by appropriating to it one lesson in a week for a single year." We hope it will find its way into our Christian families, and into our schools of all classes, as the best aid to a knowledge of the facts and places of the Bible.

(30.) "*The Withered Leaf*" is a beautiful memorial of a lovely child—early developed both in heart and mind, and early taken home. It is at the same time a lesson to parents as to the true method of Christian nurture.

(31.) "*Mabel Grant*" (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1854; 18mo., pp. 346) is a very pretty Highland story, illustrating the Christian graces in their effect upon family life. It may be placed with entire safety and advantage in any child's hands.

(32.) THERE is a new poet in England, GERALD MASSEY, who was born in May, 1828, at Tring, in Herts, the son of a canal boatman. At eight years of age he went into a silk-factory, and toiled for years from five in the morning till half-past six in the evening. Hear his own description of his child-life: "Having had to earn my own dear bread," he says, "by the eternal cheapening of flesh and blood thus early, I never knew what childhood meant. I had no childhood. Ever since I can remember, I have had the aching fear of want, throbbing in heart and brow. The currents of my life were early poisoned, and few, methinks, would pass unscathed through the scenes and circumstances in which I have lived; none, if they were as curious and precocious as I was. The child comes into the world like a new coin with the stamp of God upon it; and in like manner as the Jews sweat down sovereigns, by hustling them in a bag to get gold-dust out of them, so is the poor man's child hustled and sweated down in this bag of society to get wealth out of it; and even as the impress of the queen is effaced by the Jewish process, so is the image of God worn from heart and brow, and day by day the child recedes devil-ward. I look back now with wonder, not that so few escape, but that any escape at all, to win a nobler growth for their humanity. So blighting are the influences which surround thousands in early life, to which I can bear such bitter testimony." His mother taught him to read the Bible, Bunyan, Crusoe, and Wesleyan tracts. At fifteen he came to London as an errand-boy; and now, for the first time, books were plenty, and he soon began to live in a new world. He read at all times and in all places,—at the bookstalls, in the shop, in bed, even till two and three o'clock in the morning. Soon after he began to write verse, his mind opened for the first time to the miseries of the social state of England, as seen from the workingman's point of view. "New power came to me with all that I saw, and thought, and read. I studied political works,—such as Paine, Volney, Howitt, Louis Blanc, &c., which gave me another element to mould into my verse, though I am convinced that a poet must sacrifice much if he write party-political poetry. His politics must be above the pinnacle of party zeal,—the politics of eternal truth, right, and justice. He must not waste a life on what to-morrow may prove to have been merely the question of a day. The French Revolution of 1848 had the greatest effect on me of any circumstance connected with my own life. It was scarred and blood-burned into the very core of my being. This little volume of mine is the fruit thereof."

"*The Ballad of Babe Christabel, with Other Poems,*" (London: Bogue; pp. 165,) is a collection of Massey's pieces, which had been generally published in cheap journals, such as "The Spirit of Freedom," "The Christian Socialist," &c.,—journals little known in the so-called respectable circles. He has but two themes, Love and Freedom. His lyrics of love are full of tenderness, and have many passages of exquisite and unrivalled beauty. Savage Landor says that many of Massey's thoughts and expressions remind him of Shakspeare in the best of his sonnets; to ourselves, the new poet seems to be a cross between Burns and Shakspeare. He is full of faults, and some of them are very grave and weighty; but he has the true creative faculty, a mind teeming with images, an exuberant and even excessive fancy, a music of

rhythm, and a strength of nerve unrivalled in recent times. The chief poem in the volume is simply an account of the birth, brief life and death of a child. We destroy the effect by separating any of its single gems from the rich setting of this almost perfect poem. The Babe Christabel is born of poor parents, and throws a gleam of Heaven's light into their humble home.

"But she was one of those who come
With pledged promise not to stay
Long, ere the angels let them stray
To nestle down in earthly home.

"And, through the windows of her eyes,
We often saw her saintly soul,
Serene, and sad, and beautiful,
Go sorrowing for lost Paradise."

The following stanzas, on the death of the child, are exquisitely tender and touching:—

"In this dim world of clouding cares,
We rarely know, till wilder'd eyes
See white wings lessening up the skies,
The angels with us unawares.

"And thou hast stolen a jewel, Death!
Shall light thy dark up like a star,
A beacon kindling from afar
Our light of love, and fainting faith.

"Through tears it gleams perpetually,
And glitters through the thickest glooms,
Till the eternal morning comes
To light us o'er the Jasper Sea.

"With our best branch in tenderest leaf,
We 've strewn the way our Lord doth come;
And, ready for the harvest-home,
His reapers bind our ripest sheaf.

"Our beautiful bird of light hath fled:
Awhile she sat with folded wings—
Sang round us a few hoverings—
Then straightway into glory sped."

The Poems of Freedom are full of fiery vehemence; sometimes, indeed, terrible in wrath; yet the poet's spirit of love even here prevails over his despair and bitterness. The following has the true lyrical ring and rhythm:—

"THE CHIVALRY OF LABOUR.

"Uprouse ye now, brave brother-band,
With honest heart, and working hand;
We are but few, toil-tried, and true,
Yet hearts beat high to dare and do:
And who would not a champion be
In labour's lordlier chivalry?

"We fight! but bear no bloody brand,
We fight to free our fatherland:
We fight that smiles of love may glow
On lips where curses quiver now!
Hurrah! hurrah! true knights are we
In labour's lordlier chivalry.

"O! there be hearts that ache to see
The day-dawn of our victory;
Eyes full of heart-break with us plead,
And watchers weep and martyrs bleed:
O! who would not a champion be
In labour's lordlier chivalry?

"Work, brothers mine; work, hand and brain;
We'll win the golden age again;
And love's millennial morn shall rise
In happy hearts, and blessed eyes.
Hurrah! hurrah! true knights are we
In labour's lordlier chivalry."

The following might have been written on our own soil, in view of the passage of the Nebraska Bill:—

"TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW.

"High hopes that burn'd like stars sublime,
Go down i' the heavens of freedom;
And true hearts perish in the time
We bitterliest need 'em!
But never sit we down and say,
There's nothing left but sorrow;
We walk the wilderness to-day,
The promised land to-morrow.

"Our birds of song are silent now,
There are no flowers blooming!
Yet life beats in the frozen bough,
And freedom's spring is coming!
And freedom's tide comes up alway,
Though we may strand in sorrow;
And our good bark, aground to-day,
Shall float again to-morrow.

"Through all the long, dark night of years
The people's cry ascendeth,
And earth is wet with blood and tears;
But our meek sufferance endeth!
The few shall not forever sway,
The many moil in sorrow:
The powers of hell are strong to-day,
But Christ shall rise to-morrow.

"Though hearts brood o'er the past, our eyes
With smiling futures glisten!
For, lo! our day bursts up the skies:
Lean out your souls, and listen!
The world rolls freedom's radiant way,
And ripens with her sorrow:
Keep heart! who bear the cross to-day,
Shall wear the crown to-morrow.

"O youth! flame-earnest, still aspire,
With energies immortal!
To many a heaven of desire
Our yearning opes a portal!
And though age wearies by the way,
And hearts break in the furrow,
We'll sow the golden grain to-day,—
The harvest comes to-morrow.

"Build up heroic lives, and all
Be like a sheathen sabre,
Ready to flash out at God's call,
O chivalry of labour!
Triumph and toil are twins; and aye
Joy suns the cloud of sorrow;
And 't is the martyrdom to-day,
Brings victory to-morrow."

We conclude this hasty notice in the language of Walter Savage Landor: "Here is such poetry as the generous Laureate will read with approbation; such poetry as Jeffrey would have tossed aside with derision, and as Gifford would have torn to pieces with despair. Can anything more or better be said for it?"

(33.) CHARLES DICKENS'S "*Child's History of England*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 2 vols., 18mo.,) of which we spoke very favourably some time since, is now completed by the publication of the second volume. It brings the story down to the revolution of 1688, and is a model of history-writing for children.

(34.) "*The Dietetics of the Soul*, by E. VON FEUCHTERSLEBEN, M. D." (New-York: C. S. Francis & Co.; 1854; 18mo., pp. 214,) is a series of fragments, rather than a connected treatise, upon the regimen of the moral powers and their relation to physical health. It abounds in acute and valuable observations—sometimes, however, stated too strongly, and, in a few cases, extravagantly. To the more thoughtful and cultivated class of minds it will be very acceptable and suggestive.

(35.) "*Orr's Circle of the Sciences*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1854) is to contain a series of treatises on every branch of human knowledge, published in parts. The first and second number are before us, containing a treatise, by the editor, on the nature, connexion, and uses of the great departments of human knowledge, and another by the Editor and Professor Owen, on the physiology of animal and vegetable life. If continued in the same spirit, the work will be very valuable.

(36.) WE are late in receiving "*The Life of Henry B. Bascom*, D. D. LL. D., by the REV. M. M. HENKLE, D. D. (Louisville: Morton & Griswold; 12mo., pp. 402.) The preparation of this biography has been made a difficult task to Dr. Henkle, by the want of suitable material. Dr. Bascom kept no diary, except during a few brief periods, and the writer has been able to gather but

scanty information from other sources. It is, nevertheless, a very interesting book. The early struggles of the poor boy to prepare for the work of the ministry amid all possible forms of discouragement—the constant and self-sacrificing efforts of the man to support a feeble father and his helpless family—the triumphs and successes of the popular orator—these are themes that kindle the writer, as they will animate the reader. But the impression of the book on the whole is a sad and painful one. Dr. Bascom's difficulties, pecuniary and other, commenced in early life; he bore the burden without complaint through life, and died at last under its pressure. It is clear enough that he had little or no financial talent; and his peculiar manners and habits, as described by his biographer, were not calculated to make him "a man of many friends."

Dr. Henkle seems to be satisfied that Dr. Bascom did not recite his sermons from memory; and even that he did not elaborate the language of separate passages, and commit them. We have always been of a different impression, and remain so still. It is a little unfortunate that Dr. Henkle should quote (p. 218) a passage given in a newspaper as a specimen of Bascom's eloquence, which is taken, almost verbatim, from Watson's Sermons, (vol. i, pp. 66, 67.)

(37.) "*Charles Roussel*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1854; 18mo.) is a very pretty story, illustrating the advantages of industry and honesty, and even setting forth a higher moral, abridged from the French of Porchat, author of the admirable sketch entitled "Three Months under the Snow."

(38.) "*Advanced Latin Exercises*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 1854; 18mo., pp. 162) forms a part of Schmitz & Zumpt's excellent "Classical Series." The present volume contains exercises for practice in writing Latin, and also lessons for reading, extracted from Cicero. The rules of order and syntax, mainly from Zumpts' Grammar, are too cumbrous for practice in elementary instruction.

(39.) "*Select Speeches of Kossuth.*" (New-York: C. S. Francis & Co.; 12mo., pp. 345.) This volume consists mainly of Kossuth's speeches in America, condensed and abridged by Kossuth's express sanction. It has become the fashion with the sham democracy of America—that democracy which upholds slavery at home and sympathizes with all sorts of despotism abroad—to undervalue Kossuth's talents no less than his political sagacity. This book is enough to shame the whole tribe, if such a thing could be. It contains more true oratory, more profound political wisdom, more far-reaching insight into the course of events, than any book of speeches ever published to our knowledge. Already many of Kossuth's predictions have been translated into history, and before the year closes many more will be fulfilled.

(40.) MESSRS. CARLTON & PHILLIPS have just issued a new and neat edition of "*The Doctrine of the Trinity; or, a Check to Modern Arianism*, by the REV. HIRAM MATTISON, A. M." (18mo., pp. 162.) This compact little

treatise is especially adapted to the views of the so-called Christians, but is of value in the general controversy with anti-Trinitarians as well. It deserves even a still wider circulation than it has already received.

(41.) "*Home Truths*, by the REV. J. C. RYLE." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 18mo., pp. 292.) This little volume contains a series of lectures to a country congregation, by one of the most faithful and pungent preachers of the gospel now alive in the Church of England. It is full of fire, spirit, and evangelical feeling.

(42.) "PHILLIPS, SAMPSON & CO., have reprinted the "*Critical and Miscellaneous Writings* of T. NOON TALFOURD," (Boston: 1854; 8vo., pp. 175,) with additional articles never before published in this country. The recent death of the genial author will attract many readers to this collected and now tolerably complete edition of his miscellanies.

(43.) "*Despotism in America*, by RICHARD HILDRETH," (Boston: J. P. Jewett & Co.; 1854; 12mo., pp. 307,) is an inquiry into the nature, results, and legal basis of the slaveholding system in the United States. After an introduction giving a historical sketch of the progress of democracy in America, and showing that the northern states are in fact democratic—at least approximately—and the southern aristocratic, Mr. Hildreth treats his main subject under five heads: first, the relation of master and slave, in which he sets forth the origin of slavery, the dominion it gives to one man over another, the means of resistance on the part of the oppressed, and the perils to both parties of so unnatural and so unjust a relation. The second chapter treats of the political results of the slaveholding system, as affecting the security, liberty, equality, education, and military strength of the dominant class in the slave states. Chapter iii sets forth its economical results, with reference to wealth, agriculture, manufactures, &c.; and chapter fourth shows its *personal* results upon the character and habits of the privileged and unprivileged classes. The fifth chapter is a close scrutiny of the *legal basis* of the slaveholding system, with a demonstration of the unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. The book is a repertory of fact and argument on the whole question; and though we find views and opinions in it (apart from the main question) from which we differ fundamentally, we yet hope it will be widely circulated both in the North and South.

(44.) "*History of the Apostolic Church, with a General Introduction to Church History*, by PHILIP SCHAFF." (New-York: C. Scribner; 1854; 8vo., pp. 684.) Our readers are well prepared to judge of Professor Schaff's competency to write Church History, from his very able contributions on that subject to our own pages at different times. The present volume is, in our judgment, unquestionably the ablest history of the Apostolic Church that has ever been written. We have given a brief judgment of it before in its Ger-

man dress; the present translation, by the Rev. E. D. Yeomons, gives not only a true version of the original, but preserves its spirit, character, and sprightliness to a degree very rare indeed in translations. With this general and strong commendation prefixed, we must state certain points of equally strong objection. His theory of organic development, legitimately carried out, will lead ultimately and inevitably either to Romanism or to infidelity. Dr. Schaff does *not* carry it out logically and exclusively; but takes along with it a full belief of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity as overruling elements in history; but others may be more consistent, and in their hands his doctrine will be very dangerous. In consequence of this theory, Professor Schaff is everywhere disposed to deal leniently with Romanism, and even to apologize for some of its greatest errors and vices. The dream of absolute historical unity must be carried out, even at the expense of the facts of history and the laws of religious morality. Some of the most objectionable passages of this edition are not found in the German. The reader who understands these positions, and is able to guard himself against their perilous seductions, will find in this volume, as we have already said, the fullest and most scientific account of the Apostolic Church, and the best introduction to general Church History that has ever been published in any language.

(45.) THE publications of the Methodist Sunday-School Union, under the indefatigable hand of Dr. Kidder, have been even more than commonly prolific and valuable during the last quarter. Among them are "*The Greek and Eastern Churches*," (18mo., pp. 220,) a very timely book, giving, in a brief but clear form, an account of the history, faith, and worship of the Greek and Russian Churches. It will be seen from this book how little will be gained to Christianity by the triumph of Czar Nicholas in the war he is now so unrighteously urging.—"*Friendly Appeals*" (18mo., pp. 232) is a collection of wise advices upon the conduct of life; needing no other recommendation than the name of "Old Humphrey," which appears upon its title-page as author.—"*The Bible in Many Tongues*" (18mo., pp. 216) is a literary biography, so to speak, of the Bible; and a history of its translations and versions in ancient and modern times. It gives, in brief, a large amount of religious and historical information.—"*Old Edinburgh*" (18mo., pp. 208) is a series of interesting historical sketches of events happening at the ancient metropolis of Scotland.—"*Alexander the Great*" (18mo., pp. 208) is one of the admirable series of historical books for the young prepared only for the London Religious Tract Society.—"*Remarkable Escapes from Peril*" (18mo., pp. 171) illustrates the providence of God by a number of strange but well-authenticated facts.—"*Australia*" (18mo., pp. 207) is a sketch of the scenery, natural history, and resources of that remarkable country, with a glance at its gold fields—the best account of Australia, in small compass, that has come under our notice.—"*Old Crag*" (18mo., pp. 216) is an authentic tale illustrating the advantages of rural life, and the dangers and exposures of factory operatives in New-England. This little book we read through at a sitting; and found ourselves well repaid. It is, however, marred by frequent provincialisms of expression.

(46.) If the German contains many books for children as pure in moral tone and excellent in plan as "*The Neighbour's Children*," (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1854; 18mo., pp. 266,) we shall be glad to see the treasure drawn upon more largely. The translator (Mrs. Sarah A. Myers) has rare aptitude for this kind of work: the narrative runs on as smoothly and gracefully as if the work were an original. Our young readers will do well to find out her books as they come from the press.

(47.) "*Sketch of Rev. Philip Gatch, prepared by Hon.* JOHN M'LEAN," (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Poe; 18mo., pp. 185,) is an account of one of the fathers of Methodism, prepared, to a considerable extent, from his own journals. It is put together without much order or method, but the intrinsic interest of the subject carries the reader along with the narrative. We give the concluding paragraph of the book, inserting one little word of our own in italics:—

"Will Methodist preachers *not* forget their college lessons, and study human nature, by learning the method of the pioneers of Methodism? This method, pursued by devoted lives and sanctified hearts, will subdue the world."

Our emendation, we think, improves the sense of the passage, but not its form.

(48.) "*Noah and his Times:* by the Rev. J. M. OLMSTEAD, M. A." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1854; 12mo., pp. 414.) This book contains a series of lectures on the antediluvian and earlier postdiluvian periods of history; treating of several of the leading questions of the present day, such as the extent of the Deluge, the Death Penalty, the Origin of Language, and the Unity of the Human Race. Mr. Olmstead gives a fair resumé of the literature of each of these topics, and argues temperately for the conclusions to which he himself has come.

(49.) "*Family Prayers*, by the author of 'Morning and Night Watches.'" (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 356.) This volume contains a form of prayer for every morning and evening of the month, with a number of occasional prayers. It is, in most respects, the best work of its kind that we have seen; the prayers are not too long, nor too formal, nor too familiar. But for a tinge of Calvinistic theology pervading the book, we could recommend it without reserve for the use of families in which forms of prayer are *needed*.

(50.) "*A Month in England*, by HENRY T. TUCKERMAN," (New-York: Redfield, 1853; 12mo., pp. 243,) is the title of a scholarly book, not of travel, but of descriptions of the choicest spots in England, seen "through the medium of the associations we derive from English authors." It is, in fact, a series of highly-finished essays on British places, men, and arts—grouped about topographical centres.

(51.) THE last volume of Bohn's "Classical Library" which has reached us contains "*The Treatises of M. T. Cicero, on the Nature of the Gods; on Divination; on Fate; on the Republic; and on the Laws.*" (New-York: Banga, Brother & Co., 13 Park Row.) The version here used is principally a revision of Barham's translation, published in 1841.—The "Standard Library" gives us Smith's "*Theory of Moral Sentiments,*" in a new edition, with Dugald Stewart's Biographical and Critical Memoir of the Author. In the "Ecclesiastical Library" we have a reprint of "*The Ecclesiastical History of Socrates Scholasticus,*" (1 vol., 12mo., pp. 449.) We have also received "*The Politics and Economics of Aristotle,* translated by EDWARD WALFORD, M. A." (Bohn's Classical Library.) The translation is founded on Ellis's version, carefully revised; and prefixed to the version we have Dr. Gillies' Introductory Essay and Life of Aristotle. There is no ancient author so well adapted to the intellectual wants of this age as Aristotle; and his Politics especially contain a mine of practical wisdom. In the present volume the mere English reader will find a version so carefully and accurately prepared as to place him *almost* in the position of those who can read the original. In fact, with few exceptions, the translations given in Bohn's Classical Library combine literary accuracy with readableness to a degree very rare in such works.

(52.) "*Harry's Ladder to Learning*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers) contains a horn-book profusely illustrated, with a large collection of nursery-rhymes, and little stories for children. It is full of attractive cuts, and is admirably adapted to tempt children to learn to read.

(53.) "*A Selection from the Correspondence of Thomas Chalmers, D. D.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 12mo., pp. 504.) There are some men concerning whom we wish to learn everything that can be known; and Dr. Chalmers is one of them. The letters given in this volume are throughout characteristic of the fervid enthusiastic feeling and discursive mind of the great Scotchman.

(54.) "*History of the City of New-York,* by DAVID T. VALENTINE." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 8vo., pp. 504.) Mr. Valentine enjoys very great advantages for the prosecution of the work he has undertaken, namely, to trace the progress of the city of New-York in such a manner as to illustrate to the reader of the present day its gradual development from a wilderness condition, through its maturing stages, as hamlet, village, and city. The present volume carries the history down to 1750. It is very minute in its accounts of the early settlers and their ways, and abounds in details full of interest to New-Yorkers.

(55.) "*Glad Tidings,* by the Rev. W. K. TWEEDIE, D. D., (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 1854; 18mo., pp. 275,) contains a series of Daily Meditations, designed to foster personal religion, considered not as a theory or a doctrine,

but as taught to the individual soul by the Holy Spirit. The brief expositions of Scripture here given are generally rich in spirituality, and full both of instruction and comfort.

(56.) FOR thirty years the name of Sir Hudson Lowe has been the synonyme of vulgar barbarity. Promises were made, again and again, during his lifetime, that he would publish a complete vindication of his conduct at St. Helena; but the unfortunate man lived long enough to find himself deserted and neglected by the very British cabinet whose tool he had been, and at last, old, weary, and despised, he died and left no sign. At last an attempt has been made to remove at least a portion of the obloquy that covers his unhappy name, in a "*History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena, from the Letters and Journals of the late Sir Hudson Lowe*, by WILLIAM FORSYTH, M. A." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 2 vols., 12mo.) Mr. Forsyth, throughout this elaborate work, is the *advocate* of Sir Hudson Lowe; but it had been better even for the fame of his client that his plea had never been published. The book only relieves Sir Hudson by throwing the odium of his barbarity toward Napoleon upon the British government; but a high-minded man would never have taken the post of gaoler to the conquered Emperor, under such regulations as those which were put on the Governor of St. Helena. It is clear, moreover, from the book itself, that mean and cruel as the Prince Regent and Bathurst showed themselves, their severe rules were aggravated in the execution by Sir Hudson's low and narrow-minded conceptions of his duty. Like every book written about Napoleon—from whatever point of view—the book is even fascinating in interest.

(57.) PIERRE TOUSSAINT was born a slave in St. Domingo, and died a respected citizen of New-York, full of years and of honours. His life was a beautiful specimen of Christian purity and self-denial. The record of it, given in the "*Memoir of Pierre Toussaint*," (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co.; 1854; 18mo., pp. 124,) is written in the best style of the author of "Three Experiments of Living."

(58.) "*Memoirs of John Abernethy*, F. R. S., by GEORGE M'ILWAIN." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 434.) Dr. Abernethy was not only one of the best practising physicians and surgeons of his time, but a discoverer and legislator in the science of medicine. This book gives a fair account of his professional labours and successes; and his eccentricities afford spice enough to make it very attractive to general readers.

(59.) "*Clinton, a Book for Boys*, by WILLIAM SIMONDS," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 1854; 18mo., pp. 275,) is a pretty story, designed to illustrate the importance of early habits of obedience, industry, and virtue. It is attractive in form, and its moral tone is unexceptionable. It is disfigured, however, by several provincial and ungrammatical forms of expression.

(60.) AMERICAN elementary books of geography are far superior to those produced in England. New editions have just been issued of the "*First Book in Geography*, by ROSWELL C. SMITH, A.M.," and of "*Geography in the Productive System*," by the same author. (New-York: Daniel Burgess & Co.) The statistical tables, and the maps in the accompanying atlases are brought down to the year 1851. Mr. Smith might have been a *little* more careful and accurate in his table of the religious denominations of the United States.

(61.) "*A Memoir of the late Rev. William Croswell, D. D.*," (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 8vo. pp., 528) is a touching memorial of a noble son, written by an excellent father. Dr. Croswell was a man of fine tastes and culture; much more of a poet than a theologian; and, like most ecclesiastical men in whom the æsthetic sense predominates over the rational faculties, his views of worship were Puseyite. But he was a good, honest, active spirit; and his works do follow him.

(62.) DAVIDSON'S "*Connexion of Sacred and Profane History*" has been republished by Messrs. Carter & Brothers, (1854; 3 vols., 12mo.) It is not, in our judgment, worth the reprinting.

(63.) "*The Hearth-Stone*, by SAMUEL OSGOOD," (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 1854; 12mo., pp. 290,) is a series of essays upon home life and home duties in our American cities. It is throughout admirable both in thought and expression: no modern author excels Mr. Osgood in aptitude for this species of writing. The chapter on the "Education of Daughters" is worth the whole price of the volume.

(64.) "*Right of the Bible in our Public Schools*, by GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 303.) This is an "argument constructed with special reference to some laboured and plausible endeavours to commend to the Christian community the banishment of the Bible and of religious instruction from our common schools." It contains the usual arguments for the use of the Scriptures in education, and applies them to the practical question now before the people of New-York. The work is especially valuable for the history of the controversy, which it gives copiously, and, we think, fairly.

(65.) "*The Law and the Testimony*, by the author of the 'Wide, Wide World.'" (New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers; 1853; 8vo., pp. 840. This large volume contains a collection of passages of Scripture, illustrating a certain set of theological topics. They were arranged by two young persons as a Sunday task or pleasure—and the heads run into each other somewhat. The book may be very useful, however, to those who use it in a right spirit.

ART. X.—RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

BLACKADER & Co. (London) announce a collection of "*Papers in Theology and Biblical Criticism*," by above twenty distinguished writers, (8vo., pp. 800,) embracing the most important and valuable articles that have appeared in the "Journal of Sacred Literature" since 1848. We regret to learn that DR. KITTO, late editor of that Journal, and for the last twenty-five years a most faithful labourer in the field of Biblical learning, is suffering from a severe attack of paralysis.

THAT part of the last Census of Great Britain which refers to Religious Worship, brings to light many interesting results. It appears that on the day of the Census, March 30, 1851, the population of England and Wales was seventeen millions, nine hundred and twenty-seven thousand six hundred and nine. Of this population there were, on that day, ten millions eight hundred and ninety-six thousand and sixty-six persons attending public worship in thirty-four thousand four hundred and sixty-seven places. Of these 10,896,066 attendants, less than half—5,292,551—belonged to the Church of England; more than half—5,603,515—belonged to other professions. Of this majority of 5,603,515, the largest numbers are Wesleyan Methodists, 1,544,528; Independents, 1,214,059; Baptists, (Particular,) 740,752; Primitive Methodists, 511,195; Roman Catholics, 383,630. The other religious bodies are much smaller than these five—ranging from 83 (Seventh-Day Baptists) to 22,000 of the Society of Friends; 50,000 Unitarians; 10,874 Moravians; 99,045 New-Connexion Methodists; 91,503 Wesleyan Reformers; 264,000 Calvinistic Methodists; 35,000 Latter-Day Saints or Mormons, &c.

The whole number of independent communities or sects is twenty-seven, which are thus classified:—PROTESTANT CHURCHES: *British*, Church of England and Ireland; Scottish Presbyterians—Church of Scotland, United Presbyterian Synod, Presbyterian Church in England; Independents, or Congregationalists; Baptists—General, Particular, Seventh-Day, Scotch, New Connexion General; Society of Friends; Unitarians; Moravians, or United Brethren; Wesleyan Methodists—Original Connexion, New Connexion, Primitive Methodists, Bible Christians, Wesleyan Association, Independent Methodists, Wesleyan Reformers; Calvinistic Methodists—Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion; Sandemanians, or Glasites; New Church; Brethren. *Foreign*, Lutherans, German Protestant Reformers, Reformed Church of the Netherlands, French Protestants. OTHER CHURCHES: Roman Catholics, Greek Church, German Catholics, Italian Reformers, Catholic and Apostolic Church, Latter-Day Saints or Mormons, Jews.

THE "*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*," for January, 1854, contains the following articles, namely: I. On the Principle of Protestantism—a letter to Dr. Schenkel, of Heidelberg, in which Hagenbach, denying that Protestantism can be reduced to *one* fundamental principle, offers *three* as its basis: 1. The *real* principle, living faith in Christ; 2. The *formal* principle, the authority of the Scriptures as a rule of faith; 3. The *social* principle, forming a community, of which Christ is the individual head, and of which all the members are priests unto God. Article II. is on the locality of *Kadesh*, and on that part of the journey of Israel in the desert which depends upon the place of Kadesh, by Fries. Article III. (by Ed. Riehm) treats of the Trespass-Offering, (Lev. v, 14–19, 20–26; Num. v, 5–10.) Article IV. is on the History of Israel after the exile, according to Ezra and Nehemiah, by J. G. Vaihinger. Article VI. is a review, by Schöberlein, of an essay by Nägelsbach on the question, "Was ist Christlich?" The last paper (by Dr. Merz) treats of the relations of the German "Home Mission" to the scientific and ecclesiastical tendencies of the age.

The number for April, 1854, contains, I. A paper from Schöberlein on evangelical worship; II. An essay on the plan and course of Isaiah xl–lxvi, by Rüetschi; III. A geographical and topographical dissertation on the land of Uz, by Fries; IV. by Köster, a curious comparison of

the style of Paul with that of Demosthenes; V. a review of Köstlin's Scottish Church, by Weber; VI. Umbreit on sin; VII. Ullmann on the evangelical Protestant clergy of the Grand-duchy of Baden; VIII. a continuation of Merz's article on the Home Mission; IX. The Programme of the Hague Society for the defence of the Christian Religion for 1853.

Our Wesleyan friends in England are engaged in real earnest in settling the grounds of their Church polity on scientifically theological grounds. The Rev. George Steward's "Essay on Church Government," noticed in our last, has called forth a reply from the Rev. Nathan Rouse, in which his statements and arguments are examined with a good deal of care and pertinency. But it lacks scientific method, and shows the evident marks of an unpractised, or, at least, unskilful writer. But by far the most important book which the controversy has yet called forth, is "*The Ministry and Polity of the Christian Church*, by the Rev. Alfred Barrett," (London: John Mason; 1854; 12mo., pp. 453,) which deserves a full treatment, and will receive it in a future number. Mr. Barrett is one of the best and clearest writers English Methodism has produced: and yet his book, in a literary point of view, has many defects both of style and arrangement. Some of his positions on government, both civil and ecclesiastical, are entirely untenable: yet, as a whole, the treatise is a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

It has been quite the fashion for travellers, both English and American, to disparage Christian missions and their results, especially in Polynesia. The ignorance and prejudice which lie at the bottom of such assaults are well exposed in an able article on "*The Missions of Polynesia*," in the Quarterly Review, (London,) for January, 1854. The Methodist Missions among the Feejees are thus mentioned:—

"According to such vague history as their traditions afford, corroborated by the accounts of travellers, the Tongans had been a peaceful and happy race until the latter years of the last century—denominated among themselves, says a French missionary, the 'malaia,' or evil season—when a series of destructive civil wars commenced among them, which decimated their population, and reduced the survivors to the worst conditions of Polynesian life. In 1797 they were first visited by agents of the London Missionary Society; but ultimately, under a judicious division of the field of labour, which was made about 1827, the Tonga islands and the Fijis were handed over to the Wesleyans, whose missionary institutions in these seas are under the control of a superintendent established in New Zealand; a post now worthily filled by the Rev. Walter Lawry, whose two interesting volumes are among the list of works at the head of this article. We should judge the author to be a man of a kindly and practical as well as religious spirit, in whom the peculiar views of the missionary have been a good deal tempered by considerable shrewdness of observation, by advancing age, and by that experience of the world which renders men at once more indulgent and less sanguine. The character of the individual who fills this post is of no small importance to the welfare of a certain portion of the earth's surface; for, not to mention the other successes of the Wesleyans, they have established at Tonga a more complete system of religious government than is now to be found anywhere else in the South Seas. Nearly all the population are converted; heathenism lingering only, if it can be said to linger, in a decaying political sect. Great strictness, both of moral discipline and religious observance, is generally established. And the result is seen in an orderly and tractable Christian population, among whom the grosser vices of savage life seem nearly extirpated; polygamy has been abandoned; the ordinary habits of the men are peaceable, and of the women modest. We need not go further with Mr. Lawry, who boldly declares, 'I speak of the general state of public morals, when I say that I have never seen the wheat so free from chaff in any part of the world, as I have seen it in these islands.' The population is numerous, and, contrary to ordinary Polynesian experience, increasing, the number of children being particularly remarked."

The following passage on the Maine Law is very significant, as coming from such a source:—

"In America, the people of Massachusetts, the most sagacious in the world, have just submitted themselves to the yoke of the 'Maine law,' which makes the sale of fermented liquors an indictable offence, and this with the marked assent of public opinion. Do we suppose that their legislators were ignorant of the

maxims, common to triviality, about the danger of reaction, and the danger of hypocrisy? Do they believe that the ordinary propensities of man can be controlled by the enactment of a republic, any more than by the ukase of a czar? Not so; but they see all around them the devastations of an enemy who threatens not only to corrupt their society, but the very physical constitution of their race. They know that against such an antagonist half measures are of no earthly avail—that it must either be left unopposed, or grappled with as a mortal foe; and while numbers content themselves with the firm conviction that this is an immediate and pressing duty, and purposely refuse to look further, the more far-seeing are disposed to agree, though with doubt and trembling, because they believe that, although abuse will doubtless recur in its own time, the temporary shock may suffice to turn back thousands who are now on the high road to destruction."

It is the fashion now in England, among High-Church authorities, to praise Wesley and the Methodists as much as they formerly abused them. Eyes get strangely opened by the course of events. The "Christian Remembrancer" (Puseyite organ) for April, 1854, declares that "the origin of Methodism is a standing memorial, not so much of error in its founders, as of inefficiency on the part of the Church to satisfy the religion of its people." Again, "Necessity, and inability on the part of the Church to do her proper work, drove Wesley at length to the further step of ordaining persons to perform ministerial functions in America. This he did for the first time in the year 1784, being then eighty years of age.

"Bishop Horne, we believe, when applied to by a clergyman as to whether John Wesley might preach in his church, replied that he was an ordained clergyman of the Church of England, and that it rested with the incumbent of each parish to admit him or not. In this case Wesley preached with his usual power; and some clergyman who happened to be present in the congregation, unable to find any doctrinal errors in his sermon, followed him into the vestry, and questioned him as to his consistency in this matter of assuming the right to ordain. He did not defend it; but, being now old and fatigued with preaching, he said, with great emotion, 'The case was very urgent; the authorities of the Church did nothing; and, therefore, I gave them the best commission I could.'"

The works of the Church Fathers, in good and complete editions, are so very costly as to be beyond the reach of ordinary students; indeed, they are only occasionally to be found in public libraries. The evil is remedied to a considerable degree, for the Latin Fathers, by Gersdorf's admirable and cheap "Bibliotheca Selecta;" and the same advantage is now offered to students of the Greek Fathers in the new "*Bibliotheca Patrum Græcorum Dogmatica*," edited by Thilo, and published by Weigel, of Leipsig. The first volume is "*Sancti Athanasii Opera Dogmatica Selecta*," (Leipsig, 1853, 1000 pp., large 8vo.) To show how little of Athanasius's important writings is omitted, we give the contents of the volume:—1. Expositio Fidei: 2. Epist. de decretis Syn. Nicæn. cont. Arianos: 3. Epist. de sententia Dionysii: 4. Orationes contra Arianos: 5. Epist. ad Serapionem: 6. Epist. ad Epictetum: 7. Ad Adelphium: 8. Contra Apollinarium. Three copious indexes are appended. The work can be imported and sold in this country for about $5.

We have received a specimen number of a new German weekly paper, to be published either at Galveston or New-Orleans, entitled, "*Der Deutsche Reformator*," and edited by the Rev. Peter Mölling. It is full of spirit and life, and if kept up hereafter to the tone of the number before us, must certainly be successful.

Among the works in theology and Biblical literature recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:—

Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen Schriften des Alten Testamentes von K. Fr. Keil, Dr. d. Phil. u. Theol. und Prof. der Exegetik u. orient. Sprachen an der kais. Univ. Dorpat. Frankfurt a. M.; 1853; 8vo., pp. 748.

Des Bischofs Johannes Chrysostomus Leben, nach den Forschungen Neanders, Böhringers und Anderer für die Familie unserer Tage dargestellt von Frdr. Matth. Perthes. Hamburg u. Gotha; 1853; 8vo., pp. 251.

Bibliotheca patrum græcorum dogmatica. Ad optimor. libror. fidem edendam curavit Dr. J. C. Thilo. Vol. II. Et. s. t.: Sancti Basilii Cæsareæ Cappadociæ Archiepiscopi et Sancti Gregorii Theologi vulgo Nazianzeni Archiepiscopi Constan-

tinopolitani opera dogmatica selecta. Ex recensione monachorum ord. S. Benedicti e congregatione S. Mauricicum eorundem interpretatione et animadversionibus. Accedit appendix, Eunomii apologeticum et confessionem et Amphilochii epistolam synodalem continens. Edenda curavit Dr. J. D. H. Goldhorn. Lipsiæ, 1854: 8vo., (VII. and 735 pp.)

Böhringer F., Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen oder die Kirchengeschichte in Biographien. II. Bd. Mittelalter. 1. 2. Abthlg. Zürich: 8vo., pp. 1433.

Gass, Dr. W., Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Theologie überhaupt. I. Bd. Die Grundlegung und der Dogmatismus. Berlin: 8vo., pp. 487.

Kirchner, Dr. C. H., Die Philosophie des Plotin. Halle: 8vo., pp. 220.

Lekebusch, E., Die Composition und Entstehung der Apostelgeschichte von Neuem untersucht. Gotha: 8vo., pp. 434.

Among the new works in theology and kindred subjects, recently announced in Great Britain, are the following:—

A Treatise on the Episcopate of the Anti-Nicene Church, (with especial reference to the early position of the Roman See.) By the Rev. George M. Gorham, B. A.:—The Law of the Love of God in the first Four Commandments: an Essay, by George Moberly, D. C. L., Head Master of Winchester College. 12mo.:—Christ as made known to the Ancient Church; an Exposition of the Revelation of Divine Grace, as unfolded in the Old Testament Scriptures. By the late Robert Gordon, D. D., F. R. S. E. Vols. I, II, 8vo.:—The Natural Capabilities of Man, briefly considered with Especial Reference to the Question of Human Accountableness; containing Introductory Remarks upon the Puro-Adamic State. By Joseph Wright, Author of "Israel in China," &c. 8vo.:—Sermons on the First Epistle of Peter, Chapter I. By H. F. Kohlbrugge, D. D., of Elberfeld, Germany. With an Introductory Preface by the Rev. Octavius Winslow, D. D. Small 8vo.:—The Unity of the New Testament: A Synopsis of the first Three Gospels and of the Epistles of St. James, St. Peter, and St. Paul. By F. Denison Maurice, M. A. 8vo.:—Archdeacon Wilberforce's Sacramental and Priestly System examined. By the Rev. C. S. Bird, M. A. Fcp. 8vo.:—The Grand Romish Fallacy: with the Dangers and Duties of Protestants. By the Rev. J. H. Gurney, M. A. Fcp. 8vo.:—The Protestant in Ireland in 1853. Fcp. 8vo.:—Horæ Evangelicæ: the Internal Evidence of the Four Gospels, with Reference to their Date, Structure, and Authenticity. By the Rev. T. R. Birks, M. A. Post 8vo.:—Evenings with the Romanists. By the Rev. M. Hobart Seymour, M. A. Cr. 8vo.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

Messrs. Bagsters (London) have just issued a book of "*Arabic Reading Lessons, with Complete Analysis and Grammar*," in small 8vo., uniform with their Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac Reading-Lessons.

Among the works in classical and general literature, recently announced on the continent of Europe, are the following, namely:—

Inscriptionis Rosettanae hieroglyphicae decretum sacerdotale. Accuratissime recognovit, latine vertit, explicavit, cum versione graeca aliisque eius temporis monumentis hieroglyphis contulit atque composuit, glossario instruxit Max. Ad. Uhlemann. Lipsiae; 1853; 4to., pp. 180.

Linguae Copticae Grammatica in usum scholarum scripta, cum Chrestomathia et Glossario. Insertae sunt observationes quaedam de veterum Aegyptiorum Grammatica. Auctore Mar. Ad. Uhlemann. Lipsiae, 1853; 8vo., pp. 167.

Benfey, (Th.,) Handbuch der Sanskritsprache. Zum Gebrauch für Vorlesungen und zum Selbststudium. II. Abthlg. Chrestomathie. 2. Thl. Glossar. 8vo. Leipzig, pp. 374.

Pfeiffer, (Prof. Dr. F.,) Beiträge zur Geschichte der mitteldeutschen Literatur und Sprache. I. Bd. Die Deutschordenschronik des Nicolaus von Jeroschin. 8vo. Stuttgart, pp. 315.

James Montgomery died at his residence in Sheffield on the 30th of April, aged eighty-two. The following brief summary of his life is from the London Times:—"James Montgomery was born November 4, 1771, at Irvine, in Ayrshire. His father was a Moravian missionary, who, leaving his son in Yorkshire to be educated, went to the West Indies, where he and the poet's mother both died.

When only twelve years old, the bent of the boy's mind was shown by the production of various small poems. These indications could not save him at first from the fate of the poor, and he was sent to earn his bread as assistant in a general shop. He thirsted for other occupations, and one day set off with three shillings and sixpence in his pocket to walk to London, to seek fame and fortune. In his first effort he broke down, and for a while gave up his plan to take service in another situation. Only for a time, however, was he content, and a second effort to reach the metropolis was successful, so far as bringing him to the spot he had longed for, but unsuccessful to his main hope—that of finding a publisher for a volume of his verses. But the bookseller who refused Montgomery's poems accepted his labour, and made him his shopman. Fortune, however, as she generally does, smiled at last on the zealous youth, and in 1792 he gained a post in the establishment of Mr. Gales, a bookseller of Sheffield, who had set up a newspaper called *The Sheffield Register*. On this paper Montgomery worked *con amore*, and when his master had to fly from England to avoid imprisonment for printing articles too liberal for the then despotic government of England, the young poet became the editor and publisher of the paper, the name of which he changed to *Sheffield Iris*. In the columns of this print he advocated political and religious freedom, and such conduct secured for him the attentions of the attorney-general, by whom he was prosecuted, fined, and imprisoned; in the first instance, for reprinting a song commemorating 'The Fall of the Bastile;' in the second case for an account he gave of a riot in Sheffield. Confinement could not crush his love of political justice; and on his second release he went on advocating the doctrines of freedom as before in his paper and in his books. In the lengthy periods between those times and the present, the beliefs which James Montgomery early pioneered in England have obtained general recognition, and, as men became more and more liberal, our poet gained more and more esteem. He contributed to magazines, and, despite adverse criticism, in the *Edinburgh Review*, established his right to rank as a poet. In 1797 he published 'Prison Amusements;' in 1805, the 'Ocean;' in 1806, the 'Wanderer in Switzerland;' in 1809, 'The West Indies;' and in 1812, 'The World before the Flood.' By these works he obtained the chief reputation he has since enjoyed. In 1819 appeared 'Greenland,' a poem in five cantos; and in 1828, 'The Pelican Island, and other Poems.' In 1851 the whole of his works were issued in one volume, 8vo., and of which two editions are in circulation; and in 1853, 'Original Hymns, for Public, Private, and Social Devotion.' This venerable poet enjoyed a well-deserved literary pension of £150 a year."

We continue our summaries of the contents of American and Foreign Theological Journals:—

Free-Will Baptist Quarterly, (Providence,) for April:—I. Egypt: II. Obligations of Republicanism to Christianity: III. Exposition of 1 Cor. vii, 14: IV. The "Conflict of Ages," and the Doctrine of Native Depravity: V. The Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon: VI. Civilization; Helps and Hinderances: VII. Sacred Poetry: VIII. Adoniram Judson: IX. Contemporary Literature.

Mercersburg Quarterly Review, (Chambersburgh, Pa.,) for April:—I. Wilberforce on the Eucharist: II. Liturgical Contributions: III. Catechetical Instruction: IV. Zwingli at Berne: V. Sketches of a Traveller from Greece, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine: VI. Government in its Relation to Education: VII. Questions concerning the Church.

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburgh, Pa.,) for April:—I. Infidelity: its Metamorphoses and its present Aspects: II. Constitution and Characteristics of the Church: III. Reminiscences of Lutheran Clergymen: IV. Preaching: V. A Collegiate Education: VI. Notes on Prophecy: VII. The Song of Solomon: VIII. The Children of the New Testament.

Brownson's Quarterly Review, (Boston,) for April:—I. Uncle Jack and his Nephew: II. Protestantism doveloped: III. Temporal Power of the Popes: IV. Where is Italy? V. The Mercersburg Hypothesis.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) for April:—I. Historical Geography and Ethnography: II. God's Positive Moral Government over Moral Agents additional to that which is merely Natural: III. The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament, and the Reasons for their Exclusion from the Canon of Scripture: IV. The Relations of David's Family to the Messiah: V. Excursion to the Lakes East of Damascus: VI. The Nature of the Historic Spirit: VII. Chaucer and his Times.

Universalist Review, (Boston,) for April:—VII. Instinctive Universalism: VIII. Spiritual Baptism: IX. Relation of the Ministry to Society: X. The Central Principle of Universalism: XI. The Doctrine of Christ as exhibited in his Character and Teachings: XII. Rev. Hosea Ballou—His Parentage and Early Life: XIII. Style.

New-York Quarterly, (New-York,) for April:—I. Our National Post-Office: II. The Politics of Russia: III. The English Universities: IV. Popular Amusements: V. The Great Want of New-York City—a Government: VI. The Quarterly Conservative in Politics: VII. Grote's Greece: VIII. Priests—Their Various Orders: IX. Upon the Origin of Ecclesiastical Tribunals.

The Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) for April:—I. Christ's Second Coming: II. Inquiry into the Meaning of Matthew xxiv, 14: III. Beecher's "Conflict of Ages:" IV. Infidelity—its Aspects, Causes, and Agencies: V. The Priest and the Huguenot: VI. History of the Apostolical Church.

The New-Englander, (New-Haven,) for May:—I. Christ as Revealer of God: II. Ministerial Biography: III. Dryden, Prior, and Swift: IV. Typology: V. The Nebraska Bill and its Results: VI. Professor Schaff's Church History: VII. Politics and the Pulpit: VIII. Churches and Parsonages: IX. Morality of the Nebraska Bill.

The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, (Philadelphia,) for April:—I. Modern Explanations of the Doctrine of Inability: II. Is the Church of Rome Idolatrous? III. Ebrard on the Apocalypse: IV. Method of Church History: V. The Revolution in China: VI. Pearson on Infidelity: VII. The Church of England and Presbyterian Orders.

Eclectic Review, (London,) for March:—I. Benjamin D'Israeli—a Literary and Political Biography: II. Theory of Human Food: III. The Autobiography of a Dissenting Minister: IV. Lord Holland's Memoirs of the Whig Party: V. Sanitary Farming: VI. St. John's Search of Beauty: VII. Christianity and its Modern Assailants: VIII. The Caucasus and the Country between the Euxine and the Caspian. *April*:—Juvenile Delinquency: II. Reid's History of the Irish Presbyterian Church: III. Genius and Writings of Douglas Jerrold: IV. Speeches of the Right Hon. T. B. Macaulay: V. Characteristics of Italian History: VI. Ticonderoga, or the Black Eagle: VII. Austria and Hungary: VIII. Public Worship in England and Wales.

British Quarterly Review, (London,) for April:—I. Auguste Comte—His Religion and Philosophy: II. George Herbert and Contemporary Religious Poets: III. Philosophy of the Senses: IV. Religious Worship and Religious Ministries: V. Turgot—His Life and Writings: VI. Christians under the Sultan: VII. Phases of Faith and the Eclipse: VIII. Balance of Power and Russian Aggression: IX. Our Epilogue on Affairs and Books.

Christian Remembrancer, (London,) for April:—I. The Apostolical Constitutions: II. Arnold's Poems: III. Holy House of Loretto: IV. Census of Religious Worship: V. Gray's Letters: VI. Associated Labour and Industrial Relations: VII. The Counter Theory.

The Journal of Sacred Literature, (London,) for April:—I. The Bible and the Common People: II. On Miracles—Inspired Character of the Four Gospels: III. Discrepancy and Inspiration not Incompatible: IV. Hebrew Tenses: V. Popular Biblical Writers—Dr. Kitto: VI. The Burial of Moses: VII. St. Paul and Josephus: VIII. The Gospel preached by Christ: IX. John De Wycliffe.

Westminster Review, (London,) for April:—I. Results of the Census of 1851: II. Manners and Fashion: III. Archbishop Whately and Christianity: IV. Criminal Legislation and Prison Discipline: V. Lord Campbell as a Writer of History: VI. Schamyl, the Prophet-Warrior of the Caucasus: VII. Thomas De Quincey and his Works: VIII. The Balance of Power in Europe.

London Quarterly Review, for April:—I. Laurence Sterne: II. Sacred Geography: III. Lord Holland's Memoirs of the Whig Party: IV. The Russian Empire: V. The Criminal Law Digest: VI. Waagen's Treasures of Art in Britain: VII. The Turks and the Greeks: VIII. The New Reform Bill.

The North British Review, (Edinburgh,) for May:—I. The Plurality of Worlds: II. British and Continental Characteristics: III. The Union with England and Scottish Nationality: IV. Christianity in the Second Century and the Christian Evidences: V. The Art of Education: VI. Ruskin and Architecture—Past, Present, and Future: VII. Professor Forbes and Mr. Lloyd in Scandinavia: VIII. Auguste Comte and Positivism.

THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1854.

ART. I.—THE SIBYLLINE ORACLES.

1. *Die Sibyllinischen Weissagungen, vollständig gesammelt, nach neuer Handschriften-Vergleichung, mit kritischem Commentare und metrischer Deutscher Uebersetzung:* herausgegeben von DR. J. H. FRIEDLIEB, Professor an der Universität zu Breslau. Leipzig: 1852; 8vo., pp. lxxxv, 232, cxxiv.
2. *De Oraculis Sibyllinis Dissertatio. Supplementum editionis a Friedliebio exhibitæ.* Scripsit RICARDUS VOLKMANN, Phil. Dr. Sem. Phil. Reg. Hal. Sod. Lipsiæ: 1853; pp. 44, 8vo.
3. *Oracula Sibyllina. Textu ad Codices Manuscriptos recognito; Maianis supplementis aucto; cum Castalionis versione metrica, innumeris pæne locis emendata, et, ubi opus fuit, suppleta; commentario perpetuo, excursibus et indicibus.* Curante C. ALEXANDER. Volumen Prius. Parisiis: 1841; 8vo.

IT is an arduous and unprofitable task to attempt to interpret prophecy, whether relative to events future, imminent, or fulfilled. Even in those cases where the predictions are undeniably inspired, and the certainty of their actual or ultimate accomplishment is, in consequence, indubitable, the license afforded to conjecture by the necessary vagueness of the expression precludes any sufficient assurance of a trustworthy result. It may, indeed, be questioned whether, except in a few remarkable instances, there can be any firm or general recognition of the fulfilment of prophecy, until long subsequent ages have passed, and brought new thoughts, feelings, and associations, and until the expanding views and augmented experience of successive generations have enabled men at length to discern in the retrospect the realization of events which escaped appreciation at the time of their occurrence. It might be imagined that God had reserved for himself this testimony to his omniscience and power, and had communicated it to men, only under a seal which they could not break, that, when broken by himself, it might overwhelm human objections and cavils with unsuspected, but irresistible, evidence. So

long, however, as several, or even two, interpretations, both possible and plausible, can be assigned to the same prophecy, it is impossible that there should be any uniform or logical assent to either. Hence it has happened that those to whom divinely-inspired seers were sent, have with almost unvarying obduracy denied their mission, rejected their testimony, and been the last to perceive the verification of their words. The Israelites, in the midst of the daily-recurring miracles which illustrated their exodus, murmured against God and rebelled against Moses on every possible occasion; and, after being miraculously punished for one act of rebellion, continually provoked new miraculous castigations by fresh manifestations of disobedience and unbelief. The inhabitants of Jerusalem and their ancestors were, however, not the only people who killed the prophets and stoned those that were sent unto them; but every generation has exhibited a similar aptitude for blind repudiation, or its equally-deceptive counterpart, premature credulity, in regard to prophetic declarations. It is to be noted that even one of the Sibyls before us hopefully looks forward to an early lapidation: but she proves herself a bungler, a counterfeit, and an ignorant forger, by expecting that fate for the sins of her past life, and not for the truth of her preaching.*

It may well be said, in more senses than one, and with a different signification from that ostensibly designed in its original employment, that "he that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall receive a prophet's reward;" for it apparently requires an almost equivalent inspiration to utter the prophecy, and to comprehend it when uttered, in the moment of its fulfilment. Who understood, except by special illumination, the recorded anticipations of the kingdom of the Messiah, until after the crucifixion, and the supernatural instruction of the apostles? The expectation of a Saviour, who was to appear in the East, had been current for ages; and was, perhaps, embalmed in these oracles under the Ptolemies.† From this source it must have been taken by Virgil, to whom it was known, and who also was aware that the tenth or last age of the Sibyl had arrived, and that a new dispensation was about to commence:—

* Orac. Sibyll., lib. vii, vv. 150–162. This is one of those points which it falls neither within the scope nor the horizon of Friedlieb and Alexandre to notice or perceive. V. Friedlieb, Einleit., § 23, p. li.

† Lib. iii, vv. 652–697, vv. 784–794. Friedlieb, Einleit., § 17, p. xxxix, seems to consider that the latter passage was before Virgil. We should suppose the former—which also appears to us of earlier composition. Both unquestionably underwent many modifications: vv. 784–794 are influenced by the Apocalypse; vv. 652–697 formed upon Isaiah; but vv. 655, 656 are a Christian interpolation.

> Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas:
> Magnus ab integro seclorum nascitur ordo.
> Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna:
> Jam nova progenies cœlo demittitur alto.°

Neither Virgil nor the Sibyl understood the import of their own words. Astræa redux was the virgin of whom the former thought, while dreaming only of an Egyptian apocatastasis; and, though the latter had obviously Isaiah in view, she comprehended only the literal signification of his words, and prepared the Jewish expectation of a temporal kingdom.

Seventy years before the Advent, the Sanhedrim had solemnly announced that the time approached for the appearance of the long-foretold Messiah; but when it had actually arrived, neither Jews nor apostles were able to recognise it. Eighteen centuries have passed since the close of the Sibyl's tenth age, and still the Jews prolong the ancient expectation of their king. As a curious counterpart and confirmation of the early belief of the Western nations in the descent of the great reformer in the East, the barbarous nations of the extreme East, the Tartars, Moguls, and Thibetans, to this day look steadily to the West as the fountain whence the divine illumination is to proceed.† The time has passed, the prophecy has been long fulfilled; yet in the East and in the West the faith in its future realization is still cherished.

Who accepts with confidence any of the multitudinous expositions of the Apocalypse, except the authors who imagined them in their dreams? And which of these enlightened sages adhered for ten years to his own interpretation, if his life was so long spared after his lunatic exploit? Has not every notable event, for fifteen centuries at least, (perhaps even for eighteen,) been detected in the Book of Revelation? and have not its denunciations been liberally applied with equal impartiality to both parties in every important struggle in the long drama? What is the meaning of six hundred and sixty-six—the number of the beast? The number assigned to Rome in these oracles is nine hundred and forty-eight.‡ Who pretends to unriddle the current or the unfulfilled announcements of Daniel and Ezekiel? What is meant by the last nine verses of Daniel? Who is Gog, and who is Magog? They are not the monsters at Guildhall, nor are they the same races referred to by the Sibyl;§ but who are they? Explanations are as plentiful as black-

° Virg. Ecl. iv, vv. 4–7, and Servii Comm. ad loc. cit. et ad v. 34.

† Huc, Journey through Tartary, Thibet, and China, vol. i, ch. ii, p. 38. Ed. Appleton.

‡ Lib. viii, vv. 148–150.

§ Lib. iii, v. 319, v. 512.

berries, but none can produce adequate authentication. "The words are closed up and sealed till the time of the end."* The knowledge of the times and the seasons, in this respect, as in all others, has been kept by God unto himself: it is not accorded to fallen man; for the knowledge, which would make him like unto God, has been either denied to him entirely, or frustrated of its proposed effect in the mode of its exercise.

> *οὐκέτι σοι φανερῶς θέμις ἔσσεται ἐν μακάρεσσιν,*
> *ἐξ ἄστρων πέπτωκας, ἐς οὐρανὸν οὐκ ἀναβήσῃ.*†

There is a profound significance latent in the ancient myth, that, when Apollo had bestowed upon Cassandra the gift of prophecy, he completely neutralized its efficiency by cursing it with the incredulity of her hearers. Such has been the doom of all prophets: they are without honour in their appropriate time, as in their own country. Nay, it has always been the general belief, which is expressed by Plato, approved by Justin Martyr, and repeated by the anonymous author of the Greek Preface to the Sibylline Oracles, that prophets and sibyls did not themselves comprehend the inspiration which they uttered.‡ Balaam is not the only instance recorded in Scripture of a prophet predicting the truth, and then acting as if he did not recollect, or understand, or believe his own prediction.

If such difficulties as those we have specified impede the most earnest endeavours to interpret and apply prophecies which are inspired, and are therefore certain of ultimate verification, how hopeless must be the task when there is no guarantee of their veracity, or, consequently, of their realization! Accordingly, if we had the genuine songs of the Sibyls, which imposed upon the credulity and met with the acceptance of the elder world, it would be a vain effort to seek to apply the vague denunciations and portentous commonplaces, in which they rejoiced, to the infinite variety of succeeding and rashly anticipated, or perhaps unanticipated events, which equally admit of their loose appropriation, and are capable of reflecting upon them, after the occurrence of the facts, or in consequence of the accidental agreement of the facts, a meaning and intent neither possessed nor contemplated when they were composed.

But what pleasure or advantage can be anticipated from such investigations, when to these insurmountable impediments new difficulties are added, and further discouragements insured by the

* Daniel xii, 9. † Oracula Sibyll., lib. i, vv. 71, 72.
‡ Orac. Sibyll., p. 10, et not. Ed. Alexandre.

knowledge or suspicion that the oracles submitted to our scrutiny are not even the genuine productions of self-consecrated prophets, but may be frequently the late fictions of an ignorant age, and often the productions of illiterate or dishonest authors,—written usually after the occurrence of the destinies which they profess to foretell? Any inquiry on the subject would be a ridiculous waste of time, if this were an ascertained fact, and if the fact, when established, did not create a new interest, and give a different scope to the research.

Under these circumstances, however, it is not surprising that these oracles should have fallen into prolonged neglect and oblivion, as M. Alexandre observes;* that no new recension of the text, and scarcely a new edition, should have been published, with the exception of the Fragments of the Sixth and Eighth Books, and the four new Books, (xi–xiv,) discovered by Cardinal Mai, between that of Servatus Gallæus (1689) and that of Alexandre, (1841;) and that, from the time of Opsopœus, (1599,) no important effort should have been made toward the critical amelioration of the text, until the issue of Alexandre's edition. This, which is in many respects highly satisfactory, is unfortunately still incomplete. Only the first volume has been published, which extends no further than to the end of the Eighth Book. The additional Books, disinterred by Mai from the Ambrosian and Vatican Libraries, with the commentary thereon, the six special dissertations, whose titles excite such a lively interest, the indexes, and the sketch of Sibylline Bibliography, are promised in another volume; but the promise remains still unredeemed. In the catalogue of the Didots we notice a permanent announcement that the second volume is *sous presse;* and, on the paper cover of the copy of the first volume before us, we observe that the date of publication is given 1851 instead of 1841, as it appears on the title-page within. Can we accept these indications as any adequate assurance of the speedy performance of the long-outstanding promise? We can only hope so: for M. Alexandre's edition is neat, convenient, full, satisfactory, and designed on a much more extended plan than Friedlieb's, which gives us a good recension of the whole text founded upon new manuscripts;† a learned, though indecisive, introduction; a sufficient collation of different readings; and a metrical version in German hexameters, which is so faithful that it scarcely assists the intelligence of the obscure original, but which is not likely to obtain a continuous perusal from those who can, or those who cannot read the crabbed

* Orac. Sibyll., Præf., p. i. Ed Alexandre.

† Orac. Sibyll. Ed. Friedlieb. Vorwort, p. v.

and often-provoking Greek text. The deficiencies of Friedlieb's edition are so obvious that, the year after its publication, Volkmann brought out a supplement to aid in correcting the disorderly prosody and confused metres of the oracles as published. He has rendered good service, though he has left many fractured lines with their mutilated members still uncured, and has corrected others frequently in a manner which is more expeditious than judicious. If Alexandre's edition were completed, it should still take precedence of Friedlieb's, even with Volkmann's appendix; but while it remains in its present imperfect form, as a later and entire text is given by Friedlieb, and his introduction is copious, luminous, and valuable, his publication must be regarded as the *editio optima*, until a more thorough edition is published. The want of this is only felt more keenly from what Alexandre and Friedlieb and Volkmann have already done. They have shown that much may be accomplished, and thereby excited the desire for its accomplishment. The text can scarcely be regarded as yet settled, though perhaps little is hereafter to be expected from the MSS., which bear evidence of a deliberate and ignorant mutilation of the text from the earliest periods. Conjecture must be cautiously resorted to in future, not to restore or divine the original version, which is now impracticable, but to render intelligible and sensible what remains. Moreover, to render the edition entirely satisfactory, a very thorough *apparatus Sibylliacus* should be incorporated with it. The text of the MSS. should be kept separate from the conjectural text; the *testimonia veterum* should be added, and should embrace all the passages in the ancient authors which mention the Sibyls, or quote from their songs; this should be especially attended to in regard to the Fathers; all these diverse notices should be harmonized or explained; a table of the dates ascertained or variously imagined for the different portions of the work should be carefully prepared; and the whole might be closed with a *Lexicon Sibylliacum, Criticum et Philologicum*, which should illustrate the solecisms and neoterisms of the Sibyls by a copious citation of similar locutions in the earliest authors where they occur. This would lead to a more exact determination of the periods of composition than any other internal evidence or extrinsic testimony could justify. Of course, in this intimation of desideranda, those features only are suggested which seem not to have been contemplated by the recent editors.

The earliest editors of the Sibylline Oracles, Betuleius and Castalio,* believed implicitly in their genuineness, their antiquity, and

* Betulelii and Castalionis, Præf. ap. Orac. Sibyll., pp. v, xii. Ed. Alexandre.

their inspiration. They discerned in them additional testimony to the truth of Christianity, imitating, if not transcending, in their credulity the early Apologists and Fathers of the Faith, who had cited them as evidence against the heathen, and as affording a valid confutation of Paganism out of its own mouth. Castalio, indeed, considered it impossible to entertain any doubt that the Sibyl, whose verses he translated and edited, was a true prophetess; but this excites little wonder when his admiring enthusiasm was able to discover in these poems a majesty of sentiment and elegance of expression rarely equalled by any bard in even a perspicuous and tractable subject.* Opsopœus thought differently. He could find but few approaches to Homeric sublimity; he might have added that even those were borrowed plumes; and he impugned the ridiculous superstitions connected with the Sibylline remains in the preface to his celebrated edition. Similar views were more extensively advocated, a century later, by Gallæus, in his formal controversy on the subject with the Jesuit Crasseet; and from that time these oracles have been universally regarded, as occasionally and incidentally they had been previously considered, in the light of late and spurious productions of the declining age of Greek literature.

We may propose some slight modifications in this opinion; but this is the indefinite conclusion which has met with general acquiescence. Unless, therefore, other sources of interest reveal themselves, the study of these Sibylline Oracles can only gratify or tantalize an idle curiosity, and can hold out little hope of any adequate result to reward the fatigue incurred in endeavouring to unravel their dubious contents. Fortunately, such new attractions present themselves, even if these prophecies should prove to be mere wanton fictions. They tempt us to inquire into the origin, history, and explanation of all profane oracular utterances; to seek some solution of the grand enigma which is propounded to us in the known fact that predictions, devoid of any acknowledged, and, frequently, of any professed inspiration, have always been current, and have in numerous instances been fulfilled; to account for the existence, at all times, and among nearly all people, of either accepted prophets, or copious bodies of current prophecy, which are brought fairly to light only about the time of their accomplishment, real or supposed; to trace the growth, development, changes, and reception of the Sibylline Oracles in particular; to determine the probable dates of their composition, publication, and alteration; to discover the motives which prompted their manufacture, and the spirit which

* Castalionis Præf. ap. Orac. Sibyll., p. xiv. Ed. Alexandre.

guided their application; and to detect the causes which led at first to their easy reception, and afterward to their almost entire oblivion. These topics are entirely independent of the truth or falsehood of the pretensions of the Sibylline Oracles, and they disclose to our curious regards important subjects of investigation, which may redeem from the charge of useless inquisitiveness even the most diligent examination of these strange productions. It appears to us, indeed, that the criticism of these prophecies, in order to arrive at any available results, must proceed by a more philosophic method, and upon much broader principles, than have yet been applied to them. Their chief interest is philosophical and historical rather than literary. We cannot attain to definite or satisfactory conclusions by misplaced attention to philological niceties, accidental parallelisms, or casual testimonies alone. These aids are indispensable within their appropriate range, but much more is required in a case where many of the parties, who might have been engaged in the obscure and fanatical task of oracular compilation, were probably ignorant of grammar and literature alike, and whose rude forgeries were, in all likelihood, perpetuated in great measure by loose oral tradition, and floated about in little undigested scraps, till they drifted to the knowledge of the Fathers or other late writers who quoted them. At length, when the agitation of the theological waters subsided, they were released from their multifarious combinations, and precipitated to the bottom in the loose, slovenly, incoherent, nonsensical, and putrescent pile, which we have now before us, cooked up into the semblance of a veritable book by the stolid bigotry of ancient compilers and the too credulous diligence of modern editors.

We cannot pretend to compress into the narrow compass of a single essay the satisfactory treatment of the numerous points of interest connected with the Sibylline Oracles which we have indicated. They form the table of contents for a copious and elaborate volume. We can only touch upon them, in passing, so far as may be necessary for the communication of some conclusions in regard to the estimation in which the Sibylline collections are to be held. Any attempt to discuss them with adequate development would lead to the composition of a ponderous folio, while we desire to restrict ourselves to a brief and suggestive exposition. It is the little pitcher, and not the capacious urn, which, at this time, we desire to turn off from our wheel. The more extensive and important task may be safely left to the comprehensive diligence and multifarious learning of the German scholars, who have, moreover, facilities and opportunities provided for them by their large public libraries, which are

denied to us. The resources afforded by a very scanty collection of books, but few of which relate to that dark and little-known period of literary history which was occupied by the Alexandrine writers, Greek, Jewish, and Christian, from Lycophron and the Pleias down to the destruction of the Serapeum, will not permit the minute investigation which the thorough discussion of such subjects would require. If the erudition and opportunities of Friedlieb had been guided by a more comprehensive and philosophical spirit of inquiry, he might have been able to satisfy any reasonable curiosity; and possibly this may yet be done by the second volume of Alexandre, who has a larger appreciation than his German successor of the want to be supplied. Our own efforts must be limited to indicating some of those things which are to be done, without attempting to do them; and to furnishing occasional suggestions in regard to different parts of the subject as they present themselves to notice in the course of our speculations.

The tenacity with which men in all the earlier and ruder ages of the world have adhered to their belief in the existence and inspiration of prophets, and in the credibility of their prophecies, is one of the most singular and inexplicable phenomena of history, especially when contrasted with the extreme reluctance with which those prophecies have been received which are regarded by the general testimony of the Christian Church as inspired, and in many instances accomplished; and which, at any rate, attest their genuine character by stronger evidence than appertains to any others. The anomaly is not diminished when we contrast this proclivity to a vague belief on such subjects with the general incapacity, which has been already signalized, to recognise the verification in the event. The early traditions, and frequently the authentic historical records of nearly every people, attest the existence among them of certain supposed prophets, prove the reverence with which they were habitually treated, and the credit which was given to their utterances. For reasons which must be sufficiently obvious, we omit the consideration of the numerous examples furnished by Jewish history of prophets of strange gods, as well as of true prophets of the true God. Among the Greeks we have a hundred instances, of which the most illustrious were the Oracles of Delphi and Dodona, the Cave of Trophonius, Teiresias, Mopsus, Musæus, Orpheus, Calchas, Helenus, and Cassandra. Under the Peisistratidæ the oracular collections of the ancient seers were preserved at Athens with similar care to that which the Sibylline Oracles, in nearly the same age, received at Rome, and were honoured with a formal revision by authority of the State. It is true that, in this early recension, Onomacritus, the prin-

cipal among the compilers, was detected in the deliberate commission of the same fraud which has been so repeatedly and abundantly practised in subsequent times on our Sibylline remains, without equal felicity of detection. It is possible—for Onomacritus was a poet of some celebrity, and the metres of prophecy were lame and mutilated from the beginning*—that his guilt might have been limited to the pious crime of refurbishing with unholy hands the rusty language of the ancient sages, and doctoring their wretched prosody—a duty laudably rendered by Alexandre and Volkmann, and still much needed for our surviving oracles. It is still more probable that he expanded, modified, and interpolated his texts, in the same manner which seems to have been applied, systematically, in Hellenistic and patristic times, to the Sibylline Fragments. But, however this may have actually been, we obtain in this instance almost the only glimpse, which the long course of ages presents, into the shop where oracles were forged; and detect, in nearly an isolated case, the manufacturer or tinkerer at his work. Onomacritus was expelled from Athens for his sacrilege. The detection of the operator converted into profanity what would otherwise have been inspiration;—and what, indeed, was afterward received as such. We can scarcely venture to allege that a second failure of the like kind ever subsequently occurred; for, whatever botching might have been done by other hands, on the same or other oracles, in after times, we hear little of the process or the operators till Marco Antonio Antimaco, of Ferrara, sent to the printer Oporinus his castigations and emendations of the text of the *Oracula Sibyllina*, then recently edited for the first time by Betuleius.

The story of Onomacritus did not, however, close the chronicle of deliberate prophecy in Greece, or even at Athens. In addition to the long-enduring recourse to the principal shrines, and the antique compilations preserved in the Acropolis, other collections were formed, and circulated through the country under the names of their real or supposed authors. Thucydides† mentions the multiplicity of the oracles which agitated the Athenians during the early years of the Peloponnesian War, and the facility and caprice of their acceptation. The student of Aristophanes will remember how mercilessly he has ridiculed this multitude of vaticinations, and the superstitious avidity with which they were welcomed. He will remember, too, how amusingly these follies are satirized by the exhibition of the conflicting claims of the responses of Bacis and Glanis.‡ Glanis is,

* The authorities for this declaration are noted by Volkmann, § i, p. 2.

† Hist., lib. ii, c. xxi. Cf. Agathias, Hist., lib. v, c. v, pp. 287, 288.

‡ Aristoph. Equit., vv. 998, 999. Ed. Bekker.

of course, a mere figment. Bacis, however, was only one of many popular seers, male and female, whose predictions existed and retained much of their credit down to the times of Pausanias, who boasts of having read most of them himself.* The remark with which he closes this acknowledgment is worthy of note. He observes that, in the abundance of time, other similar oracles might again be produced; apparently regarding prophecy of this kind not as an extraordinary and divine gift, but, like Thucydides, as a natural accompaniment of certain phases of humanity. Did he anticipate the resurrection and transfiguration of the Sibyls? or the mediæval oracles? or the prodigies of Nostradamus? or the outpouring of prophecy upon the nations which was revealed in France and Germany at the outbreak of the revolutions of 1848?† Thucydides, too, throws out incidentally a most significant remark. He says, that in the interpretation of oracles, men shape their recollections to their present experiences.‡ This is a most fruitful source both of error and delusion; and is illustrated by the allegation that even the Quatrains of Nostradamus were altered and interpolated by the printers. It is most certain, whether explicable or not, that, in times of civil commotion and social disturbance, shoals of antiquated oracles spring up, as suddenly, unexpectedly, and marvellously as mushrooms in a meadow, and—what is still more surprising—succeed in bringing along with them adequate evidence of their existence, almost unnoted as it has been, long prior to the events which they are supposed to foretell.

It is remarkable that, with all the oracular appetencies of the Greeks, the Sibyls play so slight and unimportant a part in their history and literature. The earlier historians, philosophers, and poets take but little notice of them. One or more of them are cursorily mentioned by Herodotus, Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, and Heraclitus.§ Proverbs were formed in disparagement of their name and pretended functions.‖ Yet, in the classic days of Greece very little attention seems to have been paid to either them or their vaticinations. The shadow of their name only flits occasionally through the literature of the nation. While the gods continued to

* Pausan., lib. x, p. 328. He concludes, *τοσαῦτα μὲν ἀχρις ἐμοῦ λέγονται γυναῖκες καὶ ἄνδρες ἐκ θεοῦ μαντεύσασθαι· ἐν δὲ τῷ χρονῷ τῷ πολλῷ καὶ αὖθις γένοιτο ἂν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.*

† On this subject a most interesting article appeared in Blackwood's Magazine for June, 1850.

‡ *οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον, τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο.* Thucyd. Hist., lib. ii, c. liv.

§ Friedlieb, Orac. Sibyll., Einleitung I, § 1, p. vii.

‖ Aristoph. Equit., v. 61; Pax., vv. 1061, 1082; et vide Schol. et Comm. ad locos.

visit the earth, and still filled with their imaginary presence their celebrated temples, the established oracles were apparently consulted, by the political authorities at least, to the prejudice of private or traditionary prophecy. Or, it may have been, which indeed appears to have been the fact, that the Sibyls were at best only provincial diviners, and as such were entirely disregarded by the citizens of the metropolitan cities and ruling states, during their flourishing period.

The celebrity of the Sibyls was acquired from a foreign country, and dates from the early ages of Rome. There they divided the honours with the books of Tages, and the different modes of Etruscan divination, and finally acquired a preëminent authority. Faunus and Picus, and the old Italic Camœnæ, though still worshipped *more majorum*, lost their ancient repute; perhaps in consequence of their powers having been granted merely as a temporary gift, to be exercised during their terrestrial life, but incapable of being perpetuated by the vicarious services of priests and priestesses. When the Romans desired to consult oracles on occasions of extraordinary solemnity, they sent state missions to the more illustrious temples of Greece. Their whole early history indicates a constant and intimate communication between themselves and their Hellenic kinsmen—a fact which has not been sufficiently noted. Indeed, there was a closer and more frequent connexion between Greece and all the contemporaneous tribes or nations within reach of the Mediterranean than is ordinarily suspected. But the intercourse of the Romans appears to have been carried on principally, not with Sparta and Athens, and the other great cities, but with the provincial tribes, whose civilization was most congenial with their own, and whose affinities probably rested on a common and not wholly forgotten origin. The occurrence of the appellative Graii and Græci in the Latin language, in place of the more national designation Hellenes, proves that the Romans were less influenced by the great states of Greece, than by earlier, Epirotic, or, at least, Pelasgian races. It is probably to this intercommunion with the less cultivated parts of Greece that we must refer the introduction of the Sibylline Oracles at Rome, and the prominence which was there given to them. It must, at the same time, however, be acknowledged that, even in this case, the Greek element seems to have been grafted on a native stock; for the Camœnæ were nearly identical with the Sibyls, and Servius* assures us that the name of the former was

* Serv. ad Virg. Æn., viii, 336: "Sed ideo Carmentis appellata a suis, quod divinatione fata caneret, nam antique vates Carmentes dicebantur." Liv. i, c. vii, notes the veneration paid to Carmenta before the introduction of the Sibyl at Rome.

derived from their prophetic functions, as is admitted to have been the case with the latter also.

There is no necessity for supposing a later date, than that ordinarily indicated, for the reception of the Sibylline Oracles at Rome, because a Grecian origin is assigned to them. The name Sibyl is Greek, and not Greek of the more civilized races, but the Greek of the Æolic tribes. It points either to the remote periods of Greek history, or else to the Æolic cities of Asia Minor. And, while so distant a source is barely suggested, it may be well to remember the alleged foundation of the Latian kingdom by a Trojan colony, the tradition of a Lydian descent for the Etruscan empire, and especially the Æolic Cumæ. In connexion with these indications, attention may be called to the remarkable prominence assigned to Phrygia in the Sibylline Oracles which have come down to us*—a prominence which has been particularly noted by both Alexandre and Friedlieb, and has led the former to suppose that the author of the books in which it is originally apparent, must have been a Phrygian by birth.† Friedlieb regards the Third Book as the oldest of all the books preserved;‡ it is certainly compounded principally of heathen oracles long anterior to the date of its supposed compilation under Ptolemy Philometor.§ Alexandre considers as the oldest part of the whole collection, the passage in which occurs a notable vitiation of history and received tradition, in order to magnify the pretensions of Phrygia to an importance which never belonged to it.‖ It is not necessary, in consequence of these things, to imagine a Phrygian nativity for the compiler or author of the oracles, as Alexandre is inclined to do; but it is much more natural to infer that this undue estimation of Phrygia, which runs directly or derivatively through nearly all of the existing remains, has been preserved with habitual fidelity in imitation of the characteristics of the earliest Sibylline original. And it would not be a hazardous conjecture to suppose that the Sibylline predictions had in the earliest period proceeded from a Phrygian source. The connexion subsisting in remote antiquity between the Lydians and the Phrygians, the traditions relative to a colony of the former people in Italy, and to the Thracian descent of the latter, and the peculiar form and nomenclature of much of the Roman mythology, relieve from all difficulty the sus-

* Orac. Sibyll., i, 196, 261; iii, 140, 205, 401, 514; v, 130; iv, 71; vii, 12; ix, 122; x, 279; xii, 102, 155, 235.

† Orac. Sibyll., Ed. Alexandre, not. ad lib. i; Tit., v. 184, 196.

‡ Einleitung I, § 32, p. lxxi.

§ Friedlieb, Einleitung I, § 18, p. xxii; § 32, p. lxxi.

‖ Alexandre, ad lib. iii, v. 97.

picion of a Phrygian influence in the development of Roman creeds at a very early period.

These indications and explanations taken together would permit us to assign an Asiatic origin to the Sibylline Oracles, without conflicting with the Roman traditions on the subject in any serious degree. To those legends, however, we must return.

The story of Tarquinius and the Sibyl is sufficiently familiar to all to dispense with repetition here. But it may be suspected that the legend of the three visits and the burning of the six books, while the same original price was asked for the remaining three, was a later fiction than the rest of the story, and suggested by the constant recurrence of the same ideas, sentiments, and expressions in the different collections. Even in our present copies, mutilated, transmuted, disfigured as they undoubtedly are by successive manipulations, long passages are repeated, as is accurately noted by both Alexandre and Friedlieb. But it is not distinctly noted by either that the several books, as is particularly the case with the fifth and tenth, exhibit in all probability only different selections, or recensions of the same original text. Even at this late day, we might safely undertake to compress into three books all that is distinctive, not to say valuable, in the twelve edited by Friedlieb; and could very well afford to imitate the example of Tarquin, and give the same price for the smaller collection which was asked for the whole. By this procedure we should lose nothing but abridgments or amplifications, modifications or repetitions. It may be added, that it would be an easy achievement to reduce the present number to nine books, by a much more rational division than at present prevails. The sixth book, which is a late and purely Christian meditation, should be excluded. The last four books, numbered xi, xii, xiii, xiv, in the manuscripts, receive those numbers simply from the arbitrary distribution of the copyist or ancient editor; and there is as much reason for dividing the present compilation of fragments into fifty books as into twelve or fourteen. It is probable that in the patristic ages various editions, with entirely distinct distributions, were current.

After the Sibylline Oracles had come into the possession of the Roman state, they were preserved with the same religious care and veneration as the Ancile, and the other superstitious toys, on which the fate of Rome was imagined to depend. Priestly functionaries were appointed to watch over them, and they were especially confided to the pontifical authorities. In such safe-keeping there would have been no guarantee for a pure and genuine text. Nevertheless, in desperate contingencies they were solemnly consulted, and the responses, which were found or feigned in them, were obeyed with

scrupulous sanctimony. Twelve instances, at least, of such formal inspection are specified by Livy; and from the occasional mention of the *Libri Fatales* it may, perhaps, be inferred that other oracles than those of the Sibyl were preserved for the public guidance. This copious literature of futurity did not, however, prevent the Romans from availing themselves of other sources of divination, and interrogating Etruscan soothsayers, and the prophetic temples of the greater and the lesser gods of Greece. The knotty questions, which might have been presented by the dubious contents of the Roman oracles, were fortunately eliminated by an accident. During the Civil Wars, in the year A. C. 84 or 83, the capitol was destroyed by fire, and the Sibylline Oracles perished in the flames.* Commissioners, however, were promptly appointed to gather the existing fragments, which continued or had begun to circulate among the people of Asia, Africa, Sicily, the Troad, Samos, the Italic colonies, and especially Erythræ, and thus form a new collection. From this we learn that the purchase of Tarquin had not prevented the circulation of the same or similar oracles among the nations; and may, perhaps, infer that the Sibylline Oracles had risen in repute with the decline of Greek civilization at home, and the hellenization of the civilized world abroad. The great temples of Greece had lost most of their ancient splendour and authority with the impoverishment and decay of the Greek states; and the oracles themselves became gradually silent as the respect paid to them declined. But at no previous period was superstition more rife in Greece and throughout the rest of the recognised world; and the verses of the Sibyls became diffused with the other arts of Greece, and usurped the place which had been vacated by the Pythonesses at Delphi. The century preceding the grand conflagration had been eminently favourable to the reception, dissemination, and manufacture of prophecies. The Hellenic dynasties and dominions were crumbling away before the march of Roman conquest. The Asiatic empires of Grecian origin were waning, disorganized, and curiously apprehensive of the future. The growing magnitude of the Roman power was daily gaining recognition, and its destination to universal rule was growing into a fear and a belief. Such a season was peculiarly favourable to the diffusion, multiplication, and credence of prophetic warnings; and it is not surprising that the Sibylline Oracles should have then existed in abundance, and should have been easily collected by the Roman emissaries, from those places especially which were in most immediate apprehension of Rome.

* Friedlieb, Einleitung I, § 1, p. viii. He gives the date A. C. 84. Clinton, F. H., A. C. 83.

Even at Rome, however, the Sibylline Oracles appear to have lost much of their ancient prestige after the burning of the original exemplars in the capitol, and only to have furnished material for philosophic discussion,* or for the decoration of poetic fictions.† If we may judge from the character and contents of the subsisting collection, they occupied, and were calculated to occupy, a much larger share of regard among the Asiatic and other Greeks than among the Romans. It was an age of dilettantism and patrician scepticism at Rome; and the current oracles gathered by the commissioners may, moreover, have had the same anti-Roman or un-Roman aspect which is so distinctly discernible in the Third Book, as it still exists. Still the forms of ancient reverence were unceremoniously observed in the external respect paid to the Sibylline collection; and it is interesting to note the pretended homage and implied contempt which marked the communication of the acute Tiberius to the senate, when it was proposed to add a new volume to the accepted pile.‡ The very fact of such a proposal furnishes an historical testimony to one of two things; either that all the important oracles had not been procured by the special commissioners, or that new collections or fictions had subsequently come into vogue. After the establishment of the empire, however, with the increase of superstitions, the songs of the Sibyls came once more into employment, if not into favour; in great measure, no doubt, in consequence of the use made of them, or their spurious imitations, by the early Christian writers, who were ridiculed as Sibyllists by their heathen adversaries for appealing to the testimony of their writings.

If, at this time, we were to prosecute further this branch of the subject, we should be compelled to abandon the purpose for which the above remarks have been specially introduced, and thus be brought immediately to the collection before us. The leading design of our notices has been to exhibit, in connexion with the Sibylline oracles, the prevalence, among the Romans and the contemporary nations of the Hellenic world, of that belief in subsisting prophecies which we have declared to be a singular characteristic of nearly all times and people. This point we proceed to illustrate still further by later evidences.

The use which was made of the genuine or spurious Sibylline collections by the Christian writers and fathers of the second, third, fourth and fifth centuries, but especially by Athenagoras, Justin

* Cicero, De Div., lib. i, c. ii, § 4.

† Virg., Ecl. iv. To the consideration of this celebrated poem we shall speedily return.

‡ Tac. Ann., lib. vi, c. xii.

Martyr, Theophilus, Lactantius, Clemens Alexandrinus, Eusebius, and St. Augustine,* is frequently referred to in the notes of Alexandre, and in the course of Friedlieb's introduction; and has probably been the principal cause of the preservation of these books to our time. Yet Chrysostom, who lived through the latter half of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century, perceived their falsehood, and placed them only on the same level with the predictions of Bacis.† One hundred and fifty years later, however, the historian Procopius refers to them in terms which indicate his belief in their partial reality and accomplishment at least; and expresses the same view in regard to the impossibility of recognising the realization of an oracle until after the event, with which we ventured to commence this dissertation. ‡

The reception and employment of the Sibylline oracles by the Christian fathers, is only a single example of a peculiar state of things, prevalent during the long conflict between nascent Christianity and expiring heathenism. Throughout those centuries, a warfare, gradually growing bolder on the one side and more timid on the other, was carried on by turning against each other the weapons particularly belonging to its antagonist. If the Christians endeavoured to confirm the truth of their religion by alleging the raising of the dead by their Founder and his own divine origin, the pagans replied by referring to the miracles attributed to Apollonius of Tyana, and other thaumaturgists, and to the reputed paternity of Plato.§ If the heathens attributed the corruption of morals, the disorganization of society, and the decline of the empire to the new doctrines, and the neglect of the ancestral gods, the Christians had anticipated them in attributing these results to the inherent iniquity of their creeds. If the polytheists recurred to Jewish testimony, or to the asserted profanity of the new sect, in disproof of their tenets, the latter sought to substantiate them by quoting the heathen oracles and the Sibyls to prove the reality of Christ's mission. If the Christians corroborated the divinity of their religion by present

* Friedlieb, Einleitung I, § 3, p. x.

† ° ° ° *οὐδ' ἂν ἀληθέστερα εἰπω τῶν Σιβύλλης ἢ Βάκιδος.* An expression almost proverbial.

‡ ° ° ° *ἀδύνατά ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁτῳοῦν πρὸ τοῦ ἔργου τῶν Σιβύλλης λόγων ξυνιέναι, ἢν μὴ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς ἐκβάντος ἤδη τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐς πεῖραν ἐλθόντος, ἀκριβὴς τοῦ ἔπους ἑρμηνεὺς γένηται.* Procopius, De Bello Gothico, lib. i, c. xxiv, vol. ii, pp. 118, 119; cf. lib. iv, c. xxi, vol. ii, p. 579; cf. etiam Corippus, De Laud. Justin. Min., lib. iv, vv. 264–279; lib. ii, v. 45.

§ The legend was apparently originated by Plato's nephew and successor, Speusippus; it is of course turned to a bad account by Strauss, Life of Jesus, part i, c. iii, § 29.

portents, special miracles, and the direct intervention of supernatural aid, the infidels had a copious store of similar marvels, ancient, modern, and contemporary, to counterbalance them. Thus the thundering legion and the vision of Constantine had their heathen counterparts. So intimate and continual was this conflict of prodigies and interchange of wonders, that it is impossible to unravel the tangled web, and to determine either where truth ends and fiction begins, or which party was in each instance entitled to the credit of originality. It is amusing to read Zosimus, and other authors contemporary with those times, to trace the copious streams of superstitious imagination, and to note how incessant was the reciprocation of favours always false on one side, and usually fraudulent on both. Such a period was of course congenial to the manufacture, extension, and reception of Sibylline or other oracles.

The belief in them continued far into the Middle Ages, in the East and in the West. After we leave the ecclesiastical writers, however, of the earlier centuries, references to the Sibylline collections occur but rarely. Procopius asserts that he had read them all, and quotes from them on two occasions;* but his citations are absolutely unintelligible without the explanation which he gives, and appear to have been written in some Asiatic or African dialect. There is a line quoted by Theophanes and Cedrenus, and applied to the inundation of Edessa by the river Scirtus; but it is not stated by them to be Sibylline, being mentioned as such only in the commentary of Alemanni on the Secret History of Procopius.† None of the three fragments occur in Friedlieb's edition. The last may or may not have been really Sibylline; and in the same category may be placed "the most ancient oracles of the Egyptians," specified by Agathias.‡ The testimony of Procopius is most important; for he speaks from personal inspection and study, and informs us that the Sibylline oracles, even in his day, exhibited the disorderly appearance, the disconnected form, and the same difficulties which they still present. He says that there was neither a natural succession nor harmony in the exposition; but that the current of prognostication jumped abruptly from Libya to Persia, and from Rome to Africa or Britain. This is exactly the ragged condition of the subsisting remains. The remark of Procopius shows that, in his time as now, the ancient legend that the oracles of the Sibyl were written on leaves, and scattered to the winds as they were composed,

* De Bell. Gotth. i, c. vii, vol. ii, pp. 33, 34; c. xxiv, pp. 117, 118.

† Theophan. Chron., vol. i, p. 264. Cedreni Hist. Comp., vol. i, p. 638. Alemanni ad Procop., vol. iii, p. 442.

‡ *παλαίτατα τῶν Αἰγυπτίων λόγια.* Agath. Hist., lib. v, c. x, p. 298.

to be picked up at random, would have been highly appropriate as a metaphorical description of their contents, whether the expression had or had not any supposed foundation in fact. It also proves that the condition of these oracles could not have been much more satisfactory in his day than in ours; and that the task of correction, arrangement, and interpretation would have probably been an impossibility in the sixth century, and must consequently be a hopeless absurdity in the nineteenth, unless our hopes of purification and explanation are very moderate indeed. The harmony, whose absence is noted by him, may refer either to the want of method, or to metrical defects. In a writer of that age it is difficult to determine the exact signification in which words—and especially fine words—are used.

The Sibyls are mentioned by Georgius Syncellus and the Chronicon Paschale,* but from neither do we derive any information in regard to the currency of their predictions. The former makes the Cumæan Sibyl contemporary with the Trojan war; and the Samian is assigned to the date A. C. 721. The second reports the Erythræan Sibyl as flourishing in Egypt at the later date; and enumerates eleven other Sibyls. It is added, however, that the statue of the Erythræan Sibyl was still to be seen at Erythræ in the time of the Chronicle, possibly about A. D. 354.†

It is, however, unnecessary to follow the notices of the Sibylline Oracles through the series of Byzantine and other mediæval writers; but it may be mentioned that, after the middle of the tenth century, we find similar oracles, still believed, and with the name of the prophet announced, current in the Eastern Empire, and recorded in an author where we would little have expected such information. We refer to the Visions of Hippolytus, a Sicilian bishop, mentioned by Luitprand, who calls them Sibylline predictions, wherein were foretold the fortunes and successions of the Greek and Mohammedan potentates, and the ultimate overthrow of the latter by the French and Germans. This prophecy was hazarded, at any rate, a century and a quarter before the commencement of the Crusades. ‡

* Georg. Syncelli. Chronog., vol. i, p. 402. Chronicon Paschale, vol. i, pp. 201, 202.

† Du Cangii, Præf. ad Chron. Pasch., § x, vol. ii, p. 16.

‡ The passage is in many respects so curious that it may be appropriate to cite it here: "Habent Græci et Saraceni libros, quos ὁράσεις, sive visiones Danielis, vocant; ego autem Sibyllinos; in quibus scriptum reperitur, quot annis Imperator quisque vivat; quæ suit futura, eo imperitante, tempora, pax an simultas, secundæ Saracenorum res an adversæ. Legitur itaque hujus Nicephoræ temporibus Assyrios Græcis non posse resistere, hunoque septennio tantum vivere; post cujus obitum Imperatorem isto deteriorem, (sed timeo, quod inveniri non possit,) et magis imbellem debere surgere; cujus temporibus prævalere

It might have been noted, in passing, that several prophecies were current among the Romans, derived from other sources than the Sibyls, which were verified, long subsequent to their promulgation, by the event. Such was the remarkable prediction, involved in the appearance of the twelve eagles to Romulus, but otherwise distinctly announced on Etruscan authority, that the Roman Empire should endure for twelve ages. If we reckon only to the usurpation of Odoacer in A. D. 476, we have 1229 years for the duration of Rome,—a calculation which approaches very closely to the twelve centuries, counting in the ordinary manner one hundred years to the *sæculum*. But if we take, as we ought to do, the Etruscan age, which numbered 110 years as the unit, and carry down the Western Empire or the independence of Rome to its final surrender, by the recall of Narses from Italy in A. D. 567, and the entrance of the Lombards A. D. 568, we obtain the full and just sum of one thousand three hundred and twenty years, or twelve Etruscan ages exactly.

These indications, besides furnishing the opportunity of occasionally illustrating Sibylline questions, may be sufficient to free us from the necessity of pursuing still further the dark and curious traditions of oracular superstition. Abundant materials for the later periods of history and in connexion with other nations of antiquity are at hand, without having recourse to the predecessors of the *milleniarian* Miller, who have figured in every century since Christ, and whose announcement of the approaching end of the world seems to have been originally borrowed from the Sibyl. We might have enlarged upon the history of the Abbot Joachim in the twelfth century, and of Michael Nostradamus in the sixteenth; and might have easily culled a copious harvest of scattered prophecies, believed or accomplished in the succession of time. For modern ages, however, it would only have been necessary to refer to the curious revelations of old prophecy in France and Germany, and we believe in nearly every other country in Europe, which were made during the revolutions of 1848.

Enough, however, has been said to establish the singular and not

debent Assyrii, ut in Chalcedoniam usque, quæ distat Constantinopoli haud longe, potestate cuncta debeant oblinere. Considerant enim utrique tempora, una eademque re Græci animati insequuntur, Saraceni desperati non resistunt. Sed Hippolytus quidam, Siciliensis episcopus, eadem scripsit, et de imperio vestro. ° ° ° Scribit etiam præfatus Hippolytus, Græcon non debere Saracenos, sed Francos conterere, qua lectione Saraceni animati," etc. Luitprand Leg. ad Nicepb. Phoc., pp. 484, 485, Ed. Muratori. Nicephoras Phocas, of whom Luitprand speaks, was assassinated by John Zimisces in the seventh year of his reign.

readily credited fact, that in almost every age and country, predictions, local, ancient, accepted, have been current, and that some of these have been strangely accomplished. There was one, a trifling one indeed, of whose existence previous to the event we were personally cognizant, and whose realization, by a true oracular *équivoque*, we can vouch for. There are several in the German collections already published, which seem now pressing toward their achievement: and the prophecy of nearly a thousand years standing, which promised Constantinople to the Russians, is obviously tending toward its fulfilment—though scarcely at so early a period as to gratify the inordinate rapacity of the present Czar. All people, indeed, seem to have had their race of prophets, though not as regularly admitted into the hieratic establishment, or as distinctly marked by their dress, as among the ancient Syrians.*

We close this curious historical inquiry, which has trenched too far on our limits, by calling attention to the remarkable and sagacious essay of Lord Bacon, "On Prophecies."† It will be noticed, however, that his reasons for their rejection, though valid in the large majority of cases, do not cover the whole ground, but conceal the exclusion of those instances where alone an elucidation could be desired by an intelligent man; as, for example, the prediction addressed to Galba by Tiberius: *Et tu Galba quandoque degustabis imperium.* ‡ The array of evidence which may be adduced in support of cases of this kind leaves unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, the question whether, in the multifarious and wild aberrations of human speculation, a few grains of truth are accidentally deposited and preserved in the endless chaff of error, or whether the spirit of prophecy, in obscure and rarely recognised forms, is at all times circulating abroad through the earth. At any rate they indicate that the origination and existence of the early Sibylline oracles was a natural, and not altogether an extraordinary phenomenon; and that their primitive production may be more judiciously attributed to ignorance, wild conjecture, and superstition, than to ingenious artifice or deliberate fraud. Of course, when the type was once furnished, and the canvass prepared, it was easy and natural enough for folly, fraud, fear, or fancy to imitate the form or to alter the

* *ὑποδήμασί τε λίνου πεποιημένοις ἐχρῶντο, ὥσπερ οἱ κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία προφητεύοντες.*—Herodian, lib. v, c. v, § 21. According to Irmisch ad loc. these prophets were only priests.

† Essay xxxv.

‡ Tac. Ann., vi, c. xx. Suetonius, Vit. Galbæ, c. iv, attributes the speech to Augustus, but states that Tiberius had predicted the certainty of his future reign.

pattern. It is to this later stage of the procedure, as exhibited in the tattered and much-patched remnants of the Sibylline oracles still preserved, that we must confine the scant remainder of our remarks.

We shall neither question nor discuss the dates which Friedlieb and others have assigned to the several component parts of the surviving twelve books. This would lead us into too protracted an examination, and one which we have not the materials at hand to pursue thoroughly. Moreover, it would be singularly uninteresting to the majority of our readers. We prefer to give the results arrived at by Friedlieb as they are stated by him, and to make some observations on the principles by which he has been guided; for thus we shall be enabled to prosecute our inquiry, as we have hitherto done, through paths wholly untrodden by him.

At the close of his introduction, Friedlieb sums up his conclusions in regard to the several periods at which the different books and parts of books were produced, in the following manner.* The most ancient portion of the whole collection is the Third Book, which seems to have been composed by a Jew living in Egypt about A. C. 170–160. This contains the predictions of the old Hebrew, or Erythræan Sibyl, which he had previously determined to be identical with the Cumæan.† From the Third Book, however, so considered, must be subtracted some later additions, and there must be annexed to it also the original Procemium preserved by Theophilus. The Egyptian Jew, who is the supposed compounder of the work, has mingled therein heathen oracles, and others whose sources must be sought in the Old Testament. The alterations which it underwent about the end of the second or the beginning of the third century after Christ, proceeded from a Christian, who is probably responsible for the First and Second Books, and for the present shape of the Eighth. Fragments from earlier heathen oracles are inserted in all of these books. The part of the Eighth Book which obviously bespeaks a Jewish original, belongs to the time of Marcus Aurelius. The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Twelfth Books claim a Jewish author; the Seventh, a Judaizing Christian; the others a Christian. The date of the Fourth Book may be assigned to A. D. 80; that of the Fifth to A. D. 117, and must have been written by a Jew living in Egypt. The Sixth Book, which is of Christian composition, belongs to some period anterior to Lactantius. The Seventh Book is to be assigned to the second half of the second century. The Ninth Book was written by a Jew living in Egypt in the reign of Trajan, about A. D. 115–118. The Twelfth Book was also by an Egyptian Jew, and composed in the third century. In

* Friedlieb, Einleitung, i, § 32, p. lxxi. † Ibid., i, § 17, p. xxxix.

this same century, also, were written the Tenth and Eleventh Books, the former of which may be ascribed to the middle, and the latter to the second half of the century.

These are the results at which Friedlieb arrives. They do not often differ materially from the positions which Alexandre apparently intends to support. We do not regard them as altogether satisfactory, though they unquestionably possess a partial truth. The dates assigned usually indicate the time at which the latest oracles of importance were inserted in each book, and very frequently determine the periods at which particular parts were published; but they do not exclude the possibility of much later recensions and additions in each book, nor the time and progress of previous accretions, nor the relations of the separate books or parts of books to each other. If conventional dates are to be determined on, which shall be those when the greater part of the oracles in the separate books were gathered together, and if a sort of mean average time be thus inferred in each instance, we have no objections to make to Friedlieb's conclusions; but they should not be received as affording the dates either of the original composition or combination of the oracles, nor as settling the time of their latest modifications. It is probable that they underwent many changes, and assumed their present form long subsequent to the latest date which he has given. It is almost certain from the internal evidence that they had passed through many transmigrations, and had submitted to many curtailments, additions, and mutilations before even the earliest period which he has mentioned. Our own opinion is—and the subject scarcely admits of anything but judicious conjecture—that the separate oracles which formed the nucleus and original type of all that was subsequently added or developed out of them, were long current as loose traditions, before they were compounded into the pretension of a connected or harmonious whole. There are many examples of an arbitrary interpolation of oracles, which were neither Sibylline, nor had any relation to Sibylline topics, but which were violently forced into the context as congenial matter. A notable instance of this occurs in regard to the celebrated warning to Camarina:*

μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν· ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων.

Alexandre notes this as an example of the licentious manner in which the Sibyllists converted to their own use oracles proclaimed before them. This was the response of Apollo, not the verse of a Sibyl. It is introduced merely by way of illustration to induce the Ptolemies to suffer the Jews to return to Judæa, and forms an equiv-

* Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, v. 736, and Alexandre ad loc.

alent for the following line, which is a caution not to rouse the sleeping leopard. The oracle to Camarina is referred to by Virgil, and cited by Servius in a corrupt form, which may be due to blunders in the MSS., or may have been an ignorant corruption as early as his time. It is exactly such a false reading as may be still found in numbers throughout the collection after all the labours of Alexandre, Friedlieb, and Volkmann, and resulted from the misapprehension of the letters by the transcriber in the first instance, and the rash attempt to make sense without regard to metre in the second. In the edition of Servius before us, the line appears as,

μὴ κίνη Καμέριναν· ἀκίνητος παραμεινάτω—

a version not shown by Friedlieb's collations to exist in any of the manuscripts of the Sibylline oracles.

The repetition of such flaws as this does not permit us to accept any given age as the period when these oracles were produced. We can determine the age of particular parts in many instances, so far as their present form and their latest modification and application were concerned; but we can determine no more. We are thus enabled to resolve into separate and distinct, but unconnected points of light, the nebulous mist of glimmering matter, in many places; but to arrive at any definite conclusion in regard to the period of any considerable portion, we are obliged to adopt a course as arbitrary and fanciful as that by which the distribution of the stars into constellations, and the configuration of these, were devised. Yet it is just such a course that Friedlieb has pursued, and that Alexandre seems disposed to pursue. The whole subject is so slippery, intractable, uncertain, and obscure, that general views can alone be safely drawn even from the most minute examination, except with reference to a few brief paragraphs.

In order that we may detect some such probable inferences, it may be expedient to arrange in a tabular form, according to their antiquity, the dates and diversities of authorship proposed by Friedlieb:—

A. C. 170–160.	Book III.	By an Egyptian Jew.
A. D. 80.	" IV.	" a Jew.
" 115–118.	" IX.	" an Egyptian Jew.
" 117.	" V.	" a Jew.
Second half of Second Century.	" VII.	" a Judaizing Christian.
A. D. 161–180.	Jewish part Book VIII.	" a Jew.
Beginning of Third Century.	Book VIII.	" a Christian.
" " " "	" I.	" "
" " " "	" II.	" "
A. D. 235–250.	" X.	" "
" 260.	" XI.	" "
Probably in the Third Century.	" XII.	" an Egyptian Jew.
Before A. D. 300.	" VI.	" a Christian.

Supposing Friedlieb's conclusions to be worthy of acceptance, under those restrictions which we have pointed out, the inspection of this statement furnishes the history and many indications of the lineage of the Sibylline Oracles in nearly their present form. Their Hebrew and Hebraistic descent is obvious from the succession of their authors. Their manipulation by the Jews of Alexandria, in the first instance, and the constant disposition of the Jews to tinker in such metal; their reception from the Jews by the Christians, and, in great measure, by Christians of Judaizing tendencies; are all suggested by a glance at the tables. These suggestions are strengthened by a closer examination, and by calling in the aid of other testimonies. The interval between the Third and Fourth Books is greater than between the Fourth and Sixth. The five oldest books, and the older part or edition of the Eighth Book, are by Jews, with one exception, the editor of the Seventh Book, who might or might not have been a Jew. Of the remaining books, one more is by a Jew. Rejecting the Sixth or most recent book, which has no tinge of a Sibylline complexion, but is simply a Christian canticle, all the Christian compilations fall together within the narrow compass of some eighty years, and characterize a particular age; while the Jewish editions extend over more than four centuries and a half. A more critical examination will abridge this period, and exhibit the Christian participation as still less significant and important. The Eighth Book may be withdrawn from the class of Christian books, as having been originally Jewish, and only revised, amended, and augmented by a Christian. The Tenth Book stands in a similar predicament, being only a second version of the Fifth Book. The Eleventh Book is a very clumsy and awkward jumble, designed apparently as a continuation of the Tenth Book, and thus falling in some sort under the same category. It is so inconsistently put together, that two different versions of the same prediction in regard to Antioch occur in it,* both of which are evidently only amplifications of an oracle in the Fourth Book.† By comparing together the three coincident passages, we may discover the phases through which an old legend was set to a modern tune. The First and Second Books alone remain for examination in this connexion. These have very scanty pretensions to originality. Leaving out of consideration the Pseudo-Phocylidean verses, which occupy so much of the Second Book, and which might have been insinuated at any time by either accident or design, there are many passages in both which indicate their dependence on earlier compositions which they imitated. Friedlieb has noted the instances in

* Orac. Sibyll., lib. xi, vv. 59–63, 125–130. † Ibid., lib. iv, vv. 140–142

which these books have taken their materials from the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Books.* The Twelfth Book, which is wretchedly corrupt and incurable, is alleged by Friedlieb to be the production of an Egyptian Jew. It is a mere compilation of incongruous materials, jumbled together with little regard to the succession of either times or ideas. There are heathen oracles and modern denunciations, modifications of earlier sages, and novel scraps of vague anticipation, heterogeneously mingled together. A notable instance of this is furnished in vv. 207–223. In these sixteen lines there are four different parts; the first two, however, are very neatly joined together. The first two verses refer to the conflagration of Rome under Nero, and were probably written not very long after the event; for the customary notice of the return of Belial is omitted, and instead of it there is added, by a later hand, an assurance that Rome shall be restored to its ancient splendour,—an announcement which can only be referred to the person and times of Trajan, who was called Wall-Flower by Constantine the Great, for his assiduity in restoring dilapidated monuments, and inscribing them with his own name.† Next follows, in vv. 214–218, an oracle which must be conceived to be both heathen and very ancient from the parties enumerated in it. The very slight correction of *Πηνειόν* for *Πηνιόν*, the error of a copyist, renders the passage metrically perfect and rhythmical, in the midst of the rugged and intractable prosody of the book; and by substituting in another line *πτερινοῦ* for *πτερικοῦ*, the suggestion of Friedlieb, the Greek is rendered classical also. But these antique verses are immediately succeeded by a vague conjecture, which might possibly have been written after the murder of Geta by Caracalla, but were probably composed shortly before. This Twelfth Book is, however, the most mutilated and wretched of the last four discovered and published by Cardinal Mai. In regard to all of them we assent to the testy ejaculation of Volkmann: "Vellem occulta mansissent hæc oracula in bibliothecarum squalore, quæ bilem et iram legentium movent, quoniam adeo corrupta sunt, ut fere tertius quisque versus claudus et *ἄμετρος* sit."‡

The Twelfth Book is thus constitutionally, and must have been originally, so defective in the essential characteristics of a true Sibylline production, that it could never have been admitted as a sufficient authority to determine the extent of the Sibylline period, whether regarded in its natural development, in its Hebrew repro-

* Einleitung, i, § vii, p. xvi; § viii, p. xix.

† Aurel. Victor. Epit., c. xli, § 13. Ammianus Marcell., lib. xxvii, c. iii, § 7.

‡ Diss. De Orac. Sibyll., § 11, p. 36.

duction, or in its Christian modification. But, even if it could be assumed for this purpose, it has been attributed, on probable grounds, to the profitless labour of an Egyptian Jew. It will thus appear that the construction of the Sibylline Oracles, such as we now possess them, was principally and peculiarly a Hebraistic device. The six oldest books are Jewish, compounded rather than composed between A. C. 170 and A. D. 180,—while the Christian books or Christian modifications range only from the beginning of the third century to A. D. 260, less than sixty years. These Christian republications throughout display their dependence on the earlier Jewish compilations, and are devoid of originality even in their mutilations, with the exception of the introduction of Christian dogmas, ordinarily heretical, and the more notable exception of the Sixth Book, and the acrostic on the name of Christ in the Eighth, neither of which possesses a Sibylline complexion at all, though the former is intruded, and the latter awkwardly interpolated into the existing Sibylline collections. It is remarkable, however, that this exercise on the name of the Saviour should be the only surviving specimen of that acrostic form which, we are assured by good heathen authority,* was characteristic of the Sibylline verses, though not to be traced in the quotations which occur in Pausanias, and earlier heathen authors.

There seems to have been at Alexandria under the later Ptolemies, and for many generations under the Roman dominion, a regular trade industriously carried on in the manufacture of spurious literary wares, and in the more or less successful conversion of heathen materials—literature, mythology, and philosophy; fact, fable, and fancy—to Jewish uses. As a colony of London Jews drive an active trade in Monmouth-street in repairing, remodelling, and retailing dilapidated garments, so their ingenious predecessors in Alexandria occupied themselves with tinkering and remodelling other men's literary fabrics, and patching antiquated scraps into new goods. It was not merely Platonism and Peripateticism which these *Gentilized* Jews simmered down in their Hebrew kettles; but the reveries of Persians and Egyptians, the traditions of their own Levites, the dogmas of the Christians, the legends of Greek mythology, and the productions of the Athenian stage, were all subjected to Hebrew manipulation. To this impulse, if not always to that time, we owe the large and curious collection of spurious literature which, notwithstanding all the ravages of time, continues so singularly abundant—Sibylline Oracles, supposititious Scriptures, false Gospels, and fictitious histories. To this tribe of Hellenists

* Cic. De Div., lib. ii, c. liv, § 112.

we may probably ascribe the compilation of the suspicious works of Sanchoniathon, Manetho, Berosus, and Hermes Trismegistus, no less than the books of Adam, Enoch, and the Little Genesis; to the last three of which obvious reference is made in the First Book of the Oracles, and whence alone any satisfactory assistance in the interpretation of some parts can be derived.* Unquestionably this colony of Hebrew *littérateurs* reacted on the other literature of Alexandria; and if the influence of Greece is manifest in the Sibylline Oracles, in the Mysteries† of Ezechiel and similar poets, and in the speculations of Philo-Judæus, the operation of Jewish influences is equally discernible in the obscurities of Lycophron's Cassandra, and with increasing force in later writers and in the Neo-Platonists. There are, indeed, many points of resemblance between these oracles and the Cassandra; and if the latter has the advantage in Greek, which is questionable, though it ought to have it according to the testimony of Æschylus,‡ the former has the advantage in point of intelligibility; for we agree fully in old Tanaquil Faber's estimate of the incomprehensibility of Lycophron. He strains the powers of the Latin language, and exhausts the vocabulary of darkness, to intimate the impenetrable darkness which Tzetzes could not illuminate; and what is too weak as a criticism of Lycophron, is appropriate as a censure of the Sibyls. Of each may suitably be said,—

> Ἔλυσε χρησμῶν, ὡς πρὶν, αἰολον στόμα·
> Ἀλλ' ἀσπετον χέασα παμμιγῆ βοὴν,
> Δαφνηφάγων φοίβαζεν ἐκ λαιμῶν ὄπα,
> Σφιγγὸς κελαινῆς γῆρυν ἐκμιμουμένη.§

The result of our examination so far is, that the later or Christian books of the Sibylline Oracles were mere revisions and alterations of earlier collections—half compilation and half forgery—made by Hellenistic Jews in Egypt. These worthy Hebrew prophets, who attempted deliberately to manufacture at Alexandria a pretence to the inspiration whose real effluence had been so long withdrawn from the land of promise, used the ancient heathen oracles as the ground-work for their own vaticinations, and a convenient vehicle

* Γρήγοροι ἀλφηστῆρες, Orac. Sibyll., lib. i, v. 98. Alexandre very properly refers to the extract from the Book of Enoch given by Georgius Syncellus, vol. i, p. 16.

† Mysteries were not the invention of the Latin Church in the middle ages, but were much older. If the relics of Ezechiel, Gregory, and Ignatius are not such, they are at any rate mentioned by Luitprand, Leg., p. 433, ed. Muratori.

‡ In the Agamemnon Cassandra boasts that she speaks pure Greek. Æsch. Agam., v. 1254, ed. Didot.

> Καὶ μὴν ἄγαν γ' Ἕλλην' ἐπίσταμαι φάτιν.

§ Lycophron, Cassandr., vv. 4-7.

for the indulgence of their national animosity and prejudices against the heathen, and more especially against the Romans in later times. The greater part of the materials which might have entered into the oracular Mosaic, had perhaps been lost or altered by the changing fortunes of the Grecian world, or, which is more probable, were deliberately rejected by the Jews as unsuitable to their purpose; but they eked out their scanty measure by a copious infusion of imitations of Isaiah and the other prophets, as later editors and imitators did by large obligations to the Apocalypse. Perhaps their own want of art, more probably the scrupulous ignorance of later refurbishers of the old fabric, pressed into the disorderly conglomerate the scattered oracles, not Sibylline, but Pythian or miscellaneous, which they had elsewhere encountered. It appears reasonable to refer to the influence of Isaiah, and the frequent recurrence of the metaphorical expression, "the Isles of the Sea," that exaggerated and disproportionate regard which is paid to the islands of the Ægean, and the cities on the Mediterranean coasts, to the neglect or exclusion of much more important topics. But the influence of the old Hebrew prophets, and particularly Isaiah, is apparent both in special oracles,—as in the advent of the Saviour from the East,* and his virgin birth,†—and also in the irregular form in which the strain is cast, and the abrupt transitions with which it changes its subjects. To this source also must be attributed the mention of Gog and Magog, and many other incidental matters, though the circumstances attending the time of their utterance may have induced a different application from any possibly contemplated in the Scriptures.‡ But this is by no means a solitary instance of the ignorance or audacity with which the Sibyllists have perverted the materials which they employed.

Of the other ingredients worked into the earlier or Jewish books of the Sibylline remains—the transfusion of long narratives from Genesis, and the desultory and disconnected notices which they contain—it is not our purpose to speak. The chief elements, on which the Jewish manipulators operated, were obviously Greek oracles and legends,—Sibylline, hieratic, or popular,—and the Hebrew prophets, largely interpreted by Jewish traditions and Egyptian fictions. These component parts are conspicuously prominent in the Third

° Isaiah xli, 2. Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, vv. 652–660.

† Isaiah vii, 14. Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii., vv. 684–694. The latter part of this passage has been added from Revelation, or perhaps other parts of the prophets. Isaiah xi, 1–9.

‡ Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, vv. 319, 512. Alexandre, not. ad v. 319. Friedlieb, Einleitung, i, § 14, pp. xxx, xxxi.

Book—the most ancient of all, and the only book supposed to have been promulgated before the Christian era. We believe that equally ancient materials form the groundwork of, or are incorporated into other books; and we do not see any necessity to admit with Friedlieb the unity of either authorship or editorship of the body of the Third Book.* That many passages of the latter are of more recent date, or at least of subsequent addition, appears to us highly probable; but that the greater portion was written shortly after A. C. 170, is rendered certain by a very distinct determination afforded in the text.†

Ὁππόταν Αἰγύπτου βασιλεὺς νέος ἑβδομον ἀρχῃ
τῆς ἰδίης γαίης, ἀριθμούμενος ἐξ Ἑλλήνων
ἀρχῆς, ἧς ἄρξουσι Μακέδονες ἀσπετοι ἀνδρες,
ἔλθῃ δ' ἐξ Ἀσίης βασιλεὺς μέγας, αἰετὸς αἰθων,
ὃς πᾶσαν σκεπάσει γαῖαν πεζῶν τε καὶ ἱππέων,
πάντα δὲ συγκόψει, καὶ πάντα κακῶν ἀναπλήσει·
βίψει δ' Αἰγύπτου βασιλήϊον, ἐκ δέ τε πάντα
κτήματ' ἐλὼν ἐποχεῖται ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης.

Before commenting on this passage, as it is the only favourable opportunity that may be afforded for giving a specimen of Friedlieb's hexameters, we will quote his translation of the lines:—

Dann wann ein neuer König Aegyptens in siebente Reihe
Herrscht übers eigene Land, gezählt nach der Herrschaft der Griechen,
Wo Macedonische Männer gewaltsam führen die Herrschaft;
Und von Asien aus ein mächtiger König, ein kühner
Adler heranzieht, der alles Land mit Fussvolk und Reitern
Deckt, und Alles zermalmt und Alles mit Unglück erfüllet;
Und der zerstört das Aegyptische Reich und daraus alle Schätze
Raubt und hinweg sie führt auf dem breiten Rücken des Meeres
Und dann werden sie vor dem grossen, unsterblichen König,
Gott, das schimmernde Knie zur Erde, der nährenden beugen;
Und in des Feuers Gluth stürzt jeglich Gebilde der Hände.

The young king of Egypt—not a new king, as Friedlieb renders it—is Ptolemy Philometor, who ascended the throne A. C. 181, when he was quite a child, under the guardianship and regency of his mother Cleopatra. It is true that Attic usage would require the article in this construction, and that the amended version of Castalio, given by Alexandre, translates in accordance with Friedlieb:—

Quum novus Ægypti rex septimus arva tenebit.

But it would certainly be hypercritical to exact the grammatical propriety of Athens from the Hellenistic Jew, who wrote these lines; and the indeterminate language of prophetic pretension might otherwise justify the omission of the article. Ptolemy Philometor,

* Einleitung, i, § 17, p. xxxvii. † Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, vv. 608–623.

who ascended the throne in his infantile years, was the sixth of the Ptolemies, and the seventh king of Egypt, reckoning Alexander the Great as the first, according to the precise indications of the text.* The special mention of his rule over his own country is probably intended to designate the cessation of his mother's regency. The great king of Asia is Antiochus Epiphanes, who invaded Egypt A. C. 170, and carried off Ptolemy Philometor as captive. The prophecy quoted must have been written very shortly after this event, for there is no allusion to the usurpation of Ptolemy Physcon, who immediately seized the reins of government, nor to the subsequent joint-rein of the two brothers, nor to the intervention of Rome, and the visit of Ptolemy Philometor to Rome to ask the support of the Romans, unless this is unnecessarily conceived to be involved in verse 637 :—

Ἡγεμόνες δὲ φύγωσιν ἐς ἄλλην γαῖαν ἅπαντες.

This line, however, occurs in a prediction relative to Roman interference in Greece :—

βάρβαρος ἀρχὴ
Ἑλλάδα πορθήσῃ πᾶσαν.

The distinct specification of Ptolemy Philometor settles thus the date of a portion, and probably of the greater portion of the Third Book; and the manifest expectation of a restoration of the Jewish people from the invasion of Antiochus, shows the readiness with which the Jews interpreted their sacred prophecies by their hopes,† and may, perhaps, explain, or be explained by, the enthusiasm of the Jewish struggle for independence under the guidance of the Maccabees, which was nearly coincident with this period.

We have dwelt the longer on this passage because it is the most precise indication of a date which occurs in the older books, and is the earliest date which can be safely assigned to the promulgation of any considerable part of the Sibylline Oracles in a form approximating to their present appearance. It authorizes us, moreover, to conclude that there had been a body of Judaistic Sibylline prophecies, amalgamating Greek oracles and Hebrew revelations, in existence in Egypt for nearly ninety years, when the Roman commissioners were appointed to collect the remains of the Sibyls, after the burning of their own earlier collection in the capitol.

As Africa was particularly enumerated among the provinces in

* This difficulty and apparent error have arrested the attention of Alexandre, (not. ad lib. iii, v. 608;) but he has failed to solve them. "An potius *ἑβδομος*?" asks he—not perceiving that the Sibyl distinctly includes Alexander the Great, the founder of the empire, as the first king.

† Isaiah xix, 19—a reference given by Alexandre.

which the explorations of the commissioners were to be conducted, it would be reasonable in advance to suppose that they availed themselves of these Jewish compilations—as well as of others which had been previously made elsewhere, as we may infer from Strabo to have been the case at Erythræ at several periods.* But there is other evidence affording a strong presumption that this Third Book was carried to Rome, and became familiar to the Romans, thus introducing that fragmentary acquaintance with the Hebrew prophets, and that partial curiosity in regard to Hebrew dogmas and antiquities, which are observable in the classic literature of Rome.

We have previously shown that the Sibylline Oracles studied by Procopius were not in a much more satisfactory or intelligible condition than ours now are: that those gathered and treasured by the Romans toward the close of the republic were neither much better than the Third Book, as it now stands, nor very dissimilar from it, may be safely inferred from the remarkable testimony of Cicero, which is given in the note below.†

We promised to return to Virgil's celebrated Eclogue, and will now redeem that promise. It professes to be founded on the predictions of the Cumæan Sibyl, and these Friedlieb conceives to be identical with those of the Erythræan and Hebrew Sibyls—representing all three as the same collection—because Virgil has unquestionably employed either this Third Book of the Oracles, or an analogous compilation manufactured from the same common stock of materials. ‡ Friedlieb has overlooked the possibility and the significance of this alternative. If, as he proposes reasonably enough, the fragment preserved by Theophilus is added as the Procemium to the Third Book, it necessarily follows that this book is either the work of the Erythræan Sibyl, or a later revision of the same, or a similar compilation of like materials. This results from a compari-

* Lib. xiv, c. i, vol. iii, p. 142, ed. Tauchnitz.

† Cic. De Div., lib. ii, c. liv, §§ 110, 111: "Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur; quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in Senatu putabatur, eum 'quem re vera Regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse Regem, si salvi esse vellemus.' Hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? Callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, prædictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur," &c.

‡ Friedlieb, Einleitung, i, § xvii, p. xxxix. After identifying the Erythræan and Hebrew Sibyls, he says: "Wir können aber auch noch einen Schritt weiter gehen: Virgil hat in der vierten Ecloge die Weissagung des goldenen Zeitalters, und schreibt diese der Cumäischen Sibylle zu. Diese Weissagung, welche auf Jesaias, c. xli ruht, steht auch in unserer Sibylle, vv. 784–794, (better 652,) so dass wir auch den Namen der Cumäa dieser Hebräischen Sibylle zulegen können," &c.

son of the statement of Lactantius with that of Theophilus. The same relation will also subsist between the Cumæan Sibyl and the Third Book; which, moreover, professes in the text to be the production of the Erythræan Sibyl. But, instead of inferring, as Friedlieb is inclined to do, only one collection of Jewish origin, it appears much more suitable to suppose three or even more different collections, all analogous to each other, but none exactly the same. Any one, however, might fairly be taken as a type of the others, though each might contain in addition its own characteristic peculiarities. We attribute some weight to the ingenious and plausible contrivances by which he endeavours to swell the number of lines in the Third Book to the thousand said by Lactantius to be contained in the Erythræan Sibyl;* but Pausanias distinctly asserts that the Babylonian or Hebrew Sibyl, whose name and alleged origin suggest the suspicion of such fraud as we have already intimated, was posterior to the Erythræan Sibyl, who was the most ancient of the tribe.† There were, indeed, two Erythræan Sibyls, both named Herophile, one of which must have been identical with the Samian, for she is said by Pausanias to have spent a great portion of her life in Samos; but both of them were earlier than their Hebrew imitator. It is worthy of note that the same diligent author says that no oracles of the Cumæan Sibyl were preserved. Even in the days of Tacitus it was a disputed question whether there were one or more Sibyls.‡ This question might have arisen in later times, if there had been only one Sibyl acknowledged originally, and many Jewish or other imitations subsequently produced. But in this point of view it would have been unimportant in relation to our present purpose. It was a question, however, long and anciently entertained, contemporary at least with Aristophanes and Aristotle, and apparently contemplated by the Roman commissioners, and indicated clearly by the tenor of the books which we possess—for the passage in which the Sibyls speak of themselves must be regarded as usually ancient—and therefore the question could only have been occasioned in respect to collections as old as the Third Book, or still older, by such mutual resemblance as must have sprung from the identity of the original stock from which they descended, or the identity of the materials employed by all.

Under these circumstances we may assume that the Erythræan, Cumæan, and Hebrew Sibyls closely resembled each other, without

* Friedlieb, Einleitung i, § xvii, p. xxxviii.

† Pausanias Phocic., pp. 327, 328, ed. Xyland & Sylburg.

‡ "Una seu plures fuere," says Tacitus, lib. vi, c. xii, in relation to the decree of the senate, prescribing the new collection.

going so far as Friedlieb has done, and considering them as the same. We may also infer that more than one version of the oracles was known to the Romans, and that the Third Book might be among the number consulted by Virgil for the preparation of his Eclogue, and thus the introduction of Messianic prophecies into Roman poetry will be rendered intelligible; though the near coincidence of such popular promulgation of these predictions with the actual advent of our Saviour will remain one of those miracles, produced by the succession of events, which are not less miraculous than supernatural interpositions. We ought to have remarked that Pausanias informs us that the Hebrew Sibyl was also termed the Egyptian by others.

With these explanations the Fourth Eclogue of Virgil becomes perfectly intelligible. The whole oracular point and significance are contained in four lines, which we quote again:—

> "Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas:
> Magnus ab integro sæclorum nascitur ordo.
> Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna:
> Jam nova progenies cælo demittitur alto."

The rest is all poetic fancy and amplification, but every point in these four lines is Sibyllistic, and requires interpretation from the Sibylline Oracles. It was no arbitrary conclusion imagined by Virgil that the last Sibylline age had been completed, but one indicated sufficiently by the tenor of the Third Book, and by the remnants of early oracles contained in the others. The notion that a renovation of all things was to occur after the expiration of ten ages was very current in the ancient world, and may be traced from Hesiod downward through the whole stream of Greek literature, as well as in the Sibylline Oracles. According to the Sibylline enumeration seven of these ages were completed with the generation of the Titans, and the remaining three were occupied with the revolutions of human history. Unfortunately, with respect to the curious doctrines of the ancient world in regard to these systems of imaginary chronology, we have little information beyond what has been preserved to us from the wreck of this literature in Syncellus and the Paschal Chronicle. But that the tenth age had arrived about the commencement of the Christian era, in the estimation of Sibyllists, may be inferred from the Second Book of these oracles, which, though long posterior in date, must have borrowed this indication from earlier sources. The first line of Virgil above quoted may, in all probability, have been derived from some expression in the oracles accessible to him, similar to this:—

Δὴ τότε καὶ γενεὴ δεκάτη μετὰ ταῦτα φανεῖται
ἀνθρώπων.[o]

And the general impression embodied in the Alexandrian versions of the Sibyls may perhaps have had some influence in determining the decision of the Sanhedrims at Jerusalem in regard to the expected advent of the Messiah, by influencing their interpretation of their own sacred prophecies on the subject.

The renovation of the cycles of change after certain successions of astronomical periods, was a dogma peculiarly developed in Egypt, but indulged elsewhere; and communicated from Egypt with diverse modifications to the whole civilized world. Independent, however, of any extrinsic influence of Egyptian philosophy, the idea announced by Virgil is contained in the Sibylline Oracles, which appear to have borrowed from Isaiah the anticipation of a reign of millennial peace. The happy age, when the wolf should lie down with the lamb, is to Virgil the return of the Saturnian rule; to the Sibyl of the Third Book it is the prospective period when the Jews should be restored to the independent enjoyment of Jerusalem and the devout practice of their holy religion. The Virgin whom Virgil recalls to earth is the translated Erigone, who had been transferred as the impersonation of Justice to the heavens. To the Sibyl, however, whence the notion is borrowed, without being apprehended in its deep original import either by lender or borrower, it is the Virgin Mary prophetically announced by Isaiah.† The new progeny sent down from heaven seems to have been vaguely contemplated in the passage relative to Ptolemy Philometor previously cited, but is more distinctly employed with reference to the Messiah in other parts of the Third Book. One line, indeed, is so precise and pointed as to admit of no misinterpretation; but its singular precision makes us suspect it to be a late addition or alteration—a suspicion entertained by Gfrörer, Alexandre, and Friedlieb.‡ The line referred to is—

Τἰὸν γὰρ καλέουσι βροτοὶ μεγάλοιο Θεοῖο.

It is cited in this form by Lactantius and St. Augustine. The MSS. are unanimous in the mode of its exhibition, yet Alexandre has ventured to suggest *νηόν* as a new reading, which is rejected as improbable by Friedlieb; and we must believe that the line is a later corruption or interpolation.

[o] Orac. Sibyll., lib. ii, v. 15. On these generations see Friedlieb, Einleitung, pp. xiv–xx.

† Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, v. 784: *Εὐφράνθητι, κόρη, καὶ ἀγάλλεο, κ.τ.λ.*

‡ Friedlieb, Einleitung, i, § xvi, p. xxxvii.

It thus appears that the Fourth Eclogue of Virgil is literally an application and variation of Sibylline materials, probably drawn from the Third Book of the Oracles, in consequence of the manifest introduction of the ideas of the Scriptural prophets, but not necessarily indicating thereby the actual identity of the Cumæan, Erythræan, and Hebrew Sibyls. From the general current of our investigations it may be safely inferred that all the earlier Sibyls exhibited only different versions and slightly dissimilar modifications of the same original text or collection of texts; and that the later editions which have descended to us, underwent numerous successive revisions, additions, purgations, and alterations, to adapt them to the use of different ages or different parties, until, their treacherous character being finally suspected in the fourth and fifth centuries, they gradually sunk into comparative oblivion, to be at length gathered up into their present collected form by the pious charity of the writer of the preface discovered by Antimaco.* But, at whatever period they ceased to be botched and tinkered by every fanatical volunteer, we do not believe that a century of lines can anywhere be found consecutively, which exist now in the same state in which they came from the hands of their Jewish editors—to go no further back.

If, therefore, it be impracticable to determine the exact dates and fortunes of the different component parts of this trading stock of oracles, we can at any rate discern the general agencies, both psychological and historical, which have produced the variety of our present books, their discrepancies, and dissimilarities, and have also given to them the motley and incongruous character which they display. The superior antiquity of the Third Book is not inferred singly from the pointed reference to Ptolemy Philometor, but may be confirmed by much intrinsic evidence, and especially by a larger, more uniform, and more consistent employment of Homeric locution and the Homeric rhythm than belongs to any of the other books. We would venture to suggest that perhaps the most ancient ingredient in the whole collection, excluding the warning to Camarina, as not being of Sibylline origin, is the passage in the Twelfth Book, already referred to:—

> Αἱ μέλεοι Κέκροπες, καὶ Δαύλιοι, ἠδὲ Λάκωνες,
> οἱ περὶ Πηνειόν τε βαθύσχοινόν τε Μολοσσὸν
> Τρίκκην, Δωδώνην τε, καὶ ὑψίτμητον Ἰθώμην,
> αὐχένα τε, πτερινοῦ τε μέγαν περὶ βίον Ὀλύμπου
> Ὄσσαν, Λαρισσάν τε, καὶ ὑψίπυλον Καλυδῶνα.†

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* τοὺς ἐπιλεγομένους Σιβυλλιακοὺς χρησμοὺς, σποράδην εὑρισκομένους καὶ συγκεχυμένους. Orac. Sib., ed. Friedl., pt. ii, p. 2. † Orac. Sibyll., lib. xii, vv. 214–218.

This may not be Sibylline, but it can scarcely have been written after the Messenian wars. The latest passage of historical character or oracular pretension is in our opinion in the Eleventh Book:—

> Αἱ ὁπόσοι φεύξονται ἀπ' ἀντολίης γεγαῶτες
> σὺν κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν ἐς ἀλλοθρόους ἀνθρώπους·
> αἱ ὁπόσων ἀνδρῶν πίεται χθὼν αἷμα κελαινόν·
> ἔσται γὰρ χρόνος οὗτος, ἐν ᾧ ποτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν
> οἱ ζῶντες μακαρισμὸν ἀπὸ στομάτων ἐνέποντες,
> φθέγξονται καλὸν τὸ θανεῖν, καὶ φεύξετ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν.[o]

In verse 105 we detect a distinct allusion to the capture of Rome by Genseric, though Friedlieb would probably apply it to some obscure or doubtful event under Gallienus; but the lines which we have quoted, though they may be applied, on the authority of Herodian, to the reign of Septimus Severus, are applicable only to the condition of the Roman empire under Theodosius, as described by Priscus Panita in his colloquy with the Roman emigrant, or under Justinian, as illustrated by Procopius.

We have not nearly exhausted our memoranda and materials, nor given adequate development to our views; but we have exhausted our paper, and our own as well as our reader's patience; and may, therefore, conclude by referring those who desire other, further, or more minute information to Alexandre's valuable notes, and Friedlieb's elaborate introduction, having used their assistance but slightly and incidentally ourselves, while endeavouring to pursue our own explorations by new methods, and into wider fields.

It was our design to have added a new list of our own to Volkmann's catalogue of metrical rectifications. He has left much for the gleaners who may succeed him; and the task of correction is often easy enough by obvious changes. But we have occupied so much time already that we are obliged to forego our intention, which we do the more willingly, as the labour is thankless and profitless in itself; and, after the endless corruptions, deliberate and accidental, which these oracles have experienced on numerous occasions, it would seem as unnecessary as it would be to file down Mother Goose's melodies to the polish of Pope's versification. We are not certain but that all that is to be learnt from the Sibylline Oracles may be most readily gathered from them in their sluttish and mutilated state as exhibited in the MSS. Their rugged wretchedness is more suggestive than they would be in a more purified form. They are the tattered remnants of an ignorant, bigoted, superstitious, and often fraudulent phase of declining civilization; and the Sibyls who pro-

[o] Orac. Sibyll., lib. xi, vv. 113–118.

fess to be coëtaneous with the birth of antiquity,* and contemporary with Noah,† deserve to be lapidated at its close, according to the sentence and prayer put forth by one of them on her own behalf.‡

Βάλοιτέ με, βάλλετε πάντες·

Art. II.—PUBLIC PRAYER.

Prayer goes back of mere speech—it exists amid the felt emotions of the soul. To every man there are two worlds of immediate interest—the world of outward facts and events, and the world of inward thoughts and emotions. The first is concrete and tangible; the second, in a sense, abstract, and with difficulty explained. Knowledge of the first is obtained by observation, analysis, and induction; while the second can be perfectly known only to individual consciousness.

Now, as in the first, at the creation, the Spirit of God moved, separating light from darkness, land from flood, and order from general chaos; so in the second, at the *new* creation, the spirit of prayer, which is, in some sense, but another form of expression for the Spirit of God, moved, separating the light of hope from the darkness of despair, the grounds of peace from the floods of anxiety and remorse, and the order and beauty of holiness from the general chaos of depravity. And, furthermore, as in the outward

* Orac. Sibyll., lib. iii, v. 813. She calls herself the Erythræan Sibyl, daughter of Gnostos and Circe, a statement which must be late and fraudulent, as not agreeing with geography, mythology, or the testimony of antiquity, and indicating Oriental influences by the name of her father. In lib. v, v. 53, a late book, she is the sister of Isis, a declaration probably ancient, and borrowed from the old Egyptian Sibyl.

† Orac. Sibyll., lib. i, v. 288. She is the daughter-in-law of Noah; and the same is again asserted, lib. iii, v. 826, which must have been in the latter book a Jewish addition to their heathen materials, and is at variance with the previous allegation of her parentage.

‡ Orac. Sibyll., lib. vii, vv. 150–162. In this passage, besides incidents obviously imitated from the Cassandra of Æschylus, there is a confused reference to the tradition which represented the younger Erythræan Sibyl as indiscriminately the wife, sister, and daughter of Apollo. Pausan. Phocic., p. 327. We may mention here, what we have had no suitable opportunity of mentioning in the text, that the Jewish expectation of an actual restoration to Jerusalem is, in the main, a Sibylline idea, derived originally from the Jewish colony at Alexandria under the Ptolemies, but adopted and repeated in the Sibylline Oracles.

world there is a continual, absolute necessity for the presence and agency of the Spirit and power of God to preserve and to develop the creation, so also in the inner world is there a like necessity for the presence and agency of the spirit of prayer, in order to the preservation and development of the new creation. In order to a successful cultivation and ripening of those blessed fruits, "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance," there must be unceasing prayer and universal thanksgiving.

It was thus with the ancient worthies. Hannah's lips did not move, yet "she spake in her heart unto the Lord." David interprets the same active inner state when he says, "My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee in a dry and thirsty land where no water is." It was enjoined by our Saviour when "he spake a parable unto them, that men ought *always* to pray, and not to faint;" and also by the Holy Ghost, through Paul, when he exhorted the brethren to "continue in prayer, and watch thereunto with thanksgiving." They who cry day and night unto him are termed, preëminently, "God's own elect." When the disciples were under the most powerful dispensation of the Holy Ghost, namely, on the day of Pentecost, it is said that "they continued steadfastly in prayer." The pious and accepted Cornelius "prayed to God always;" by which we are to understand that he continually maintained an inward frame of active devotion. When men thus live, Satan comes and has nothing in them; duty calls, and they are always ready for its performance; troubles break in, but are not able to overwhelm; persecutions bear down, and the soul maintains its integrity; public calamities rage and dangers threaten, but no fear is realized; death comes, and is welcomed with joy. "They are like the earth in its orbit, guided by a central power, illuminated by a central light, and carrying everywhere a circumambient atmosphere with a life-giving and refreshing influence."

But though in its elementary existence and fundamental exercise prayer exists back of speech, yet God has ordained that it shall often break forth in overt supplications. Hence the command, "Enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." This obligation was recognised as binding in the most ancient times. It is not an arbitrary command, unaccompanied by reasons and encouragements. It is founded upon the necessity of personal communion with God, and upon that great privilege conferred by religion upon man, of making his requests known unto God in everything. And the encouragement consists

in this, that God is in his retirement; he is there to bless and to cause his face to shine upon him; "*he seeth in secret;*" he enters into his case, and penetrates the meaning of silent desires and sighs as well as words, which have no need of loud utterance to enter into his ears. And he *openly rewards* all such as practise this secret duty in a right spirit.

We have not, indeed, to direct us, a "thus saith the Lord" respecting the exercise of FAMILY PRAYER. None of the inspired penmen have in so many words commanded that the family shall be collected, morning and evening, around a domestic altar for the purpose of reading the Scriptures and prayer to God. But what is the inference? That there is no such obligation resting upon man? Certainly *not;* for it is plain that if such an inference were to be admitted as just, then, because there is in the Bible no express command to feed, clothe, and educate children, it might with equal justice be inferred that no *such* obligations exist, which every one knows is not the case. He that in these temporal things "provides not for his own house, denies the faith, and is worse than an infidel;" while that professed Christian who refuses, by readings, instructions, and prayers, to provide for the spiritual wants of his house, proves eminently reckless to a powerfully-felt obligation, and is worse than a heathen.

The object of PUBLIC PRAYER is threefold; namely, to honour the great Master of Assemblies; to call into exercise the devotional feelings of the congregation; and, lastly, to secure that divine influence, without which the preached word is inevitably lost, like "water spilled upon the ground." If this statement be correct, then how many are our shortcomings! How few there are who bring "beaten oil" into the sanctuary! What odours of strange fires are smelled by the Lord of Sabaoth!

There are two extremes in public prayer. He who falls into the first is *indifferent;* he who adopts the other is *extravagant.* The one coldly *performs* his so-called prayer in dull monotony; the other rushes into the awful presence of God literally "as the unthinking horse rushes into battle." If the first wearies us by his soulless formality, the second alarms us by his excesses of language, voice, and manner. Furthermore, we have heard some ministers confess and bewail so many and such malignant crimes, that we were almost ready to conclude that the services of a civil magistrate were needed. This might have arisen from pure humility; but surely such language, such berating of the first person, both singular and plural, better becomes the closet than the sacred desk and the ears of a promiscuous congregation. Again, it would seem, from

the language and tenor of some public prayers, that the minister has at length "found out the Almighty to perfection," and become his counsellor in government, if not preceptor in knowledge. There are others again who *talk* to the Lord as they would to a familiar acquaintance, and bestow upon him endearing titles and fondling epithets, such as they would not venture to employ in addressing any earthly dignitary. We remember to have listened to one public prayer, though, happily, in this case, the supplicant was not a minister, in which the awful NAME was reiterated full threescore times! And, furthermore, it is not three months since we heard a minister say, while addressing the throne of grace in public, "*We would say unto thee, in the language of the poet, O God,*" &c., &c. In other instances the ear is grated upon by the constantly-recurring phrases, "We pray thee," "We beseech thee." On the other hand, some ministers pray as if they would captivate the Almighty by high-sounding diction and rounded periods. This is an error less only than those described above. Such efforts may please certain refined audiences, but we doubt if they are treasured up in the golden censers of heaven.

Now, surely, of all men living, the minister of the gospel ought to be the most thoroughly versed in the theory, so to speak, and skilled in the exercise of prayer—prayer in general and prayer in public. He fills an office beneath which every other earthly profession falls. He bears responsibilities such as are denied even to angels. Physicians, jurists, and statesmen bow before the pulpit, and observe a reverent silence while in the official presence of him whose work it is to bear up their wants to a throne of grace, and deliver messages from the upper sanctuary. From a minister called of God, as was Aaron, and qualified for his work in a manner at all answerable to the means Providence has furnished him to that end, this homage is rarely for a moment withheld. For such a man to be ignorant, or negligent of the immense importance of public prayer, and unskilled in its appropriate exercise, is unpardonable. Years of time, toil, and expense devoted to the acquisition of scientific and classical accomplishments, mastering text-books of theology and homiletics, and attaining the art of approved elocution, are insufficient to atone for the defect. No matter how finished and beautiful the sermon, if it be accompanied by the defects we have spoken of so plainly, it will fall upon the depraved hearts of the hearers as powerless and harmless as did the spear of Priam on the buckler of Neoptolemus. On the other hand, a mere exhortation falling from the lips of one destitute of all the above-enumerated advantages, not unfrequently lashes the most indifferent and hardened sinners into

convictions and wailings for sin. Whence the difference? "Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord." But why so much larger and more effective outpouring of the Spirit of God in the latter than in the former instance? The secret is found in the two prayers, which, by the way, are also indices to the hearts of the respective speakers. Whereas the first was formal, boisterous, or rhetorical, anything but purely spiritual in his addresses to the throne of grace, the second was simple, warm, direct, appropriate, effectual. God honours those who depend on him in this work, while such as "go down to Egypt for help, who stay on horses and trust in the mountains of Samaria," or, in other words, who make the exercise of prayer in public worship a merely intellectual, or in any sense a secondary thing, are left to a legitimate confusion and defeat. It is vain for a minister to attempt to make up in preaching that which is lacking in his prayers. It has, indeed, "pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe;" but he has also commanded that, "*first of all*, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings shall be made for all men," &c. Strike out the exercise of prayer from individual conduct, and there would be no religious experience; and strike out the exercise of prayer from public Christian worship, and the pulpit would at once descend to the level of the rostra.

The effect is nearly as disastrous when the appropriate *spirit* of prayer is lacking. It is that influence which is given only in answer to appropriate, fervent, effectual prayer, that has enabled the Christian pulpit to enchain the hearts of millions for centuries. But for this, the minds of men would soon turn loathingly away, and demand the excitement of something new. From the lips of one inexperienced in the spirit and unskilled in the exercise of prayer, the story of the cross is received only as a sentimental fiction or a piece of tragic history. Nothing but the spirit of earnest supplication can impart that sober and effective energy which is demanded by a dying world from the pulpit. Such were the prayers offered up by the prophets and apostles of old. Those specimens of their supplications which are left upon record are models of language as well as of spirit. There is profound reverence, deep thought, and extremely careful, if not studied, expression. They were not, indeed, governed by liturgies, nor did they abandon themselves to a wild and enthusiastic caprice. Their performances were the echoes of fervently pious hearts, guided by a judicious mind, to the voice of God as uttered in his works and word. Hence David says, "When thou saidst, Seek ye my face; my heart said unto thee, Thy face, Lord, will I seek." Their adorations and ascriptions, at least such as are

left upon record for our "doctrine, reproof, correction and instruction in righteousness," were but responses to what the Almighty had revealed of his natural and moral perfections; their confessions responded to the charges he had preferred against them, and the punishments he had denounced; their petitions and intercessions responded to his commands, his promises, and the descriptions he had given of their wants and those of their fellow-creatures; and their thanksgivings responded to the favours bestowed upon themselves, their kindred, and the human race. Take, for instance, the prayer of Jehoshaphat, when the kingdom and cities of Judah were invaded by the hosts of Moab. Standing up in the "congregation of Judah and Jerusalem, in the house of the Lord, before the new court," he said: "O Lord God of our fathers, art not thou God in heaven? and rulest not thou over all the kingdoms of the heathen? and in thy hand is there not power and might, so that none is able to withstand thee? Art not thou OUR God, who didst drive out the inhabitants of this land before thy people Israel, and gavest it to the seed of Abraham thy friend forever? And they dwelt therein, and have built thee a sanctuary therein for thy name, saying, If, when evil cometh upon us, as the sword, judgment, or pestilence, or famine, we stand before this house, and in thy presence, (for thy name is in this house,) and cry unto thee in our affliction, then thou wilt hear and help. And now, behold, the children of Ammon and Moab and Mount Seir, whom thou wouldest not let Israel invade, when they came out of the land of Egypt, but they turned from them, and destroyed them not; behold, I say, how they reward us, to come to cast us out of thy possession, which thou hast given us to inherit. O our God, wilt not thou judge them? for we have no might against this great company that cometh against us; neither know we what to do: but our eyes are upon thee." 2 Chron. xx, 6–12.

Jehoshaphat did not *read* this prayer. It was the unpremeditated outburst of a devotedly pious heart. Directly in point we instance also the prayer of King Hezekiah, uttered in the same place, under very similar circumstances. Sennacherib had sent him a menacing letter; and Hezekiah went up into the house of the Lord and spread out the communication before the Holy Shekinah, and then prayed as follows: "O Lord God of Israel, which dwellest between the cherubims, thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and earth. Lord, bow down thine ear, and hear: open, Lord, thine eyes, and see: and hear the words of Sennacherib, which hath sent him to reproach the living God. Of a truth, Lord, the kings of Assyria have destroyed the nations and their lands, and have cast their gods into

the fire: for they were no gods, but the work of men's hands, wood and stone: therefore they have destroyed them. Now therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord God, even thou only." 2 Kings xix, 15–19.

The following from Daniel is a model of *importunate* prayer:— "O Lord, the great and dreadful God, keeping the covenant and mercy to them that love him, and to them that keep his commandments; we have sinned, and have committed iniquity, and have done wickedly, and have rebelled, even by departing from thy precepts and from thy judgments: neither have we hearkened unto thy servants the prophets, which spake in thy name to our kings, our princes, and our fathers, and to all the people of the land. O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion of faces, as at this day; to the men of Judah, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and unto all Israel, that are near, and that are far off, through all the countries whither thou hast driven them, because of their trespass that they have trespassed against thee. O Lord, to us belongeth confusion of face, to our kings, to our princes, and to our fathers, because we have sinned against thee. To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgivenesses, though we have rebelled against him; neither have we obeyed the voice of the Lord our God, to walk in his laws, which he set before us by his servants the prophets." And thus he goes on confessing and bewailing his own sins and the sins of his people, till he breaks forth in earnest petition as follows: "O Lord, according to all thy righteousness, I beseech thee, let thine anger and thy fury be turned away from thy city Jerusalem, thy holy mountain: because for our sins, and for the iniquities of our fathers, Jerusalem and thy people are become a reproach to all that are about us. Now therefore, O our God, hear the prayer of thy servant, and his supplications, and cause thy face to shine upon thy sanctuary that is desolate, for the Lord's sake. O my God, incline thine ear, and hear; open thine eyes, and behold our desolations, and the city which is called by thy name: for we do not present our supplications before thee for our righteousnesses, but for thy great mercies. O Lord, hear; O Lord, forgive; O Lord, hearken, and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God: for thy city and thy people are called by thy name." Dan. ix, 4–10, 16–19.

There are other instances in the Bible with which the reader is doubtless familiar; but these are sufficient for illustration—for example. If more are desired, let the reader go to the Psalms of David, many of which are of a supplicatory character; and where,

no less than in the illustrations above, the voice of God echoed back in a manner eminently glorifying to his character and edifying to the reader. "That public prayer may produce its proper and designed effects upon the hearers' hearts," says Dr. Payson, "it should be, if I may so express it, a kind of devout poetry. As in poetry, so in prayer, the whole subject-matter should be furnished by the heart, and the understanding should be allowed only to shape and arrange the effusions of the heart, in the manner best adapted to answer the end designed. From the fulness of a heart overflowing with holy affections, as from a copious fountain, should the minister pour forth a torrent of pious, humble, and ardently affectionate feelings; while his understanding should only shape the channel, and teach the gushing streams of devotion where to flow and when to stop. In *such* a prayer every pious heart among the hearers will join. They will hear a voice and utterance given to their own feelings. They will hear their own desires and emotions expressed more fully and perspicuously than they could express them themselves. Their hearts will spring forward to unite with the heart of the preacher. The well of water which our Saviour assures us is in all who drink of his spirit, will rise and burst its way through the rubbish of worldly cares and affections which so often choke it, and the streams of devotion from many hearts will unite and flow on in one broad tide to the throne of Jehovah; while with one mind and one mouth minister and people glorify God." Such are the effusions of patriarchs and prophets. Thus Ezra prayed "and blessed the Lord; and all the people," catching his spirit, "said, Amen, amen, with lifting up of their hands; and they bowed their heads and worshipped the Lord with their faces toward the ground."

Art. III.—THE CLAIMS OF ROMANISM.

Delineation of Roman Catholicism, drawn from authentic and acknowledged Standards of the Church of Rome; namely, her Creeds, Catechisms, Decisions of Councils, Papal Bulls, Roman Catholic Writers, the Records of History, etc., etc.; in which the peculiar Doctrines, Morals, Government, and Usages of the Church of Rome are stated, treated at large, and confuted. By Rev. Charles Elliott, D. D.

The teachings of a politico-religious organization, assuming infallibility in doctrine and discipline, perpetuity in duration, and universal supremacy in administration, without controversy, demand careful and critical investigation. The more so because, if the claims

of this organization be well founded, all who deny them are under an anathema pronounced by those who hold the keys of heaven and hell, and for them remain only the eternal displeasure of an offended God and the destiny of perverse schismatics.

To the Christian minister—the Protestant minister—these claims assume an importance real and momentous. They meet him in his daily pastoral work, and denounce him as a "wolf in sheep's clothing." They meet him in the pulpit, and proclaim him a "blind leader of the blind," and point to the "pit wherein is no water" as that into which he and his deluded followers must ultimately fall. When he stands by the bed of the dying man and essays to point him to the "better hope" brought in by a suffering Redeemer, even there they openly confront him, and charge him with deluding in the last hour a soul that can never die, and thus sending it into the presence of God unannealed and unabsolved. When he pronounces the consecrating words of holy baptism, this system claims the baptized one as *jure divino* its subject and slave. He sees, too, these claims advocated with a zeal and pertinacity hitherto unknown. Hence it becomes his solemn duty to acquaint himself with the evidences upon which they rest, that, if well founded, he may give them his earnest support; if false, that he may not only "give an answer of the reason of the hope" that is *in him*, but also be prepared to "drive away all dangerous and false doctrines." He must be able to vindicate his right to administer the holy sacraments, and to show that he is a member and minister of the *true* "Holy Catholic Church."

Nor is the minister alone interested. The student of political economy finds here a system of stupendous power—one claiming the right of absolving from all oaths of allegiance, assuming the control of all educational plans, and professing to be the universal arbiter and supreme monarch among the rulers of earth. It is his duty to understand it—to know whether it does or does not contain elements essentially and unchangeably despotic and anti-republican.

In short, these lofty claims demand close attention and patient study from the theologian, the statesman, and the jurist; for, if well founded, they will set aside our theology, remould the plans of the statesman, and revolutionize the practice of American law.

This being so, it is an important question, "What is Romanism?" To find the correct answer to the question is far from an easy task. If one seeks information as to the doctrines and practice of Romanism, he is referred to the *Rule of Faith*. And where may that be found? The author of the "Delineation" thus answers the question:—

"To the Scripture the Roman Catholic adds, 1. The Apocrypha; 2. Traditions; 3. Acts and Decisions of the Church, embracing eight folio volumes of the Pope's bulls, ten folio volumes of Decretals, thirty-one folio volumes of Acts of Councils, fifty-one folio volumes of the Acta Sanctorum, or the Doings and Sayings of the Saints; 4. Add to these at least thirty-five volumes of the Greek and Latin fathers, in which is to be found the *unanimous consent of the fathers;* to these one hundred and thirty-five volumes folio add the chaos of unwritten traditions which have floated down from the apostolical times."—Vol. i, p. 51.

Now if the above be Romanism, who is to know what it is? Who can or will wade through all that mass of barbarous Latin and latinized Greek? Not the politician. He can concoct and develop a score of practical (Buncombe?) schemes in half the time required to read the Pope's bulls alone. The priest cannot—he is too busy. Can the minister? Engaged as he is in the great battle of life, daily going forth to new conflicts, can he do so? While he is to preach the word, visit the afflicted, go after the wanderer, teach the youth, and instruct the ignorant, can he be expected to make himself familiar with this infinitely extended "Rule of Faith?" Manifestly *no.*

A desideratum, then, is an accurate *delineation* of Romanism—one going carefully over the ground, giving no statement unsustained by evidence which none can gainsay, and that evidence given both in the original and vernacular tongues, that the unlearned may understand and the learned be convinced.

An enumeration of the celebrated works which have appeared from time to time upon this controversy cannot be given. Distinguished names are arrayed on each side,—distinguished for learning and for wit. Among the champions of Romanism, Baronius, Bossuet, and Bellarmine stand preëminent. They have done in its defence all that can be done. Modern Papists say that Bossuet destroyed Protestantism—albeit, considering how long since the destruction took place, it gives some lusty indications of vitality. He has been seconded by Challoner, Gother, Milner, Kinsella, Doyle, and others, who, entering upon their work *con amore*, "have done what they could." Nor has Protestantism been destitute of bold, learned, and zealous advocates. Protestantism was the recognition and defence of the right of private judgment. Luther wielded his tireless pen; and Rome felt that *that* "pen was mightier than the sword." He did not always stop to polish the missives he hurled; but their execution was, therefore, no less terrible. By his side was the erudite, polished, chaste Melancthon. Zuingle, Bucer, Calvin, and Beza scattered their pages like winter snowflakes over Switzerland and France. In England, Chillingworth shouted, "The

Bible, the Bible is the religion of Protestants." Cartwright and Jewel give evidence of learning and research. The voluminous works of Barrow stand unanswered proofs of Rome's apostasy. Ireland, so long trodden into the very mire of degradation by Romanism, has given some fearless and mighty champions of Protestantism. Ouseley not only went among his countrymen preaching from tombstones, carts, and horseback, the pure doctrine of justification by faith without human priestly intervention; but, assailed by his enemies, he, in self-defence, gave the world his "Old Christianity against Papal Novelties"—a work which, for its size, is unsurpassed. Digby, Grier, and others produced works of various merit. Edgar, in his "Variations of Popery," has, with generous liberality, given Papists *the change* for Bossuet's variations of Protestantism. With merciless truth he arrays Bossuet against Challoner; sets Dupin against Dens, the Jansenists against the Jesuits; exhibits a triangular Papal war between Sylvester, John, and Benedict; arrays council against council, synod against synod, and infallible decrees against decrees infallible. His periods are not always fully rounded, and sometimes he quotes too literally from Romish documents to permit great delicacy to characterize all his pages.

American literature has not been destitute of works on this subject. Dowling's History of Romanism, written in popular style, though not characterized by profound learning, nor range of thought, and perhaps taking too many authorities at second-hand to be always historically reliable, has nevertheless had an extensive circulation, and has made a marked impression on the popular mind.

Dr. Rice has spent much of his time in speaking and writing upon this controversy. He has dissected some parts of the system with all the precision and accuracy of a practised operator. The "Kirwan Letters," written with all the terseness, beauty, and force which characterize "Junius," have been read by the million, and are still read. They have made heads tremble which wear the mitre, and hands holding the crosier shake. Kirwan has sorely provoked archiepiscopal indignation and apostolical rebuke. The influence of his letters upon the masses has been incalculable. They have fallen upon "the faithful" like the ancient Greek fire; and if there was a crevice in the armour, they penetrated, burning into the very bone.

Still the work we have under consideration has a place which none of those mentioned can claim or occupy; it supplies a want none of them fully meet. Some of them are inaccessible; some are voluminous and unwieldy, and will never be widely read in America; others are expensive; some are resistless applications of the *reductio*

ad absurdum to the vulnerable points of the system: but none, like the "Delineation of Roman Catholicism," in a cheap, condensed, and readable form, give an answer to the question, "What is Romanism?" and apply the double test of Scripture and logic to the claims so arrogantly set up.

It is not claimed for these volumes that they are specimens of rhetorical finish and ornate style. The learned author has never been distinguished for a careful attention to the graces of composition; but he *has* been celebrated for his nervous, plain, right-on Saxon style. To this, of set purpose, he has rigidly adhered in these volumes. Occasionally, it is true, he has for a while been urged beyond the limits of the mere polemic, and has written some paragraphs with the nervousness of Prescott or Macaulay. But let not the reader expect the offering of a constant oblation to his imagination. He has a mind—such, at least, is the hypothesis of the author—and to that mind as something that *judges* and *reasons* has he directed his labours.

Here, by the way, is one difference between Romanism and Protestantism. The former absolutely ignores the functions of reason in all matters of faith. *There* reason has no place—has nothing to do but to hear the voice *professedly* coming from the Church, and *obey*. No matter how absurd, no matter how contradictory; reason may not ask a single question, may not suggest a solitary doubt, may not even ask if it be indeed the voice of God's Church or the utterance of antichrist? In unquestioning submission it must receive all the teachings of tradition as the "oracles of God." Hence, while Rome has framed her whole economy to impress the imagination, she addresses not man's noblest attribute—his reason.

Protestantism, on the other hand, claims to be a system of inspired truths. She points to the Bible, and says, "There is the rule of faith;" and challenges obedience thereto because it is the word of God. She bids reason examine the evidences of inspiration and see if they are conclusive. If so, then our faith is demanded, because it is the word of God. And because she makes her appeal to reason, she hath no gorgeous ceremonial designed to overawe the emotional nature.

In the preparation of these volumes the author has spared no pains. They are a specimen of what a man may do who is in earnest. During the time of writing, collecting, comparing, and arranging his materials, he was actively engaged in various duties of ministerial life, either as a pastor, a presiding elder, professor in a college, or editor of a weekly newspaper. Yet there are no marks of hurry or incompleteness. The leading object of the work is to

give, after a careful survey of Rome in "all the length thereof and the breadth thereof," an accurate publication of the *field notes*. It is a chart—a map of the system. This he designed to make it, conscious that as Scripture is the best interpreter of Scripture, so is Romanism the best refutation of Romanism. The following is his own statement:—

"Another reason which induced him [the author] to publish these volumes is, to disabuse the public mind respecting the deceitful character of Popery. Romanists misrepresent their own creed, their Church, and its institutions. The most forbidding features of their professedly immutable system are kept out of sight by its Jesuitical teachers, while a Protestant sense is attached to most of their doctrines and peculiarities. By this means they designedly *misrepresent themselves* and impose on the public. One object, then, of this work is to spread before the people true Popery, and strip it of its Protestant garb, which it has for the time being assumed.

"Popery is truly irreformable, and it cannot change essentially without destruction. It professes to be *unchangeable*. Pope Pius's creed affirms that the Church *hath held* her doctrines as she *now holds* them. . . . . Pope Gregory XVI., in his encyclical letter of August 15, 1832, says: 'The universal Church suffers from every novelty. It is no less injurious to the Church that *anything* by way of *restoration* or *regeneration* should be forced upon her, as if she could be thought obnoxious to decay, to obscurities, or any other such inconveniences.' And as Roman Catholics profess this immutability, Protestants cannot be charged with uncharitableness in ascribing great unfairness to them when they vary so glaringly from the accredited standards of their Church.

"An additional reason for writing these pages is to inform Protestants concerning the true nature, tendency, and design of Popery. Many Protestants think Roman Catholics are misrepresented when their real system is delineated. Nor is it marvellous that Protestants should be generally unacquainted with Popery.

"It is believed, also, by some, that young ministers may find this work convenient, not only for the sake of reference, but also as a source from which to collect authentic documents, and proofs by which they may be aided in meeting the arguments of their opponents."—Vol. i, pp. 5, 7.

Of course no delineation would be reliable which was not drawn from Roman standards. To these he has gone. Wherever it is important he gives them in full—in Latin at the foot of the page, and the translation in the text. The following he lays down as *standards* which no Romanist can repudiate:—

I. "The creed and oath of Pius IV.," given in the Latin and English from "Butler's Book of the Roman Catholic Church," supplying only the portions Butler and Challoner saw fit to leave untranslated. This creed Butler says is "considered in every part of the world as an accurate and explicit summary of the Roman Catholic faith."

II. "The episcopal oath of allegiance to the Pope." "This second juramentory obligation is entered into by the hierarchy or whole ruling order of the Italian Church." It is, in the *most abso-*

lute sense, *an oath of fealty* to the Pope, and a recognition of his temporal and spiritual supremacy.

III. "The Catechism of the Council of Trent." This is absolute and *infallible* authority. The author quotes from Donovan's translation (Maynooth, 1829, and republished in Baltimore in 1833,) and also gives the decree upon each article of faith in the original. IV. Decrees of General Councils. V. Papal Bulls. VI. The Liturgical Books. VII. Traditions. VIII. Ancient Fathers. IX. Roman Catholic writers. From these sources he draws his materials.

The plan pursued in the *Delineation* is this:—1. The statement of the doctrine to be discussed, in the language of the Council of Trent, or some other infallible exponent. 2. The principal arguments offered in its support by Roman Catholic writers. 3. The refutation, drawn, first, from the Scriptures; secondly, from the fathers; thirdly, frequently from the testimony of their own writers, in which Dr. Elliott arrays authorities against authorities, and places the poor article of faith between the hot fires of its professed friends.

For instance, there is the *infallibility of the Church.* This is the strong tower of Romanism. Her children are securely intrenched behind it. In vain may we reason—in vain plead Scripture, history, the testimony of the fathers, and common sense; they have one answer: "The Church teaches a different doctrine, and I must believe the Church. Reason may err—the Church cannot." In vain do you again open the Holy Scriptures. The Church has expressly said "that neither a heretic nor any person not an ecclesiastic is capable of interpreting the Scriptures." Thus the Romanist stands intrenched behind infallibility, and you have no means of dislodging him. But, now, if you can bring him to look at the doctrine of his own Church, how will he be astonished when, from the infallible standards of that Church he ascertains that there is not any agreement as to the seat of that infallibility! that some, as the Jesuits, place it in the Pope alone; others in a General Council *lowfully assembled,* and affirm that the Pope without the Council is liable to err; others again place it in the Pope and General Council united; and yet a fourth party locate it in the opinions and decisions of the whole Church. Now here the astonished Papist sees the Church drawn up in a hollow square, and engaged in a quadrangular fight. Will he say infallibility is with the Pope alone? They ask him on all sides of the square, *save one,* "Was Stephen VI. infallible when he annulled the decisions and all the acts of Formosus? Or was John IX. infallible when he condemned Ste-

phen's acts and endorsed those of Formosus? Or was Pope Sergius infallible when he put his veto on the decisions of John and reännulled the acts of Formosus?" If he says it resides in a General Council, then let him decide *which* was infallible—the Council of Nice which decreed a downright hearty anathema upon any who should presume to "add any new article to the creed of faith of Nice," or the Council of Trent which *did add twelve new articles to that very creed*, and pronounced just as infallible an anathema on all who did not receive them? Now his infallibility has got him where he has to face a curse—the curse of Nice, or the curse of Trent. Which had the infallibility—the Council of Nice, or the Council of Constantinople—when they decided directly opposite in reference to image-worship; both, as in the former instance, sealed with solemn curses? What will he do?

We pursue this illustration no further. We think the point demonstrated that a clear knowledge of the teachings of Romanism is the most effective antidote to Romanism,—that the *facts* of Romanism destroy her *doctrines!*

The present position and aggressive movements of Romanism are reasons why at this very time the system should be perfectly understood. The genius of our government, so mild and generous, has welcomed Roman Catholics to our midst, and given them a home and privileges many of them never had under Catholic government. They are now numerous, and still they come. It behooves us to understand whether they come as republicans. More than this, to understand if they are, or are not, under the control of a system essentially anti-republican. We do sincerely believe that if the masses of the people understood the doctrine of Romanism in reference to the supremacy of the Pope, the political cant, now so common in some quarters, about the "republican tendencies of Romanism" would at once be exploded. They would see that whatever may be the personal feelings of Catholics, Roman Catholicism is essential despotism; that it concentrates all power in, and claims *for* its earthly head, political and ecclesiastical supremacy; that it claims for him superiority to "all rule, authority, and power."

We are not ignorant that this political supremacy is denied by some modern ecclesiastics, and repudiated by some Papist colleges located in Protestant countries. They say, "We know that Pius IX. has not the right to depose Protestant princes and absolve their subjects from allegiance." Now if they said he had not *the power*, there would be no dispute. But they will pardon us if we refuse—at least if we hesitate to receive—their disclaimer when their infallible decrees proclaim another doctrine, and curse us solemnly if we do

not receive it. Papal supremacy in all things was taught by the Lateran Council under Innocent III., the Council of Lyons under Innocent IV., and the other Lateran under Leo X. These decrees have been sanctioned by the Popes; so that whether infallibility dwell with the Pope, with a lawfully-assembled General Council, or with the Pope and General Council, in either case we have this doctrine of Papal *political* supremacy as one of the infallibilities. If the Church ever held it, by her own showing she holds it now. She cannot change.

If Holy Mother has ever changed her ground on this question it has been since the year of grace 1080, when Hildebrand deposed Henry IV., using these modest and gracious words:—

"For the dignity and defence of God's Holy Church, in the name of Almighty God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I depose from imperial and royal administration King Henry, son of Henry, sometime emperor, who too boldly and rashly hath laid hands on thy Church. I absolve all Christians subject to the empire, from that oath whereby they were wont to plight their faith unto true kings; for it is right that he should be deprived of dignity who doth endeavour to diminish the majesty of the Church."—Vol. ii, p. 162.

Now, could we have a good-natured chat with Archbishops Kenrick and Purcell, and Cardinal (?) Hughes, we would like to ask them, "Gentlemen, are the doctrines of the above bull American republicanism? Are they infallible? Has American Catholicism ever, by any formal edict, repudiated them? Answer upon your episcopal honour."

It would also afford us sincere pleasure to be referred to the place and time when the Church officially rebuked and condemned Paul III. for having, in 1535, and again in 1538, damned "Henry VIII. of England, and all who favour or obey him;" and also for having at the same time "absolved all his subjects from their oaths of allegiance to him, and commanded them all, under pain of excommunication, not to obey him nor any officer nor magistrate under him!" As Romanism now becomes the special patron of republicanism, of course the conduct of Pius V. has been condemned, and his name stricken from the roll of saints. In 1570 he issued a bull of excommunication and deposition against saucy Queen Bess in these words: "The damnation and excommunication of Elizabeth, Queen of England, and her adherents, with an addition of other punishments." It asserts of the Pope that he is "*made prince over all kingdoms to pluck up and destroy, scatter*, consume, plant, and build." * * * "And, moreover, we [the Pope] declare her [Elizabeth] to be deprived of her pretended title to the kingdom aforesaid, and of all dominion, dignity, and privilege whatsoever. And also the nobility, subjects, and people of said kingdom, and all others which have in

any sort sworn unto her, to be forever *absolved from any such allegiance, and all manner of duty, dominion, allegiance and obedience;* as we also do by the authority of these presents *absolve them,* and *deprive* said Elizabeth of her pretended title to the kingdom, and all other things above said. And we command and interdict all and every, the noblemen, subjects, *and people,* and others aforesaid, that *they presume* not to obey her or her monitions, mandates, and laws. And those that shall do the contrary, we involve in the same sentence of condemnation."—Vol. ii, pp. 165, 166.

We may not, in the space we dare claim, attempt an enumeration of the instances in which the Popes have pronounced sentence of deposition against emperors and kings. Suppose, however, the reader substitutes the name of Franklin Pierce for Elizabeth, president for queen, and see how it would read! There would be some slight modifications needed to make it just suited; but Brownson could send over a draft, and Pio Nono could swear by it. Why not? There the right claimed and often exercised stands an infallibility! Rome has never condemned it: she never will. Why may not an American president be solemnly "damned and deposed," and all governors, judges, and citizens absolved from their allegiance to the government?

It is rather edifying to witness the efforts of American bishops and archbishops to disclaim political supremacy for the pontiff. They are in a delicate position. They are in a republic, and one that views foreign affinities with jealous eye. And yet they are under a solemn oath to a foreign power and prince! This places them before the people in an unenviable position, and they feel it acutely. We can therefore appreciate their efforts to prove that Romanism is not the enemy of republicanism—that Pio Nono claims not the right to unseat General Pierce and appoint General Scott, Mr. Hale, or O. A. Brownson to fill his place. But yet we are not going to incur the danger of the anathema of pope and council by setting aside their solemnly-expressed and exercised will on this point, in favour of the personal, irresponsible disclaimer of these gentlemen of the mitre and crosier. More than this, we regard the disclaimer a little more suspiciously because we know that these men have each solemnly sworn on the "Holy Gospels of God" to "*help, keep, and defend the Roman papacy* and the REGALITIES OF ST. PETER (saving my order) against all men." Each one has sworn, "The rights, honours, privileges, and authority of the Holy Roman Church *of our Lord the Pope* and his aforesaid successors, I will endeavour to preserve, defend, increase, and advance. . . . . *Heretics, schismatics, and* REBELS TO OUR SAID

LORD OR HIS SUCCESSORS, *I will to my* UTMOST PERSECUTE AND OPPOSE!" Now, reverend gentlemen, you surely do not wish us to disbelieve your solemn oath! Certainly not. Therefore, when we hear a Romish bishop advocating freedom of conscience and denying Papal supremacy, we may know that he is merely "letting on;" so his "lord" understands it, and so must we, or else we throw the imputation of perjury into their teeth.

We receive this disclaimer suspiciously for another reason—*it* is disclaimed and denounced by American Catholics. In American journals the old doctrine of Hildebrand is openly avowed. Mr. Brownson in a late number of his Review has said: "That the popes have in certain cases deposed temporal sovereigns, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance, is undoubtedly true; and that *they have a right to do so in all analogous cases, we suppose must be conceded*, whether we adopt Ultramontane or Gallican doctrines."

Here we have it without evasion. An organ of American Catholicism openly, boldly assumes the ground that in the Pope of Rome, by divine ordinance, inheres the prerogative of absolving from allegiance the citizens of these States at such time and for such cause as he may determine; perhaps for rebelling "against the majesty of the Church!" Is this republicanism? And yet there has been no official condemnation of Brownson, who declares that he writes by episcopal authority!

To see the anti-republican tendencies of Rome we need no longer go to down-trodden Italy, where freedom of conscience is unknown—where imprisoned hundreds now groan in papal dungeons for *spiritual offences*. True, the abuses, the tyranny of the papal government have at last arrested the attention of American statesmen. But we have in our own midst the evidence. The past few years have witnessed quite a change in the tone of papal journals. Their conservatism is gone; their republicanism is retained as a blind, but in their columns are found treasonable averments, persecuting sentiments, and anti-American, anti-progressive doctrines. The doctrines of the Gregories and Piuses are openly avowed. We cannot say we regret this. The mask is off, or nearly so; the war-cry is sounded—these lands are claimed for a foreign despot. "We are fairly warned."

The Bible is denounced, and these men have declared they will drive it from our schools. They say more—they declare that our common schools, where the children of rich and poor meet together, shall be destroyed. They insist that a portion of the funds raised by taxation shall be placed under their exclusive management for

the purpose of advancing Romanism. The imprisonment of a poor family in Tuscany for Bible-reading, and their subsequent banishment from their country, are openly approved. And men who in public aided in measures for their relief, have been marked for political destruction!

We think we assert a mere truism when we say "that no man is better than his principles." He may conceal them for purposes of self-interest; he may disguise them—nay, under external pressure, he may even act contrary to them. But let a time come when he can develop them without danger, and he will do so. Then will *his* actions show that all the while he has played a borrowed part—that he only bided his time. So we also believe of Churches. They can claim no sanctity nor liberality superior to what they have laid down in their authentic standards. They may act in direct contrariety thereto, but it is for a purpose. Principles are sacred, and will be carried out whenever possible.

Apply this to Rome. Surely she does not profess to be more holy, more liberal than the doctrines—the infallible doctrines—of her popes, synods, and councils. Then how idle the assertion, how groundless the argument that she can, under any circumstances, approve of personal freedom! of religious freedom—freedom of conscience. There is a doctrine of this pseudo-Church which seems very liberal. There is no salvation without baptism; and as thousands must die and be lost if dependent on the hands of Holy Mother, she has decided that a heretic may baptize, and that St. Peter will acknowledge the validity. Liberal, is it not? That it is the doctrine of the Church, is demonstrated by the following authorities:—

The Fourth *Canon* of the Council of Trent says: "Whosoever shall affirm that baptism, when administered by heretics in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is not true baptism, let him be accursed."

In speaking of the *intention*, Dens says:—

"The intention, though *with the will of not conferring the effect, is sufficient*, by which, simply and generally, he wills to do what the Church does; for the effect does not refer to the essence of the sacrament. Hence, though heretics [Protestants] deny that grace is conferred by the sacraments, they validly baptize. . . . . It is sufficient that he [the baptizer] wills to do what Christ instituted, or what the Church does, *whatever his opinion may be concerning the Church.*" "Suppose he have two opposing intentions—*e. g.*, an intention to do what Christ does, or what his Church does, but not what the Church of Rome does? Answer:—Such a one, morally speaking, baptizes validly."—*Dens's Tract. de Sacram.*, No. 40, vol. i, pp. 187, 188.

These quotations, given at length, verify the view we have given of the Fourth Canon of Trent. Now, why this liberality to heretics? Why this legalising of their ministry? If Rome admits that persons "dedicated to God by our office and ministry," heretic though we be, are validly baptized, why denounce her exclusiveness? Because this baptismal scheme has been designedly framed to hold rigidly responsible to her laws all who have been baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity! Those baptized are not eligible to the privileges of the Holy Church, but are considered as becoming her subjects! The Thirteenth Canon of Trent says, "Children are to be reckoned among the faithful by virtue of baptism;" that is, they become members of the Church of Rome, whether baptized by heretic, schismatic, infidel, Jew, or Turk. Yet Romish "divines carefully distinguish between the qualifications necessary for the *validity* of a sacrament and those required in order to enjoy its *effects* or *fruit*." "The Eighth and Ninth Canons of Trent teach that all baptized persons are bound by all the precepts of the Church of Rome, written, or delivered by tradition, and are *obliged* to observe them, whether willing or unwilling." And if any man shall teach that, when they arrive at years of discretion, they are to be left to their own judgment, "and not to be compelled, meantime, to lead a Christian life by any OTHER PUNISHMENT than exclusion from the eucharist, and other sacraments, let him be accursed."—*Trent Can.*, 14. Benedict XIV. says all "baptized heretics or Protestants are members of the Roman Church, and subject to its authorities and laws."

For the wearisome length of these proofs we make no apology. They show the doctrine of Rome to be this: Every baptized person, adult or infant, is a sealed subject of the Roman See! No matter in what latitude, of what creed, or what colour—the one universal Church claims him, soul and body, forever.

Give Rome *power*, and will that claim be relaxed? Believe it who can. What she teaches once, she says she teaches evermore; and she once said, Let him be accursed who shall teach, that besides exclusion from the sacraments, other punishments shall not be inflicted upon such as disclaim that power. *Other punishments!* Shades of the victims of inquisitorial cruelty! spirits of Huss, of Wiclif, of Ridley! of the Waldenses whose bleaching bones lie unburied on Alpine heights! could ye speak, what revelations would we hear of what is included in those terrible words!

Give Rome universal power, we ask, and will she be better than her principles? Will she instruct her votaries that only moral weapons may be used in enforcing her claims on these bap-

tized subjects? Reader, do you believe so? If so, "great is thy faith."

This doctrine of baptismal dominion furnishes the key which unlocks many of her arrogant claims. Our author on this subject says:—

"She has converted the doctrine of baptism into an indelible brand of slavery; whoever has received the waters of regeneration is under the dominion of her who declares there is no other Church of Christ. She claims her slaves wherever they may be found; declares them as subjects to her laws, both written and traditional; and by her infallible decisions dooms them to indefinite punishment, till they shall acknowledge her authority and bend their necks to her yoke. *Such is, has been, and ever will be* the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church; such is the belief of her sincere members; such the spirit that actuates her views, and which, by every possible means, she has always spread among her members. Him that denies this doctrine, Rome devotes to destruction."

The relation, therefore, we sustain to Rome is not that of the heathen world; it is that of *fugitive slaves.* Property is proven by baptism, and she claims the privilege, as soon as she can muster the power, to "remand us" into her dominion to be dealt with "according to law." The end is not yet. If it were, then, while all baptized persons are "under the law," those not baptized might appear to be "under grace." Not so. The doctrine of universal supremacy would "cover the case." But there is special legislation. Rome has provided for the compulsory baptism of children, and even of adults. This our author has clearly shown. See vol. i, book ii, chap. ii, where he makes the following quotations from Dens:—

"Can children be lawfully baptized without the *knowledge* or *consent* of their parents? Answer: 1. If the parents are baptized, whether heretics or Catholics, their children may be *lawfully baptized without their consent;* because their parents, by virtue of their own baptism, and their children by virtue of their nativity from their baptized parents, are subjects (*subditi*) of the Church. But in cases where the parents are heretics, (*i. e.*, Protestants,) schismatics, &c., their baptized offspring ought to be *separated from the parents*, lest they be perverted.° 2. If the parents are infidels, or *not baptized*, and are despotically subject to a Catholic prince, as slaves or persons taken in war, then, also, in that case, their infants may be baptized without the consent of their parents, because in *this case the parents may be deprived of their children without injury*, as the prince comes into the place of the parent."

May be separated without injury! Surely the writer of that cold-blooded sentence had kept his vow of celibacy faithfully, for had he ever known one swelling emotion, one single thrill of paternal love, he would not have written as he has. "May be deprived of their children without injury!" A Catholic editor says, "If the state comes between the Catholic parent and his child, we will resist the state." What is that to tearing it away?

° There is toleration for you!

The author also quotes a delectable passage from Ferraris:—"The small children of certain infidels, or those who were never baptized, or of those now baptized, can be baptized without the consent of their parents. . . . . This is certain, because heretics are subject to the jurisdiction of the Church, whence it is so that the Church, for the preservation of the faith, can compel the parents by punishment, and can deprive them of their children and baptize them." Now is Holy Mother's claim to universal dominion made out? All the baptized are hers, signed with her seal, marked with her *mark;* and if unbaptized, it is her right to drag them to the holy waters and baptize them, thus "opening the doors" of the Church and "compelling them to come in." If they refuse, or delay, she can quicken their zeal and determine their consent by those potent OTHER PUNISHMENTS. In view of these things we press the question, Will Rome, possessed of power, be better than her principles? If this day the power "that sits upon her seven hills in her whoredoms" ruled these broad lands as she rules in Italy, in Spain,—as she bids fair to rule in France,—would she acknowledge, and maintain, or would she repudiate these infallible doctrines? Would she carry them out in letter and spirit, or would she suddenly forget the "faith once delivered" by *her* "saints?" Would she not enforce baptism on all children of unbaptized persons, that she might have the "answer of a good conscience?"

Perhaps the following extract from a paper published almost under the direct control of Archbishop Hughes, may throw some light upon these questions. In speaking of the imprisonment of the Madiai, it says: "It is easy to show that, while the Catholic government of the entirely Catholic community *is not bound in order to be consistent with its principles to tolerate any other religious teaching*, the Protestant state, though having no Catholics established in its realms, could not, without denying the *essential principles of Protestantism*, oppose the introduction of Catholicity, or any other religion." As this comes from an archiepiscopal organ, it is as near infallibility as anything we can have this side the Vatican. It states the distinctive features of Romanism and Protestantism:—

1. Romanism, where in power, is under no obligation to tolerate any other form of religion.

2. Protestantism is, by its essential constitution, *bound* to tolerate freedom of opinion and worship!

Here, then, we have them side by side—which of the two is better adapted to the genius of our government "judge ye."

This journal is not alone in such views. Some Catholics repudiate them, and denounce them in unmeasured terms. But they are

the doctrines of American Romanism as proclaimed by its own chief authorities and authorized exponents. There is a Catholic journal published in St. Louis. The editor, we believe, is a Mr. Bakewell; but the paper is understood to be the organ of the Most Rev. Archbishop Kenrick. The editor professes not to "speak of himself," but simply to utter what is *given* or allowed to him: for he says, "If there be one Catholic journalist in these United States, who, in his character as such, has manifested *the slightest disregard to the will of his ordinary*, we wish to see his journal blotted *from existence*. We profess in our editorial capacity the most entire obedience to our bishop, who represents us to the pope! and have no higher ambition than to serve him to the best of our ability, and to obey any intimation of his will with which it may please him to favour us." We may say, *en passant*, that the above is a fair specimen of the cringing, fawning spirit Rome teaches the laity to observe toward the clergy. And how low must have sunk the feelings of that American citizen who, as an editor only, does the bidding of a superior who is his representative to the pope! We have scarcely patience to copy such treasonable and servile sentiments. But this editor, who always writes as his bishop tells him, says:—

"As to this religious liberty question, we have spoken our mind about it plainly more than once, and have nothing to add to, nothing to retract from what we have already said. Truth is intolerant. It must necessarily condemn and reject error, which seeks to destroy it, as God, who is truth, must necessarily hate falsehood and sin. Common sense tells us this, and all the nonsense we hear from Protestants and ill-instructed Catholics about the rights of all sects and creeds has been explicitly condemned—not to go further back—by Pope Gregory XVI. in his famous encyclical of 1832, as well as in other encyclicals of 1834 and 1851, to which we have already referred in speaking of this subject. Heresy and unbelief are crimes; that is the whole of the matter: and in Christian countries, as Italy (?) and Spain (?) for instance, where all the people are Catholics, and where the Catholic religion is an essential part of the public law of the land, THEY WILL BE PUNISHED AS OTHER CRIMES. Here the law does not take cognizance of them, *because the law* does not recognise the truth of the Catholic religion."

Comment upon the sentiments in this extract is needless. It is full of moral treason, and declares open war upon freedom of conscience. Let not Catholics say it is only the utterance of an individual who has embraced Ultramontane views. No. He would not in the *slightest degree* disobey the will of his bishop. At the first suggestion from his representative to the pope, he is willing to modify, alter, amend, retract, or, perhaps, deny all that he has written. In this extract, then, we have officially American Catholicism.

We have alluded to the Romanist controversy on the subject of free schools and free education. Ere this paper can be published this whole question may assume a different ground, for the leaders find they have made a sad blunder in the initiative, and will no doubt shift their ground. As matters now stand this is about the case. In a number of cities the Romanists demanded that a portion of the funds raised by direct taxation for common-school purposes should be transferred to them, and that with them they might teach the dogmas of Romanism. The stern rebuke they have received at the ballot-box has sorely maddened them, and they now swear by all the saints in the catalogue that they will secure their purpose.

What has caused this sudden and wide-spread effort? Some of our American editors have in days past by glorified Pio Nono as a progressive pope, imbued with liberal ideas. These will, perhaps, read with some astonishment the following from his holiness' allocution to his rebellious subjects in New-Grenada:—

"Nor must we pass over in silence, that by the new constitution of that republic enacted in these recent times, among other things, *the right also of free education is defended, and liberty of all kinds is given to all*, so that *each person may even print and publish his thoughts, and all kinds of monstrous portents of opinions, and profess privately and publicly whatever worship he pleases.* You assuredly see, venerable brothers, how *horrible* and *sacrilegious* a war is proclaimed against the Catholic Church by the rulers of the Republic of New-Grenada, and what and how great injuries have been inflicted on the said Church and its sacred rights, pastors, and ministers, AND OUR SUPREME AUTHORITY, and that of this Holy See."

Beyond all controversy this *is* authoritative. In each line and in every sentiment are reënacted the doctrines of Rome in the palmy days of inquisition, rack, stake, and thumb-screw. In each thought is breathed deep and vengeful hate to free education and unshackled religion. Ay, and "horrible" and "sacrilegious" is the exercise of "private judgment." But we wrote it simply to ask this question, "Was there any connexion between the publication of this allocution and the sudden array of Romanism against free schools in so many places?" An Italian despot denounces free education as a horrid and sacrilegious war against the Church! The words of this despot, once for his tyranny and oppression driven by the hatred of his people into exile, and now sustained in place and power by the bayonets of the perjured Napoleon—the words of this oppressor of his people and panderer to oppressors and usurpers—his words, written in his palace at Rome, find their way to this land, and lo! all at once men who prate loudly of love to American institutions, raise the shout, "Down with the godless schools!" Here is revealed a significant fact: *the American Catholic priesthood is politically subject to Rome.*

And if not free education, then what? We answer, Rome will be content with no system not thoroughly purged of heresy. A late proclaimer, who spoke, doubtless, with the approbation of Archbishop Purcell, said, "A child cannot help becoming the child of the devil when not taught by a minister;" that is, a Romish priest—a Jesuit!

The contest for some years with Romanism in this land is to be waged upon this ground. The fair fields of childhood shall witness the meeting of the forces. For that are weapons burnished and troops marshalled. The prize is worthy the contestants. We meet in a struggle for the souls of our children with an *army trained for this special strife.* Hear Romish language—Brownson, in his Review of last January, says: "Our enemies rely upon godless schools—state education—as a means of checking the progress of Catholicity. We must admit they have laid their plans with infernal skill. The result will not equal their anticipations, however. The attention of the Catholic world has been directed to this subject by those whom God has sent to rule over us, and a struggle, which will end in victory for the Church, has begun between Catholicity and the state to see who shall have the child." Note the sentiments. This man, who, after making almost innumerable gyrations, has landed at last in the true fold, and is ready in all things to obey his bishops who "have the rule over him," tells us that the attention of the CATHOLIC WORLD *is directed to the system of free schools in these states!* Against that system have combined the hosts and energies of Catholicity! But more: he tells us—this honourable, law-abiding, republican Mr. Brownson—tells us that these hosts have met and have begun a war against the state! It was begun, it seems, by order of the Catholic bishops assembled in convention in Baltimore the May before the above precious *morceau* found its way into the world. These men, be it remembered, hold their office from the despot of Italy, and are sworn to do his bidding and "defend his regalities." His Grenada allocution declares his will, and therefore we cannot wonder that his sworn vassals in this land determined to begin a war against the state. Shall it be said that these are personal opinions? Where is the Catholic journal that has denounced them? Has his *ordinary* condemned them? No.

The conclusion, then, is fairly made out. The immediate object of papal effort is the control of popular education in the United States. Look out, then, and see the net-work of the system all over the land. We have already said there was an army *trained for this purpose.* But with that training they have some drawbacks. By the ungodly dogma of clerical celibacy, and the celibacy of their nuns, they have destroyed in their teachers the paternal sentiment.

There have we the advantage, and we enter the conflict as they cannot. We contend for *our* children. The control of childhood, the moulding of the youthful mind in this country for the next quarter of a century, shall decide the ascendency of Protestantism or Catholicity.

We may need some justification for citing ephemeral newspapers so freely. We had heard much of the *progression* of Romanism. From trading politicians had we heard repeatedly that the Roman Catholic element in our land was one of the strongest assurances of republican stability—that American Catholicity repudiated tyranny and denounced the oppression of conscience—that it moved "among the foremost first" in the cause of human freedom. We hoped it might be so. For the sake of humanity we wished to see it proved. This anxiety directed our attention to their newspaper literature, which is usually a more reliable exponent of the popular mind than literature of a graver cast. We knew, too, that most "Catholic journals" were organs of the episcopacy. Hence for a "delineation" of American Romanism we have looked there.

In the extracts from the Catholic press contained in this paper, is in part the result of that search. We might ask, "Whose image and superscription is this?" Is it that of ONE who said, "My kingdom is not of this world?"

Some have dreamed of an American Catholicity, separated from Rome, repudiating Papal authority, yet in doctrine and form abiding sufficiently near "the old landmarks" to make it acceptable to Catholics from every land. Vain hope! Catholicity must have a unity, and that unity must centre in an earthly head. There is to be no reformation of the system to be hoped for. Liberal disguises may be assumed for a time; but when they may be cast off without danger, they will be, and then the Romanism of this country will be seen identical with that of Hildebrand or Loyola.

It becomes the ministers of the Lord Jesus to be ready—fully prepared for this contest. They cannot leave it to be settled by *practical* politicians. Roman Catholic votes are valuable; they may decide even a presidential election. Consequently, political leaders will move cautiously; they will not destroy the hope of party triumph for any *abstraction*, however high the principles it may involve. The true Church of God, led on by ministers divinely called, must meet the shock already determined against American institutions.

Our own denomination and ministry have an important part

assigned them in this controversy; especially in the mighty, the illimitable West have we access to the people such as none others have. It is our duty to mould those masses in the mould of truth. It is also our duty to "warn them of approaching danger"—to speak to them honestly of the treasonable designs, or, to speak more mildly, the anti-republican doctrines of Romanism. Therefore should we, especially those of us who are yet blessed with youth and favoured with privileges our fathers never had, study and understand what Romanism is. Understanding it clearly, refutation will be easy. Our fathers had *their* warfare. Nobly did they fight their battles, and bright was their victory. We have other foes and other battles. Antichrist and atheism have made peace, and together assail the teachings of the Bible, and endeavour to wrest it from our children. We must meet them; the issue we dread not. Ours are still the pure forms of Protestantism; ours still the everlasting gospel; ours the promise of the perpetual presence of the "Captain of the Lord's hosts;" and ours still the "Holy Ghost sent down from heaven." Evangelical religion lives not by *permission* from the enemies we have named, but in spite of them. It will still live. Watered it may be—as by the bidding of Rome it hath been in days gone by—by the "blood of the saints," but still it cannot be destroyed. "No weapon formed against it shall prosper."

To aid in a preparation for this warfare have we recommended Dr. Elliott's work. It is a complete *Thesaurus* of the subjects included in the controversy.

We understand that the learned author intends adding a third volume on political Romanism, and that until then the work is considered by himself as unfinished. A volume on that topic from his pen at this time would be most opportune. When that is done, it is hoped that a new edition of the first and second volumes will be prepared by the venerable author himself, and that copious indexes will accompany it.

Were it not savouring too greatly of presumption, we would offer one suggestion. We will offer it any how, for it originated with older and wiser ministers. It is the preparation of an abridged *delineation* for popular use. It will perhaps be hard for the doctor to put "Homer in a nutshell;" but still we only echo the sentiments of ripe experience when we say that the times upon which we have fallen demand such a work.

ART. IV.—THE GENUINENESS OF DANIEL.

1. *Dissertations on the Genuineness of Daniel.* By DR. E. W. HENGSTENBERG, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. Edinburgh. 1847.
2. *Neue kritische Untersuchungen über das Buch Daniel.* Von HEINRICH HÄVERNICK, der Theologie Doctor, u. s. w. Hamburg. 1838.
3. *A Commentary and Defence of Daniel.* By MOSES STUART. Boston. 1850.
4. *Das Buch Daniel verdeutscht und ausgelegt.* Von C. VON LENGERKE. 1838.
5. *A Critical and Historical Introduction to the Canon of the Old Testament.* By WM. M. L. DE WETTE.

WE purpose in the present article to consider the most important objections that have been made to the genuineness of the Book of Daniel, and to bring forward the arguments that may be adduced in support of it; but before we do this we shall inquire into *the existence and age of Daniel.* There is not the slightest reason for supposing Daniel to be a mythical character. If a book is forged in the name of a person, it shows that at the time of the forgery not only was there no doubt of his existence, but also that he was a man of repute. We need not, however, rely wholly on an *a priori* argument in proof of his existence and reputation, for the prophet Ezekiel, who lived during the captivity, makes express mention of him. (Chap. xiv, 14, 20, and xxviii, 3.) Now if Daniel did not live during the captivity, the question arises, To what period can we assign his history? The passages cited from Ezekiel speak of him as a man of distinction, and show that he was well known to the prophet's contemporaries. But we have a connected history of the Jews from the calling of Abraham to the captivity, and there is nowhere mentioned a man of any eminence by the name of Daniel. *He must, therefore, have lived during the captivity.* Besides, it would be very improbable that a fabricator of his history would place him in the captivity, if it had not been the general voice of tradition that he lived at that period. At the time Ezekiel wrote, he enjoyed, according to our book, the highest reputation at Babylon.

We shall now proceed to consider the objections that have been made to the book's having proceeded from Daniel.

I. *Its Position in the Canon.*

It is known to every one in the least degree acquainted with the Hebrew Bible, that the arrangement of its books is different from that of the English version. We have, first, the Pentateuch; next, what are called the earlier prophets, beginning with Joshua and end-

ing with II. Kings, the same as in the English version, with the exception of Ruth; after these the later prophets, viz., Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve minor prophets. The last division, called the Hagiographa, comprises all the remaining canonical books, twelve in number. In this last division, Daniel is the ninth book, standing between Esther and Ezra.

Now, say the objectors, if the book had been written when the later prophets were arranged, it would have been placed along with them in the second division of the Sacred Canon, and not in the third; and its position, therefore, must be owing to the lateness of its composition.

The first point to be determined in replying to this objection is, whether the canonical books were originally arranged as they now are. Hengstenberg and Hävernick* assume in their reasoning the affirmative, and account for the position of Daniel by making a distinction between נָבִיא, *one who held the prophetic office*, and חוֹזֶה and רֹאֶה, *one who had the prophetic gift without the office*. According to this view, Daniel, not being in the prophetic office, could not be placed with the regular prophets, but in the Hagiographa. Professor Stuart, however, denies that any such distinction is made in the Bible in the application of these terms to the prophets; and in this he seems to be right, though we are inclined to think there may have been a difference between regular prophets and those who were not so. His opinion is that the Book of Daniel was not placed among the Kethubim, (Hagiographa,) but occupied its proper place among the prophets, down to the time of Jerome and the compiling of the Talmud. In proof of this position he appeals to the division of Law, Prophets, and other books, as made by Sirach, who describes the third division as consisting of *μέλη μουσικῶν* and *ἔπη ἔγγραφα*,—*i. e.*, poetry to be sung, and written maxims. This, he observes, would exclude Daniel from the third division. This division, in Luke xxiv, 44, is called Psalms. But Daniel has nothing to do with Psalms. Philo and Josephus's description of the character of the third division by no means suits the hypothesis that Daniel was included in it. He, in the next place, runs over the catalogues of the councils and fathers, beginning about A. D. 170, with Melito, in Eusebius, and ending about A. D. 390; and in all of them he finds Daniel placed among the prophets. He also remarks that in the Septuagint, Bos's edition, Daniel stands between Ezekiel and the minor prophets. But in Van Ess's edition, which I have before me, Daniel is placed immediately after Ezekiel, and just before the Maccabees, which close the book. But is it not probable that the early

* In Kitto's Cyclopædia.

Christians, as they generally used the Septuagint, followed its arrangement of the books? And may these not have been arranged in the order of their translation, and not in the order of the Hebrew? We may, however, remark that there is no proof that the present arrangement of the books of the Canon was originally the same. And the probability would seem to be in favour of the hypothesis that Daniel was originally among the prophets. For his degradation from that position, various reasons have been assigned, which are hardly satisfactory. But it is quite clear that his present position in the canon affords no proof of his having been introduced long after the captivity, for the Lamentations of Jeremiah are placed in the same division, and the Book of Ezra is placed after Daniel.

II. *Greek Words in Daniel.*

It is alleged that there are several Greek words in Daniel, and that, therefore, it could not have been written before the time of Alexander the Great, or, at furthest, the latter part of the reign of Darius Hystaspis, who invaded Greece B. C. 490, when Daniel was no longer alive. פרתמים *πρότιμοι*, פתגם *φθέγμα*, כרוז *κήρυξ*, כרז *κηρύσσειν*, קיתרוס *κίθαρις*, סבכא *σαμβύκη*, סומפניה *συμφωνία*, פסנתר *ψαλτήριον*, פסרס *πέτασος*, נבזבה *νόμισμα*. This list is quoted from Bertholdt by Hengstenberg; but it must be observed that the Greek origin of several of them is no longer advocated by the opponents of the genuineness. They are the names of musical instruments, and occur in the third chapter. The first of these words, פרתמים, is, according to Gesenius, of *Persian* origin. The second, פתגם, he thinks, is probably *Persian*. In regard to the third and fourth, כרז, he remarks: "This root is widely diffused in the Indo-European languages; *e. g.*, Sanscrit, *krus*, to cry out; Zend, *khresiô*, crying out, a herald; Persian, the same; German, *kreischen;* English, cry." It is evident, then, that this word is not of *Greek* origin. The fifth word, קיתרוס, the same philologist seems inclined to regard as of Greek origin; but Lengerke, an opponent of the genuineness, thinks that both the Greek and Chaldee words come from the Persian word *sitareh*, which means a six-stringed instrument. Strabo regards this word as of foreign origin: *κιθάραν Ἀσιᾶτιν ῥάσσων*, *beating the Asiatic harp.* Rosenmüller remarks in regard to it: "The word is rather of a barbarian (*i. e.*, oriental) than of a Greek origin." The sixth, סבכא, Strabo affirms to be of barbarian (*i. e.*, oriental,) origin; to which origin Gesenius offers no objection. The seventh, סומפניה, Gesenius regards as the Greek *συμφωνία*. Prof. Stuart thinks this quite probable. That the instrument is called

סומפניה in verse ten, Hengstenberg thinks unfavourable to this derivation. Hävernick expresses his conviction that the word is derived from the Hebrew סוּף, (a reed,) and remarks that its formation is not more strange than that of עֶמֶק and עֶמְקִי.* In Polybius, who flourished about 150 B. C., the word *συμφωνία* is used for a musical concert, (Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon;) but this meaning scarcely suits Daniel, for the word occurs among musical *instruments*. Now a concert is a *union of musicians;* and this is not to be looked for in the description of musical instruments. The eighth, פסנתר, Gesenius considers as the Greek word *ψαλτήριον*. This Hengstenberg thinks doubtful; while Stuart is of opinion that the word is of Egyptian origin, from the fact that *santir*, a form very similar to it, is the name of a musical instrument now used by the Arabs in Cairo. We do not, however, think that this proves the antiquity of the word, as it may have been introduced in modern times. The ninth, סבכא, Gesenius derives from the Hebrew סְבַךְ; and the last one, בגדה, he derives from the Hebrew בָּגַד. Thus the nine or ten words of Greek origin are reduced to two or three, and these doubtful. The word אגרטל, in Ezra i, 9, is regarded by some as the Greek *κάρταλος*. If this could be established, would it disprove the genuineness of Ezra? The word פִּילֶגֶשׁ, in Genesis, Gesenius thinks might come from the Greek *πάλλαξ*. If this derivation be correct, will any one contend that Genesis was not composed until long after the Babylonian captivity? In Judges vii, 16, the word לַפִּיד occurs, and there is no Hebrew verb in use from which we can derive it. But how easy is it to derive it from the Greek *λαμπάς*, *a lamp*, the same meaning as the Hebrew word. And will it follow, then, that the Book of Judges was not written until the time of Alexander the Great? Why, then, should the existence of two or three Greek words in Daniel be thought to indicate that it was written long after the captivity? But it is easy to account for the existence at Babylon of musical instruments of Grecian origin; for, as far back as the time of Sennacherib, Greeks settled in Asia Minor, and from them these musical instruments may have been introduced into Babylon. But apart from this fact, before the time of Daniel, Babylon had extensive commercial relations, and a people peculiarly fond of music would import musical instruments from every source,† just as we introduce the conveniences and fashions of Europe. And what is remarkable in Daniel, is the fact that no

* These two words are derived from עָמַק.

† De Wette admits, in his Introduction to the Old Testament, that these instruments of music may have been brought to Babylon from Greece.

other words occur which can be of Greek origin. Musical instruments could be easily conveyed from one country to another. There is no Greek colouring in the book, which we might expect had it been written in the time of the Maccabees.

III. *The Silence of Jesus Sirach.*

It is asserted by some of the opponents of the genuineness, that Jesus Sirach, in giving (chapters xliv–lx) a list of the great men among the Jews, omits the name of Daniel. But the *argumentum a silentio* is in many cases very delusive. If applied to either sacred or profane history, it leads to results which no sensible man can for a moment admit. If a writer professes to give a catalogue of *all* the men who have distinguished themselves in any particular department, then the omission of any distinguished name in that department may be considered as a *probable* proof that, in the judgment of the writer, no such character existed. But this is not the case here; for Sirach does not profess to give a list of *all* the distinguished men of Israel. He begins in the following manner: "Let us praise distinguished men, even our fathers in their generation." Chap. xliv, ver. 1. Enoch is the first name in his list. Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses, Joshua, and a few others of the early ages, next follow. He altogether omits Jephthah, Gideon, and Samson—distinguished men. Of the later eminent Jews, he makes no mention of Mordecai, or Ezra; passes over Esther in silence; but gives us Zorobabel and Nehemiah. In chap. xlix, ver. 10, he mentions the twelve prophets; but Bretschneider has proved this passage to be spurious, so that the minor prophets are also omitted. There is, then, nothing strange in the omission of Daniel. The reason assigned by some for his omission, is the fact that he lived at the Babylonian court, and did not labour among the Jewish people. Furthermore, several of the men in Sirach's list never wrote anything. It is not their *books* that he is praising, but their *deeds*. If Daniel was a man of any eminence, he could with propriety have been placed in the catalogue, though he had left no writings. The omission of his name, therefore, on the part of Sirach, proves that no such character ever existed, (if it proves anything,) in positive contradiction to Ezekiel. Suppose Sirach had praised Daniel without mentioning his book; this would only have been another testimony to his existence and character, not a confirmation of the genuineness of his book, any further than Ezekiel's testimony already confirms it. The omission amounts to little or nothing, and has, accordingly, been passed over by some of the opponents of the genuineness.

IV. *Historical Errors.*

It is contended by the opponents of Daniel that it contains historical errors. If this charge were true, we are not sure that it would prove the spuriousness of the book, though it might prove that Daniel was not in *everything* inspired, and did not possess accurate information on all the points of history of which he wrote. We shall, however, show that the charge is unfounded. "In the *third* year of the reign of Jehoiakim king of Judah came Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon unto Jerusalem, and besieged it. And the Lord gave Jehoiakim king of Judah into his hand," &c. Dan. i, 1, 2. "The word that came to Jeremiah concerning all the people of Judah in the *fourth* year of Jehoiakim—that was the *first* year of Nebuchadrezzar king of Babylon." Jeremiah xxv, 1. According to this latter passage the *first* year of Nebuchadnezzar corresponds, in part at least, with the *fourth* year of Jehoiakim; and yet in the *third* year of Jehoiakim he is called king, evidently before he had mounted the throne. Hengstenberg, Hävernick, and Stuart pursue nearly the same method in removing the discrepancy; and as it seems to us quite satisfactory, we shall adopt it. Berosus, the Chaldean historian, (quoted by Josephus, lib. x, cap. ii,) states that when Nebuchadnezzar's father, Nebuchodonosor, [Nabopollassar,] heard that the governor whom he had set over Egypt and the places about Cœlosyria and Phœnicia had revolted from him, he committed to his son Nebuchadnezzar some parts of his army, and sent them against him. Nebuchadnezzar gave him battle, defeated him, and reduced the country from under his subjection, and made it a branch of his own kingdom. About this time Nebuchadnezzar heard that his father was dead, and having settled the affairs of Egypt and the other countries, as also those that concerned the *captive Jews* and Phœnicians, and those of the Egyptian nations, and having committed the conveyance of them to Babylon to certain of his friends, he went himself hastily with a few others over the desert to Babylon. So he took upon him the management of public affairs, and of the kingdom which had been kept for him by one that was principal of the Chaldeans; and he received the entire dominions of his father, and appointed that when the captives came they should be placed as colonies in the most proper places of Babylonia.* The beginning of this expedition must have been in the end of the third year of Jehoiakim, (the same as Dan. i, 1.) In Jeremiah xlvi, 2, it is stated that Nebuchadnezzar, in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, smote the army of Pharaoh-Necho, king of Egypt, which was by the river

* This is the substance of the passage. Some words not relevant to our purpose we have omitted.

Euphrates, in Carchemish. Some months, we may suppose, were necessary from the time of the setting out of the expedition until the capture of the city. Now, since Jehoiakim had been set on the throne by the king of Egypt, there is nothing improbable in the supposition that before besieging Carchemish he besieged Jerusalem, and carried away captives in the third year of Jehoiakim. But even if Jerusalem was not taken until after the defeat of the Egyptians at Carchemish, the discrepancy might be reconciled on the hypothesis that the first year of Nebuchadnezzar did not begin at the same time that the third of Jehoiakim did, but several months after. In this way the first year of Nebuchadnezzar would correspond to the third and fourth of Jehoiakim. That Nebuchadnezzar is called king in the lifetime of his father is not strange. He may have been a co-regent with his father; but even if he was not, it was quite natural that the appellation should be given to him. As far as the Jews were concerned, he was an absolute sovereign. We ourselves could speak of *General* Washington's accompanying Braddock in his Indian expedition, though, in fact, he had not then attained the rank of general. In the same manner we might speak of *President* Pierce's campaign in Mexico. Upon the whole, this objection turns out to be an argument in favour of Daniel. Had the author been a mere fabricator, what could have induced him to place the siege in the *third* year of Jehoiakim in apparent contradiction to Jeremiah? A forger would have either been silent respecting dates, or would have followed the *very words* of the sacred history.

Lengerke says, "The book introduces a Cyaxares II. (Darius the Mede) who never existed;" on which Hävernick remarks, "To this bold hypothesis but few have been able to rise—it would be the most glaring historical error, and, indeed, the most recent scholars here abandon our critic." In reference to this Darius, Josephus says, "He was the son of Astyages, and had another name among the Greeks."—*Antiq.*, lib. x, cap. ii, sec. 4. On which Gesenius remarks: "This was apparently Cyaxares II., the son and successor of Astyages, and uncle of Cyrus, who held the empire of Media between Astyages and Cyrus, yet so that Cyrus was his colleague and viceroy; on which account he alone is mentioned by Herodotus."—*Heb. Lex.* Herodotus, Ctesias, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, and Polyænus, know nothing of a king between Astyages and Cyrus. But if the Book of Daniel be genuine, (and in discussing this subject no one has a right *to assume* the contrary,) his testimony is worth more than all these historians put together; and that he possessed accurate knowledge of Babylonian affairs we shall show in another place. The testimony of one credible eye-witness

weighs more than that of a dozen men who write from rumour. Daniel was upon the spot; those historians were remote. There is, however, a passage in Eusebius's *Præparatio Evangelica*, from Abydenus, which Hengstenberg quotes in proof of the existence of the Darius in Daniel. After it has been mentioned that Cyrus made the last king of Babylon a present of the province of Carmania after his imprisonment, we have these words: *Darius rex de regione depulit aliquantulum.* There is also a passage in Æschylus, where a ruler between Astyages and Cyrus is spoken of. (Persæ, 765–8.) The same kings often bore different names, which makes the great difficulty in identifying them. What Daniel says in reference to the division of lands by Darius, corresponds to what Xenophon relates, so that the only point of difference is in the name of the ruler. But if no such king as Darius the Mede ever existed, can we believe that the author of the Book of Daniel, supposing it to have been forged in the Maccabean times, would have introduced him? Is it characteristic of writers of history, or even of novelists, to introduce historical men who, in the judgment of mankind, never existed? What would we think of an historian, or of a novelist, indeed, who should introduce a king of England between James II. and William Prince of Orange? The fame of Cyrus completely eclipsed that of his predecessor Darius; it spread all over the East and West. In the Apocryphal addition to Daniel, written probably about the times of the Maccabees, we have this statement: "King Astyages was gathered to his fathers, and Cyrus the Persian received his kingdom." Had Daniel been written at that age, it would probably have contained a similar statement.

In Dan. v, 11, 13, 18, Nebuchadnezzar is called the *father* of Belshazzar, which some think an incorrect statement, as he was several degrees removed from him. But the Hebrew אב, *father*, has a very extensive meaning.* In 1 Kings xv, 11, David, who was removed from Asa *four degrees*, is called his *father*. The last king of the Babylonians is called by Herodotus, Labynetus; by Berosus, Nabonnedus. In this there is nothing which should surprise us, as the Eastern kings bore a variety of names. Xenophon agrees with Daniel as to the fate of Belshazzar.† (Cyrop. vii, 5, 30.) In viii, 2, Daniel states that he was in Shushan in the palace, in the province

* See Gesenius, *sub voce.*

† Hävernick supposes that Belshazzar was not the last king of the Babylonians, but that he was identical with Evil-Merodach, the son of Nebuchadnezzar. This opinion, we think, untenable, for immediately after his death it is said: "And Darius the Median took the kingdom." Dan. v, 31. Here is no room for the interposition of a king.

of Elam, and saw a vision. Now it has been alleged that it was not until after Cyrus that the kings took up their winter residence there. This, however, cannot be proved. Jeremiah (xlix, 34) predicts the destruction of Elam. And in Ezekiel (xxxii, 24) we find this people named among others that were destroyed by the king of Babylon. In the time of Belshazzar it may have been incorporated into the Assyrian empire, and the king may then have had his winter residence there. Yet there is no necessity for supposing that Daniel was really at Shushan. He says: "It came to pass when I saw that I was at Shushan;" that is, in his vision he seemed to be there. The reason for placing the vision in Shushan was the circumstance that this was to be the future metropolis of Persia, the destruction of which was predicted in the vision. In like manner Ezekiel is represented (viii, 3; xl, 2) as carried to Jerusalem in the *visions of God*, where no bodily presence is intended.

Lengerke thinks there is a contradiction between Daniel ii, 1, and i, 5, 18. In the first of these passages it is stated that Nebuchadnezzar dreamed dreams in the second year of his reign, which Daniel interpreted; and it is said in the last of these passages that Daniel and his three friends, having been nourished for three years, were brought in before the king. Now Nebuchadnezzar is called king when he is spoken of as bringing away Daniel from Jerusalem; and three years for nourishing him previous to his standing before the king, would make it at least in the *third* or *fourth* year of his reign. But all difficulty vanishes by bearing in mind that he is called king in chap. i, ver. 1, by anticipation, while he was general in his father's lifetime, (as we have before rendered probable,) and that the second year of his reign has reference to his accession to his father's government.

The account in the third chapter of Nebuchadnezzar's setting up a golden image, and commanding everybody to worship it, has been severely criticised by some of our opponents. The image which he set up is stated to be sixty cubits (about ninety feet) in height, and its breadth six cubits, (nine feet.) These proportions, on the supposition that it was a human figure, have been pronounced monstrous. It should have been about fifteen feet in breadth. But Prof. Stuart remarks that it is not stated at what part of the image the breadth was taken. We would, however, suppose at that part which gave the average breadth. There is no reason for supposing the figure to have been symmetrical. The Babylonian figures were characterized by rudeness and monstrosity. Hengstenberg supposes that צֶלֶם may mean an obelisk, and then all difficulty vanishes. Columns in honour of the gods were very common among the ancients. Some have

thought that the ninety feet in height included the pedestal; in that case it may have been a symmetrical human figure. That the statue was of solid gold, which some objectors suppose, there is not the least probability. It was probably hollow, or made of wood or some other substance, and covered with gold. Wooden altars covered with gold are called by Moses golden. Compare Exodus xxxvii, 25, with xxxix, 38, &c. The conduct, too, of Nebuchadnezzar in compelling the Hebrew children to worship the image, is thought to be inconsistent with the toleration which at that time was allowed all religions. But it is obvious that the objectors do not understand the matter. The king was willing to allow the Jews the privilege of worshipping their God, but at the same time he expected of them an acknowledgment of his own. It was the *exclusiveness* of their religion that excited his hatred. Judaism admitted of no compromise. Other religions, without any sacrifice of their principles, could acknowledge the claims of other gods. It was the same spirit of exclusiveness that brought upon Christianity so much persecution in its early history.

The truth of the account of Nebuchadnezzar's madness has been called in question by some critics. Their objection to it is not so much the improbability of the thing in itself, as the silence of ancient history respecting it. But this silence can be easily explained. None of the other books of the Old Testament make any mention of the latter part of the life of Nebuchadnezzar. The historical books (with the exception of three,—Esther, Ezra, and Nehemiah) extend only to the captivity; and the three which make the exception treat only of the Persian dominion. There was no occasion, therefore, for these writers to refer to this incident in the king's life. The oldest of the Greek historians, Herodotus, does not give us the history of Nebuchadnezzar at all. Among the Chaldean historians, as Hengstenberg remarks, there remain only Abydenus and Berosus from whom we may expect any information about this occurrence; and Berosus says that the king, falling sick, (*ἐμπεσὼν εἰς ἀῤῥωστίαν,*) died. Hengstenberg, Hävernick, and Stuart are of opinion that in this passage there is an allusion to the king's madness. Of Neriglossar and Nabonned, who are not represented as dying natural deaths, falling sick is not mentioned. There is a passage in Abydenus in which Nebuchadnezzar is represented as ascending to the roof of his palace, where he becomes inspired by some god, and delivers a prediction in reference to the future government of the country; and, from the language he uses, he seems to refer to his own madness and wanderings. In the judgment of the ancients, there was a close connexion between madness and a prophetic spirit.

But it must be observed, in reference to the Chaldean historians, that they had a national propensity to embellishment. It is not likely, therefore, that they would relate anything that would in the least degree detract from the greatness of their kings. In the account of the king's madness and roaming at large, there is nothing improbable. There are several instances of the sort recorded in history. In the description of the king's madness, strong expressions are used, in accordance with the custom of the Orientals; but there is nothing to warrant us in believing that he was metamorphosed into a brute. Hengstenberg is of opinion that he was kept chained.

The decree of Darius that no man should ask a petition of any god or man, except of the king, for thirty days, (Dan. vi, 7, 12,) is considered by some as very improbable, since it would be a suspension of religious duties for the time. It has, nevertheless, been shown that "the kings of the Medes and Persians were worshipped as representations and incarnations of Ormuzd;" and Heeren remarks: "The person of the king in Asiatic kingdoms is the centre about which everything moves. He is regarded not merely as ruler, but rather as proprietor of land and people." Plutarch relates that it was a custom among the Persians "to honour the king, and to worship the image of God, the preserver of all things." Curtius also says, "The Persians worship their kings among the gods." That the Assyrians really regarded their kings as incarnations of their divinity, Ormuzd, is proved from the monuments of Nineveh, discovered by Layard.

The prophecies of the Book of Daniel, say its impugners, are remarkably definite respecting events until the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, after which they are quite obscure; and they contend that this is a proof that the book was composed in the age of that king.

In reference to the first part of this objection, we may remark that Daniel's prophecies are not more definite than some of those of the other prophets. Jeremiah (chap. xxv, 11, 12, and xxix, 10,) predicted that the Babylonian captivity should last *seventy years*. What more definite than this? Also in reference to the destruction of Babylon he is very definite, describing the manner of the capture of the city, by the drying up of the Euphrates while her men were drunk. (Chap. l, 38, and li, 32, 36, 37, 39.) Isaiah, too, is very definite respecting Babylon, (chap. xiii, 19–22;) and (chap. xvi, 14) he predicts the destruction of Moab in the most precise language: "Within *three years*, as the years of a hireling," &c.; the addition, "*as the years of a hireling*," is to show that it shall neither be more nor less. And he foretells our Saviour's history

with the greatest accuracy. (Chap. lii, 13–15, and chap. liii.) More examples are useless. In reference to the second part of the objection, that after the time of Antiochus Epiphanes the prophecies are obscure, we remark that this is not altogether true, for Daniel predicts the establishment of the Messiah's kingdom during the existence of the fourth kingdom—the Roman; (chap. ii, 44;) that in the course of seventy weeks (weeks of years, *i. e.*, four hundred and ninety) the Messiah should be cut off, sacrifice and oblation should cease, everlasting righteousness brought in, &c. (Chap. ix.) But suppose the objection were true, that they are obscure, it would not follow that those which are clear were written after the events. But few of Jeremiah's prophecies go far beyond the captivity. The prophecies of Isaiah are very definite respecting Christ; less definite after him. Were they written after Christ? It sometimes has happened, as has been observed by Hengstenberg, that God granted the prophets only a definite knowledge of the times immediately subsequent to their age. Furthermore, the accuracy of the fulfilment of Daniel's prophecies in reference to events that happened previous to Antiochus Epiphanes, is principally owing to the fact that Porphyry, in the third century, collected the historical materials which prove their fulfilment. But this has not been done in the case of any of the other ancient prophets.

We may remark, in general, upon the objections to the genuineness of Daniel, that an acute mind may frame objections to the best authenticated books. Objections, indeed, may be made to the most firmly established facts. It would be a difficult matter for the most acute logician to answer Archbishop Whately's Historical Doubts relative to Napoleon. But if it can be shown that all the objections to the genuineness of the book are unfounded, there is, in that case, a strong presumption in favour of its genuineness; for the forgery of such a book, conducted so skilfully, amid so many difficulties, would be almost, if not altogether, impossible: even if we were unable to answer all the objections, yet, if the arguments in favour of the genuineness were very strong, we should receive it. We shall now proceed to notice the arguments in favour of the genuineness of Daniel.

I. *Its Admission into the Canon.*

It is an unquestioned fact that the Book of Daniel has been received by the Jews as a part of Holy Scripture, ever since the time of Christ. Of this we have historical proof. According to Josephus, the Canon of Scripture was closed in the reign of Artaxerxes. He says: "From the death of Moses till the reign of

Artaxerxes, King of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets who were after Moses wrote what was done in their time in thirteen books. It is true, our history hath been written since Artaxerxes very particularly, *but hath not been esteemed of the like authority with the former by our forefathers, because there hath not been an exact succession of prophets since that time.*"—*Against Apion*, book i, sec. 8. Now if the Book of Daniel had not been written until the time of the Maccabees, (170–150 B. C.,) three or four hundred years after Daniel's age, how could it have found its way into the canon? The Book of Tobit, which was probably written about the time of the Maccabees, if not before, the Books of Maccabees, and other writings subsequent to the time of Artaxerxes, were never admitted into the canon. The Apocryphal book, entitled "The Wisdom of Sirach," is considered a very excellent performance; and I. Maccabees is an authentic history of Jewish affairs in its own age: but, notwithstanding all their merits, they were excluded from the canon. What was it, then, that gave Daniel its position in the canon? If the book be not genuine, the Jews must have been deceived in the matter. They must have supposed that it was really written about the time of the captivity. But it was impossible for them to think this; for, subsequently to the captivity, before the time of the Maccabees, the Holy Scriptures were diligently studied. "The age of the Maccabees," says Hävernick, "was one in which Scripture-learning already flourished." Not only does I. Maccabees mention the Scribes, (*συναγωγὴ γραμματέων*, vii, 12,) but also the Book of Sirach praises the wisdom of the Scribe, (*σοφία γραμματέως*, xxxviii, 24.) How could these men be deceived respecting Daniel? Furthermore, if the book was not written by Daniel, they knew that it was a forgery; so that whatever otherwise might have been its claims, this consideration would have caused its rejection.

II. *The Statement of the Author.*

The author expressly speaks of himself as Daniel: "As for me Daniel," &c., (chap. vii, 28;) "A vision appeared unto me, even unto me, Daniel," (viii, 1;) "I Daniel fainted," &c., (viii, 27;) "I Daniel understood by books," (ix, 2.) But it must be observed that Daniel, in the first six chapters, speaks of himself in the third person: "Now among these were Daniel," &c., (i, 6;) "Then Daniel answered," &c., (ii, 14.) From this difference between the first and second parts of the book in the use of the persons, some have concluded that the book is the work of different authors; but this peculiarity is a proof of the genuineness of the book. The third person

is used in the first part because it is historical.* It was necessary for the author to consider himself as one of the actors in the scene, and to keep his subjectivity out of sight. In the last six chapters he speaks in the first person, because it is not historical. The visions are made to him alone. Here individuality and subjectivity are very prominent, and the use of the first person is peculiarly appropriate. The seventh chapter, in which Chaldee is used, has the first person; and so have the remaining chapters, which are Hebrew. How improbable it would be that the author of the second part should finish the Chaldee chapters of the first part with Chaldee, and then begin the eighth chapter with Hebrew. It is evident, from the whole style and phraseology of both portions, that they proceeded from one author. The *unity* of authorship has been so clearly established by Gesenius, De Wette, Bleek, and Kirms, that it is unnecessary for us to dwell longer on this point. Now either Daniel wrote the book, or it is a palpable forgery. There is no middle ground. But the hypothesis of forgery does not well suit the character of the book. The author appears to be a man of piety, and his object is evidently to exalt and glorify the God of Israel. Are piety and falsehood congenial principles? Was the forgery of such books common among the Jews at that time?† If the book be not genuine, then the name of the author would be most likely taken from Ezekiel. Now in that book the name is דָּנִיֵּאל, while in the Book of Daniel it is in every instance written with the yod (י) דָּנִיִּאל. If the forger borrowed the name, what could have induced him to change the orthography?

III. *The Testimony of Josephus.*

In reference to one's being anxious respecting the knowledge of the future, Josephus says: "Let him be diligent in reading the Book of Daniel, *which he will find among the sacred writings.*"—*Antiq.*, lib. x, cap. x, sec. 4. And further, respecting his writings: "From them we believe Daniel conversed with God; for he did not

* For the same reason Moses in the Pentateuch speaks of himself in the third person.

† The Book of Tobit is not to be regarded as a forgery, since it is uncertain in what form it originally appeared. It appears to have been originally written in Hebrew or Aramaic. In the first two chapters, and in a part of the third, Tobit speaks in the first person; in the remaining part, in the third person. We cannot discover the least reason for this difference. Probably Tobit wrote the first two chapters and a half, and the rest was written or modified by a later hand. It is remarkable that the story of the woman who had seven husbands, who were killed by the evil spirit Asmodeus, begins with the use of the third person.

only prophesy of the future, as did the other prophets, but he also determined the time of their accomplishment." Again, in reference to certain calamities, he says: "Our nation suffered these things under Antiochus Epiphanes, according to Daniel's vision, and what he wrote many years before they came to pass. In the very same manner Daniel also wrote concerning the Roman government, and that our country should be made desolate by them. All these things did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him; insomuch that such as read his prophecies, and see how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honour wherewith God honoured Daniel; and may thence discover how the Epicureans are in error who cast providence out of human life," &c.—*Antiq.*, lib. x, cap. xi, sec. 7. What sharp-sighted critics we have at this day, who can see what Josephus, with all the learning of antiquity before him, could not see—that the predictions upon which he relied to prove a providence *were all written after the events!* But we are not yet done with Josephus's testimony. In his *Antiquities* (lib. xi, cap. viii, sec. 5) he states that Alexander the Great, while on his eastern expedition, visited Jerusalem, and offered sacrifice to God; and that the Book of Daniel was showed him, in which Daniel declared that one of the Greeks should destroy the empire of the Persians. That Alexander really entered Palestine is confirmed by Pliny, (Nat. Hist.;) and Arrian says that Judea surrendered to Alexander; and no force is spoken of as compelling them to do it. So that there is no reason to doubt the fact. Even if the incident never occurred, it shows that it was the voice of tradition or Jewish history (perhaps both) that it did occur, which is sufficient to show that the book was believed to exist at the time, and that it was not kept secret.*.

IV. *The Language of the Book.*

The language of the Book of Daniel precisely suits his age and position. About two-fifths of the book are Hebrew; the remaining three-fifths are Chaldee. Its Hebrew is as pure as that of almost any book of the captivity. No one familiar with the Hebrew of the other books, if he have any candour, will deny this. It is not a blending of the two languages. The first chapter and the first three verses of the second are Hebrew. The Chaldee begins at the fourth verse, where the Chaldeans are represented as speaking in Aramaic, (Chaldee,) and ends with the seventh chapter. The remaining five

* The sealing up of the prophecies simply refers to their being dark and mysterious, and for a long while but little understood. The shutting up of the prophecies nowhere refers to keeping them concealed.

chapters are Hebrew. Now, if the book had been written at the time of the Maccabees, would its Hebrew have been so pure? Is it probable that the language was written in its purity at that late age, four hundred years after the captivity? Some, it is true, have thought that the Hebrew language continued in use for a long time after the captivity. In Nehemiah (ch. viii, ver. 8) it is stated that "they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading." From this passage Dr. Hengstenberg concludes that the people, while in captivity, lost the knowledge of the Hebrew, which made it necessary for Ezra to translate it for them into Chaldee. Gesenius, on the contrary, does not understand it of translating, but simply of explaining the law. Our own opinion is, that the passage does not necessarily mean a translation, though it may have that sense, and that the declension of the Hebrew language must be determined from other sources. The existence of targums (translations) in Chaldee, one of which, at least, was written about sixty years before Christ, proves that the Hebrew language had gone out of use before that period. There seems to be good proof that for at least a century before Christ, the Chaldee superseded the Hebrew. Now, there is strong reason to suppose that the Hebrew grew into disuse shortly after the captivity; for it was during that period that the Israelites came in contact with those who used the Chaldee tongue; and we all know the influence exerted by the language of the conquerors over the conquered. If the Hebrew could have maintained its ground against the Chaldee during the captivity and immediately afterward, why should it have declined at all previous to the time of Christ? If it declined gradually from the captivity to the time of Christ, then it must have been quite different at the time of the Maccabees from what it was soon after the captivity. The language of Daniel is inexplicable on the supposition that it was written in the Maccabean age. Supposing that Daniel wrote the book, all is easy. His position, being among both Hebrews and Chaldeans, made him familiar with both tongues. He could use either at pleasure. Lengerke evidently feels the difficulty of reconciling the language of the book with the hypothesis of its late origin. At one time he says that the Hebrew language was written in its purity in the Maccabean age; at another, that the Hebrew garment was burdensome to its author, who threw it off at the first opportunity. On the latter remark Hävernick observes that it is, then, strange that he should have put it on again with the beginning of the eighth chapter, and continued with it to the end of the book.

There is, in several respects, considerable similarity between

Daniel and Ezra, who also lived at the time of the captivity. Daniel, as we have already stated, is partly in Hebrew and partly in Chaldee. So is Ezra. The phrase שׂוּם טַעַם, *to publish a decree*, is common to Daniel and Ezra. יָעַט, *to counsel*, occurs in both books. The peculiar future form לֶהֱוֵא, from הֲוָא, is also found in both; likewise the Chaldee form חֲמוֹ, *they*, and חֲזָה, *to see*. The forms גַּלְגַּל in Ezra, and גַּלְגַּל, in Daniel, meaning a *dunghill*, are very similar. Also between Daniel and Ezekiel there are several points of resemblance: חוּב, in the sense of *to make guilty*, is found only in Dan. i, 10, and Ezek. xviii, 7. חָלָל, *smooth*—Dan. x, 6; Ezek. i, 7. לָבוּשׁ הַבַּדִּים,—Dan. xii, 6, 7; Ezek. ix, 11, &c. It has, indeed, been contended by Lengerke that the author of Daniel imitated Ezekiel. Of this, however, we have no proof. The words seem to have been peculiar to the age of the captivity. But it cannot be argued that he imitated Ezra, for several of their forms are different. There is, indeed, resemblance enough to indicate the same age; dissimilarity enough to show the independence of the writers. It cannot be denied that the Chaldee of Daniel agrees remarkably well with that of Ezra; but between Daniel and the Targums* (Chaldee translations) there are marked differences. דָּא, *this*, in Daniel, is written in the Targums with the demonstrative ד, חָדָא, חֲדָא. בְּרַם, in Daniel as well as in Ezra, has the meaning *but, yet, nevertheless;* in the Targums *truly*. שְׁרַר in Daniel is written in other Chaldee writings and in Rabbinic שְׁדַל. אַרְוִי, *lo, behold*, in Daniel, is not found in other Chaldaic books, but another form is used for it. שָׁגָא, in Daniel, is סגא in Targg. מָאן, a *vase*, in Targg. is מָן. Not only in the use of words is there a difference between Daniel and the Targums, but also in the grammatical forms. In reference to the Chaldee of Daniel and Ezra, Winer remarks, (*Chaldee Grammar*, p. 10, Prof. Hackett's Trans.:) "Various peculiarities of the Hebrew occur intermixed with it; as, *e. g.*, the article ה, the plural ending ים, the conjugations Hiphel and Hophal, and the writing of ה instead of א." Again (p. 85) he observes: "The dual forms in use [in Chaldee] are borrowed from the Hebrew, and found only in the Biblical Chaldee, (Dan. ii, 34; vii, 4, 7;) on the contrary, in the Targums objects which exist in pairs are expressed by the plural." That celebrated critic, J. D. Michaëlis, remarks in his Chaldee Grammar (p. 25) in reference to some examples of the imitation of the Hebrew found in the Biblical Chaldee: "From these and similar Hebraisms of Daniel and Ezra, which are peculiar to these books, you will perceive that both books

* The Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan were probably written about sixty years before Christ.

were written at that time when the Chaldee language was still new to the Hebrews, who blended with it their own vernacular forms; and that *they were not fabricated at a later period.* For in the Targums, even the oldest, you will most generally seek in vain for those Hebraisms which are everywhere to be met with in Daniel and Ezra."* The time, then, of their composition, could only be that of the captivity, or the age immediately succeeding it. If we suppose Daniel to have been written in the Maccabean age, how is it that the Chaldee does not differ from that of Ezra, written three hundred years before, while it differs so remarkably from that of the Targums written only a hundred years later, or at most a hundred and fifty years? The reader will bear in mind the two points of our argument. 1. The purity of the Hebrew of Daniel, which could not belong to an age long posterior to the captivity; and, 2. The correspondence of the Chaldee portion with the Chaldee of Ezra, and its imitation of Hebrew, which indicate its proximity to the age of the captivity.

V. *The Author's Exact Historical Knowledge.*

If the Book of Daniel was composed in the Maccabean age, we may expect to find in it numerous historical errors. On the contrary, however, we find an exact knowledge of history—an acquaintance with Persian customs and manners, which shows the proximity of the author to the events he relates. In Dan. v, 1–4, is an account of Belshazzar's feast, which well corresponds with what we know of his character and of the customs of Babylonian feasts. "Belshazzar, while he tasted the wine, (Chaldee, *in the flavour of wine,*) commanded to bring the golden and silver vessels—taken out of the temple at Jerusalem—that the king and his princes, his wives and his concubines, might drink therein." The account given by Xenophon in his Cyropædia of the last king of Babylon, agrees well with the character here attributed to him. In Herodotus (book v, 18) we have the following statement in reference to Persian custom, quite different from that of the Greeks: "It is a custom with us Persians, whenever we make a great feast, *to bring in our concubines and our wives to sit beside us.*" In Dan. vi, 18, it is stated that after Darius (who corresponds to the Cyaxares of Xenophon) had sealed the stone of the den of lions that contained Daniel, he went to his

* Ex his, similibusque Danielis et Ezræ Hebraismis, qui his libris peculiares sunt, intelliges, utrumque librum eo tempore scriptum fuisse, quo recens adhuc vernacula sua admiscentibus Hebræis lingua Chaldaica non seriore tempore confictum. In Thargumim, enim, antiquissimis etiam, plerumque frustra hos Hebraismos quæsieris, in Danieli et Ezra ubique obvios.

palace, and passed the night fasting; *nor did he let his concubines come before him.* (English version erroneously renders, *instruments of music.*) According to Xenophon, (Cyrop. iv, v, 8, 25, 52,) he was much addicted to women. In our book he manifests considerable weakness in yielding to his courtiers, and in his fruitless efforts to save Daniel. This well suits Xenophon's description of him. When he took the kingdom of Babylon, he was, according to chap. v, 31, threescore and two years old. This was very probable. In Dan. v, 31, Belshazzar is represented as slain on the very night of the feasting. In this there is nothing improbable, for the Babylonians were a luxurious people; and Herodotus states that they laid up provisions for very many years, and took no account of the siege. (Lib. i, 191.) This statement of Herodotus is confirmed by Xenophon. (Cyrop. vii, 5.) In chap. vi, 8, 12, 15, mention is made of the law of the *Medes and Persians;* but in the Book of Esther, written at a later period, and in reference to later events, *Persians stand first—Persians and Medes.* Now, this is a remarkable instance of historical accuracy, which we could not expect from a writer of the Maccabean age: for Darius was the son of Astyages King of Media, and, consequently, in his time the Medes, his own people, would stand first; but Cyrus was a Persian, and in his time, and subsequently, it was natural for the Persians to stand first. The allusion made to the unchangeableness of the laws of the Medes and Persians is corroborated by Esther, i, 19. In chap. vi, 1, it is stated: "It pleased Darius to set over the whole kingdom one hundred and twenty princes," [satraps.] Xenophon remarks of Cyrus that he sent satraps to the conquered countries, (Cyrop. viii, 6, 1;) and there is no intimation that this was a new institution. It is to no purpose that Lengerke objects that the office of satrap was not known before the time of Cyrus. In Ezekiel xxvi, 7, God calls Nebuchadnezzar *king of kings:* this, as Hävernick remarks, shows that the Babylonian king had rulers under him. And Heeren receives, without any suspicion, the statement in Daniel. Nor was the number in Daniel taken from the Old Testament, for in Esther the number of satraps is one hundred and twenty-seven.

The account of the Magi could only have been written by one most intimately acquainted with Persian affairs, as Daniel was. *Indefiniteness* in regard to the classes, sects, and customs of a country is ever characteristic of those who write at a remote distance, either in *time* or *space*, from the objects of their description. Of the Magi caste, Daniel gives us, in chap. ii, ver. 2, four classes: חַרְטֻמִּים, *sacred Scribes;* אַשָּׁפִים, *Magicians;* מְכַשְּׁפִים, *Sorcerers;*

כַּשְׂדִּים, *Chaldeans.* In verse twenty-seven we have also חַרְטֻמִּין, *wise men,* גָּזְרִין, *diviners,* (astrologers.) Lengerke objects that this division of the Magi caste is not confirmed by the writers of antiquity, who knew of only three classes. According to Hävernick, Ctesias and others with him speak only of two classes. There is, however, a passage in Strabo which very strongly confirms our book: "Of the Chaldean astronomers there are very many classes; for some are called Orchenoi, Borsippenoi, and a great many others,"* &c. Now if the book was forged at a late age and in a foreign country, what could have induced the author to describe classes of men who had no existence? Why should he have so far departed from general tradition? The only reasonable supposition is, that the author wrote from his own personal knowledge,—*i. e.*, that he was Daniel. No mention is made by Daniel of prostration before the king in addressing him; according to Arrian, Cyrus was the first king that was honoured in that manner. As the Persians regarded their king as an incarnation of Ormuzd, in worshipping him there was nothing strange; but before the Persian dominion it was not so appropriate. In the Maccabean age, it had been long a custom to prostrate one's self before the king. Could we have expected such exact historical knowledge in a writer of that age? In Dan. ii, 5; iii, 29, Nebuchadnezzar threatens to make the houses of those who disobey him *dunghills,* (*sinks.*) Also in Ezra vi, 11, in the decree that Darius made in favour of the Jews, it is declared, whosoever shall alter it, let his house be made a *dunghill.* The houses of Babylon were built of *unburnt* brick, and when demolished and made wet with rain, they became *miry sinks.* In Dan. iii, 6, Nebuchadnezzar declares that those who refuse to worship his golden image, "shall the same hour be cast into the midst of a burning fiery furnace." In Jeremiah xxix, 22, we have a clear instance of the same kind of punishment: "The Lord make thee like Zedekiah, and like Ahab, *whom the king of Babylon roasted in the fire.*" Now the Persians were *fire-worshippers,* and, of course, never punished criminals in this manner; and we accordingly find that, as soon as the government of Babylon passes into the hands of the Medes and Persians, casting into a den of lions is substituted for it. (Dan. vi, 7.) Here is an historical discrimination which, in the highest degree of probability, would not have been found in a writer of the Maccabean age, or even in any writer who was not present at the transactions he describes. Even the ancient Greek historian,

* Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν Χαλδαίων τῶν ἀστρονομικῶν γένη πλείω, καὶ γὰρ Ὀρχηνοί τινες προσαγορεύονται καὶ Βορσιππηνοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους. xvi, 1, 6.

Herodotus, has fallen into the gross error, which has been ridiculed by the critics, of making Cyrus the Great, a Persian *fire-worshipper*, *burn* Crœsus. (Book i, 86.)

In chap. iv, 30, Nebuchadnezzar says: "Is not this great Babylon, that I have built for the house of the kingdom by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?" Nebuchadnezzar built a new palace of great dimensions and beauty. To this palace with its environs he here refers. The ruins of this second Babylon have been discovered by Layard.* This is another instance of historical accuracy.

But to place the argument in proof of the genuineness of Daniel, drawn from its historical accuracy, in a clear light, it is necessary to compare it with the writings of the Maccabean age. The absurdities of the Book of Tobit are well known to every reader of the Apocrypha. No one would for a moment compare it with the Book of Daniel. The Books of Maccabees, if we except the first, are of little historical value, and full of errors. The first book is of great value, and is regarded as the most authentic history of the times of which it treats. It is not, however, free from some gross errors. Hengstenberg has pointed out a considerable number of them. In chap. viii, 7, it is stated that the Romans took Antiochus alive, which never happened. In verse eight it is said they took from him India, Media, and Lydia; but Antiochus never ruled over Media and India. In verse fifteen it is said that the Romans made a senate, composed of three hundred and twenty men, who daily held deliberations for the commonwealth; and that they intrust their government to *one man annually*, who rules over all the country, and all obey him. In this statement are several errors. In chap. i, ver. 1, we are told that when Alexander conquered Darius, he reigned in his stead, first over Greece. The writer seems to suppose that Darius had ruled over Greece. In verse six he relates that Alexander, before his death, divided his dominion among those who had been brought up with him from his youth. This contradicts authentic history. In chap. vi, 1, he makes the province Elymais a *city*. There are other errors of a similar nature. Now if an author in the time of the Maccabees, writing of events that occurred and of customs that existed in his own age and in the ages immediately preceding, has committed so many errors, what would he have done had he attempted to describe *Babylonian* history and

* The name of Nebuchadnezzar has been found upon the brick. (Layard's Nineveh, vol. ii, p. 138.) Layard, in his second expedition to Nineveh and Babylon, says in reference to the bricks of the latter place: "They record the building of the city by Nebuchadnezzar."—P. 532.

customs? In chap. i, ver. 2, occurs the name Shinar. This name of Babylonia is found only in a few places in the Bible, and appears to have fallen into disuse in the *later* periods of Jewish history. If written at Babylon, its use was natural enough. According to chap. v, 16, Belshazzar offers to reward Daniel with a golden neck-chain. This was a Babylonian custom, as it seems from a passage in Brissonius. In iii, 1, it is said that Nebuchadnezzar set up his image in the *plain of Dura.* This plain is mentioned nowhere else in the Bible. Layard, however, has found a place in the region of Babylon called *Dura.*

VI. *Other Arguments in Proof of the Genuineness.*

The difference between the conduct of Nebuchadnezzar in reference to the Hebrew children, and that of Darius in regard to Daniel, strikes us as historical truth. When the Hebrew children refused to worship the image of the former, he is represented as *enraged* on account of it, while the latter is *grieved* because Daniel is cast into the lions' den. This was quite natural, for the three children disobeyed Nebuchadnezzar in a matter of *his own appointment;* but Darius's *courtiers* proposed the decree that bore so hard upon Daniel, and he would look upon his disobedience as an offence against *them* rather than against himself.

There is a striking difference between Daniel and the Apocryphal writers in a point which we think worthy of notice; we allude to its *freedom from prayers in the midst of narratives.* The Book of Tobit, I. Maccabees, Judith, and indeed *all* the Apocryphal writings,—we know of no exception,—abound with prayers and ejaculations. The Book of Esther, in the Hebrew, contains no prayers; but there is no want of them in the Greek version. In Daniel, not a word of prayer is mentioned as having been uttered by the Hebrew children. In the Greek version, however, prayers are put into their mouths. No prayers are ascribed to Daniel in the lions' den. The custom of giving the prayers which it was supposed the righteous offered, or should have offered, was characteristic of the Maccabean age. Had Daniel been written in that age, it would most probably have abounded with prayers and pious ejaculations.*

The great power ascribed in the Book of Daniel to the Babylonian kings agrees remarkably well with what we know of Eastern nations; but in the *Apocryphal addition* to Daniel, the Babylonians, in reference to Bel and the Dragon, are represented as rising up against the king, and threatening him with death, if he did not de-

* Daniel's prayer in the ninth chapter is required by the circumstances connected with it. Simplicity is characteristic of the Book of Daniel.

liver up to them Daniel; and thereupon he accedes to their demand.

There is a remarkable correspondence between Herodotus (lib. i, 195) and Daniel, (iii, 21,) in reference to Babylonian dress. The former mentions garments reaching to the feet, (trousers,) a linen over-tunic, and a cloak; the latter mentions trousers, a tunic, and a cloak. (The English version is here defective.)

The author of the book shows an acquaintance with the religion of Zoroaster. He represents Nebuchadnezzar as speaking (chap. iv, 13, 17, 23) of *watchers* exercising a superintendence in the affairs of the world. In the Bun-De-hesh, a commentary on the Zend-Avesta, a passage is quoted from the latter in reference to the watchers: "Ormuzd has set four watchers in the four quarters of the heavens." Could we have expected this allusion from a forger in Palestine in a later age? In vii, 9, there is an allusion to the movable thrones of the Babylonians: "His throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheels [or its wheels] as burning fire."

The symbolic form of Daniel's prophecies suits well the place of their delivery. In chap. viii, 2, and in x, 4, he represents river banks as the scenes of his visions. This was very appropriate for a prophet in Babylon, but not for one in Palestine. With the Euphrates, Tigris, and other streams, either in the vicinity of Babylon or not very remote, Daniel was familiar; and we find that the Deity usually adapts himself to the conceptions and position of his prophets in his revelations to them. Nebuchadnezzar's dream of the great image is in exact accordance with Babylonian taste, for they were remarkably fond of the grotesque and the rude. The imagery of Daniel's vision in the seventh chapter is nearly the same as that found on monuments in the ruins of Nineveh. Daniel speaks of a lion that had *eagle's wings*, and of a leopard that had four *wings*. Here we are strongly reminded of the *winged bull* and other figures excavated by Layard.* "In his [Daniel's] strains," remarks Schlosser, who is no friend to Scripture, "a Chaldean and Babylonian style is so conspicuous, that it strongly expresses the character of the times in which he lived."

The *character of Daniel's prophecies* suits his position. He was engaged in the state affairs of the greatest nation of the age. That he would be deeply anxious to know what would be the fate of this kingdom and of subsequent ones; what effect they would have upon the chosen people, was very probable: and that God would make known to him the future—would choose him for the office, which we are informed he did—was also probable. Paul, the scholar of Ga-

* Layard treats Daniel as genuine and authentic.

maliel, deeply skilled in Hebrew lore and Rabbinical learning, was intrusted with the most profound doctrines of the gospel. He was the most suitable to write the Epistle to the Hebrews, and he wrote it. What a strong proof do Daniel's position and his prophecies afford of the genuineness of the book!

In I. Maccabees* ii, 49–60, it is stated that Mattathias, when about to die, exhorted his sons to steadfastness in the law, by referring them to many distinguished examples of obedience to God in the time of trial in different ages of the world. He names Abraham, Joseph, Phinehas, Joshua, Caleb, David, and Elijah. Immediately following these worthies, and placed in the same list, we have the following, found in the Book of Daniel: "Ananias, Azarias, and Mishael, by believing, were saved from the flame. Daniel in his simplicity [innocency] was saved from the mouth of the lions." Now since the other names in this list are selected from the *written history* of the Jews, it is very probable that these last are also the names of distinguished Jews occurring in *written* history. If it had been merely a floating tradition, it is very improbable that it would have been cited. We have, then, good proof that, at the time of Mattathias, (say 180 or 190 B. C.,) the history of Daniel and his friends was well known to the Jews, and a very probable proof of the existence and authority of the book.

It seems well established that the Sadducees as well as the Pharisees received all the canonical books of the Old Testament; and Prof. Stuart remarks that, since the Sadducees arose very early, (about 240 B. C.,) and carried on fierce controversies with the Pharisees in regard to the obligation of the oral law,—the former rejecting it while the latter received it,—it was impossible for the Book of Daniel, if forged, to have been received during the Maccabean period: and to this remark we would add that, as the book contains (chap. xii) the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, which the Sadducees denied, it could never have been received by them, if written in the Maccabean age.

Between the years 280 and 140 B. C. the canonical books of the Old Testament were translated into Greek. In this translation Daniel was included. It seems very probable that this version of Daniel was used by the writer of I. Maccabees. Especially does *βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως, abomination of desolation,* (i, 54,) appear to be taken from it. Dan. ix, 27. This also renders very probable the existence of the book before the time of Antiochus Epiphanes.

The *miracles* in our book are worthy of God. They were not performed on trivial occasions;—quite different from the miracles of

* I. Maccabees was probably written about 135 B. C.

the Book of Tobit, the scaring of devils out of men by smoking a fish's liver, &c.;—totally different from those which disgrace the Jewish, Mohammedan, and Roman Catholic legends. They had an important connexion with the Jewish theocracy—the elevation and deliverance of the chosen people. Without the existence during the captivity of such a person as Daniel, it is not easy to account for the favour shown the Jews by Cyrus and Darius.

In the Third Book of the Sibylline Oracles, composed for the most part by an Alexandrine Jew of the Maccabean age, according to the most recent critical investigations, there is an evident imitation* of the Book of Daniel in several points. This is another proof of its existence before the time of the Maccabees.

According to i, 7, the prince of the eunuchs changed the names of Daniel and his friends. That it was not an unusual thing for the king of Babylon to have the names of foreigners changed who came into his power, appears from II. Kings, xxiv, 17. The name given Daniel was בַּלְטְשַׁאצַּר, i. e., *Bel's prince:* according to Gesenius, compounded from בֵּל; *tsha*, an ending which in Zend marks the genitive; and *tsar=sar*. Now if this name was fabricated by the pseudo-Daniel, he must have been acquainted with the Zend language. Really this forger must have been a wonderful man! What a knowledge of history and language he must have possessed! שַׁדְרַךְ, *Shadrach*, is Chaldee; מֵישַׁךְ, *Meshach*, is also Chaldee; עֲבֵד נְגוֹ, *Abed-nego*, a *worshipper of Mercury*. This god was greatly reverenced at Babylon. There is in these names nothing improbable or inconsistent.

The *Messianic* character of the book is remarkable. Poverty of ideas and want of comprehensive views of the Messiah's character mark the Apocryphal writings. Daniel describes the four great kingdoms of the ancient world, and in his lofty flight passes on rapidly to the fifth kingdom, that of the Messiah, which should break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and stand forever and ever. In his description of the *Ancient of Days*, he employs the most sublime imagery, and represents myriads as gathered before him for judgment. Are these lofty and pious conceptions indicative of base imposture? But we have another testimony to produce in favour of Daniel: it is that of Him who is emphatically "THE TRUTH," the Lord Jesus Christ; and his testimony we are bound to receive. In his predictions concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, he says: "When ye, therefore, shall see the abomination of desola-

* De Wette contends that these oracles were written in the same age as the Book of Daniel, from some similarity in a few points; but these points are not those which mark the same age, but an imitation.

tion, spoken of by Daniel *the prophet*, stand in the holy place, (whoso readeth, let him understand.") Matt. xxiv, 15; Mark xiii, 14. Here our Lord calls Daniel *the prophet*, giving his divine attestation to his prophetic character, and exhorts those who read him, to do it understandingly. The imagery in the Book of Revelation is, to a great extent, borrowed from Daniel. And Paul's description of the man of sin (II. Thess. chap. ii) seems to have been partly taken from it. In his Epistle to the Hebrews, he refers to Daniel in the lions' den, and to the Hebrew children in the fiery furnace. (Heb. xi, 33, 34.) Thus the apostles, too, give their testimony to the authenticity of the book.

We have now finished our investigations in reference to the book. We have seen the weakness of the objections brought against its genuineness, and the strength of the arguments that may be adduced in favour of it, which are so cogent that they would be regarded as conclusive in regard to almost any other writing. To see such a book as this, of such an exalted character, so intimately connected with Christianity, supported by such strong external and internal evidence, confirmed by the testimony of Christ himself, stricken from the canon, is what no Christian can endure without pain and indignation.

Art. V.—BRODHEAD'S HISTORY OF NEW-YORK.

History of the State of New-York. By John Romeyn Brodhead. First Period, 1609–1664. New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1853; pp. 801.

A very large share of our domestic literature relates to the affairs of the country during its colonial and revolutionary periods. In this field the genius of our writers has attained the largest development, and achieved the greatest results. The names of Prescott, Bancroft, and Hildreth, who are known almost exclusively as historians, are among the most eminent in the annals of our literature. Irving, too, is quite as much celebrated as the author of "Columbus," as of the "Sketch Book;" and the fame of Cooper, though he is justly classed as a novelist, is inseparably associated with the early history of the country. There is in the story of the infancy of our giant republic much of genuine romance, giving its colouring to the simple narrative, and commending it at once to the imagination and the sober judgment. Our writers, too, have entered upon this sub-

ject with great zeal, and, under the influence of a genial patriotism, have given it a generous and faithful delineation.

The question as to the balance of favour between the writer and his subject is renewed in this case. We very naturally congratulate the writer whose productions command our admiration, on the good fortune that led him to the golden mine in which he has so successfully delved. Genius, however, seldom wants a theme upon which to exercise its powers, and it may be presumed that our native historians have to no small degree created the interest on account of which we now congratulate them, as though they had only discovered it. Probably American history is quite as largely indebted to our historians, as they are to their themes.

Our early annals, as generally given and received, have not wholly escaped the suspicion of unfairness, as to the aspect of affairs which they present. Originally that portion of our present country, which at the period of the revolution was consolidated into a single nation, consisted of several distinct, diverse, and often hostile colonies, derived from almost every kingdom of northern Europe, and each acknowledging allegiance to its mother country. Of these, two, among the oldest and most considerable, Virginia and Massachusetts, including Plymouth, have commonly filled the vision of observers, and been recognised as the types and chief parts of colonial North America. Other colonial settlements are indeed not wholly overlooked; but their position is always a subordinate one, and their histories are given as matters merely incidental to the general subject. This is stated only as a matter of fact, and not as a complaint; though it may properly suggest the inquiry whether that which has given so great prominence to the affairs of the Cavaliers and the Puritans, has not thrown other parts too much into the background of the picture. Nearly all of our historians are of New-England or Virginian origin, and it is only natural to suspect that, viewed from their stand-point, the early affairs of those portions of our common country would seem relatively greater than they were. A Roman poet affirms that there had been kings, as great as Agamemnon, whose names were unknown to posterity; and deeds no less valorous than those achieved before the walls of Troy had been quite forgotten, because no poet had celebrated them. The same thought is more quaintly stated in the saying, that "much of a tale is in the telling;" and this general truth applies with special fitness to early American history.

The Dutch settlements on the Hudson originated at about the same time with the English colonies of Virginia and New-England, or a few years later than the former, and a few years before the latter.

These several colonial settlements thus grew up simultaneously: yet while our early annals carefully note every step in the progress of the English colonies, the story of the Dutch settlements is almost entirely disregarded. The cause of this is obvious. At first diversity of national origin, languages, pursuits and purposes, kept them apart, and excluded the history of Dutch colonial affairs from the copious annals of the English; and subsequently, for a long time, our domestic histories were drawn almost entirely from English authorities, to the exclusion of the Dutch. New-Yorkers, engrossed by their commerce and mercantile enterprises, for several generations, left their history to be written by their more learned and inquisitive neighbours, and it is therefore occasion for neither surprise nor complaint if the most ample justice has not been rendered in all cases.

But the long-delayed, long-wished-for change has at length come, and the history of New-Netherland in America is no longer unwritten. The work named at the head of this paper, gives ocular assurance that New-York has at last found an historian worthy of her present greatness, and adequate to do justice to her original worth; and that, too, in the person of a branch of one of her oldest families, a Knickerbocker of the Knickerbockers, who has come forth to rehearse before the public the annals of his native State, to vindicate the character of his ancestors, and to separate the genuine and authentic from the apocryphal and legendary, in their history.

Of the author of this volume, and his adaptation to the work he has undertaken, we presume our readers are already sufficiently informed. As a scholar and a man of generous impulses, his attention was drawn to the unwrought mines of historical gold and gems presented by the accessible, but unused records of the colony of New-Netherland and New-York. Attention soon ripened into love of the subject thus opened to him, and led on by its allurements he has made it the chief business of his life. Peculiar facilities for prosecuting this study were afforded by the documents collected by the New-York Historical Society,—the richest as well as the most learned association of the kind in the country; and by the records found in the archives of the State, at Albany,—records of the highest historical importance, but strangely overlooked till within a few years past. Our author also had the opportunity of examining in Holland the records of that government, and of the city of Amsterdam, and of the West India Company, for matter relative to the history of New-Netherland; and more recently, as secretary of legation to the Court of St. James, under Mr. Bancroft, he found opportunity to pursue his favourite subject among the papers of the colonial offices of Great

Britain. From one so capable and so zealous, and with such facilities placed at his disposal, the public had a right to expect a history at once full and accurate, and written in a style becoming both the author and the subject; and it is only an act of justice to add, that to the extent that the work has proceeded, that expectation has been amply redeemed.

The plan of the History of the State of New-York, as contemplated by Mr. Brodhead, embraces four great periods. The first comprehends the time of the Dutch ascendency, and extends from the discovery by Hudson, in 1609, to the conquest of the colony by the Duke of York, in 1665,—the period embraced in the present volume. The second period extends from the English conquest to the close of the French and Indian war, and the cession of Canada to Great Britain in 1763. The third is the period of the revolutionary struggle, beginning with the troubles growing out of the Stamp-Act, and ending with the settlement of the government under the Federal Constitution. The last is the period of the existence of the State of New-York as a member of the great American confederation. This distribution is a very natural one, and its announcement by the author, with this specimen of the work as he proposes to finish it, is full of assured promise. We may now expect soon to possess the history of the Empire State, in four volumes, so prepared and written as to afford to the whole world, and to coming generations, an adequate exhibition of its early conflicts, its steady progress and present unequalled attainments. To the people of that state especially, and also to the whole nation, and to the whole republic of letters, this announcement is certainly full of deep and abiding interest.

Our further purpose shall be to present to our readers the author's manner of treating the subjects he has undertaken, with extracts to illustrate his style, and to set forth certain important historical facts or discussions, and also to examine some of his opinions as to the influence of colonial New-York in leading on the destinies of the country to liberty, independence, and national greatness.

The account given of the discovery of the region now occupied by the city of New-York and its environs is not materially different from that commonly given and generally known. In the spring of the year 1609, the Dutch East India Company fitted out a small vessel to prosecute the search then making for a western passage to the Indies. The command of this vessel, which was named "De Halve Maan," or Half-Moon, was given to the "schipper," Hendrick Hudson, an Englishman, who, after a variety of adventures, passed the bar at Sandy Hook on the 9th day of September of that year,

and subsequently explored the Bay of New-York, and the river that there empties its waters. Thus the States of Holland acquired a title to this portion of North America, and the name of the discoverer became associated with that noblest of American rivers.

The question of priority of discovery, as upon that rested the claim to proprietorship, could not be passed over in silence, in the history of a colony whose later affairs were so much affected by a disputed title. Some antiquarians have fancied that the famous "Vinland," of the Northmen, included this region,—a notion that Mr. Brodhead thinks not altogether unworthy of consideration. The story that Verrazani, nearly a hundred years before, had discovered and explored these waters and shores, he thinks, rests on no sufficient authority. It is barely possible, and quite unimportant if true, that one or more of the vessels of the Dutch Greenland Company passed down Long Island Sound and through New-York Bay some ten or twelve years before this time; but however that may be, Hudson's discovery was an original one, and it was made while Europe was yet wholly ignorant of the existence of such a region, and of course before any Christian nation had occupied any portion of its soil. Upon this discovery and the immediate subsequent occupation of its shores, and a like discovery and exploration of Long Island Sound, the Connecticut River, and still later of the Delaware, the Dutch claimed, and for a season occupied, the whole region of country washed by these waters; and to the whole of their American territories they gave the name of New-Netherland.

The account of Hudson's discovery was written by De Laet, who was one of the ship's company, and whose florid style and lively imagination impart an air of romance to his story; and by some means the enthusiasm of the original chronicler seems to have been caught by almost every subsequent writer on the same subject. Even Mr. Brodhead, though distinguished for the sober dignity of manner that becomes the historic muse, grows eloquent in his account of the original exploration of the majestic river, in which, as in duty bound, every genuine son of the old burghers so greatly glories. Witness the following extract:—

"The first of Europeans, Hudson now began to explore the great river which stretched before him to the north, opening, as he hoped, the way to the Eastern seas. Slowly drifting upward with the flood-tide, he anchored over night just above Yonkers, in sight of 'a high point of land which showed out' five leagues off to the north. The next day, a southeast wind carrying him rapidly up Tappan and Haverstraw Bays, and beyond the 'strait' between Stony and Verplanck's Points, Hudson sailed onward through the majestic pass guarded by the frowning Donderberg, and at nightfall anchored his yacht near West Point, in the midst of the sublimest scenery of the 'Matteawan' Mountains.

"The next morning was misty until the sun arose, and the grandeur of the overhanging highlands was again revealed. A fair south wind sprung up as the weather became clear. . . . . A bright autumnal day succeeded the misty morning. Running sixty miles up along the varied shores which lined the deep channel, and delighted every moment with the ever-changing scenery, and the magnificent virgin forests which clothed the river banks with their gorgeous autumnal hues, Hudson arrived toward evening opposite the loftier 'mountains which lie from the river side,' and anchored the Half-Moon near Catskill landing."—Pp. 28, 29.

The period of Hudson's discovery was peculiarly a favourable one as to the history of Holland. After maintaining for more than forty years an unequal conflict with Spain, first for the smallest share of liberty, and at last for entire national independence, during which time the several provinces of the Netherlands had become consolidated by the external pressure, and the whole people closely united by a passionate love of their common country, the Hollanders had just wrung from their ancient foe a truce, granting for the time being the full exercise of their rights; and now the energy and enterprise that had been so long exercised in war, were at liberty to be employed in the arts of peace. Already had Dutch trading vessels visited every part of the known world, while yet they were waiting to occupy any new field of commerce that might be opened to them. In such a state of things the discovery so made could not be allowed to be a barren one, and so the history declares:—

"A new temptation was unexpectedly offered to the expanding commerce of Holland. Vast regions of North America, which Hudson had seen abounding in beaver and other valuable furs, and where native hunters, unrestrained by arbitrary regulations of excise, furnished regular and exhaustless cargoes, were now open to Dutch mercantile enterprise. The tempting opportunity was not neglected. Another vessel was immediately fitted out, and despatched from the Texel in the summer of 1610, to the great river of the mountains, with a cargo of goods suitable for traffic with the Indians. . . . . The Half-Moon had now just returned to Amsterdam after her long detention in England. A part of her old crew manned the new vessel, the command of which was probably intrusted to Hudson's Dutch mate, who had opposed his early return; and the experienced mariners soon revisited the savages of the great river, whom they had left the autumn before. Tradition relates, that when the Europeans arrived again among the red men, 'they were much rejoiced at seeing each other.'"—P 44.

A nobler ambition than mere commercial enterprise was also called into exercise by the new discovery,—a desire to explore the newly-found regions, and to annex its territory to those of the States of Holland in other parts of America. Accordingly, in the year 1611, Hendrick Christaensen and Adraen Block, who had before been occupied with voyages to the West Indies, chartered a ship and made a voyage to the newly-discovered river in North America, bringing back a valuable cargo of furs and two young natives. Their reports,

with the substantial evidence of the value of the trade, awakened no small interest among the merchants of Holland. Two vessels were therefore sent out the next year, commanded respectively by Christaensen and Block, "to traffic with the savages along the *Mauritius* River,—which name, as a compliment to Maurice, Prince of Orange, had been given to the "great river." Other vessels followed soon afterward, and by common consent the southern point of Manhattan Island became the centre of the fur trade of New-Netherland. Such was the beginning of the city of New-York,—a mart of commerce even before it became the dwelling-place of white men. The beginnings of a settlement, and also of a most important branch of manufacture, are thus detailed by our author:—

"By accident Adraen Block's ship, the Tiger, was burned at Manhattan, while he was preparing to return to Holland. Undismayed by his misfortune, the persevering mariner set about building a small yacht out of the admirable ship timber with which the island abounded. This work occupied Block during the winter of 1613, and until the spring of 1614. To accommodate himself and his companions during their cheerless solitude, a few huts were now first erected near the southern point of Manhattan Island; and in the absence of all succour from Holland, the friendly natives supplied the Dutch through the dreary winter with food and all kinds of necessaries."—P. 48.

The current histories very generally agree in fixing at the time immediately succeeding these affairs, the event that gave rise to the first pretence set up in behalf of the British claim to this region of country; but Mr. Brodhead discredits the whole affair. His remarks are:—

"On his return voyage from Acadie to Virginia, late in November, Argall is said to have 'landed at Manhatas Isle, in Hudson's River,' where finding 'four houses built, and a pretended Dutch governor,' he forced the Hollanders to submit themselves to the king of England and to the government of Virginia. But this favourite story is very suspicious; it is inconsistent with authentic state papers; it has been deliberately pronounced to be 'a pure fiction;' and it certainly needs to be sustained by better authority than any that has yet been produced, before it can be received as an historical truth."—P. 54.

At the opening of the spring of 1614, the Dutch adventurers commenced a thorough exploration of the waters and shores of New-Netherland. De Witt, in the "Little Fox," sailed up the "Mauritius River," carefully examining its shores and islands, and during that season a trading-house was erected on an island at the head of tide-water, among the Maquaas, or Mohawks, and named Fort Nassau, and the island on which it was built was called Castle Island. May, in the "Fortune," coasted eastward beyond "Vischer's Hook," or Montauk Point, and visited a large "white and clayey" island, called by the Indians Capack, which the Dutch named "Texel," but the English afterward changed the name to *Martha's Vineyard*. But

Adraen Block, with his new yacht of sixteen tons, which bore the significant name of *Onrust*, or "Restless," performed the most notable feats in this line. He sailed boldly through the terrible "Helle Gaat," into the "Great Bay," and carefully examined the whole shore and neighbouring islands as far eastward as Cape Cod. Near Norwalk he fell among a cluster of islands which he called the "Archipelagoes;" a river (the Housatonic) entering the salt water near the present town of Stratford, with banks of red earth, was called the "River of Roodenberg," or Red Hills; and yet a little further eastward the red sandstone, at the head of New-Haven Bay, secured the name of "Roodenberg" for that place; and beyond these the adventurous mariner "came to the mouth of a large river running up into the land." Into this he entered and ascended it till passing by the villages of the Sequins, at Wethersfield, he came to the rapids near the present town of Windsor, where was the fortified town of the Nawaas, who were then governed by their sagamon, Morahieck. From the quality of its water, Block named this the "Versch," or Fresh River, but the native savages called it the "Connittecock," or Quonehtacut." Returning to Long Island Sound, he continued his course eastward to the "river of the Siccanomas," the "Pequod" River of the early English settlers, or the Thames of the present time. Thence stretching across the sound he visited the "Vischer's Hook," which he found to be the eastern extremity of "Sewan-hacky," or Long Island, and thence bearing away to the northeast he discovered a large island, which the Dutch immediately designated "Block Island," a name which it still bears, as an honourable memorial of the original explorer of these shores and waters. He next ran across to Narragansett Bay, which he named "Nassau Bay," and with that keen perception for red earth before indicated, "an island of a reddish appearance" was noticed, and called by the Dutch "Roode Island." Proceeding still further to the east and north he explored "Vlieland," or Nantucket, and passing thence beyond the "Vlack Hook," or Cape Malebarre, he coasted along "the Fuyck," or Cape Cod Bay, and explored Massachusetts Bay as far north as latitude 42° 30′, at the "Pye Bay, to which," says the chronicler, "the limits of New-Netherland extend." Turning his prow toward the south, Block now set out to return to Manhattan, but falling in with the ship of his comrade, Christaensen, he left the "Restless" to the care of his mate, Cornelis Hendrickson, and embarked in the "Fortune" for Holland.

Arriving at Amsterdam, Block laid an account of his discoveries before the parties under whose auspices he had gone out, and suggested the measures necessary to render them permanently valuable.

A "figure map" was prepared from his notes of the voyage, under the personal directions of the navigator,—the first ever drawn of that part of the world. In company with a number of merchants of Amsterdam, Block proceeded to lay the matter before the States General, asking, at the same time, a monopoly of the trade of the region discovered. This prayer of the petitioners was readily granted, and upon the charter then given the name of New-Netherland was for the first time employed to designate a portion of North America. It was described as lying between New-France and Virginia, and extending from the fortieth to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, which territory was claimed as belonging to the States of Holland, having been discovered and occupied by persons acting under their authority, while as yet it was "inhabited only by aboriginal savage tribes, and unoccupied by any Christian prince or state." Such were the grounds of the Dutch claim to this territory.

Two years after Block's famous explorations in the east, Hendrickson, who had succeeded him in the command of the "Restless," set out to search the coast southward, and to find a large river in that direction, of which the savages had often spoken. This voyage was eminently successful, and the account given of the discoveries made, is only less glowing than that of the discoveries on the Hudson. Nine years before, Hudson had entered this river with the Half-Moon, but had not ventured to press his way inland on account of the "shoals and reedy islands." The next year, Argall, sailing from Virginia in company with a vessel commanded by Lord Delaware, becoming separated from his consort in a fog, came into the bay, but made no explorations; while Lord Delaware never even saw the place that commemorates his name. Hendrickson seems to have coasted up along the western shore of the bay, and to have been the first European navigator who set his foot on the soil of Delaware and Pennsylvania. The river was at first called the "New-River," but afterward more commonly the "South River," in contradistinction to the "Mauritius," which was familiarly known as the North River.

By these discoveries the Dutch title was established, according to the laws of nations, to the entire region extending from the north point of Massachusetts Bay to the southern cape of Delaware, including all the bays, islands, rivers, and shores of all that extensive and fertile portion of North America. Within this entire region there had then been no settlement made by any European government, and much the greater part of it was utterly unknown till explored and occupied by adventurers from Holland. The details of these discoveries and explorations fill a deeply interesting chapter

in Mr. Brodhead's history; and as the advocate of the original claim of the Dutch, he certainly makes out a strong case.

With an energy and foresight characteristic of their countrymen, the Dutch adventurers made haste to secure for themselves and the States General the fruits of their discoveries. Their attention was more especially directed to those parts lying on the Fresh and the South River, as being more in danger on account of their remoteness from New-Amsterdam, which name had been given to the chief settlement at Manhattan Island, and their proximity to the English colonies on the east and south. Early in the year 1623, a small fort was erected on the South River, and a settlement of four families made; and about the same time "two families and six men" were sent into the Fresh River, who, ascending about fifty miles, laid the foundation of a fort on the west bank of that stream, on a tongue of land between the river and the creek, within the limits of the present city of Hartford, at a spot still known as "Dutch Point."

These efforts were renewed and zealously prosecuted some ten years later, when, under the company's direction, Van Twiller purchased of the governing sachems a large portion of the lands on both sides of the Connecticut, and formally occupied the country in the name of the States of Holland, while as yet the English had made no attempt to gain a foothold in the same region. Our author, after giving the details of these transactions, thus sums up the whole matter, as to the rival Dutch and English claims subsequently set up:—

"Thus the Dutch West India Company obtained the Indian title to the territory on the Connecticut River, of the whole of which they 'had previously taken possession.' The purchase was made of the natives, who 'declared themselves the rightful owners;' Lord Warwick's grantees had, as yet, done nothing toward the occupation of the region which they claimed; and the people of New-Plymouth had made no attempt to plant a settlement in a region which they knew was beyond the limits of their patent. Van Curler, the Dutch commissary, soon completed a redoubt 'upon the flat land on the edge of the river, with a creek emptying at the side.' The little post was fortified with two small cannon, and named the 'Good Hope.'"—P. 235.

The contests of the Dutch and English for the possession of the valley of the Connecticut forms a curious and interesting chapter in this portion of our early history. Mr. Brodhead, as the advocate of the Dutch claims, makes out a strong and very satisfactory case for his clients, especially as regards the region below the southern line of Massachusetts. Our colonial annals abound with strange anomalies; and since the time in which restitution could be either asked or rendered is forever past, there can no longer be any reason why the truth in the case should be concealed or suppressed.

The occupation of the South River was prosecuted with like decision and energy. In 1630 Godyn and Blommaert purchased of the Indians a tract of land "on the south corner of the bay of the South River," running north twenty-two miles from Cape Henlopen, and two miles inland. This, our author remarks, "was the first European title, by purchase from the aborigines, within the limits of the present State of Delaware, and bears date two years before the charter of Maryland, granted to Lord Baltimore." Next year the purchase was occupied by settlers, and the colony of Swaanendael, thus planted, was, in the prophetic language of the contemporary chronicler, "the cradling of a state." The next year a tract extending along the east shore of the river, twelve miles from Cape May, was purchased for the same parties. By these purchases, as well as by priority of discovery and occupation, was the Dutch title to the region along the Delaware Bay and River perfected, and especially fortified against the claims subsequently set up by the English.

Colonies necessarily partake of the characteristics of the countries from which they are drawn; yet rather those of the common people, than those of the more elevated classes. The Dutch people, however, of all classes, were at this time unusually homogeneous in character, manners, and sentiments. An unconquerable love of freedom, seconded by indefatigable industry, had, within the past hundred years, raised the Dutch nation from the most scanty and rudest elements, to commercial greatness and political independence. Spain, indeed, still made a barren claim to the sovereignty of the States of Holland, which even then was only a pretence, and soon after it was formally abandoned. Living in constant conflict with the ocean, which they had expelled from the land they occupied, the Dutch became sailors by the force of circumstances, and merchants by virtue of the opportunities thus afforded them. Holland was now the first of commercial countries. It held diplomatic relations with nearly every civilized nation of the world, and always took pains to have the balance of trade in her own favour.

Two kindred yet distinct and often antagonistic traits of character were cherished by this state of things,—a spirit of bold self-reliance, and the love of wealth; and both of these were carried by the adventurers to the New World, and there gave character and complexion to society. But individual self-reliance had been compelled to yield to the necessities of the times, and seek in associations that defence against the common enemy which no amount of individual prowess could secure; and now the same principle of combined action began to be carried into trade. The commercial enterprise of Holland

thus took the form of associated wealth, claiming special and exclusive privileges in its own field of operations. Of this character was the West India Company, incorporated in 1621, with the exclusive privilege of trading under the Dutch flag to any of the islands or the continent of America, and also invested with enormous political powers and prerogatives. To this monstrous monopoly were committed all the interests of the newly-created province of New-Netherland.

The West India Company, in the same spirit in which it had its origin, attempted to establish a kind of feudalism in their American possessions; but though suddenly acquired wealth made many desirous of purchasing the freedom of the poor, the spirit of hardy independence, still active among the people, rendered the attempt a futile one. It was found by experience that the Dutch colonists could not be reduced to a state of vassalage, and that the forms of feudalism could be maintained in New-Netherland only by carefully avoiding the exercise of its powers. Whatever influence the system ever exercised was doubtless only evil, except as it may have tended to rouse the love of freedom in the breasts of its subjects. On this subject Mr. Brodhead judiciously observes:—

"The introduction of the feudal system into New-Netherland was the most unfortunate result of the charter of exemptions. In the fatherland the industrial spirit of a self-relying and liberty-loving people had shorn feudalism of many of its worst attributes; and, practically, there was perhaps now more popular freedom in Holland than in England, or in any other country in the Old World. But there is always danger in delegating political powers; and the danger increases, the further the exercise of these powers is removed from the fountain of supreme authority. Feudalism, which in Holland was made to bow before the spirit of a people long accustomed to self-government, had less restraint in the distant province, which was itself wholly under the arbitrary rule of a commercial corporation. The free spirit of the Netherlander went with him, indeed, to his new home across the sea; but his political freedom was less secure there than in the fatherland. It was only by degrees, and after constant struggles against an oppressive colonial government, that the people of New-Netherland worked their way to some of those franchises which their countrymen were enjoying at home. The colonists under the patroons were subjected to the double pressure of feudal exaction and mercantile monopoly."—P. 198.

There was this remarkable difference as to the liberties enjoyed by the Dutch colonists and those of their Puritan neighbours. In both cases the spirit of freedom had many difficulties to withstand, but in the former these were imposed by the government against the will of the people, while in the latter they were created by the people themselves. If among these either civil or religious liberty was denied to any portion of the people, it was not because New-England colonists, like those of New-Netherland, were compelled to extort

from their superiors at home whatever share of freedom they enjoyed. The privileges granted to the patroons were attractive to the ambitious notions of the aristocratic merchants of Holland, in whom sudden wealth had given rise to a desire for social preëminence. They accordingly hastened to appropriate the virgin soil of the province to their ambitious purposes, but found to their chagrin that the burghers of the fatherland would not be tempted to exchange their native freedom for the promised rewards of feudal subjection in a distant land,—or if, in any case, some were allured to adventure the perilous enterprise, the conditions were soon found intolerable, and the authority of the feudal compact was cast aside. Though Holland could have supplied a patroon for every manor of New-Netherland, she lacked entirely the materials from which to gather the necessary number of vassals.

New-Netherland had passed from the character of a trading establishment into that of a civil community, when, in 1633, a regular government was established under the direction of Wouter Van Twiller. It often happens that the greatest tyrants are the best promoters of the spirit of liberty among the people; and it is not at all improbable that the misrule of that rash, vacillating, and covetous magistrate, did much to cherish the free spirits of the colonists, as was also the case under his successors in office. While he was chiefly intent on enforcing the trading monopoly of his superiors, or in promoting his own private interests, the colonists were steadily seeking their own welfare and resisting his feeble tyranny. Thus from the beginning the attitude of the people toward the government was one of resistance, and habits of self-reliance and combined opposition to oppression were substituted for a mean dependence upon the state. It was a reluctant concession to the love of freedom among the colonists, when, only a few years later, the company granted leave to any person who should convey to the colony six grown up persons, to occupy and possess two hundred acres of land. The rapid increase of this class of freeholders soon originated towns and villages, to which municipal governments were also granted, thus creating magistrates from among the people, and that, too, by virtue of a popular nomination. In New-York no less than in New-England, the *township* was the primary school of liberty; for in these local municipalities men became skilled by exercise in the arts of self-government, and learned to love their municipal regulations because they were self-imposed and enforced by common consent. The liberty of the people in any country can be maintained only by a distribution of governmental power throughout the remotest parts of the territory, in the form of local and territorial corporations.

At the time of Stuyvesant's accession to the directorship, (in 1647,) though the entire population was only about two thousand, nearly one-half of whom were within Van Rensselaer's patent, there were twelve incorporated plantations about New-Amsterdam and on the western end of Long Island, governed by a local magistracy, depending in part upon a popular election, and more or less responsible to the people, though New-Amsterdam was still governed by the sole authority of the director and his fiscal. A few years later, however, the people of that town obtained, by petition, from the home authorities, enlarged municipal privileges. A board of magistrates, or city court, was created, composed of burgomasters and schepens, after the manner of cities in the fatherland, to be selected by the governor from a double nomination, first by the commonalty and afterward by the retiring magistrates. Thus the elements of popular liberty were at a very early date transplanted from Holland, and naturalized in the soil of New-Netherland.

Another of the popular features of the home government was also at a very early period introduced into the affairs of the colonial government. When Kieft found himself menaced on every side by hostile savage tribes, whom he wished to chastise, but lacked the means to do so, he found it necessary to propitiate the colonists, and solicit their aid against the common enemy. A general assembly of all the heads of families, held at New-Amsterdam, "to resolve there on something of the first necessity," began by choosing "twelve select men," to coöperate with the director for the common safety. A popular form of government was thus instituted, and the people from the beginning of the history of the colony became accustomed to a popularly-elected branch of government, authoritatively coöperating with the representative of the governing company, in the highest affairs of the state.

Though Stuyvesant was no friend to popular liberty, he nevertheless found himself compelled to yield to the demand of the people, and to increase rather than curtail the franchises given by his predecessors. Wanting the means to defend and conduct the affairs of the colony, in independence of the commonalty, he was forced to purchase the aid and coöperation of the people by granting them political franchises, and especially by recognising, both practically and formally, their rights. Trouble was apprehended from the savages with whom the government had failed to fulfil its treaty stipulations; the defences of the colony were not in a satisfactory condition, and the provincial treasury was "actually unprovided with money or goods." In such a state of affairs, the high notions of the soldierly governor were forced to yield:—

"Necessity produced concession, and prerogative yielded to popular rights. The council recommended that the principle of representation should be conceded to the people. Stuyvesant assented, and an election was ordered to be held, at which the inhabitants of Manhattan, Breuckelen, Amerfoort, and Pavonia, chose eighteen 'of the most notable, reasonable, honest, and respectable' persons among themselves; from whom, 'as is customary in the fatherland,' the director and council were to select NINE MEN, to advise and assist, when called upon, in promoting the welfare of the province at large."—Pp. 473, 474.

It has been too much the custom among us, especially in that large department of our native literature, whose most perfect type is seen in Fourth-of-July orations, to refer the spirit of liberty found in the American people to a Puritanical origin. Had this been confined to such occasional ebullitions of uninformed patriotism, it might be passed by as a harmless folly; but when the same false assumption is found in the pages of our most approved histories, it is time to call public attention to the facts of the case. We concede great honour to the Puritan fathers, for their sturdy and honest love of liberty, as they understood it; but it is only an act of justice to concede equal honour to all who displayed equal virtue, and if one party learned its lessons from the other, let the honour of priority be also equitably bestowed. Mr. Brodhead has so fitly adjusted this whole matter that we choose to let him speak directly to our readers, and we solicit from every unprejudiced mind a candid consideration of the subjoined extract:—

"No class of persons in the world has, perhaps, on the one hand, been loaded with more extravagant eulogy, and, on the other, been covered with more undeserved ridicule, than the English Puritans, and their descendants in America. An incessant repetition of stereotyped panegyrics may, indeed, be excused on those periodical occasions when a large posterity is accustomed to commemorate, with filial pride, the many worthy attributes of a devout, active, acute, independent, and resolute ancestry. The honest reputation of that renowned ancestry no candid mind can depreciate; and the real services which the Puritans rendered to the cause of civil liberty it is grateful to applaud. But there is danger lest zeal should outrun knowledge; and lest ideal pictures, drawn by self-adulatory rhetoric, should gradually come to be received as faithful portraits of reality. And while naught should be set down in malice, no temptation to flatter self-conceit, nor anxiety to demonstrate hypotheses; no reluctance to oppose the most eloquent ability, nor fear of provoking cherished prejudice which unwelcome candour may offend, should ever warp those who assume the responsible task of recording the annals of their race, from the duty of clearly exposing historical truth.

"However ample may have been the true scope of their compact on board of the May Flower at Cape Cod, it cannot be denied, and it ought not to be concealed, that the Pilgrims, before they left their asylum in Holland, had seen, in her tolerant government, an early and illustrious assertion of the rights and the power of the people, and a noble protest against oppression and tyranny. While the fugitive Puritans, unmolested at Leyden, observed the popular principles of majorities triumphant, even in severe ecclesiastical decisions, they found that sublimest element of all in civil liberty,—freedom of conscience,—

more fully realized in the United Netherlands, than in any other country in the world. The same immunities which the Dutch had won from Spain were freely granted to the non-conforming refugees from England. In the Batavian republic, too, they saw the happy workings of the federal system which afterward bound together the American colonies. And, in the constitution of self-governing Holland, those refugees had before them the practical example of a representative administration, imperfect indeed, but nevertheless a marvel of the age, founded on large principles of popular liberty, maintaining those principles with splendid success, and deserving the lasting gratitude of mankind for its earnest, consistent, and magnanimous vindication of the rights of humanity. All this was observed in the United Provinces, at a period when James I. was King of Great Britain, Louis XIII. King of France, and Philip III. King of Spain. Such lessons could not possibly have been lost upon the Pilgrims; to their value they had themselves borne testimony, in soliciting encouragement to emigrate to New-Netherland, 'under the order and command' of the Prince of Orange and the States General: and when they are found affirming, in New England, some of substantially the same principles as those which they had seen operative in the Dutch republic, and which at that time were developed nowhere else, it cannot be just to monopolize for them the glory of having originated 'popular constitutional liberty.'"—Pp. 131–133.

Still, it must be conceded that the English Puritans learned their first great lessons of freedom in their native land. The English common law, the noblest charter of liberty that ever pervaded any political body, was then, though only partially developed, actively operative, and by its teachings these apostles of liberty had gained their first ideas of those individual rights which in Holland were seen much more fully brought into practice, though less clearly recognised in theory.

Neither was the spirit of freedom which prevailed in New-Netherland altogether a foreign importation. The American province was never a perfect type of its European ancestor. From a very early date the Belgic basis of the population was largely diluted with foreign elements. The colony was from the beginning an asylum from religious persecution, and large numbers of refugees of almost every name and creed, from Europe and from the neighbouring colonies, were attracted thither as to a place of common security. The zeal of the patroons to obtain settlers induced them to offer liberal conditions, and to disregard both national and theological differences. Accordingly the population of these infant communities were often composed of the most heterogeneous materials, whose only point of coincidence was that all were free and loyal denizens of the colony. Here a forlorn band of Walloons, outcasts of Europe's religious wars, sought and obtained all that they desired,—the rights of citizenship, and religious liberty. When religious intolerance had expelled a portion of the people from the English Puritanical colonies, the outcasts sought and gained a resting-place in the Dutch province. The English conquest hastened the same

tendencies among the colonists, both by the introduction of English jurisprudence, and by the liberal course of administration pursued, with the design of attaching the colonists to their new rulers. The free principles of English law found a ready response in the free spirits of those hardy provincials, and engendered among them an ardent and enlightened love of liberty. The subsequent infusion of large bodies of French Huguenots, German Palatinates, and Irish political refugees, still further developed and strengthened among the masses this love of personal liberty.

The character of the persons who made up the heterogeneous population of New-Netherland, and the motives that brought them thither, no doubt, had a great influence in forming the character of the future population. The lessons of religious liberty and of mutual forbearance among persons of diverse and opposing religious creeds, are often more difficult to learn, and to reduce to practice, than those of civil equality; but even this difficult problem was satisfactorily solved in the Dutch colony. True, in this, as in other particulars, the right was obtained in spite of the will of the governor, who had as little favour for Lutherans or Quakers, as had any of his Puritanical neighbours. But the people resisted the bigoted spirit of the director, and when appealed to, his superiors in Holland directed that the same indulgence which had made the parent city a general asylum for the oppressed should also prevail in the province.

The practice of a free toleration in matters of religion was coëval with the history of New-Netherland. The planting of the colony was not a religious, but a commercial enterprise. The original colonists brought with them the prevailing religious notions of the fatherland, not wholly excluding the intolerance that disgraces the ecclesiastical annals of Holland. But the merchants of Amsterdam were more mindful of their profits than zealous for the maintenance of a forced orthodoxy; and, as in their own city a free toleration was allowed, so they determined it should be in New-Amsterdam in America. Here, therefore, the persecuted non-conformists of almost every European nation sought and found an asylum, and "freedom to worship God." Here Calvinists and Lutherans dwelt together and enjoyed equal privileges. Here arrogant Episcopalians and stubborn Presbyterians were compelled to refrain from annoying each other. Here Anabaptists and Quakers, left to enjoy their own peculiarities, ceased to be fanatical, and became rationally devout, and valuable members of the social and political body. Here, too, the forlorn Israelite, proscribed and down-trodden among all nations, was permitted to set up his synagogue, and to worship the God of his fathers according to the ancient faith and ritual of his people.

A custom thus early established and steadily maintained, at length came to be approved by all classes of community; and so religious freedom, the earliest result of true liberty, was cherished among them.

Stuyvesant's administration of nearly twenty years' continuance, though characterized by great energy and honest devotion on the part of the director to what he supposed to be the best interests of his superiors, was not a successful one. Between himself and the commonalty was a perpetual struggle,—they, contending for the rights of freemen; and he, to maintain and exercise an arbitrary authority over them. The relations of the province to the neighbouring colonies were also very unsatisfactory. The whole of the original province of New-Netherland, to the east of the Fresh River, had been tacitly given up, since the occupation of a portion of that region by English colonies, and more recent aggressions at Hartford and New-Haven began to threaten still greater curtailments of the limits of the company's territory. The steady increase of the English settlements on the Connecticut at length quite expelled the Dutch from that river, while the outposts of the New-Haven colony began to press hard upon the borders of Manhattan Island itself; while much the larger part of Long Island was formally conceded to the English. On the South River, the Swedish settlement for a while quite expelled the Dutch; and though the authority of New-Netherland was reëstablished, yet its hold upon the scattered settlers on that river was at best weak and uncertain. The colony of Rensselaerwick maintained a kind of independence, and frequently successfully resisted the authority of the director; and the savages for much of the time maintained a threatening attitude toward the colonists.

Though the existence of the Dutch authorities on the Hudson was frequently recognised by the English, yet in no case did the government of Great Britain disclaim its pretensions to the whole of this part of North America; nor were there wanting intimations that at a proper opportunity those pretensions would be enforced. The New-England colonies, especially New-Haven, whose entire territory lay within the limits of the original New-Netherland, looked with evil eyes upon the Dutch province, and often urged upon the home government the necessity of extinguishing the authority of the Netherlands on Hudson's River. While a state of war existed between the Dutch republic and the English, during the Protectorate of Cromwell, measures were actually put in operation for that purpose, which miscarried only by the delay of the vessels which conveyed the orders across the Atlantic, and the conclusion of a peace, in the mean time, between the two belligerent commonwealths. This,

however, was only a brief postponement of a cherished purpose, which even a complete revolution of the English government by the restoration of the monarchy did not change: for no sooner was the newly-restored monarch instated in his kingdom, than he, by a secret treaty, gave to his brother, the Duke of York, the claim of the British crown to the whole of the province of New-Netherland; and he, though the two countries were at peace, immediately hastened to seize and occupy it by force of arms. Thus, after a little more than fifty years' continuance, terminated the Dutch dynasty on the Hudson.

The Dutch title to the region they occupied was as little liable to exceptions as that of any colonial establishment in America. But this availed nothing against English cupidity and "manifest destiny." An historian may not be a partisan, nor feel too deeply the interest of his story, though it is one of innocence spoiled of its rights, and injustice triumphant. Mr. Brodhead's reflections at the close of the account of this transaction are no doubt just, though they indicate the bent of his feelings as to the affair:—

"Viewed in all its aspects, the event that gave to the whole of that country a unity in allegiance, and to which a misgoverned people complacently submitted, was as inevitable as it was momentous. But whatever may have been its ultimate consequences, this treacherous and violent seizure of the territory and possessions of an unsuspecting ally, was no less a breach of private justice than of public faith. It may, indeed, be affirmed that, among all the acts of selfish perfidy which royal ingratitude conceived and executed, there have been few more characteristic, and none more base."—P. 745.

We can find room for but two other extracts, which we take from the author's concluding reflections. They must be their own apology:—

"The pioneers of New-York left their impress deep upon the state. Far-reaching commerce, which had made Old Amsterdam the Tyre of the seventeenth century, early provoked the envy of the colonial neighbours of New-Amsterdam, and, in the end, made her the emporium of the Western World. Longer lines of barges than those which once crowded the Batavian canals are now drawn from the great lakes to the ocean, through those magnificent channels which the experience of Holland suggested, and the enterprise of her children helped to construct. Buildings as solid and as quaint as those which grace the 'Heeren-Gracht' stood as monuments of the olden time, until necessity, the desire of gain, or a distaste for what is venerable, doomed them to destruction. Cherished holidays yet recall the memory of the genial anniversaries of the fatherland; and year by year the people are invited to render thanks to their God, as their forefathers were invited long before Manhattan was known, and while New-England was yet a desert. Those forefathers humbly worshipped the King of kings, while they fearlessly rejected the kings of men. The children of such ancestors were well fitted to act an important part in the great work of opening the continent of America to the civilization of Europe. They added no ignoble ingredient to the Union's blended masses."—P. 747.

"Without undervaluing others, it may confidently be claimed that to no nation in the world is the republic of the West more indebted than to the United Provinces for the idea of the confederation of sovereign states; for

noble principles of constitutional freedom; for magnaminous sentiments of religious toleration; for characteristic sympathy with the subjects of oppression; for liberal doctrines in trade and commerce; for illustrious patterns of private integrity and public virtue; and for generous and timely aid in the establishment of independence. Nowhere among the people of the United States can men be found excelling in honesty, industry, courtesy, or accomplishments, the posterity of the early Dutch settlers in New-Netherland. And when the providence of God decreed that the rights of humanity were again to be maintained through long years of endurance and of war, the descendants of Hollanders nobly emulated the example of their forefathers; nor was their steadfast patriotism outdone by that of any of the heroes in the strife which made the blood-stained soil of New-York and New-Jersey the NETHERLANDS OF AMERICA."—P. 750.

We must now hasten to close our remarks on this noble volume, which we have read with unmixed satisfaction, and with an interest that increased steadily to the end. We esteem it an invaluable contribution to the literature of the country, filling very acceptably a hitherto vacant space in our domestic history. The importance and richness of this department of our national annals have long been known to a few who have given special attention to the original sources of information on this subject; hereafter, we may hope, they will be known and read by all. The production of such a work is a substantial addition to the literary wealth of the whole republic of letters; and especially has the author devolved a debt upon the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of his native state, and upon all those of the present day who have succeeded to their heritage. The whole nation has a proprietorship in such a work, detailing, as does this, the early annals of the leading members of our national confederation.

As a writer of history Mr. Brodhead possesses many and great excellences, which entitle him to a place among the very first class of our native historians,—with Bancroft, Prescott, and Hildreth. With the first and last of these, as writers of domestic histories, he is necessarily brought into comparison; nor need he dread the ordeal. In patient and thorough research, and in large and comprehensive views of his whole subject, he is perhaps equal to any historical writer of ancient or modern times; and in all those intellectual and æsthetical qualifications which in such a work are detected in a thousand nameless excellences, the richness of his mental furniture is attested by the work itself. Its value does not consist in any one, nor in several specifically excellent features, but rather in a symmetrical elevation and faultlessness of the whole production. The style of composition is eminently pure, chaste, and simple. There is nothing turgid or swelling about it,—no accumulation of epithets, nor straining after high-sounding expressions,—no aiming at dramatic effect, nor attempts at a forced sprightliness by the use

of startling announcements or sharp antitheses. In short, there is throughout a remarkable absence of all studied excellences of language and manner. Yet the terms and forms of expression seem to be always happily chosen, and to fall naturally into their places, conveying in just proportions the thoughts evidently intended to be conveyed. One may read the whole volume through without any thought of the style as good or bad; for, like a transparent medium, its clearness and purity secure it from attention. The narrative is animated without apparent effort, and forcible without labour; the whole discourse is rich without the aid of mere embellishments, and alluring, though there is no apparent solicitude to please.

In detailing events or discussing characters, this writer is equally removed from the eulogistic manner of Bancroft, and the severe depreciations of Hildreth. His characters are neither all prodigies in their several spheres, nor yet are they little men overpraised, for whom historical truth has nothing to do but strip them of their paint and tinsel. Though there is necessarily much correcting traditional errors, yet even this is done so gently and inoffensively, that the statement seems more like the award of an umpire than the pleading of an advocate.

In the composition of his story, Mr. Brodhead's method is rather the synthetical than the analytical, so that his readers see the subject as a whole rather than in its details; the work is in fact a history of the province, and not merely a collection of historical incidents, nor a gallery of portraits of character. His characters are always subordinate objects, and in every part the work is historical rather than biographical. Nor does he, in imitation of certain German writers of the present time, make his narrative a mere framework upon which to exhibit a theory; nor yet, on the contrary, does he give us only a catalogue of facts. There are both facts and philosophy in the composition; but it is facts teaching philosophy, rather than philosophy teaching by facts.

In conclusion, without any reference to other writers, invidious or otherwise, we tender to Mr. Brodhead our hearty thanks for the great work, of which this volume is at once an earnest and a valuable instalment; and we congratulate the public on the acquisition of so valuable an addition to our historical classics. We shall await with no little interest the advent of the succeeding volumes, as from time to time they shall be given to the public, feeling assured that the words of encouragement with which an appreciating public have welcomed this volume, will stimulate the author to hasten the completion of the series.

Art. VI.—FABER ON BAPTISMAL REGENERATION.

Sermons on the doctrine of Regeneration, according to Scripture and the Church of England. By George Stanley Faber, B. D. London: 1816; Philadelphia: E. C. & J. Biddle, 1853.

The name of the author of these sermons must be familiar to most theological students, at least in this country, for his writings have been widely circulated and very generally read. In the best sense of the phrase, he was a learned man. He chiefly distinguished himself, however, in Biblical and theological science. His Essay on the Prophecies is among the best things of the kind in the English language. His productions are never superficial; he always goes to the bottom of whatever he takes in hand. But then, however profound, he is always perspicuous. Thoughts in themselves recondite and metaphysical, passing through his mind and flowing from his pen, at once become all but transparent. In this respect, as well as in calm dignity, he may be regarded as a model for the polemic.

The sermons, four in number, named at the head of this article, furnish a fine specimen of Faber in his happiest mood. On the subject of "Baptismal Regeneration," they are full and conclusive. His argument has not only never been answered, but is really unanswerable. The dogma against which it is aimed will never be able to stand before such a sweeping battery of evangelical truth and powerful ratiocination.

But the query naturally arises, Was there really any occasion for these sermons? Is it true that any part of Protestant Christendom has, within the last half-century, held that baptism and regeneration are identical; that they are so inseparably linked together that one cannot possibly occur without the other? That such a theory at once existed, at least in substance, will probably be questioned by no one at all acquainted with ecclesiastical history. About the time that Christianity, under the Emperor Constantine, became the religion of the state, it was perhaps almost universal. This was the chief reason why baptism was often delayed to a very late period in life. Under an impression that it washed away all antecedent moral stains, and wishing to die in a state of sanctification, many persons delayed receiving this solemn rite till they were at the very point of death. Constantine himself was not baptized till he was at his last gasp; and in this he was followed by his son Constantinus. Two of his other sons, also,—Constantine and Constans,—though theo-

retical believers, and designing to receive the ordinance, were killed before they were baptized. Even St. Ambrose was not baptized before he was elected Bishop of Milan, and several of the fathers not till near the time of their death.

It need scarcely be stated that the inseparability of baptism and regeneration has always been a fundamental article in the creed of Romanists. But, had it always been confined to the adherents of the Roman pontiffs, there would have been little occasion for the sermons under review. It is matter of profound regret, however, that it has found its way into Churches claiming to be Protestant. Indeed, all along from the time of the Reformation, there have been, here and there, individuals in the Anglican Church who *seemed* to avow the doctrine. Either, however, they were personally of so little note, or put forth their novel views in terms so vague and equivocal, that no general controversy has taken place on the subject until within the last fifty years.

The immediate cause of Mr. Faber's sermons seems to have been the publication, in 1815, of certain tracts by Doctor, afterward Bishop, Mant. The following citations from these tracts will give the reader an idea of the author's teaching on the subject of baptism and regeneration. Of the former, the bishop says, "Supernatural grace is conferred thereby." "Baptism is a new birth, by which we enter into the new world, the new creation, the blessings and spiritualities of the kingdom." "From this time forward we have a new principle put into us, the spirit of grace, which, besides our soul and body, is a principle of action." "The doctrine of regeneration by baptism is most clearly asserted by her, [the Church of England;] she supposes not merely all real Christians are regenerated by God's Holy Spirit,—by which I understand all those who live a Christian life,—but that those also are regenerated to whom baptism is rightly administered, notwithstanding by their future conduct they may forfeit the privileges of their new birth." "Denying the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is a heresy." "If the work of regeneration is not effected by baptism, it is almost impossible for any sober man to say when and by what means it is." "To deny the regenerating effect of baptism is, in some sense, to *do despite to the Spirit of grace.*" "To the Romans he [St. Paul] employs the same figure, describing baptism as a burial; adding, withal, a particular which confirms an opinion presently to be insisted on, *that no other than baptismal regeneration is possible in this world.*" "Does not the language of the apostle warrant the argument that we are born anew in baptism, and *in baptism exclusively?*"

Language similar to the above occurs again and again in these tracts. Further quotations, however, appear to be quite unnecessary. Even the baptism of Simon Magus, Bishop Mant insisted, as did Dr. Pusey after him, was a true case of regeneration, followed, however, it was admitted, by an immediate falling into sin.

But Bishop Mant was by no means alone in this controversy. The Dean of Chichester, Dr. Bethell, addressed an "Apology" to Mr. Faber soon after the publication of his sermons on baptismal regeneration. The following passage (page 5) will indicate the tenor of his apology:—

"As to those persons who, after being baptized in a state of hypocrisy and wilful sin, afterward became true penitents and believers, I, for my part, entertain no doubt of their forgiveness and salvation. But by what *physical process* they are brought into a state of salvation and acceptance with God, whether by infusion or resuscitation of the incorruptible seed, or by what other mysterious means, I neither know nor do I wish to inquire. It is a case not mentioned in the covenant, nor supposed, nor provided for in the Church of God."

Thus it would seem that, in the estimation of the dean, regeneration and baptism are so absolutely connected, that even those who nullify their baptism by wilful sin and arrant hypocrisy, if ever saved at all, are saved only by a sort of revivification of the baptismal water dropped upon their heads when hypocrites! The grace of God cannot get into their hearts, unless it goes back to what was done for them in their baptism—say five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years previously—and "resuscitates the incorruptible seed" then sown in their moral nature.

If, however, we would see the *maximum* of this exceedingly dangerous doctrine, we must come down to what may be called, perhaps not inaptly, the Tractarian Dispensation. In "Tracts for the Times," No. 67, Dr. Pusey holds the following language: "Nicodemus asked, How can these things be? And most of our questions about baptismal regeneration are Nicodemus questions. We know it in its author, God; in its instrument, baptism; in its end, salvation, union with Christ, sonship to God, resurrection from the dead, and the life of the world to come. We only know it not where it does not concern us to know it—in the mode of its operation. But this is just what man would know: so he passes over all those glorious privileges; ..... he would fain know how baptism can be the same to the infant and the adult convert. Yet the gift *is* the same; .... to both it is nourishment and life." "Our life in Christ is throughout represented as commencing when we are by baptism made members of Christ and children of God. ..... A com-

mencement of life in Christ after baptism, a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness, at any other period than at that one first introduction into God's covenant, is as little consonant with the general representations of Holy Scripture, as a commencement of physical life long after our natural birth is with the order of his providence."—Pp. 24, 25. "If baptism be the cleansing and quickening of dead souls, they [ministers] do work miracles."—*Tract* 85. "We are saved by faith *bringing* us to baptism; and *by baptism* God saves us." "There are but two periods of *absolute* cleansing—baptism and the day of judgment."—*Tract* 64, p. 49.

Scarcely less explicit than even Pusey himself is the present Bishop of Exeter. Writing to the Archbishop of Canterbury in condemnation of the judgment of the Privy Council in the Gorham case, he says, page 45: "Mr. G. separated entirely the inward and spiritual grace from the sacrament, inasmuch as he stated 'regeneration' to have preceded baptism." Again, in his address to candidates for confirmation, published in the "English Churchman," he says: "If any of you have the least doubt as to the completeness of the gift bestowed in baptism, or that it places you in any other state than that of *actual salvation*, I entreat and beseech you, if any such there be, at once rather to leave the Church than to receive the holy ordinance of confirmation under such circumstances." In one of his Pastoral Letters he makes the following remarkable declaration: "By some supernatural and mysterious operation, we, our bodies and souls, are in baptism united to the body and soul of Christ, and thereby to the Godhead; and the Holy Ghost it is by which we have this union—a union which makes us to be as truly of the lineage of the second Adam, as we are naturally in the lineage of the first Adam. This is our new birth—the being born of the Spirit."

Thus also the Bishop of London, in a charge to his clergy, so recently as 1842, says: "The doctrine of our Church as to the Christian's spiritual life has always appeared to me to be this: *justification* begins in *baptism*, when the children of wrath are regenerated by water and the Holy Ghost, and are made children of God. Remission of sins is expressly declared to be *then* given; and the remission of sin implies justification in the proper sense of the term."

The author of "Bernard Leslie," Mr. Gresley, a clergyman of some notoriety as a Tractarian writer, says that baptismal regeneration "is the beginning of the life of God in the soul. It is the implanting in the heart the seed of divine grace, thenceforth to be cherished and confirmed. It is the grafting of the redeemed soul into

the stock of Christ."—P. 13. In another place he says, "God does then and there implant the principle of faith in the child's heart."

Another writer of the same school speaks thus in the "Christian Spectator" of even unrepenting adults: "Not only in the language of charity, but of FACT, of even an impenitent adult coming to baptism, it may with truth be said, as the Church of England says, that he is 'born again,' and 'grafted into the body of Christ's Church,' —that he is 'regenerate.'"

The above quotations are only a sample of what might be adduced, to almost any extent, from distinguished English writers of the last twenty-five or thirty years. Indeed, the doctrine of baptismal regeneration has been echoed and reëchoed, iterated and reiterated, from almost every part of the Anglican Church, so that one can hardly go amiss in pursuit of it. Nor has this doctrine been by any means confined to the transatlantic Episcopal communion. The Protestant Episcopal Church in this country has been most sadly "plagued," and distracted, and weakened by it. Some of her leading ministers, as well as many of less note, have not only given in their adhesion to Tractarianism, but have out-Heroded even Herod himself. It would seem that they could hardly be extravagant enough to suit themselves. Ambitious not to be outdone by their English brethren, they have not only republished their tracts, but have quite exceeded them in the strength and explicitness of their avowals. Take the following examples. When, in 1852, Bishops M'Coskry of Michigan, and De Lancey of Western New-York, went as delegates to England to attend the closing exercises of the jubilee of the "Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts," the former was invited to preach the anniversary sermon. He complied, and preached in St. Paul's Cathedral. That the sermon gave satisfaction, it is perhaps reasonable to infer from the fact that it was published. It should certainly give satisfaction even to the most rigid Tractarian. In it the bishop says: "God has given his own Son to be the head of a new family on the earth, the descendants of which are bound together by stronger ties than blood. They are, in the higher sense, brethren. They are connected through the Son of God. It becomes an important matter to inquire, In what manner are we admitted into this family, and thus made brethren? IT IS BY BAPTISM. This is the initiatory right. No amount of personal holiness, (if it can ever be acquired out of this family,") [a matter of doubt, it seems,] "or inward experiences, or raptures, can make us members of the Church of Christ. We must enter through the door which its Divine Head has opened, and we must enter by receiving from those whom he has constituted as

his earthly representatives the right to enter; and this right, we have observed, is baptism. In this ordinance every child is made *a new creature in Christ Jesus*. . . . . The relationship thus created will remain. It cannot be shaken off in this world: however unworthy the members of this family may become, they will still remain the children of God."

The bishop of the diocese of Maryland, (Whittingham,) in a charge to his clergy in 1853, says: "The divine commission of the ministry, in apostolical succession, as the authorized dispenser of justifying and sanctifying grace in the sacraments of regeneration, [baptism,] and of the communion of the body and blood of Christ, has been the uninterrupted doctrine of the Church."

Another bishop, Doane, whose name has of late become rather familiar to the public, in a charge to the clergy of the diocese of New-Jersey, delivered in 1842, holds the following language: "Man is a sinner. . . . . He must be born again. This, as the Saviour says, must be of water and of the Spirit. He is regenerated, the Church declares, in holy baptism. Now he has washed away his sins in the fountain opened on the cross. . . . . This is the new or spiritual birth. Whether it be the infant of an hour, brought in the faith of parents and sponsors, or whether it be the man of threescore years and ten, converted and become a little child, the laver of the new birth is the font of baptism."

This doctrine has been made a matter of catechetical instruction. In the "Manual of Oral Instruction upon the Bible," the question is asked, (page 8,) "When is the Christian justified? *Ans.* The infant is justified at his baptism: it is the first step in the Christian life." "Very young children are ready to do wrong; but when they are baptized, then they are made clean from sin, that is, from wickedness."—*Juv. Rep.*, vol. i, p. 72.

The Protestant Episcopal Tract Society have abundantly avowed the doctrine in question. In Tract No. 171 we find the following: "It is frequently asserted, in opposition to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, that the meaning and design of baptism are simply to admit into the visible Church. . . . . Because baptism was ordained by way of admission into the visible Church, have we any right to say that it was ordained for no purpose besides? But let us take the statement as it stands. Baptism is admission into the visible Church of Christ. What does this mean? I maintain that it means admission into *all spiritual blessings whatsoever;* that it means nothing short of that comprehensive benefit we call REGENERATION."

"Baptism is to be considered as conveying to us the Holy Ghost.

The baptized person is born into the covenant of grace, and, by the terms of that covenant, has a right to the indwelling and aid of the blessed Spirit. Consequently, whether or not he will put them to use, he receives in baptism powers which by nature he could not have. Born carnal, he has now a spiritual constitution, with spiritual faculties—faculties which he could never have inherited by his first birth, and whereby he can apprehend heavenly truth, and discern, obey, and love the spiritual law." "And I take this opportunity of observing that this covenanted"—that is, baptismal—"presence of the Spirit in each baptized man, is the only presence of the Spirit of which we at all know in any man."

The tract from which the above is taken, as well as others in the catalogue published by the same society, abounds with similar expressions. Further quotations, however, seem quite unnecessary.

It is well known that the "New-York Churchman" has, for many years, been regarded as the exponent of the extreme party in the Protestant Episcopal Church. Of its multiplied avowals on the subject of baptismal regeneration, what follows seems too remarkable to be omitted: "Were entrance into the covenant to be effected by man's own act, or by a certain kind or degree of mental state—if his own virtue or his own *faith* were the means whereby he was to be admitted into the way of salvation—human weakness and ignorance would be a perpetual source of delusion. But God has set in the Church those by whom, through a means and form [baptism] appointed by himself, he takes those who by nature are children of wrath, and by giving them a new birth into a state of salvation, makes them children of grace." . . . . "We hold this doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The baptized infant is with us 'a member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven;' and this he is made by a sacrament, a mysterious and inscrutable means of conveying God's grace, the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit. And this is no figure, no metaphor embodied in action, no type, no bare symbol, no signifying that which may be, or may not be; but a *saving ordinance*, a reality tenfold more real than any phenomenon that is presented to us, either in time, or yet in space."

One more reference will quite answer our present purpose. In a sermon by the Rev. John Alden Spooner, of Glenn's Falls, New-York, preached on occasion of the death of the Rev. Palmer Dyer, of the same diocese, we have a frank and specific avowal of many, if not most, of the peculiarities of Popery. We have space, however, only for what relates to baptismal regeneration and its immediate cognates. Speaking of Mr. Dyer, he says: "He was *baptized*.

The record and proof of that, his CONVERSION, is in the Church-book at Granville, N. Y. At the sacred font there his sins were washed away, and he was regenerated." "He was *confirmed.* There is left us no doubt as to his receiving the Holy Ghost. That gift was imparted to him in the Church, by the laying on of the hands of Bishop Brownell; and the record of it exists. Our ground of humble and Scriptural joy is thus enlarged. Union with the mind of God was thus rendered more sure by the possession of the Holy Spirit to enlighten and guide. The heart, before cleansed in baptism, now made the tenement of the Holy Ghost in the lesser sacrament of confirmation, had double certainty of improvement."

After reading the above, no one will be surprised with the following paragraph: "It is the absolution and the benediction of the Church for which God looks in the individual to determine that he is in favour. It is to the ministry that God says, 'Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.' Matt. xviii, 18. Separated, then, from the Church, we see no ordinary Bible hope of heaven. Otherwise than in the Church, and with that ministry which God has appointed, the individual is not 'loosed from sin.'"

The preceding we take to be a fair specimen of the teachings of the High Church party, both in England and America. How, then, can any reflecting man be surprised that so many persons from the Episcopal communion should have gone to the Church of Rome? The wonder indeed is that the number is no greater. It would seem that no considerate and discriminating individual could go thus far, and then hesitate to go further. Consistency would all but irresistibly impel him onward. Newman, Manning, Wilberforce, and their ecclesiastical relatives, in England, and Bishop Ives, Drs. Allen and Forbes, and their sympathizers, in this country, in seeking an asylum in the bosom of "Holy Mother," are justly chargeable with nothing worse than practically carrying out their own solemnly-professed theory; and one can hardly avoid the conviction that the starting-point in the sliding-scale which has taken them where they are, is the doctrine of spiritual regeneration in the article of baptism. He who believes that the sacraments have an unconditional, a sort of talismanic efficacy,—that they do, *per se*, bless and sanctify those who receive them,—should, in all conscience and in all consistency, at once throw off the guise of Protestantism and avow himself a Romanist. To do otherwise is to sail under false colours.

But, honesty and consistency apart, it is utterly astonishing that

any sane mind should ever adopt the theory in question. On this point Mr. Faber, in the sermons now before us, has a strong and characteristic paragraph:—

"The assertion that a certain outward application to the human body invariably produces a certain inward effect upon the human mind; that the moment the hand of a priest sprinkles water upon the catechumen, or plunges him wholly beneath its surface, reciting at the same time a formula in which our Lord has directed the rite of baptism to be administered, at that identical moment his soul always experiences the commencement of sanctification, and becomes radically changed in its every faculty; in fine, (for this is the sum and substance of the matter,) that God should have been pleased to confer, without any exception to the general rule, upon a particular outward action of his appointed ministers, or perhaps, (as some have contended with the Church of Rome,) of any baptized Christian where a priest cannot be procured, a miraculous potency of affecting the very soul itself through the fleshly veil with which it is shrouded—an assertion like this, so extraordinary, so little agreeable to common analogy, so portentously wonderful, under whatever aspect it be viewed, manifestly requires the highest possible degree of proof in order to its being rationally admitted."—P. 8.

These sermons are founded on Rom. ii, 28, 29: "He is not a Jew which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God." A text more admirably adapted to the purpose of the author could hardly be imagined. The reader will carefully notice its deep spiritual import—an import, too, in direct conflict with the theory that baptism and regeneration are always inseparable. It most clearly shows that the outward rite is one thing, and the inward grace quite another; and that, consequently, the rite may be received, while the grace is wholly wanting. The development and illustration of this single thought are, in effect, the pivot on which the whole of these four masterly sermons, extending through one hundred and twenty-three octavo pages, is made to turn.

The first sermon is a simple argument against the theory in question, constructed without any immediate reference to the special teachings of the sacred text. It is maintained that this theory respects a matter of fact, the truth of which must be proved or disproved, like that of any other matter of fact. What, then, *is* the fact? Is it true that all who receive the rite of Christian baptism become, *ipso facto*, "new creatures"—that they do really "pass from death unto life?" In regard to infants, it is admitted that it is somewhat difficult to settle the question; because we have no means of positively ascertaining what takes place in their souls at the time of their baptism. Still, if so great a change be actually

effected in their moral natures, it would certainly seem not a little strange that such multitudes of them should exhibit, by their views and actions in after life, not the least indication of it. Baptized and unbaptized children, under the same moral discipline, display, substantially, the same moral character. This will be admitted by all candid persons who have paid any attention to the subject.

But infants are not the only persons baptized within the pale of the Christian Church. Adults are, perhaps in far greater numbers, admitted to this solemn rite. Such subjects ought not to be, and doubtless are not, altogether insensible to the workings of their own minds. These, then, are the very persons by whose unanimous testimony the alleged matter of fact must be proved, if proved at all. In this connexion, the following paragraph from the sermon before us should not be omitted:—

"It is asserted, that the spiritual change of heart called regeneration *invariably* takes place in the precise article of baptism. If this assertion, therefore, be well founded, the spiritual change in question will *invariably* take place in every adult at the identical moment when he is baptized—that is to say, at the very instant when the hand of the priest brings his body in contact with baptismal water, at that precise instant his understanding begins to be illuminated, his will to be reformed, and his affections to be purified. *Hitherto* he has walked in darkness; but *now*, to use the Scriptural phrase, he has 'passed from darkness unto light.' *Hitherto* he has been wrapped in a death-like sleep of trespasses and sins; but *now* he awakes and rises from the dead, Christ himself giving him life. *Hitherto* he has been a chaos of vice, and ignorance, and spiritual confusion; 'the natural man receiving not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him:' but now he is 'created after God in righteousness and true holiness;' 'being in Christ, he is a new creature;' having become *spiritual*, the things of the Spirit of God are no longer foolishness unto him—he 'knows them, because they are spiritually discerned.' Such are the emphatic terms in which regeneration is described by the sacred writers. What we have to do, therefore, I apprehend, is forthwith to inquire whether every baptized adult, without a single exception, is *invariably* found to declare, that, in the precise article of baptism, his soul experienced a change analogous to that which is so unequivocally set forth in the above-cited texts of Scripture."—P. 13.

The inquiry, then, is apposite—Does each person baptized experience this great moral change? Is he at all conscious of any such thing? Can any single instance be adduced in which the baptized person has been known to declare that, the moment he was sprinkled with the consecrated water, or, if the reader please, was immersed in it, he perceived a new light to dart into his understanding, a new bias to be given to his will, a new character to be stamped upon his affections, —in a word, a complete change to pass upon his whole moral nature? To sustain the theory here combatted, it should be shown indeed that *all* persons baptized do really experience this change; for if a single individual, voluntarily coming to

the sacred font, fail to experience it, the whole theory is found to be false. But waiving a clear logical right, we only ask, Can a single instance be found—is there one on record—in which the person baptized could say that he was distinctly conscious of experiencing this divine change, this great moral transformation, the very moment he was brought into contact with the baptismal element?

But the alleged fact under consideration is as well a matter of observation as of personal experience. The regenerate are expected and required to bear the fruits of the Spirit. If the tree have been made good, then its fruit will be good also. Such is the averment of an infallible Teacher. A man professing to have experienced regeneration, and, consequently, to be a child of God, who still lives according to the flesh, is justly regarded either as a deceiver or as being deceived. Well, then, Do all those adults who receive the ordinance of Christian baptism at once begin a life of holiness? Is it at all apparent to even the most candid observer, that their baptism has had any material effect upon their moral habits? If they had not truly repented and unfeignedly believed *previously*, did not their moral character, as a whole, remain precisely what it was? Alas for the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, when tested by sober, unquestionable matter of fact!

And then this doctrine leads to some most startling conclusions. If regeneration is always communicated in baptism, it will follow that all baptized persons are in a state of salvation. Hence it follows that all who die immediately after receiving the rite, and before they have lapsed into sin, are infallibly sure of the kingdom of God.

"Now, under this view of the subject, every prudent parent who espouses the theory before us, will carefully refrain from having his child baptized during its infancy; because, by deferring the rite, he may almost insure the salvation of his offspring; and, on the same ground, every adult who is converted from Paganism to Christianity [or from the world to the faith] would do well to put off his baptism and receive it as a sure viaticum in his last extremity. By such an arrangement, the pleasures of sin may be freely tasted with very inconsiderable danger to him who adopts it. No man, indeed, can absolutely guard against sudden death; but, in ordinary cases, he may have wallowed during his whole life with perfect safety and impunity in every abomination, provided only he takes care to be duly baptized when his last great enemy is approaching."—P. 19.

Again, if baptism and regeneration are inseparably identical, then it follows that every unbaptized person is, *ipso facto*, unregenerate. Consequently, he must be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. Every Pagan, young or old,—every Mohammedan, whether he has

had an opportunity of hearing the gospel or not,—every Jew, whatever may have been his advantages for knowing the truth,—every Quaker, whatever may be his honest doubts in regard to the necessity of water baptism,—each, every one, all of them, must go to perdition without hope or remedy! Nay, all of those we have been wont to call God's people under the former dispensation,—Moses, David, Samuel, Isaiah, and their illustrious compeers,—not having been baptized, must have been doomed to everlasting burnings! Nor will it much relieve the conclusion to say that circumcision in the Levitical Church was analogous to baptism in the Christian Church; for if circumcision in the former conferred regeneration, as baptism does in the latter, then it were plainly superfluous and nugatory to baptize any one who had been circumcised. By the former rite he had been regenerated, and of course could not be regenerated again by baptism. And yet it is well known that our Lord left a general injunction to his apostles to baptize all proselytes without distinction, Jews as well as Gentiles.

Besides, if either circumcision or baptism be indispensable in order to regeneration, then none can be regenerated, and consequently none can be saved, who do not receive either one ordinance or the other. What, then, became of "righteous Abel"—of Noah, "a just man and perfect in his generation"—and of all other good people who died before the institution of circumcision? Are they, too, with the "damned cast out?" Nay, what became of many of the martyrs themselves? Mr. Faber says:—

"In the primitive Church, during a period of horrible persecution, it not unfrequently happened that a devout catechumen was dragged to the stake and barbarously put to death, ere he had partaken of the initiatory rite of baptism: and there are cases upon record of Pagans being suddenly converted to Christianity by merely witnessing the constancy of the martyred faithful; who instantly, under the first impulse of zeal, professing their belief, were forthwith led to slaughter themselves. Now what must we suppose to be the final condition of these pious people? Were they saved, or were they not saved? They certainly were never baptized; therefore, if baptism and regeneration be inseparable, they never were regenerated. But, if they never were regenerated, then they cannot have entered into the kingdom of heaven; for "without holiness no man shall see the Lord," and regeneration is the commencing point of holiness. Yet this conclusion is evidently too absurd to be admitted for a single moment; no reasonable man can doubt of the salvation of such persons. If they then obtained salvation, they must have been previously regenerated; because it is a scripturally-determined point, that without regeneration and consecutive holiness no man possibly can be saved. But if they were previously regenerated, then they must have been regenerated without having been baptized."—Pp. 26, 27.

Now how are the abettors of the theory upon which we here animadvert to extricate themselves from this difficulty?

Our author, in the second sermon, enters more immediately upon the Scripture argument. Here we have all for which any candid mind could reasonably ask; at least, all who receive the preëminently Protestant doctrine, that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation," must be abundantly satisfied with the conclusion to which Mr. Faber conducts them. The sermon opens with a sentiment at once so admirable in itself and so admirably expressed, that injustice would be done alike to the author and the reader not to transcribe it:—

"The theory, that spiritual regeneration is the inseparable concomitant of external baptism by water, has frequently been maintained with a degree of confidence, perhaps, more dogmatical than prudent. A sober and genuine Protestant inquirer, however, will be little disposed to receive any system merely because it comes recommended by a somewhat overweening positiveness. He will rather be disposed to prove all things, and to hold fast only that which is good. Hence he will not lightly admit a theory which advances one of the most extraordinary propositions upon record. He will not, indeed, peremptorily decide against it in the first instance, simply because it does advance a most extraordinary position; for he well knows that, although we are not precisely bound to receive any extraordinary position because it is boldly and peremptorily asserted to be true, yet very extraordinary positions may, after all, be perfectly consistent with veracity. But he conceives it to be not only his right, but his bounden duty also, to sift such a position to the very bottom by every varied mode which he can devise; so that he may admit it or reject it, according as he is determined by the weight of evidence. This was the grand principle of the Reformation—a principle by which real Scriptural truth can never be endangered—a principle, the dereliction of which is a virtual relapse into the very spirit of Popery. Most heartily, then, can a genuine Protestant say, with a late eminent bishop of the English Church, [Bishop Horsley,] 'Would God, all the Lord's people were prophets.' But, as in the nature of things this can never be, he will at any rate be a decided friend to a spirit of sober inquiry in those who have the means and opportunities of embarking in theological discussion."—Pp. 32, 33.

The advocates for baptismal regeneration rely, so far as Scripture authority is concerned, chiefly on John iii, 5, Tit. iii, 5, and 1 Pet. iii, 19–21. In his remarks on these passages, Mr. Faber sums up as follows:—

"It may be remarked of the three conjointly that, as it is agreed on all hands that baptism is the outward symbol of regeneration, whatever may be its additional efficacy, so it is impossible to deny that, by one of the most common figures of rhetoric, the sign and the thing signified are conversely and indifferently used in our ordinary forms of speech. Thus we are accustomed to style the sacrament of the Lord's supper the holy communion of the body and blood of our Saviour Christ: and with good reason, for Jesus himself scrupled not to say of the bread, 'This is my body;' and of the wine, 'This is my blood;' yet when we so speak of the last supper, we do not mean to intimate that all who partake of the bread and wine are therefore partakers of the holy communion of Christ's spiritual body and blood. Thus, in a similar manner, Moses denominates the paschal lamb 'the Lord's passover;' yet no one supposes him to mean that the lamb was the same thing as God's act of

passing over the houses of the Israelites. Thus again, inversely, Christ denominates himself a 'door' and a 'vine;' and thus Jehovah is said to be a 'sun,' and a 'shield,' and a 'rock;' yet no confusion ensues. By this very common figure, therefore, it is perfectly natural to style regeneration a *washing*, or a *baptism*, and thence to speak of our being saved by baptism, or of our being 'born again from water.' It is a phraseology which we so well understand in all ordinary cases, that there seems little reason why, in the three texts now under consideration, we should adopt a different principle of interpreting them; at least, ere we adopt such a principle, we may require a decisive proof of its propriety from other less equivocal passages, if any such can be found."—Pp. 35, 36.

But however ambiguous these texts might appear, in the abstract, there are others which are so plain and explicit, that there is scarcely room left for misconstruction. Instance the following from the First Epistle of John: "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." "Whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world." Now in neither of these passages is there a word said about outward baptism. The drift of them, each and all, is precisely the same. Regeneration is predicated, not of baptism, but of love, of faith, and of a holy superiority to the world. The obvious and indisputable teaching is, that whosoever "loveth," "believeth," and "overcometh," is, whether outwardly baptized or not, born of God; and that he that loveth not, believeth not, and overcometh not, is not born of God, even though he may have been outwardly baptized.

But to these texts we may add examples. If it can be proved that any person has been admitted into the kingdom of God without baptism, it will thus be proved that baptism and regeneration are not identical—unless, indeed, it be contended, as we are sure it will not be, that such person was admitted without regeneration. To the examples, then. Enoch "was not, for God took him." Thus runs the record. His salvation is, therefore, placed beyond all doubt: and yet, living as he did, before the organization of the Church under Abraham, he cannot have been even circumcised. Again, to the penitent thief on the cross the Saviour said, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." But for this he was certainly not prepared by baptism, never having received the rite. Nor will it in the least relieve the case to say he may have been circumcised, for circumcision had now ceased to be the initiatory ordinance in the Church of God. Had we space, other instances, equally in point, might be adduced. These two are, however, sufficient for our present purpose.

Let us now see if we cannot find instances in which persons were regenerated *before* they were baptized, and who subsequently sub-

mitted to that rite as an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. A certain Roman centurion of the name of Cornelius, whose case is treated somewhat at large in the tenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, is said to have been "a devout man, and one that feared God with all his house, who gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God always." Such was his general character even before he had received the least evangelical instruction. Subsequently, while St. Peter was speaking to him and others who had been invited to his house, "the Holy Ghost fell on all them that heard the word;" and then Cornelius was "baptized in the name of the Lord." If he were not regenerated before he was baptized, it would certainly be difficult to say by what language such a fact could be indicated.

Nor is the case of Cornelius a solitary one. A similar train of reasoning may be applied with equal force to that of pious Lydia, mentioned also in the Acts of the Apostles. She is said to have had her "heart opened" by the Lord, so that "she attended to the things that were spoken by Paul;" and was then "baptized, together with her household." Here the order of events is precisely the same as it was in the case of Cornelius: first, regeneration, God working upon her heart through the medium of that imperfect knowledge she already possessed; next, catechetical instruction; and, lastly, regular water baptism.

Thus we see from direct Scripture examples, that regeneration does sometimes take place before baptism is administered. And now, if we can further show that an individual has been duly baptized, who nevertheless has not been regenerated, the argument would seem to be absolutely complete. With the details of such a case we are furnished in the eighth chapter of the same book from which the preceding examples are taken. We refer to the case of Simon Magus, who, professing to receive the gospel, was baptized by Philip. The whole, however, so far as he was personally concerned, evidently proceeded from the most sordid motives; for when he saw that the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost were imparted by the imposition of the hands of Peter and John, he offered money to the two apostles, that he also might be enabled to confer the same gifts on whomsoever he might choose to lay his hands. This nefarious proposal called forth from St. Peter the following well-merited rebuke: "Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money. Repent, therefore, of this thy wickedness, and pray God, if perhaps the thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee. For I perceive that thou art in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity." Acts

viii, 20, 22, 23. The assumption that he was spiritually regenerated at the time he was baptized by Philip, and then immediately backslid, is really unworthy of serious refutation. It is impossible, indeed, to conceive that one who had been brought out of darkness into God's marvellous light, who had been made a new creature in Christ, should forthwith so relapse into his former character as to have "neither part nor lot" in the gospel, to be cursed with a "heart not right in the sight of God," and to be actually in "the gall of bitterness, and in the very bond of iniquity."*

Our author carries forward his argument through two more sermons, and most clearly shows from the standards, the Articles, the Liturgy, and the Homilies of the Church of England, that the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is an exotic, having no legitimate connexion with the creed for which she holds herself responsible. His documentary evidence here is absolutely overwhelming. No ingenuity or sophistry can ever turn away the force of it. In all of this we do most heartily rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. We are, in some sense, a party concerned: for, if it could be shown that the doctrine in question is really the doctrine of the Episcopal communion, we see not how we could consistently fellowship it—save only as we fellowship the Church of Rome. Baptismal regeneration differs so widely from JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH—the great central doctrine of the Reformation—that we know not how any genuine Protestant can fellowship the patrons of it. Error here is fundamental. It lies at the very foundation of the Christian character. He who knows no other regeneration than that which he experienced in the sacramental application of water to his person, faith in the Lord Jesus Christ apart, has not even begun to be an evangelical Christian. He still needs to be taught even "the first principles of the oracles of God."

We cannot, however, further follow Mr. Faber, at least for the present. Time and space are both wanting. Possibly, indeed, we may have already, in the estimation of some, engrossed too much space with a controversy belonging chiefly to a sister Church. But he regards it as not altogether a foreign matter. Error is always diffusive. When countenanced in one quarter, there is

* The writer has been a little surprised to find that Mr. Faber does not quote Mark xvi, 16: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Observe, the Master does not say, he that believeth not and is not baptized; but simply, "he that believeth not." The inference goes directly and decisively against the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The damnation of the hearer is set forth as a pure sequence, not of the want of baptism, but of faith.

always danger of its being received in another. What corrupts one member of the body, may in a short time, if unopposed and uneradicated, corrupt the whole system. If the doctrine of *baptismal* regeneration be allowed to go on and spread, our American Churches might be *unprotestantized* in the course of a very few years.

We cannot, therefore, do otherwise than earnestly hope that the sermons of Mr. Faber will be generally read. They have already, we are assured, had a most happy effect. This was particularly the case when they were first published in England. And, had not these powerfully argumentative discourses been carelessly allowed to get out of print, and consequently out of general circulation, the strong presumption is that *Tractarianism* proper would have been wholly unknown in the Anglican Church. Whether the friends of evangelical religion in that Church, having learned wisdom by the things they have suffered, are now taking pains to put them into the hands of their countrymen or not, it is matter of profound gratitude that they are being read by hundreds and thousands in this country. They have been republished in Philadelphia the present year, and, along with other kindred productions, are evidently making a powerful impression on the Episcopal communion. Who have been chiefly concerned in sending them abroad in this country, we are not advised; though, judging from several facts that have come under our observation, we are inclined to think it is the result of a somewhat extensively concerted effort. We have reason to know, indeed, that some of the best men in the Protestant Episcopal Church, including several of her most distinguished bishops, have come to a fixed resolution to oppose, with all their strength, the further advances of Puseyism; nay, if possible, to banish it wholly from their communion. Who that loves spiritual religion, a pure and elevated Christianity, can do otherwise than wish them all possible success? If we mistake not, indeed, there is already something like a healthful reaction in that Church. It would be wonderful were it not so. The number of apostates from her communion to the Church of Rome is truly appalling. Some of the patrons of this new divinity are doubtless sincere Protestants; but they have been misled. Assured that the leaders of the Pusey party were only aiming at the restoration of the simple forms of primitive Christianity, they followed on with unsuspecting confidence. But the utter defection of their leaders, has opened their eyes to their own danger. They have doubtless been greatly surprised to find themselves verging so rapidly upon the territory of "the man of sin." No wonder they retreat somewhat precipitately; no wonder they lift up their warning voice to others. They should do so. The safety, the purity of

their whole communion is vitally concerned. Nor should the practical sympathy of other branches of the Church catholic be withheld. Every evangelical Christian in our land has a deep interest in the issue of the pending conflict. No Protestant can, indeed, look upon it with indifference; for, if Tractarianism should generally prevail in the Protestant Episcopal Church, she will then lose her essential character as a member of the great Protestant family. So far as true evangelical efficiency is concerned, she would become virtually extinct, and might go, in form as well as in fact, back into the embraces of the Roman pontiff. But we are persuaded she will not do this. The recuperative energies of her ecclesiastical system are by no means exhausted. There are clear and grateful indications of returning vitality. The heart of spiritual life seems now to beat with increasing strength in her bosom, and a healthful glow to be diffusing itself over her whole system. The evangelical party is not only rapidly increasing and gaining strength, but actually getting the ascendency. Perhaps those not of the communion can do little *directly* to aid that party, but they can do much *in*directly. They can sympathize with it, encourage it, pray for it. Finally, we are persuaded that we shall call forth a hearty response from every evangelical Christian in the land, when we say, GOD BLESS THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH!

ART. VII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) "*The Knout and the Russians*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1854; 12mo., pp. 266) is a translation from the French of DE LAGNY. It is clear in style, true to its French origin, and gives a large amount of information with regard to the resources and condition of the Muscovite empire. Its concluding chapter paints the Czar rose-colour, but the tints used in the other portions of the volume are dark enough. The book is profusely illustrated, and affords, on the whole, a more satisfactory and agreeable account for ordinary readers of the present state of Russia than any of the recent brood of books on the subject that we have seen.

(2.) "*Farm Implements, and the Principles of their Construction and Use*, by JOHN J. THOMAS." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1854; 12mo., pp. 267.) The title of this book gives but an inadequate idea of its value: it is, in fact, a treatise on mechanics as applied to agriculture, with abundant graphic illustrations. It was originally published in the "Transactions of the New-York State Agricultural Society," and in the present edition it is carefully revised

and greatly enlarged. All the implements and machines used on the farm are so clearly explained that the *rationale* of their operation can be understood by the farmer. It ought to be a text-book in all the public schools of the country.

(3.) "*A Lamp to the Path*, by the REV. W. K. TWEEDIE, D. D.," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1854; 18mo., pp. 240,) is designed to bring the Bible and its principles into practical contact with the consciences of men, not merely in their churches, but in their homes, their workshops, and their marts. It is a thoroughly practical book, and deserves an extended circulation.

(4.) "*History of the Protestant Church in Hungary*," edited by the REV. J. CRAIG, D. D. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co., 1854, pp. 559.) This volume furnishes information that has long been needed. The fortunes of Protestantism in Hungary have been various—mostly, however, unhappy. This work gives a brief but comprehensive account of its vicissitudes from the beginning of the Reformation up to the year 1850. It has an introduction by Dr. Merle (D'Aubigné) certifying to the integrity and capacity of the original compiler of the work, and recommending it to the notice of Protestants everywhere. We trust that the day is soon to dawn both on the Church and the state in Hungary.

(5.) "*Life in Judea*, by MARIA T. RICHARDS," (Philadelphia: Baptist Publication Society, 1854; 12mo., pp. 312,) is an attempt, something after the manner of Gallus, Charides, or Zenobia, to reproduce the spirit and manners of the first Christian age in the form of a story. The narration, though merely the thread on which the history of the early Christian Church is strung, has sufficient interest in itself to carry the reader along with it; and the book will be both acceptable and useful to the young, for whom it is more especially designed.

(6.) "*Gold and the Gospel*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1854; 18mo., pp. 328) contains two essays, which obtained the prizes offered by the presbytery of Ulster; the first on "The Measure of Christian Liberality," and the other on "The Scripture Rule of Religious Contribution." They are full of fact, argument, and energetic exhortation; and are precisely adapted to the wants of the times.

(7.) "*The Plurality of Worlds, with an Introduction*, by EDWARD HITCHCOCK, D. D." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1854; 12mo., pp. 307.) This treatise, understood to be by Professor Whewell, takes the ground that the facts of science will not sustain the conclusion that the heavenly bodies are inhabited; and, in fact, that the "earth is probably the only body in the solar system, nay, in the universe, where an intellectual, moral, and immortal being, like man, has an existence." The position is broader than the argument which is brought

to sustain it. Professor Whewell may be able, indeed, to prove that no such being, in all respects, as man is, could live on the planets under present conditions; but then it is a rapid leap to infer that *no* intellectual or moral beings can inhabit them. Dr. Hitchcock admits in the Introduction that the argument of the book is inadequate.

(8.) "*Daniel a Model for Young Men*, by the Rev. W. A. SCOTT, D. D." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1854; 8vo., pp. 340.) This volume contains a series of lectures, delivered during the winter of 1852–3, to a congregation of young men in New-Orleans. The writer is a faithful minister there, and this volume is proof of it. The lectures are not marked by decided originality or learning; but are, in the main, clear and forcible exhortations to the performance of Christian duty. We are sorry, however, to notice a passage on page 43 which seems to sanction the piratical attack of Lopez & Co. upon Cuba, and to cherish the spirit which leads to such forays. A man like Dr. Scott *should* be above the influence of the *genius loci*—most of all in such a place as New-Orleans.

(9.) MESSRS. PHILLIPS, SAMPSON & Co. have just issued a new and neat edition of "*The Recreations of Christopher North.*" (Boston, 8vo., pp. 307.) It includes many of the best and most interesting of Wilson's Miscellanies.

(10.) "*Oriental and Sacred Scenes*," by FISHER HOWE. (New-York: M. W. Dodd, 12mo., pp. 408.) This is a record of personal observations in the lands of the Bible. The narrative is clear and agreeable; the descriptions lucid and ample, without being tiresome; the reflections becoming an intelligent Christian observer, free from superstitious credulity on the one hand, and from scepticism on the other. The profits of the book are to be applied "to the cause of promoting the gospel in the East, under advisement of the secretaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. The book is beautifully printed, and illustrated by finely tinted engravings.

(11.) MORMONISM is among the strange things of the nineteenth century,—a chapter in human history presenting a study for the learned and curious in man's character. The latest, and perhaps the best, authority on this subject is the volume just published by Harper & Brothers, entitled "*Utah and the Mormons*, &c., by BENJAMIN G. FERRIS, late Secretary of Utah Territory." In his official capacity the author spent six months in Salt-Lake City, including the winter of 1852–3, where he had ample opportunity to learn the practical workings of that strange system, as developed in its separation from the interference of "Gentile" influence. We have examined these accounts of "saintly" depravity *ad nauseam*, and turned away from them with deepened convictions of the reality of the total depravity of human nature. The narrative, though disclosing a state of society and of moral degradation almost be-

yond conception, bears strong internal evidence of truthfulness. The style of the book is vigorous and transparent; and though but little aided by rhetorical embellishments, the work is just such a one as the subject requires. Apart from the disgusting details of Mormon abominations, the volume is one of unusual interest.

(12.) "*Memorials of Baptist Martyrs; with a Preliminary Essay*, by J. NEWTON BROWN," is the title of a duodecimo volume just issued by the American Baptist Publication Society; containing, besides the preliminary essay mentioned on the title-page, and a regular introduction to Baptist martyrology, the story of the persecution, and in some cases the martyrdom, of over thirty persons, scattered historically over the whole age of the Church, and locally over nearly the whole of Europe. The chief design of the book seems to be to prove the antiquity and perpetuity of the Baptists as a faithful but persecuted sect of Christians. Some of the cases presented are those of names well known in ecclesiastical history, but not usually identified with the Baptists; while others are those of obscure persons, of whom we know but little, and are quite unable, at this age of the Church, to say whether they were simple and evangelical Christians or unruly fanatics. We doubt whether the cause of religion is promoted by works of this class.

(13.) "*The Master's House: a Tale of Southern Life*, by LOGAN." (T. L. M'Elrath & Co., New-York; 12mo.) This is one of that numerous class of recently-published books, in which, in the form of fiction, the attempt is made to delineate the social peculiarities of the people of the Southern States of our republic. The subject is a popular one just now, owing partly to the political relations of the two sections of the country, and partly to the great success of "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The present work, though not destitute of originality, bears evidence in all its parts that it was called into being by the influence of the "Cabin." Its title is the contrast of that of its predecessor, and the whole design of the work is, in like manner, the contrast—the other side of the story—of that presented in the "Life among the Lowly." This state of the case must of course operate disadvantageously, for the idea of imitation always damages the acceptance of any production, though it may possess a large share of real merit.

The author effectually conceals himself from the uninitiated behind his pseudonom, "Logan," though we see it intimated that he is a person of some reputation in literary circles. His manner of writing would indicate that he is not altogether unpractised in authorship, though it would not imply marked eminence in the profession. He writes easily and naturally, generally correctly, though for the most part without sufficient energy to give the requisite vivacity to the story. His style is better suited to historical or didactic compositions than to the more vivacious imagery of fiction.

The material of the narrative is good. There is an air of romance about southern life which only needs to be justly and vividly delineated to give delight. These materials have been freely and generally judiciously employed. Had they been more exclusively relied on, and the whole narrative confined to them,—

omitting the hero's college career, and his courtship and marriage into a good New-England family, whose history must needs be glanced at by the way,—the work would have been the better for it. A tale ought not to aspire to be a biography, much less a family register. The properly southern portion of the story is well made up. The scenes and circumstances are not only really southern; they are both distinctively and characteristically such. The individuality of the chief actors is pretty well maintained, and each one of them is the representative of a component elementary class in southern society. The leading events developed in the course of the narrative are just such as are constantly occurring, and they are just the kind of scenes that best illustrate the peculiarities of the social organization of the South.

But though he is a good draughtsman, we cannot say so much as to the author's skill in filling up his own sketches. It is one thing to form an accurate diagram, and quite another to paint a life-like picture. The power of description, whether in verse or prose, lies in the little characteristic points; and where these are neglected, however justly the great features may be drawn, the image is lifeless, and fails either to engage the imagination or to please the fancy. In reading "Uncle Tom's Cabin," the reader sympathizes with the objects, and especially the persons of whom he is reading; in this work he contemplates the scene as a spectator, and possibly, if he is of a thoughtful temper, philosophizes on the principles illustrated. People generally read fictions for pleasure; and if they at any time become a medium of instruction it is done stealthily, reaching the understanding or the conscience through the imagination. To fail to affect the imagination is therefore a capital fault in a work of fiction. We do not say that this author has wholly failed in this particular, though he certainly has not manifested great imaginative ability.

That the writer is dispassionate and fair, all must allow; and that it is his purpose to present a truthful picture of southern society, exhibiting its good and evil portions, is equally manifest. And in this we think he has succeeded, so far as his imperfect colouring brings out his scenes and characters. Mrs. Stowe's work illustrates chiefly the influence of slavery upon the coloured people themselves, and only incidentally its more general results; this work dwells almost entirely upon its influence upon the dominant class. Leaving the "Cabin" of the slave, "Logan" introduces his readers to the "Master's House," and, according to our notions of things, shows most conclusively that the harvest of iniquity, gathered by violence from the helpless slave, is bitterness in the house of the spoiler. We only regret that the writer's graphic powers were not equal to his constructive genius. As it is, we can commend the book most heartily as worthy to be *studied* by all who would understand the matters of which it treats; and as a work well calculated to give just views of its subject.

(14.) THE utility of helps and formal instructions in the exercise and service of prayer is an old and vexed question, each side of which has about equal portions of the truth. Few persons are so well instructed as to both the matter and manner of prayer as to be above the need of such helps; and yet it is

often found that what is used to assist in the effort to pray is made a hinderance—being mistaken for prayer itself. At present there seems to be a tendency to favour the use of such "aids to devotion," if the multiplication of books on the subject may be taken as an indication of the public requirements. Of this class is "*The Closet Companion, or Manual of Prayer, consisting of Topics and Brief Forms of Prayer*," (M. W. Dodd, New-York,) a work evidently designed to serve as an outline of the subjects of prayer, rather than as a book of forms. Its style is pure and chaste, the thoughts and sentiments are Scriptural, and the forms of expression are frequently borrowed from the sacred volume, and the whole well calculated to lead the devout spirit more intimately near to the throne of grace. If used in the spirit in which it is written, the book will be, especially to young and inexperienced Christians, a valuable "Closet Companion."

(15.) "*The Orator's Touchstone*" (Harper & Brothers) is the title of a volume designed "for the improvement of the voice, and for advancement in the general art of public speaking,"—a work containing many good suggestions and hints to public speakers, but not distinguished for originality of either matter or method. The multiplication of common-place works of elementary instruction is a thing of doubtful expediency.

(16.) "*Thoughts and Things at Home and Abroad*, by ELIHU BURRITT," with a *Memoir*, by MARY HOWITT, (Phillips, Sampson & Co., Boston,) is the title of a respectable duodecimo volume, containing a large number of essays and occasional pieces from the pen of the "Learned Blacksmith." The subjects are various, but relate for the most part to self-culture,—of which the author may be allowed to speak with some assurance, since he is himself an example of all that he inculcates,—and to social and moral reforms, to the promotion of which he is devoting his energies and attainments. The Memoir is the same that appeared a few years since in the London *People's Journal*, and it forms an appropriate introduction to the book. The volume is a valuable one, especially for the use of young persons, as it sets forth, in an earnest and not inelegant style, most wholesome precepts, illustrated and enforced by an excellent example.

(17.) SIR GARDNER WILKINSON'S great work on Egyptian Antiquities has, from its first publication, stood foremost among books of its class; and though nearly twenty years have passed since it first saw the light, it is still the standard authority upon that subject. But its voluminousness, and especially its price, has hitherto confined its circulation to the favoured few. This evil is now happily removed; for we have before us, from the press of Harper & Brothers, "*A Popular Account of the Ancient Egyptians, Revised and Abridged from his Larger Work*, by Sir J. G. WILKINSON, F. R. S., &c.," in two volumes, 12mo. These volumes, neatly printed and profusely illustrated, contain the substance of the larger work in a condensed and concentrated form, thus rendering it

really more valuable to the general reader than before, and bringing it within the reach of all. Nor are these volumes merely an abridgment; they contain much valuable additional matter, that has been brought to light by more recent investigations. In its new form the work is not only the cheapest, but also the most comprehensive on that subject extant, giving an account of the oldest civilization recorded in profane history, and casting much light upon Biblical subjects. We anticipate for it a large and continued demand from the reading public.

(18.) No other books are so universally acceptable as stories of adventures into regions that lie beyond the verge of ordinary observation. Among books of this class, that lately issued by Harper & Brothers, entitled "*Twenty Years in the Philippines,*" from the French of PAUL P. DE LA GIRONIER, (12mo., pp. 372,) deserves a high rank. The author, who details his own adventures, was a native of France, educated to the medical profession, and soon afterward went abroad as a naval surgeon in a national vessel, bound for Manilla; and at length, after a number of characteristic vicissitudes, established himself as proprietor of an estate, inhabited by natives and thronged by banditti—to say nothing of wild buffaloes and alligators—among the Philippines; where he continued in almost complete seclusion from the civilized world, the monarch of all he surveyed, for nearly twenty years. The story of his adventures in this strange land is as wild as a fairy tale, though told with an air of truth that almost precludes doubts. The narrative has all the simple naturalness of Robinson Crusoe, without its monotony; its statements are scarcely less wonderful than the tales of the Arabian Nights, though always within the bounds of probability. Its style and manner have the vivacity of Ike Marvel's tales, but without their offensive coarseness; and its wildwood achievements are equal to Cummings's best exploits. Altogether, the volume is such a one as only a Frenchman could have written, and its adventures such as only a Frenchman could have achieved. To any who may wish for an earnest, exciting, and yet not improbable story of personal adventures, mingled with a good share of valuable information relative to the Philippine Islands, we commend this literary curiosity.

(19.) UNDER the general title of "*Great Truths for Thoughtful Hours,*" Blackader & Co., of 18 Paternoster Row, London, propose to issue an occasional series of small volumes, on a variety of moral and religious topics. They assure the public that "each volume will be complete in itself, and sufficiently short to be read at a sitting or two by even the most busy, while the matter and style will be such as to woo to a repeated perusal." We have received the first two numbers of the proposed series: the first entitled, "The Great Discovery; or, the Fatherhood of God," by the Rev. George Gilfillan; and the second, "The Bible; its Oneness of Mind, and Oneness of Design," by the Rev. David Laing. These little volumes very well sustain the promises of the publishers. Their mechanical execution is truly excellent.

(20.) EVER since the whole world agreed to sympathize with the joys and sorrows of the good Vicar of Wakefield and his strangely assorted family, a peculiar interest has been felt in all stories relative to the internal affairs of clergymen's households. Hence comes the popularity of such volumes of gossip and twaddle as make up the Sunny-side—Shady-side literature of the day. The latest of this prolific race, that we have seen, is a small volume entitled, "*The Pastor's Family*," (Carter & Brothers,) tracing the history of the family of a New-England pastor. The author's purpose, further than a foregone determination to "write a book," is not apparent.

(21.) GOULD & LINCOLN, of Boston, have lately enriched their valuable catalogue of religious publications by the addition of THOLUCK'S "*Guido and Julius; or, Sin and the Propitiator, exhibiting the True Consecration of the Sceptic, with an Introductory Preface*, by Dr. JOHN PYE SMYTH." This little volume—one of the earliest productions of its gifted author—discusses some of the elementary doctrines of Christianity, and was the result of the peculiar state of things then existing in the Protestant German Churches and universities. It was translated into English nearly twenty years since,—first, we believe, in part, by Dr. Nast, then an instructor in Kenyon College, for the Biblical Repository,—and issued complete in Great Britain as early as 1836, but has never been published in this country in the present form till now. Its appearance at this time is opportune; for we heartily endorse the annexed extract from the preface to this edition:—

"It may occasion surprise to some that the work is republished in this country at so late a day; but we apprehend its present appearance is more timely, and will attract a larger number of readers than if it had been published many years ago. The commerce of thought has brought Germany into intimate relations with the United States. The theology and literature imported from that land of scholars have been naturalized on our shores; and the subtler and more fascinating forms of scepticism, for which Dr. Tholuck prepared this work as an antidote, have gained many disciples and some advocates among us. The practical tendencies of the American mind, and the active piety incident to our social life, and the philanthropic movements of the age, almost preclude the fear of a general unbelief, like the blighting mildew that crept over the German universities and Churches in the early part of the present century. But no student of American literature can overlook the fact that some of the best minds among us, gifted with the noblest impulses, and enriched by the most elegant scholarship, betray the withering influences of the Pantheistic creed."

The epidemic that so fearfully afflicted the German Church, during the earlier part of the present century, and out of which it has come forth with renewed strength and increased purity, is unquestionably now stealing its way among ourselves. The best class of minds, and the most elevated productions of our theological and philosophical literature, discover its symptoms. But we have no fears for the results. A few shallow minds may be borne off by it; but the same agencies that were sufficient to withstand it when in the strength of youth and full of the prestige of expectation, will be more than adequate to repeat their victory among us. The whole Church owes an incalculable debt of gratitude to the evangelical divines of Germany—those champions of Scriptural truth, who for the past half-century have so ably and

successfully vindicated the claims of the gospel against the attacks of its powerful and subtle foes. In no other way can students of theology, as well as those who are especially set for the defence of the truth, more certainly fortify themselves against the insidious attacks of modern infidelity, than by acquainting themselves with the works of the better class of German evangelical writings, among which the works of Tholuck hold a prominent place.

(22.) MISS LESLIE, (we would rather write *Mrs.*,) by her contributions to culinary literature, seems to have won for herself the prerogatives of the oracle of the kitchen. Her "Directions for Cooking" and "House-Book" have both received substantial marks of public favour in a wide and continuous circulation. Her "*New Receipts for Cooking*" (T. B. Peterson, Philadelphia, 12mo.; pp. 520) is a more pretending work than either of its predecessors. Though we may not presume to speak of the value of the "Receipts," we can confidently commend the style and composition of the work.

(23.) THE history of early Methodism is full of genuine romance. But the men of that age were actors rather than writers of history; and so the memory of many of those stirring incidents is doomed to perish with the generation that enacted them. Some attempts have of late years been made to rescue and record those that belong to the eastern portion of the country; but the still more exciting scenes of the West—the field in which Methodism has achieved its largest conquests—have hitherto remained unwritten. We are, however, now able to announce a work which will contribute largely to perpetuate the memory of those events: "*Sketches of Western Methodism—Biographical, Historical, and Miscellaneous*, by REV. JAMES B. FINLEY." The writer is a well-known pioneer of Methodism in the West, who has been for nearly half a century occupied in the itinerant ministry, and was to a large extent an eye-witness, and often an active agent in the events he details. These Sketches are written with much vivacity, and in a style that would not disparage a practised writer. The work forms a valuable contribution to the early social and religious history of Ohio and Kentucky, and cannot fail to be favourably received by the public.

(24.) "*Leila Ada: or, the Jewish Convert.*" (New-York: John Wiley, 167 Broadway; 12mo., pp. 355.) This book professes to be "an authentic narrative" of the conversion to Christianity of an intelligent and highly accomplished young woman, born of Jewish parentage, and educated among the influences of Judaism. The story is related in a very lively manner, and in many cases the plain course of narration is superseded by animated dramatic scenes and personal conversations. The volume is a decidedly interesting one, and will doubtless find a multitude of readers; for, while by its assured authenticity it escapes the odium that in some minds attaches to all mere fictions, it possesses most of the attractions of that form of compositions.

(25.) "*Boyhood of Great Men,*" (16mo., pp. 385,) and "*Foot-prints of Famous Men,*" (16mo., pp. 369; Harper & Brothers,) are two volumes, adapted especially for boys' reading. Sketches of the early days of forty "Great Men," chiefly English, with a few of American, and of Continental-European origin, make up the former volume; which consists of anecdotes, often but imperfectly authenticated, of the youthful career of persons whose subsequent renown gives interest to whatever belongs to their history. Such stories are often interesting, but only a secondary practical value attaches to them. The latter volume contains condensed biographies of nineteen "Famous Men," all except two—Washington and Necker—British subjects. The selections are generally judiciously made, and the examples presented well calculated to awaken noble aspirations, and to stimulate to persistent endurance in duties and efforts. They are both safe and valuable books for youth.

(26.) No one has, of late years, done more to popularize the two principal fine arts, Architecture and Painting, than MR. JOHN RUSKIN, the author of "*The Seven Lamps of Architecture,*" and "*The Stones of Venice.*" He writes with the earnestness and fervour of a man who appreciates his subject, and fully confides in the safety of his positions, and thus imparts great vivacity to a style, itself not deficient in the properties of good writing. His "*Lectures on Architecture and Painting, delivered at Edinburgh, in November,* 1853," (New-York: John Wiley,) will rather increase than diminish his reputation as a writer and art critic. His zeal for his own tastes and preferences often betrays him into strange reasonings, and the warmth of his partisanship renders him unsafe as a guide, to be followed implicitly. Yet there is something genial in his spirit, and though one may dissent from his determinations, he will be interested and instructed by his discussions.

(27.) "*A Harmony of the Gospels, in the Greek of the received Text, on the Plan of the Author's English Harmony,* by JAMES STRONG, A. M." (New-York: John C. Riker.) The favour with which Professor Strong's "English Harmony" has been greeted by the public, might very properly encourage him to prosecute his undertaking, by rendering the same service for the original text of the Gospels that he had done for the English version; and accordingly we now have a harmonized Greek Testament,—as to the four Evangelists,—agreeable to the plan of the well-approved English Harmony of the author. This work is of course intended for a more advanced class of learners than the former, and of course a more critical and thorough discussion of many points is allowed. The text used in this case can scarcely be described as a copy of any one of the celebrated editions of former distinguished editors, but rather as a thoroughly-revised selection and combination of whatever of peculiar value is found in each of them. At the foot of each page are given all the various readings sanctioned by the best German critics, thus showing at a glance the authentic text, and also the most probable supposed

variations from it. This method cannot fail to be highly satisfactory to every independent and ingenuous student and critic; while the believer who has based all his hopes upon the integrity of the sacred volume, is assured that his confidence has not been misplaced. With the facilities here afforded for the critical study of the Gospels, it is to be hoped that increased attention will be given to the subject, and especially that in all our seminaries and colleges the Greek Testament will be made a standard text-book; and whenever this shall be the case, we believe this "Harmony" will be the favourite form in which the sacred text will be pursued. For private students and clergymen, this manual will prove a valuable aid, whether for critical examination or for daily reading.

The matter, thus carefully guarded against the suspicion of fault, is presented in this volume with all the advantages of an engaging exterior: clear and new type, fine paper, and good substantial binding.

(28.) "*Palmoni*" (Hebrew for "a certain one," in Dan. viii, 13, rendered in the margin, "wonderful numberer,") is the quaint title of an anonymous, but exceedingly elaborate "*Essay on the Chronological and Numerical Systems in use among the Ancient Jews;*" published by Longman, Brown & Co. (London: 1851; 8vo., pp. 681.) It undertakes to show, that all the ancient schemes of Biblical chronology, including that of the Hebrew text, have been either corrupted, or originally devised so as to conform to certain mystical numbers, or astronomical periods; especially multiples of seven, or of the days in a lunar month. To us, the essential idea of the book is not so new, nor the reasoning by any means so conclusive, as the author appears to be confident it will be with his readers. The investigation and suggestions, however, may be of some use in explaining the interpolations and changes found in the Samaritan and Greek lists of the patriarchal ages. The numerous coincidences pointed out as evidences of a preconceived design, in later chronology, although developed with much ingenuity and considerable research, are mostly far-fetched, some of them really puerile, and all of them too much at variance with what we know of the a history and method of the sacred books, to warrant the admission of so extensive an artifice practised upon the canon of Scripture. We notice, especially, new theory of Daniel's "seventy weeks," which are computed at three hundred and seventy one actual years, being seven times the period to which the round number of the "seventy years' captivity" had previously been reduced: thus basing one hypothesis upon another. The whole theory of emendation proposed is too speculative to avail against positive documents, even when applied —as is very largely done in the volume before us—to the statements of Josephus; but it may be of service, if cautiously employed, in cases of special inconsistency, irreconcilable in any other way. Since the days of the Millerite controversy, these knottiest of all subjects have been discussed with a fresh earnestness, and we are likely, ere long, either to arrive at certainty respecting the main points, or learn that a moderate degree of probability is all that can be hoped for concerning such far-gone "times and seasons."

(29.) "*Sunny Memories of Foreign Lands*," (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Company; 2 vols., 12mo., pp. 326, 432,) is the characteristic title given to the latest production of the prolific pen of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, "author of Uncle Tom's Cabin, etc.," in which are detailed the adventures and experiences of the fair authoress, during her recent visit to Europe. If Mrs. Stowe betrays indications of self-complacency, the weakness is at least venial, for few have been equally tempted in the same direction. It is certainly no small feat in authorship to set the whole world agog,—and to give being at a single stroke to a new class of literary productions; and this she has done, probably as much to her own surprise, as to that of others. But it is rather hazardous for one who has thus made a capital hit, to risk a second throw. So we thought when we heard of the proposed publication of the "Key;" nor did we think otherwise after it was published. So, too, we thought when the fair *débutante* accepted an invitation to visit the admirers of her works in Great Britain; and so we still think after her return. Nobody that knows anything of Mrs. Stowe's character will suspect her of being invulnerable to the influences of flattery: nor is it at all strange that, since her visit abroad was one protracted ovation, her recollections of "foreign lands" are all "sunny memories." Her apology for giving everything *couleur de rose*, that "there are many worse sins than a disposition to think and speak well of one's neighbour," would have sounded better from some other than the author of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," or its "Key." Still we find no fault with her for being gratified with the attentions of the titled and dignified of Great Britain.

But this narrative has a much deeper and more serious import than arises from its relations to merely the personal affairs of its author. The reception given to Mrs. Stowe, was not intended so much to do honour to her personally, as to express detestation of American slavery. In this we could heartily unite, were we assured that this professed hatred of slavery is sincere; but certain awkward facts, make us a little suspicious that it is not slavery *per se* that is so intensely hateful to our transatlantic kindred, but rather slavery having the prefix "American" attached to it. No doubt these volumes will be widely circulated and eagerly read; we trust they will do much good. In a partisan warfare we ought not to require perfection in those who defend the right; and while imperfection is characteristic of human nature, a contest in the best cause must be expected to elicit both follies and faults. These we must consent to endure for the sake of the compensating good; and therefore we welcome these "Sunny Memories" without endorsing much that they contain.

(30.) We find upon our table three volumes relating severally to three highly important interests of the present times; to each of which we would gladly give an elaborate review, but are compelled by want of room to despatch them with only a brief notice. The first of these is "*Sandwich Island Notes*, by a Hāolé." (Harper & Brothers.) The relations of these islands to our own country are becoming such as to impart a lively interest to whatever relates to them. This volume does not pretend to give a complete survey and history of the group, but is rather designed to sketch the observations of a *voyager*,

(hăolé,) with passing notices of the history and institutions of the islands. Though we dissent from much that the book contains, yet we can commend it as a decidedly clever production, and well worthy of a careful reading.

The second is entitled "*Armenia: a Year at Erzeroom and on the Frontier of Russia, Turkey, and Persia,* by the HON. ROBERT CURZON." (Harper & Brothers.) The author of this volume was for several years (from 1842) English commissioner, acting jointly with a Russian commissioner and Turkish and Persian ministers, for settling the boundaries of Turkey, Persia, and Russia, in the wild regions of Armenia, over which range hordes of predatory Koords; the design of the conference being to reduce these banditti to order, by defining the boundaries of the several powers, and thus fixing the allegiance of each tribe. Both the political and religious affairs of this hitherto almost unknown region render any authentic account of it interesting to us. The book is partly a record of travels and personal adventures, and partly a history and description of the country.

The last is a "*History of Cuba: or, Notes of a Traveller in the Tropics, etc.,* by MATURIN M. BALLOU." (Phillips, Sampson & Company.) Like the two former works, this is of a mixed character, combining the features of a record of travels with "a political, historical, and statistical account of the island, from its first discovery to the present time." The writer makes it very apparent that he regards Cuba as a rich prize, for which the great maritime powers are intriguing, and that it is his earnest desire that our country may be the winner in the game. The book might with much propriety have been called "The Fillibuster's own Book;" yet it is decidedly well written, and full of lively interest, and much valuable information.

(31.) "*Florence Egerton: or, Sunshine and Shadow.*" (New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 392.) This is a well-written story of domestic joys and sorrows; its moral tendency is decidedly healthful, and from its style and method it is well adapted to give entertainment and instruction to young persons,—a book of a class for which the press of the Messrs. Carters is justly celebrated.

(32.) WE continue to receive from Bangs, Brother & Company, (New-York,) the current volumes of the various Library publications of Henry G. Bohn, Covent Garden, London. Of the *Philological Library*, the latest work received is "*Devey's Logic: or, the Science of Inference,*" a thorough and elaborate treatise on the science and practice of dialectics. In the *Classical Library*, we have, in one volume, the "*Elegies of Propertius;* the *Satyricon of Petronius Arbiter;* the *Kisses of Johannes Secundus;* and the *Love Epistles of Aristænetus,*"—the first three literally translated into English prose, and also rendered into English verse; the latter in verse only,—the translation of Brinsley Sheridan: we doubt whether the intrinsic value of the series is increased by the addition of this volume. "*India: Pictorial, Descriptive, and Historical;*" a condensed account of the affairs of British India, with nearly a hundred engravings, makes an additional volume of the *Illustrated Library.*

Of the newly-commenced *Ecclesiastical Library*, the Church histories of *Theodoret* and *Evagrius*, together, form the second of the series,—the former, extending from A. D. 322 to 427, and the latter from 431 to 594; and the two, with Eusebius, which constitutes the foregoing number of the series, make up a continuous history of the Church, by contemporaneous writers, during the first six centuries. Bohn's Libraries are generally selected with discretion, and edited with ability. The mechanical execution of these volumes is commendable, and, for once, the descriptive term "cheap" applies only to the price.

(33.) MESSRS. CARLTON & PHILLIPS have recently added to their extensive Catalogue a number of rather attractive little volumes, designed especially for juvenile readers. Among these are, first, "*Stories for School-Boys;* Second Series," (18mo., pp. 228,)—an interesting and instructive collection of narratives; second, "*James Baird: or, the Basket-Maker's Son,*" (18mo., pp. 144,)—a sketch designed to illustrate the importance and happy results of early piety; and third, "*The Friendships of the Bible,*" (12mo., pp. 140,)—a beautiful volume, elegantly printed and bound, and embellished with several fine wood cuts, containing attractive sketches of some of the most striking instances of friendship given in the sacred pages,—altogether, this is a truly valuable, excellent little volume, and cannot fail to be acceptable to adults as well as to children.

(34.) WE received, at too late a period for any extended notice of each, a package of the late publications of James Munroe & Company, of Boston. The catalogue of this firm is becoming one of the most valuable in the country; and though less pretending than many others, probably the finances of the house show, that books for "the million" are quite as profitable as those designed more exclusively for the learned or *élite*. Among those sent us, we find a new edition of "*Whateley's Elements of Rhetoric,*" from the author's "new and revised edition." The work is too generally and too favourably known to require our commendation. It is neatly printed and well-bound. Also a new edition of "*Historic Doubts in relation to Napolean Bonaparte,*" by the same author. The best of evidence that the work is a steady favourite with the public, is given in the announcement that this is "the fourth American, from the eleventh London edition." Next, we have "*The Bow in the Clouds: Discourses,* by GEORGE WARE BRIGGS, Minister of the First Church in Salem, Mass.," (12mo., pp. 280;) "a new edition, enlarged." A second edition of the sermons of a living minister ought to indicate unusual merit. "*Friends in Council:* a series of Readings and Discourse thereon," (2 vols., 12mo.,) is a reprint of an English work, which has been well received by our transatlantic kindred; and no doubt its success with us will be equally flattering. Two volumes of poems are also among them,—one a goodly volume, (12mo., pp. 246,) entitled "*The Recalled; in Voices of the Past, and Poems of the Ideal,* by JANE ERMINA LOCKE." The other is a single poem of five cantos, in Spenserian verse, called "*The Bride of the Iconoclast,*" and is anonymous. We have dipped into it a little, and are suspicious that it contains more sub-

stance than most of the ephemeral poetry that is perpetually issuing from the press. We may speak of this work more fully at another time. Teachers of the ancient classics will be interested with "*The Voice of Letters:* Ancient Proprieties of Latin and Greek; the Standard of English Letter Custom; their inherent system, and preferred orthography; by JOSEPH B. MANNING, A. M.," (12mo., pp. 135;) and the ladies in "*A Complete Guide to Ornamental Leather Work,*" (12mo., pp. 74.)

For juvenile readers, there are "*Lucy Herbert: or, the Little Girl who would have an Education,*" (16mo., pp. 114;) and "*The Bud, the Flower, and the Fruit: or, the Effects of Education,*" (18mo., pp. 144:) two very neat volumes, and well adapted, both in style and matter, to improve as well as please their young readers.

(35.) "*Fruits and Farinacea the Proper Food of Man; being an Attempt to prove from History, Anatomy, Physiology and Chemistry, that the Original and Best Diet of Man* is derived from the Vegetable Kingdom, by JOHN SMITH; with *Notes and Illustrations*, by R. T. THRALL, M. D." (New-York: Fowlers & Wells; 308 Broadway 12mo., pp. 312.) We give the full title of this work, which is a well written and handsomely printed and bound volume, in which the author endeavours to make out that animal food is unsuitable for man, and unfriendly to both his bodily or mental growth and greatness. We are not convinced that he is correct in his conclusions.

(36.) "*My Schools and Schoolmasters*" (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 1854; 12mo., pp. 537) is an autobiography of HUGH MILLER, so well and favourably known as a writer on geological topics, and as editor of the "Edinburgh Witness." The book is, in fact, a treatise "on the best mode of teaching one's self;" with illustrations from the life of the author, forming, indeed, a better manual on the subject than any formal essay on self-culture could be. It is addressed more especially to working-men, but its interest is by no means confined to that or any other single class of men; it gives lessons of wisdom, and offers examples of industrious use of opportunities, which must benefit all who read the book, whether "gentle or simple." It furnishes also many glimpses of the inner life of the Scottish people of the middle and lower classes—"districts of society" not very carefully explored before; and in this respect it possesses, as the author well expresses it, some of the interest which attaches to the narratives of travellers who see what is not often seen, and know, in consequence, what is not generally known. These are a few of the excellences of this most entertaining book. Like most productions of self-made men—so called—it is marked by a strong vein of vanity; but this may well be pardoned in Hugh Miller, as in all men who make *such* way in the world, in spite of difficulties that to the generality of mankind would be insurmountable.

(37.) "*Uncle Sam's Farm Fence*, by A. D. MILNE," (New-York: C. Shepard & Co.; 1854; 12mo., pp. 282,) is a strong argument for the Maine Law, in narrative form. It should be scattered broad-cast over the whole land.

(38.) We have received from Daniel Burgess & Co., New-York, copies of the following excellent school-books, namely: Guernsey's "*Primary History of the United States*," (pp. 206;) Tower's "*Elements of Grammar*," (18mo., pp. 124;) Tower's "*Gradual Lessons in Grammar*," (12mo., pp. 288;) Tower's "*Intellectual Algebra*," (12mo., pp. 208;) and Mayhew's "*Practical System of Bookkeeping*," (12mo., pp. 144.) They are all well printed and bound.

(39.) The concluding volume of Kitto's "*Daily Bible Illustrations*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1854; 12mo., pp. 448) contains original readings for that part of the year extending from the fortieth to the fifty-second week, on subjects taken from the history of the apostles and the early Church. The entire series, now complete in eight volumes, is, in fact, a popular cyclopædia of the history, biography, geography, and antiquities of the Bible, not presented in a dry and scientific form, but in brief readings suitable for daily use in the family circle. We know of no book more worthy a place on the family bookshelves.

(40. Messrs. Carter & Brothers have reprinted the well-known "*Morning and Evening Exercises*, by William Jay." (Vols. II. and III., April to September.) Commendation of a book which has found its way into so large a proportion of Christian families is needless; it is only necessary to say that the edition before us is the neatest, and is presented in the most convenient form, of any that we have seen.

(41.) Among the many books called out by Strauss's "Leben Jesu," one of the very best is "*Christ and Christianity: a Vindication of the Divine Authority of the Christian Religion, grounded on the Historical Verity of the Life of Christ*, by W. L. Alexander, D. D." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1854; 12mo., pp. 314.) The aim of the book is, by arguing exclusively from *facts*, and by keeping close to the established laws of scientific investigation, to place the claims of Christianity, by a process of strictly inductive reasoning, upon a solid philosophical basis. The argument rests upon two leading positions,—first, the genuineness of the Gospels; and, secondly, the truth of their statements, as consequent upon their genuineness. The first point is made out, not indeed by any *new* arguments—there was no need of such—but by a very apt and skilful arrangement of facts and arguments already well known. The line of reasoning in the main coincides with that in "Norton on the Genuineness of the Gospels;" but a good deal is added to Norton's view. The most novel and interesting part of the book is the fifth chapter, which gives a fair and full statement of Strauss's mythical theory of the origin of the Gospels; and then presents the best refutation of the theory in compendious form that has yet been printed, at least in English.

(42.) "*Lives of the Queens of Scotland, and English Princesses connected with the Regal Succession of Great Britain*, by Agnes Strickland;" vols. III. and IV. (Harper & Brothers.) The subject of these volumes is Mary Stuart,

of whom the favourable side is adopted by the fair biographer; but it requires a vast amount of whitewashing to hide the deformities of the character of "Mary Queen of Scots." Mrs. Strickland is among the ablest writers of historical biographies of the present age; and we predict that this work will become a standard on that side of the question it discusses.

(43.) THE death of JOHN WILSON will give rise to new editions of his various popular books. Messrs. Carter and Brothers have just issued a very neat one of his "*Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life*," (12mo., pp. 354,) one of the purest works of Kit North, both in style and moral tone.

(44.) THE STANDARD HYMN-BOOK of the Methodist Episcopal Church is one of the best, if not indeed preëminently the best, collection of "Hymns for Public Worship" ever made. Probably no other sect of Christians rely so much on their hymn-books as do the Methodists, and therefore it is especially important that they should be well provided for in that particular. We knew that we said a great deal when, at its first publication five years since, we gave this volume, independent of its peculiarities of doctrines, our decided preference to all others in use; but our position has been abundantly sustained by the suffrages of nearly every one whose acquaintance with the book has enabled him to judge of it understandingly. We are glad to learn that the demand for the book corresponds to its value: more than half a million of copies have been issued, and five stereotyped editions of various sizes are kept constantly on sale, in every variety of binding. Recently the publishers have brought out a large number in superb Turkey morocco and velvet covers, designed especially for gift-books. The specimens before us are most exquisite pieces of workmanship in the book-binder's art. No more appropriate *souvenir* could be given and received by mutual Christian friends.

(45.) MESSRS. CARLTON & PHILLIPS, Agents of the Methodist Book Concern, (200 Mulberry-street, New-York,) are rapidly increasing their already large and well-selected Catalogue, by the addition of many valuable and popular works. The most considerable one of these is "*The Gentile Nations: or, History and Religion of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans*, by GEORGE SMITH, F. S. A." (8vo., pp. 663.) This volume will be hailed with much satisfaction by such as have read "The Patriarchal Age," and "The Hebrew People," by the same author. The three volumes, though each one is complete in itself, form a comprehensive historical survey of the human race before the advent of Christ,—in which history is made to serve its legitimate end, by presenting the moral, social, and intellectual conditions and aspects of its subjects, as well as their political affairs and military transactions. For thoroughness of research, and a scrupulous regard to truth, Mr. Smith stands preëminent among writers of his class.

Next we have "*The Friendships of the Bible*," (12mo., pp. 140,)—a beautiful

volume, elegantly printed and bound, and embellished with several fine wood cuts, containing attractive sketches of some of the most striking instances of friendship given in the sacred pages.

Also "*Gold and the Gospel*," (16mo.,) one of their beautiful Tract Series; and "*Christ and Christianity*," (12mo.) The foregoing all belong to their *General* Catalogue of publications.

As publishers for the Sunday-School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church, they are likewise bringing out a large number of excellent works, designed chiefly for juvenile readers, under the able editorial supervision of Rev. Dr. Kidder. Among these are, in the Adult department, "*Heroines of History*," (12mo.,) a beautiful and finely-embellished volume, suitable also for a gift-book. This will shortly be followed by "*The Seven Wonders of the World*," in the same style.

To the Sunday-School and Youth's Library, (now numbering nearly six hundred volumes, exclusive of the Children's Library of nearly five hundred volumes,) large and valuable additions have been made, and still more are rapidly advancing to completion. Among the recent issues are, "*Stories for School-boys*, second series;" "*Cheerful Chapters;*" "*Mary Sefton;*" "*Kenneth Forbes;*" "*James Baird;*" *Stories of the Norsemen;*" and "*Kitten in the Well.*" All of these are, both in matter and form, just what books for such purposes ought to be. Of the volumes in preparation, and nearly ready for publication, a series, entitled "*Short Stories from History*," forms an important portion. This series was written for, and originally published by, the English "Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge," and consists of ten volumes, one of which, "Stories of the Norsemen," is already published. The complete set will be made up of "*Stories of Ancient Rome*," two volumes; "*of England*," two volumes; "*of the Norsemen*," "*of Spain*," "*of Sweden*," "*of France*," "*of Italy*," and "*of Mexico*," each one volume. These brief sketches are written in a lively and pleasing style, and are designed to unite entertainment with instruction, and especially to incite young persons to more systematic and extensive historical reading. The typography and paper of these little volumes are most unexceptionable, and the engravings excellent.

Besides this series, they will soon issue, in separate volumes, "*Paris;*" "*Rambles at the South;*" "*Sketches of Missionary Life in Oregon;*" "*The Prodigal;*" "*Three Days on the Ohio;*" "*The Two Fortunes;*" "*Child's Sabbath-day Book;*" "*Illustrated Catechism;*" and "*Pictorial Gatherings.*" All of these (except two or three in 16mo.) are to be of the large octo-decimo size of the more recent portion of the library for which they are specially designed; they will be put up in both the uniform library dress, and also in a variety of plain and fancy bindings for general sale. We congratulate the friends of our Sunday schools in view of so large and valuable an increase of this department of the facilities for teaching.

But the most important addition to this department is "*A New Sunday-School Hymn-Book.*" The want of a good hymn-book for the use of Sunday schools has been for a long time felt and confessed among us, but hitherto all attempts to supply one have proved unsatisfactory. It is believed that the present effort will prove more successful. The editor informs his readers that "it

has been compiled from a very large collection of the very best Sunday-school hymn-books, published both in this country and Great Britain; besides containing some original hymns." Of the entire volume we are told that it contains—

1. All the Sunday-school hymns now to be found in the standard Church Hymn-Book and Supplement.

2. A selection of about one hundred and twenty of the very best standard devotional hymns, also reprinted from the regular Church Hymn-Book.

3. About three hundred and fifty hymns from other sources, making an aggregate of about five hundred and fifty hymns.

Having examined a large portion of the early sheets of the promised volume, we feel authorized to assure our readers, that they may expect in this a work vastly superior to anything of the kind heretofore used among us.

(46.) Of the following we can only announce the titles:—

"*Gratitude:* an Exposition of the One Hundred and Third Psalm, by REV. JOHN STEVENSON." (New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers.)

"*A Practical and Commercial Arithmetic;* containing Definitions of Terms, and Rules of Operations, with numerous Examples,—the whole forming a Complete Treatise, for the use of Schools and Academies, by GERARDUS BEEKMAN DOCHARTY, LL. D., Professor of Mathematics in the New-York Free Academy." (Harper & Brothers.)

"*A Child's History of England,* by CHARLES DICKENS," volume II. (Harper & Brothers.) The best work of its kind.

"*History of Pyrrhus,* by JACOB ABBOTT," with engravings. (Harper & Brothers.) This is one of Abbott's series of Illustrated Histories, so well known and highly appreciated by the public.

"*The Better Land: or, The Believer's Journey and Future Home,* by AUGUSTUS C. THOMPSON, Pastor of the Elliot Church, Roxbury, Mass." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln; 12mo., pp. 244.)

"*Fritz Harald: or, The Temptation,* altered and enlarged from the German, by SARAH A. MYERS." (New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 228.)

"*Poems and Ballads,* by GERALD MASSEY," (New-York: J. C. Derby,)—a work of which we gave an extract and notice of the English edition in the July number.

A Discussion of the Doctrine of the Trinity. By Luther Lee and Samuel J. May.

The Barren Fig-tree: a Sermon for the New Year. By Rev. Z. Paddock, D. D.

Symbolic Prophecy: Remarks on "An Exposition of the Apocalypse, by D. N. Lord."

A New Theory of the Apocalypse, as corroborated by Daniel's numbers. By S. S. Ralston.

A Sermon preached to the Members and Families of the Nestorian Mission in Persia, July 3, 1853. By Rev. J. Perkins, D. D.

An Examination of the Mosaic Laws of Servitude. By William Jay.

INDEX.

Abbeokuta..... Page 151
Abernethy, Life of..... 481
Addison's Works..... 155
Address of the General Conference of the M. E. Church to the British Conference..... 443
Advanced Latin exercises..... 476
Anecdotes of painters..... 157
Asbury, Bishop..... 407
—— and his coadjutors..... 158
——, appointment of, as missionary to America in 1771..... 412
——, appointment of, to the general superintendency in America..... 416
——, arrival of, in Philadelphia and New-York, and his abundant labours..... 413
——, birth, parentage, and early training of..... 409
——, conversion of..... 410
——, his celibacy—reasons for it..... 426
——, his character as a preacher..... 428
——, his gift of government..... 429
——, his greatness of character..... 430
——, his intellect..... 428
——, his laboriousness..... 429
——, his piety..... 427
—— is apprenticed to a chape filer..... 411
—— licensed as a local preacher, and joins conference in 1767..... 411
——, peaceful death of, March 31, 1818 427
—— visits Boston, and attempts to establish Methodism there..... 414

Ballad of Babe Christabel, &c..... 472
Banvard's American Statesman..... 160
Baptismal Regeneration, Faber on..... 599
——, baptism and regeneration identical, questionable..... 599
——, baptism and regeneration inseparable, a fundamental article in the creed of Rome..... 600
——, not a matter of surprise why so many join the Church of Rome who hold this doctrine..... 606
——, opinions of some of the clergymen of the Church of England on 601–603
——, texts of Scripture adduced against 612–614
——, the Articles, Liturgy, and Homilies of the Church of England against..... 614
——, the author's argument against 607–611
——, the immediate cause of the publication of..... 600
Baptismal Regeneration, views of some of the clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church on Page 603–606
Barnes on Daniel..... 157
Beecher's Conflict of Ages..... 150
Berridge's Christian World Unmasked. 320
Bibliotheca Sacra..... 165
Binney's Make the Best of Both Worlds 463
Black Arts, modern credulity attributable to the natural reaction of the human mind from a state of almost universal scepticism..... 198
——, modern tendency to, illustrated by Mormonism..... 195
——, revival of the..... 191
——, some little good likely to grow out of "modern spiritualism"... 203
——, the claims of modern spiritualism occupy the same foundation for belief as ancient astrology and Sibyllism..... 205
——, the present age remarkable for being prolific of delusions..... 193
——, the rebound of the human mind from extreme scepticism to extreme credulity rather the ground for hope than fear..... 209
Bledsoe's Theodicy..... 150
Bohn's Classical Library..... 480
—— Libraries..... 470
Bonar's Eternal Day..... 466
Book of Nature..... 151
Boyhood of Great Men..... 625
Brewer's Guide to Composition..... 160
Brodhead's History of New-York..... 578
Brown's Discourses of Christ..... 464

Camp-meetings, origin of..... 425
Carter's Fireside Series..... 466
Chalmers's correspondence..... 480
Cheever's Bible in Common Schools.... 482
Child's History of England..... 475
Christ and Christianity..... 631
Christian Father's Present..... 152
Classical and miscellaneous intelligence..... 167
Clemens's Speculative Theologie, etc.... 319
Clinton..... 481
Closet Companion..... 621
Cobb's Philosophy of Faith..... 321
Cokesbury College, establishment of... 420
Coleman's Historical Text-book..... 471
Coleridge, (S. T.,) freedom of the human will proved from the nature of its constitution..... 44–47
——, nature of the human will..... 44

Coleridge (S. T.) on the conversion and regeneration of the will .... Page 50
—— on the doctrine of original sin 48
—— on the nature of sin 47
——, philosophy and theology, the themes on which he has most successfully written 35
——, tendency of, to the German style of metaphysical speculations..... 35
——, theory of, on the distinction of the understanding and the reason..... 40–43
——, works of 34
——, writings of, chiefly valuable for their suggestive qualities 36, 37
Conflict of Ages 169
——, consideration of the "argument" in 185
——, futile objections to Arminianism in 183
——, general design of 173
——, theological training and character of the author of 171
——, theory of preëxistence as set forth in..... 180
——, theory of preëxistence not original with the author of..... 182
——, the real, lies between two erroneous systems, namely, Calvinism and Unitarianism..... 176–180
——, the work evidently the result of the errors of Calvinism..... 188
Constitutional Text-book 467
Converted Infidel, Life and Experience of a 315
Croswell, (Dr.,) Life of 482
Czar, the, and the Sultan..... 160

Daniel a Model for Young Men 618
——, genuineness of..... 553
——, Greek words in 555
——, historical errors in 558
——, its admission into the canon..... 564
——, its position in the canon 553
——, language of the book 567
——, objections met 561
——, other arguments in proof of..... 574
——, testimony of Josephus... 566
——, the author's exact historical knowledge 570
——, the silence of Jesus Sirach..... 557
——, the statement of the author 565
Davidson's Connexion 482
De Vere's Outlines of Comparative Philology 154
Dietetics of the soul 475
Dixon's Howard 465

Elliott's Lectures to Young Men 321
English Grammar and the English Language 368
European literature, letter on recent... 322

Faber on Baptismal Regeneration..... 599
Family prayers 479
Farm Implements..... 616
Field's City Architecture 158
Florence Egerton..... 628
French literature, letters on recent..... 454

Fruits and Farinacea the Proper Food of Man..... Page 630

General Conference in 1808 first delegated..... 425
Gentile Nations, History and Religion of the 161
German Evangelical Kirchentag, the sixth 163
God with Men, by Osgood..... 321
Gold and the Gospel 617
Grant, (Dr.,) and the Mountain Nestorians 468
Grayson's Church and Ministry..... 467
—— True Theory of Christianity..... 149
Great Truths for Thoughtful Hours 622
Grinnell Expedition in search of Sir John Franklin..... 314
Ground and method of human knowledge 287
Guido and Julius..... 623
Guizot's Cromwell 468
Gurowski's Russia 469

Hale's (Mrs.) Liberia..... 320
Hamilton, (Sir William,) Discussion and Philosophy of 148
Hamilton's Memoir of Richard Williams 317
Harmony of the Gospels..... 635
Harry's Ladder to Learning..... 480
Hawks's Peruvian Antiquities 152
Henkle's Life of Bascom..... 475
Hildreth's Despotism in America 477
Hill's Infant Baptism 470
Homes of the New World..... 150
Hook's Church Dictionary..... 155
Hughes's Outlines of Scripture Geography 152
Hunters of the World 159

Infant Church-membership 157
Insurrection in China 152
Ives's Trials of Mind..... 463

Jay's Female Characters 468
—— Morning and Evening Exercises... 631
Jimeson on the Twenty-five Articles ... 160

Kirwan's Men and Things in Europe... 152
Kitto's Daily Bible Illustrations..... 631
Knout and the Russians..... 616
Kossuth's Select Speeches 476

Lamp to the Path 617
Lardner's Hand-books 466
Law and the Testimony 482
Layard's Second Exploration 113
Lelia Ada..... 634
Letters of John Calvin 161
Leu's Warnung von den Neuerungen und Uebertreibungen in der Kathol Kirche Deutchlands 317
Life in Judea..... 617
—— of Augustine..... 469
—— of Dr. Judson..... 155
—— of Louis XVII..... 153
Lives of the Queens of Scotland and English Princesses 631

London Quarterly Review..... Page 162
Lost Prince, by J. H. Hanson 315
Lowe's (Sir Hudson) Journal 481

Mabel Grant 471
Malcom's Bible Dictionary..... 160
Master's House, the 619
Mattison's Checks to Arianism..... 476
Maurice's Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament..... 322
—— Religions of the World and their Relations to Christianity 321
M'Lean's Sketch of Philip Gatch..... 479
Memoir of S. B. Bangs 156
Memorials of Baptist Martyrs..... 619
Methodism, earnestness of, rendering her peculiarly fitted for her mission of evangelization..... 59–67
——, importance of the educational interests of, not to be overlooked.. 75
——, previous attempts to establish, in Boston..... 414
——, spirit and mission of..... 57
——, the itinerancy of its existence a cause of past and present prosperity, and its continuance vital to the interests of the Church 67–74
Methodist Hymn-Book..... 632
Miller's Two Records..... 469
Missionary of Kilmany 159
My Schools and Schoolmasters..... 630

Narrative of a Journey round the Dead Sea and in the Bible Lands 143
Neighbour's Children 479
New English and German publications 165
New Receipts for Cooking..... 624
New-York, Brodhead's History of..... 578
——, a mart of commerce before it became the dwelling-place of white men..... 584
——, formerly inhabited by savages 586
——, free toleration in matters of religion allowed to all..... 594
——, governed by magistrates and other officers for the common safety... 591
——, termination of the Dutch dynasty in 596
——, the account given of the discovery of the city of, not materially different from that commonly given and generally known 581
——, the author's history of, an invaluable contribution to the literature of the country 597
——, the author's peculiar facilities for writing a history of..... 580
——, the author's plan embraces four periods..... 581

Old Brewery..... 315
Olin, (Stephen,) ambition of, and excessive application 12
——, attachment of, to Methodism 18
——, character of, as a teacher 28
——, character of his preaching, and effects upon his audience 21
——, conversion, and Christian character of..... 14–17
Olin, early education of..... Page 11
——, enters college at Middlebury..... 11
—— goes to South Carolina 13
——, his earnestness..... 22, 23
——, his preparations for the pulpit... 25
——, intellectual powers of..... 20, 21
——, labours of, in behalf of Christian education..... 26
——, Life, Works, Letters, and Travels of 9
——, moral qualities of..... 19
——, parentage of..... 10
——, scepticism of..... 13
——, services as president of Randolph Macon College and the Wesleyan University 27
——, the clearness and profundity of his theology 24
——, the secret of his power in the pulpit..... 22, 23
——, the sweeping comprehensiveness of his intellect..... 23
——, views on slavery as connected with the Church..... 29–33
Olmstead's Noah and his Times 479
Orator's Touchstone 621
Oriental and Sacred Scenes 618
Orr's Circle of the Sciences..... 475
Osgood's Hearth-Stone 482

Palmoni 626
Parish-Side 464
Pascal, (Jacqueline) 393
—— becomes acquainted with M. Singlin, the pious director of Port-Royal convent..... 399
——, childhood of..... 394
——, conversion of, and of her family.. 397
——, death of her distinguished brother 405
——, death of her father..... 402
—— dies of grief for having conceded to the errors of the Church against her conscience..... 405
——, early development of talent..... 394
—— enters the convent in 1642..... 402
——, exemplary piety of the officers and inmates of Port-Royal 400
—— is received at the French court.... 395
——, nonconformity to the monstrous opinions of the Church 404
—— obtains the yearly prize (at Rouen) for the best poem 396
——, persecution of, and demolition of the convent 405
—— publishes a volume of poems at thirteen years of age 395
——, striking resemblance between the Pascal and the Wesley Family... 406
—— visits Paris with her brother..... 399
Pastor's Family, the 623
Philosophy of Induction..... 431
——, Cousin's exposition of..... 432
——, Hume's remarks on..... 437
——, Mill's view of the subject 434
——, Whewell's (Dr.) view of, considered 433
Physics, new theory of 102
Pierre Toussaint, Life of..... 481
Plurality of Worlds, the 617

Point of Power, the ..... Page 228
—— is nowhere in the region of error. 230
—— is sought for in vain amid the precincts of sorrow and despondency..... 234
—— not to be found in the precincts of transgression 229
—— not to be looked for amid the fluctuations of a vacillating will 237
—— not to be realized within the dreary realms of doubt 233
——, to arrive at the, every man must walk with, and be in partnership with God 238
——, to stand upon, he must know himself 239
——, vainly sought for in the province of unadaptedness or unfitness... 231
Poole's Index..... 154
Popular Account of the Ancient Egyptians..... 621
Positive Religion: or, Religion of Humanity, Comte's 329
Principles of Church Government, and their Application to Wesleyan Methodism, by Rev. G. Steward. 165
Prohibitory Liquor Law 244
——, arguments in favour of, drawn from jail and poor-house statistics..... 249
——, arguments in favour of, from a consideration of the cost of the traffic 248
——, authorities cited, proving the constitutionality of a..... 261
——, conditions required in the enactment of a 247
——, human authority competent to the enactment of a 264
——, inability of the Church and of society to extirpate the evil without a..... 245
——, peculiarity of the liquor traffic rendering necessary a 244
Protestant Church in Hungary, History of the..... 617
Public Opinion, our Relation to..... 360
Public Prayer 526
——, examples of, from the Scriptures taken as models 531
——, manner of 529
——, object of..... 528
Purple Tints of Paris..... 469

Quarles's Emblems 470

Recreations of Christopher North..... 618
Religious and literary intelligence..... 483
Remarkable examples..... 467
Reply of the British Conference 445
Reviews, foreign and American, contents of..... 328
Revivals, great..... 425
Revolutionary war, breaking out of the, its effects upon the Churches.... 417
Rhetoric of Conversation 158
Romanism, antirepublicanism of 542
——, celebrated works on, from both sides of the controversy..... 535
Romanism, claims of ..... Page 533
——, claims of, to infallibility 539
——, claims of, to political supremacy. 540
——, definition of..... 534
——, delineation of..... 537
——, doctrines of baptismal dominion.. 544
——, opposition of, to free schools..... 549
——, ultramontanism of American Catholic journals..... 547
Roussel, Charles..... 476
Rutherford's Children 156
Ryle's Home Truths 477

Salad for the Solitary..... 153
Schaff's History of the Apostolic Church 477
Science and Revelation 213
——, alarm of many good men at the apparent hostility between 213
——, Christianity only strengthened by the investigations of science 221
——, connexion of geological science with revelation..... 244
——, connexion of mathematical science with revelation..... 217
——, hostility between. 213
——, suspicions against science groundless..... 215
Scotia's Bards..... 151
Scott's (William Henry) Interpretation of the Apocalypse 165
Seton, (Mrs. Eliza A.,) Memoirs of..... 83
——, birth, parentage, and early education of..... 87
——, death of her father 88
—— founds the institution of "Sisters of Charity" at Emmetsburgh, Maryland..... 93
——, her death 97
——, influences of Catholic friends 89
——, literal attempts to work out their salvation by penance and voluntary hardships, resulting in the death of fourteen of the inmates..... 94–96
——, present condition of the society.. 96
——, public apostasy of, to Papacy..... 92
——, remarks on the Romish system of charities..... 98–102
——, returns to New-York..... 90
——, Rose White becomes her successor, society flourishes, miracles wrought 97
——, tendency of, to Catholicism 90
——, unites in marriage with Mr. Seton..... 87
——, voyage with her husband to Leghorn 88
Seven Lamps of Architecture..... 625
Short Reviews and Notices of Books.... 148
314, 463, 616
Sibylline Oracles, the 489
——, belief of, continued far into the middle ages..... 506
——, doubtful origin of much that is attributed to..... 515
——, Friedlieb's book on 510
——, introduction of, into the Roman state 501

Sibylline Oracles, little importance given to, by the ancient Greek historians ..... Page 499
——, long neglect of the..... 493
——, reputation of, at home, for veracity 504
——, tenacity of the ruder ages to the belief in 497
——, the celebrity of, mostly acquired from foreign countries 500
——, Virgil's frequent references to ... 520
Silliman's Visit to Europe 153
Simms's Egeria..... 160
Sketches of Eminent Methodist Ministers 160
Sketches of Western Methodism..... 624
Smith's First Book in Geography 482
—— History of Greece..... 464
Social Science, by Colins 461
Spicer on Christian Baptism..... 154
Stroud's Harmony of the Gospels..... 77
Successful Men 466
Summers on Baptism..... 464
Sunday-school books..... 478
Sunny Memories of Foreign Lands..... 627

Talfourd's Miscellanies 477
Theodicy, by Bledsoe 263
——, a condensed analysis of 265
——, examination of Augustinian and Pelagian platforms 279
——, on the possibility of a 266
——, system of optimism as developed in 280
Theodicy, the nature of virtue and vice as defined in... ..... Page 278
——, the scheme of necessity considered in..... 267
Theological intelligence, European..... 326
Thoughts and Things at Home and Abroad 621
Tischendorf's (Prof.) Second Journey to the East in search of Biblical MSS..... 162
Tuckerman's Month in England..... 479
Turner on Romans..... 159
Tweedie's Glad Tidings 480
Twenty Years in the Philippines..... 622

Uncle Sam's Farm Fence 630
Utah and the Mormons..... 618

Valentine's New-York..... 480
Vara 468
Vinet's Homiletics 322
—— Pastoral Theology 466
Visit to Europe, Silliman's..... 153

Wallace, (Horace Binney)..... 132
——, letter on..... 447
Weiss's History of the French Protestant Refugees 466
Western Methodism, Sketches of 624
West's Analysis of the Bible..... 158
Wilson's Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life 632
Withered Leaf..... 471
Words of Jesus..... 468